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Abstract		Drawing	on	the	work	of	Walter	Benjamin,	Jacques	Derrida	and	Samuel	Weber,	the	thesis	discerns	a	theoretical	description	and	demonstrative	performance	of	theatrical	iterability	as	the	structural	crisis	of	meaning	and	mastery	in	mediated	self-relation.	In	this	context,	the	concept	of	a	politics	of	rehearsal	imposes	itself	as	a	modality	of	acting,	which	demonstratively	affirms,	exposes	and	aggravates	a	constitutive	breach	in	self-presence	qua	mediation.	The	thesis	links	this	modality	of	rehearsal	to	a	concern	with	the	political	effectiveness	of	bearing	certain	effects	of	virtuality,	possibility	and	potentiality.	As	a	repetition	that	maintains	a	simultaneous	reference	to	the	future	and	the	past,	the	rehearsal	is	further	associated	with	an	attitude	of	ex-appropriation	that	follows	the	task	of	inheritance	as	a	perpetual	re-work	of	mourning.		In	actively	resisting	all	limited	tendencies	towards	closure	and	non-sharing	in	the	transmission	of	cultural	history,	the	politics	of	rehearsal	becomes	the	model	attitude	of	an	amateur’s	participatory	desire.	With	brief	recourse	to	Bernard	Stiegler	the	thesis	develops	the	figure	of	an	“amateur”	who	perpetually	seeks	for	renewed	possibilities	of	a	transforming	and	transformative	participation	in	the	socio-individual	de-construction	of	a	precarious	ethos	from	within	an	affirmed	position	of	limited	security.	It	finds	amateurs	at	work	and	play	in	the	context	of	Benjamin’s	writings	on	Bertolt	Brecht,	Franz	Kafka	and	the	German	Baroque	Trauerspiel,	as	well	as	the	performance	practices	of	Yvonne	Rainer,	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door.	In	their	overt	exposure	of	a	body’s	inextricable	relation	to	the	archive,	these	experimental	theatre	and	dance	practitioners	are	found	to	employ	a	method	and	style	of	appropriative	restrained,	which	seeks	to	demonstratively	re-launch	a	cultural	inheritance	by	aggravating	its	future	response-ability.	The	thesis	analyses	their	compositional	strategies	of	interruption,	citation	and	virtualisation	as	an	amateur’s	appeal	to	the	participatory	coming	of	the	negative	infinity	of	justice	as	infinite	perfectibility.		
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Introduction	
	
	
Gesture,	Vorstellung,	Schwelle:		
Rehearsing	the	Future	To	Come				 The	space	of	the	theatre,	of	the	stage,	of	the	theatrical	scene,	is	defined	not	just	by	its	physical	perimeter	but	rather	by	the	far	less	definable,	heterogeneous	others	to	which	it	appeals,	and	which	through	their	responsiveness	retroactively	make	places	into	theatrical	stages.	[…]	It	is	therefore	a	Schwelle,	not	in	the	sense	of	a	transition	or	interval	situated	between	two	fixed	points	or	places,	but	as	a	zone	of	indefinite	expansion	and	inflation	reaching	out	to	others	on	whose	response	it	depends.	This	zone	is	theatrical	in	being	internally	split,	divided	into	spectacle	and	spectators,	stage	and	audience,	inseparable	and	yet	distinct.	Such	an	audience	marks	the	intrusion	of	the	outside	on	the	ostensibly	self-contained	interior	of	the	place,	“swelling”	it,	as	it	were,	inflating	it,	making	it	larger	than	life,	and	yet	also	dislocating	it	in	principle	by	rendering	it	dependent	on	a	perimeter	that	is	essentially	displaceable,	involving	not	just	other	places	but	also	other	times.	For	a	theatre	is	always	also	a	place	of	memory	and	of	anticipation,	where	what	has	been	is	rehearsed	and	repeated	as	what	is	to	come.1			
Schwelle		 In	Limited	Inc	–	Jacques	Derrida’s	elaborate	response	to	John	R.	Searle’s	confrontational	“Reply”	to	his	own	reading	of	the	speech	act	theory	of	J.L.	Austin	in	‘Signature,	Event,	Context’	–	Derrida	expresses	at	more	than	one	point	an	uncertainty	over	the	spatio-temporal	locatability																																																									1	Samuel	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities.	(Cambridge	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press	2008),	235-6.	
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of	a	“confrontation”,	as	he	puts	it	always	in	inverted	commas,	of	which	it	is	difficult	to	ascertain	if	it	will	or	will	have	been	able	to	take	place.	‘What	I	like	about	this	“confrontation”	is	that	I	don’t	know	if	it	is	quite	taking	place,’	he	says,	‘if	it	ever	will	be	able,	or	will	have	been	able,	quite,	to	take	place;	or	if	it	does,	between	whom	or	what’.2	For	Derrida,	what	troubles	the	place	and	the	taking-place	of	the	“confrontation”	is	its	irreducibility	to	two	identifiable	interlocutors	or	adversaries.	Playing	on	the	consequences	of	a	general	impossibility	to	assure	the	link	of	an	utterance	to	its	source	–	the	structurally	necessary	drift	in	the	function	of	every	mark	cut	from	its	guaranteed	arrival	at	a	destined	address	as	well	as	from	its	contextual	affiliation	to	a	source	of	“origin”	–	Derrida	repeatedly	refers	to	the	author(s)	of	the	Reply	as	Sarl,	the	French	abbreviation	for	a	“Society	with	Limited	Responsibility”.	Replacing	the	proper	name	Searle	with	the	acronym	Sarl,	Derrida	seriously	pokes	fun	at	a	certain,	perhaps	over-serious	legal	and	narcissistic	concern	with	the	copyright	of	a	text.	He	does	so	throughout	by	impeccably	explicating	as	well	as	playfully	demonstrating	–	beginning	with	the	title	of	his	essay	–	the	necessary	limits	of	all	such	common	phantasms	of	filiation,	ownership	and	the	possibility	of	a	narcissistic	re-appropriation	of	marks	that	must	be	able	to	stand	the	test	of	time	in	order	to	be	legible	in	the	first	time.3	For	Derrida,	it	is	precisely	the	implications	that	follow	from	the	necessary	temporal	movement	of	the	mark’s	survival	that	links	the	possibility	of	its	repetition	to	alterity.	Iterability,	Derrida’s	term	for	this	general	structure,	is	nothing	but	‘the	irreducible	possibility	of	indefinite	repetition	as																																																									2	Jacques	Derrida,	Limited	Inc.	(Illinois:	Northwestern	University	Press	1990),	37.	3	Elsewhere,	Derrida	describes	the	common	illusion	of	the	possibility	of	narcissistic	reappropriation	as	follows:	‘The	infinite	paradoxes	of	what	is	so	calmly	called	narcissism	are	outlined	here:	suppose	that	X,	something	or	someone	(a	trace,	a	work,	an	institution,	a	child)	bears	your	name,	that	is	to	say	your	title.	The	naïve	rendering	or	common	illusion	[fantasme	
courant]	is	that	you	have	given	your	name	to	X,	thus	all	that	returns	to	X,	in	a	direct	or	indirect	way,	in	a	straight	or	an	oblique	line,	returns	to	you,	as	a	profit	for	your	narcissism’	[Derrida	in	Pleshette	DeArmitt,	The	Right	
to	Narcissism.	A	Case	for	an	Impossible	Self	Love.	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press	2014),	93].		
	 13	
alteration,	as	a	reproduction	that	constitutes	what	it	repeats	différance,	both	altered	and	alterable’.4	The	immediacy	with	which	the	mark	breaks	with	any	given	context	of	production	by	the	force	of	the	sheer	possibility	of	its	graft,	citation	or	counter-signature,	haunts	it	from	the	beginning.	The	signature	–	paradoxically	singular	yet	iterable	mark	–	as	much	as	every	text	signed,	dated	and	sealed	–	echoes	and	calls	forth	the	other	time	in(stead	of)	the	first,	‘the	time	and	place	of	the	other	time	already	at	work,	altering	from	the	start	the	start	itself,	the	first	time,	the	at	once’.5	The	limited	authorial	responsibility	of	which	Derrida	therefore	speaks	springs	from	an	inevitable	network	between	the	“same”	marks	in	different	contexts	that	always	lies	in	excess	of	the	limited	control	of	an	author’s	conscious	intentions,	or	indeed	any	other,	more	or	less	institutional	efforts	at	containing	its	structural	over-determination.	Put	differently,	the	play	of	the	text,	which	is	always	also	a	(virtual)	play	of	the	inter-text	–	between	other	times	and	places,	past	and	to	come	–	can	never	be	fully	contained	by	the	copyrighted	seal	of	an	author’s	work	or	any	historical	archival	or	disciplinary	schema.	Instead,	the	network	of	the	inter-text	subjects	it	to	a	multiplication	of	“authorship”	as	so	many	(possible)	intrusions	of	the	outside.	In	the	context	of	Derrida’s	reading	of	the	‘Reply’,	the	latter	stretches	and	swells,	from	taking	into	account	the	two	people	to	whom	Searle	acknowledges	a	certain	debt,	as	Derrida	puts	it,	to	the	infinite	expanse	of	‘the	entire,	more	or	less	anonymous	tradition	of	a	code,	a	heritage,	a	reservoir	of	arguments	[…]’	to	which	both	interlocutors	of	the	“confrontation”	find	themselves	indebted.6	That	the	link	of	an	utterance	to	a	source	of	origin	and	destined	address	can	never	be	fully	secured	is	perhaps	nowhere	better	exposed	than	in	the	theatre,	where	the	production	of	speech	as	the	seeming	production	of	life	itself	is	always	already	souffled,	as	Derrida	puts	it	in	an	essay	on	Artaud,	that	is,	‘spirited	away’,	both	prompted	and	stolen,	notwithstanding	the	most	radical	efforts	to	prevent	or	overcome	this																																																									4	Derrida,	Limited	Inc,	120.	5	ibid,	62.	6	ibid,	36.	
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structural	state	of	affairs.7	The	speech	act	theory	of	J.L.	Austin,	the	initial	topic	of	the	“confrontation”,	which	conceives	of	an	ideal	scenario	of	a	fully	saturated	context	that	would	guarantee	the	success	of	a	performative	speech	act	without	remainder,	thus	sees	itself	repeatedly	forced	to	exclude	an	otherwise	acknowledged	possibility	of	a	theatrical	parasite	able	to	undermine	even	the	most	serious	intentions	by	relegating	it	to	the	status	of	the	non-serious.	Once	however	taken	account	of	as	a	structurally	necessary	possibility	and	risk	for	the	minimal	functioning	of	the	mark,	the	possibility	of	theatrical	doubling	always	already	threatens	to	unhinge	the	securities	of	the	proper	from	within	and	the	uncertain	space	of	theatre	becomes	ubiquitous.	The	risk	of	the	theatrical	parasite	no	longer	merely	surrounds	a	place	of	contextual	containment	‘like	a	kind	of	ditch	or	external	place	of	perdition’,	but	intrudes	upon	it,	like	the	outside	on	the	ostensibly	self-contained,	and	causes	it	to	swell	from	within.8	Theatricality	marks	this	intrusion	of	the	outside	on	the	inside	that	the	split	space	of	the	theatre	embodies,	making	of	every	mark	a	stage	or	rather	Schwelle	[rise,	swelling,	threshold],	as	Samuel	Weber	calls	it	with	recourse	to	the	writings	of	Walter	Benjamin	and	always	in	proximity	to	a	recasting	of	the	traditional	conception	of	a	medium,	‘not	in	the	sense	of	a	transition	or	interval	situated	between	two																																																									7	In	‘La	Parole	Soufflée’	Derrida	gives	the	following	cursory	account	of	a	proposed	understanding	of	the	semantic	field	of	soufflé	in	the	context	of	his	analysis	of	Artaud’s	Theatre	of	Cruelty.	‘Spirited	[soufflé]:	let	us	understand	stolen	by	a	possible	commentator	who	would	acknowledge	speech	in	order	to	place	it	in	an	order,	an	order	of	essential	truth	or	of	a	real	structure,	psychological	or	other.	The	first	commentator,	here,	is	the	reader	or	the	listener,	the	receiver	which	the	“public”	must	no	longer	be	in	the	theater	of	cruelty.	[…]	Spirited	[Soufflé]:	at	the	same	time	let	us	understand	inspired	by	an	other	voice	that	itself	reads	a	text	older	than	the	text	of	my	body	or	than	the	theater	of	my	gestures.	Inspiration	is	the	drama,	with	several	characters,	of	theft,	the	structure	of	the	classical	theater	in	which	the	invisibility	of	the	prompter	[souffleur]	ensures	the	indispensable	différance	and	intermittence	between	a	text	already	written	by	another	hand	and	an	interpreter	already	dispossessed	of	that	which	he	receives.	Artaud	desired	the	conflagration	of	the	stage	upon	which	the	prompter	[souffleur]	spirited	away	[soufflé],	wanted	to	plunder	the	structure	of	theft’.	[Jacques	Derrida	‘La	parole	souffleé’	in	Writing	and	
Difference,	212-245.	(London:	Routledge	2001),	220-1].	8	Derrida,	‘Signature,	Event,	Context’,	Limited	Inc,	17.	
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fixed	points	or	places,	but	as	a	zone	of	indefinite	expansion	and	inflation	reaching	out	to	others	on	whose	response	it	depends’.9				
Spectres	of	Bertolt	Brecht		 Throughout	the	following	reflections	on	the	citability	of	gesture,	the	signature	of	Bertolt	Brecht	constitutes	a	kind	of	privileged	blind-spot,	the	most	overtly	missing	link	in	any	chain	of	filiation	of	an	inherited	debt.	Although	the	concept	of	the	gesture	as	it	is	here	put	to	work	begins	its	life	as	a	more	or	less	direct	graft	from	the	writings	and	theatrical	experiments	of	Brecht	in	the	work	of	Walter	Benjamin	–	before	its	echo	recedes	further	in	Samuel	Weber’s	reading	of	Benjamin’s	reading	of	Brecht	–	a	genealogical	account	of	this	chain	of	filiation	is	never	pursued	directly.	Instead,	the	figure	of	Brecht	functions,	not	as	a	repressed	source	of	origin,	but	as	a	faint	or	silent	call	of	an	always	already	distorted	echo	that	keeps	on	returning	it	otherwise.	Marking	a	displacement	within	the	reference	to	what	has	preceded	it,	the	echo	returns	the	spectres	of	Brecht	in	what	is	always	a	more	or	less	theatrical	scenario,	namely:	staged,	cited,	orated,	appropriated,	interpreted,	embodied	in,	through	and	by	the	writings	of	others	who	are	in	turn	thereby	souffled.	In	this	scenario,	Brecht’s	“own	voice”	–	a	phrase	in	which	one	must	hear	both	the	limited	effects	of	his	intentions	as	well	as	the	singular	ambiguity	of	his	signature	–	will	have	always	already	been	countersigned.	Without	thus	taking	recourse	to	Brecht	“himself”,	that	is,	to	a	more	direct	encounter	with	his	signature,	I	nevertheless	want	to	briefly	speculate	on	the	selective	movement	of	inheritance	that	informs	his	spectral	returning	as	it	is	here	read	and	restaged	predominantly	in	the	encounter	with	Walter	Benjamin.	Before	turning	to	the	latter	context	more	directly	and	by	way	of	its	anticipation,	I	will	take	recourse	to	two	other	contexts	that	in	their	own	style	and	scope	seek	to	contribute	to	and	reflect	upon	the	afterlife	of	Bertolt	Brecht.																																																									9	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	235.	
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The	Lehrstück	at	the	Crossroads	of	Enlightenment	and	Uncertainty:	
Towards	a	Theatre	of	Co-production	and	Response-ability		 First	up,	in	a	recent,	small	publication	on	theatre	and	ethics	that	is	broad	in	scope	and	general	in	tone,	Nicholas	Ridout	offers	a	brief	yet	insightful	gloss	on	what	he	sees	to	be	the	dominant	conflicting	dimensions	of	Brecht’s	work.	For	Ridout,	Brecht	is	standing	at	a	crossroads,	split	between	an	emphatic	commitment	to	Marxism	and	a	theatrical	practice	put	in	the	service	of	a	rational	demystification	of	illusionism	on	the	one	hand,	and	a	laborious	effort	to	practically	experiment	in	open-ended	conditions	with	a	less	linear,	less	teleologic	and	less	universalizing	potential	of	socio-political	transformation	on	the	other.	Whereas	the	former	could	be	said	to	‘place[…]	his	thought	and	work	firmly	on	the	side	of	progress’	and	enlightenment,	as	Ridout	goes	on	to	say,	the	latter	embodies	‘a	deliberate	courting	of	uncertainty’.10	‘Even	in	what	are	frequently	viewed	as	his	most	doctrinaire,	scientific-socialist	hardliner	works,	the	Lehrstücke	(‘Teaching	Plays’),’	Ridout	asserts		 [t]his	uncertainty	turns	out	to	be	at	the	core	of	his	practice.	Brecht’s	is	at	one	and	the	same	time	a	theatre	of	enlightenment	modernity,	ideologically	committed	to	progress	and	to	the	realisation	of	universal	goals,	and	a	theatre	that	radically	challenges	the	very	structure	of	enlightenment	thought,	through	an	interest	in	process	and	openness	[…].11		In	Ridout’s	proposed	reading	of	the	Lehrstücke,	what	at	first	sight	often	looks	like	a	parable	designed	to	teach	the	virtue	of	a	certain	cause	of	action	on	the	level	of	content,	quickly	finds	itself	troubled	by	the	form	of																																																									10	Nicholas	Ridout,	Theatre	&	Ethics.	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan	2009),	45.	11	ibid,	45-6.	
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its	staging.	What	matters,	ethically	and	politically,	for	Brecht	and	his	inheritors,	as	Ridout	proclaims,	‘is	what	is	done	with	theatre	itself	rather	than	what	the	theatre	is	about’.12	The	question	that	imposes	itself	on	theatrical	practice	with	and	in	the	wake	of	Brecht	‘is	how	you	make	it,	and	what	relationships	you	establish	in	the	making	of	it	(between	producers,	consumers,	actors,	spectators,	participants),	[…]	not	what	message	or	ideology	you	are	trying	to	communicate’.13	The	radical	manner	in	which	Brecht	begins	to	experiment	with	the	destabilisation	of	established	relations	of	production	and	consumption	indicates	how	the	
Lehrstücke	‘were	more	complex	and	less	didactic	than	they	seem’.			 As	Reiner	Steinweg	has	argued	[…],	these	plays	were	actually	intended	as	the	basis	for	a	process	of	ongoing	rehearsal,	in	which	all	possible	decisions	and	their	consequences	could	be	explored.	The	text	is	not	a	finished	text	but	an	open	field	for	a	process	of	improvisation,	rewriting	and	discussion.	This,	rather	than	public	performance,	is	how	Brecht	and	his	collaborators	sought	to	create	a	theatre	for	its	producers	rather	than	for	an	audience	of	consumers.	The	practice	of	theatre	becomes	a	collective	labour	of	political	and	ethical	exploration.14			Yet	as	part	of	his	radical	experiments	with	the	apparatus	of	theatre	under	the	banner	of	its	‘refunctioning’,	Brecht	not	merely	sought	to	interrupt	the	possibility	of	consumption	by	excluding	a	traditional	audience	from	the	event	of	theatre,	but	by	transforming	ordinary	spectators	into	co-producers	[Mitwirkende].	That,	at	least,	is	one	of	the	arguments	of	Benjamin’s	famous	rechanneling	of	Brecht	in	his	1934	lecture	‘The	Author	as	Producer’.	Ridout	too	seems	to	suggest	as	much	when	he	considers	more	recent	concerns	of	performance	and	performance	studies	to	put	into	play,	identify	and	champion	a	‘re-activation	of	the	spectator’																																																									12	ibid,	49.	13	ibid.	14	ibid,	48.	
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that	‘[…]	follows	[…]	a	tradition	which	can	readily	be	traced	back	through	Brecht’.15	For	Ridout,	one	such	example	can	be	found	in	Hans-Thies	Lehmann’s	articulation	of	a	theatrical	‘politics	of	perception’	as	an	‘aesthetic	of	responsibility	(or	response-ability)’.16		The	fact	that	Lehmann	identifies	the	latter	in	the	context	of	theatre’s	proposed	ability	to	intervene	in	a	‘world’	suffering	from	‘the	politically	malign	consequences	of	[its]	saturation	[…]	by	media	information’	here	furthermore	recalls	the	very	context	in	which	Benjamin	is	often	found	to	take	recourse	to	Brecht	or	theatre	more	generally.17	For	Lehman,	in	any	case,	as	Ridout	relates,	theatre’s	ability	to	intervene	in	this	context	must	not	be	sought	at	the	level	of	a	direct	political	effect	but	can	be	more	adequately	identified	as	an	intervention	‘at	the	level	of	‘perception’’,	that	is,	in	its	ability	to	‘[activate]	a	capacity	to	respond	(response-ability)’.18	In	doing	so	it	can	offer	an	alternative	experience	of	perception	than	that	mediated	by	media,	as	Lehmann	puts	it,	which	he	associates	with	a	lack	of	‘connection	between	the	receiving	and	sending	of	signs;	[…]	of	a	relation	between	address	and	answer’.	Theatre’s	potential	on	the	other	hand	lies	precisely	in	challenging	this	ostensible	disconnection	by	harnessing	its	capacity	to	‘move	the	mutual	implication	of	actors	and	spectators	in	the	theatrical	production	of	images	into	the	centre	[…]’,	problematizing	thereby	the	‘deceptively	comforting	duality	of	here	and	there,	inside	and	outside’.19	‘Where	the	information	flows	of	the	global	media	typically	preclude	any	response	(other	than	by	means	of	banal	and	pre-programmed	interactivity),’	Ridout	sums	up,		 theatre	makes	the	possibility	of	response	central	to	the	way	it	functions	by	placing	actors	and	spectators	in	the	same	space	as	each	other	and	permitting	both	to	understand	that	the	production	
																																																								15	ibid,	59.	16	Lehman	in	ibid,	57,	(original	emphasis).	17	ibid,	57.	18	ibid.	19	ibid.	
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of	images	in	the	theatre	is	something	in	which	they	are	collaborating.20		 In	the	context	of	Benjamin’s	writings	on	Brecht,	a	championing	of	the	latter’s	experiments	with	the	co-implication	of	actors	and	spectators	in	theatrical	production	are	similarly	employed	in	close	proximity	to	a	critical	evaluation	of	a	modern	media	apparatus.	Here,	a	general	concern	with	the	means	of	production	over	the	produced,	with	the	mattering	of	the	how	over	the	what,	splits	into	two	distinct,	albeit	profoundly	interrelated	aspects:	on	the	one	hand,	an	active	intervention	in	the	institutional,	socio-economic	aspects	of	the	relations	of	cultural	production,	and	on	the	other,	a	philosophical	critique	and	practical	experiment	with	the	formal	aspects	of	representation	in	different	media.21	As	the	previous	formulation	implies,	in	both	instances	it	is																																																									20	ibid,	57-8,	(my	emphasis)	21	Derrida,	in	a	brief	commentary	on	Benjamin’s	politico-aesthetic	attitude	of	refusing	to	merely	supply	an	apparatus	with	a	revolutionary	content	but	to	begin	by	analyzing	and	transforming	it,	gives	the	following	sketch	of	the	two	aspects	of	the	apparatus	as	I	here	seek	to	describe	it:	‘The	apparatus	in	question	involves	not	only	technical	or	political	powers,	procedures	of	editorial	or	media	appropriations,	the	structure	of	a	public	space	(and	thus	of	the	supposed	addressees	one	is	addressing	or	whom	one	should	be	addressing);	it	also	involves	a	logic,	a	rhetoric,	an	experience	of	language,	and	all	the	sedimentation	this	presupposes.	[…]’	[Derrida,	‘The	Deconstruction	Actuality’	in	Negotiations.	Interventions	
and	Interviews,	1971-2001.	ed.	&	trans	by	Elizabeth	Rottenberg,	85-116.	(Standford:	Stanford	University	Press	2002),	113].		The	analysis	and	transformation	of	the	apparatus	that	Benjamin	calls	for	and	demonstrates	–	that	is,	makes	himself	a	model	of	by	bearing	‘the	established	codes	of	articulation	to	which	one	is	necessarily	submitted,	but	which	are	also	susceptible	to	change’	–	amounts	to	an	effort	to	expose	and	put	into	play	the	possibility	of	their	de-sedimentation	and	deconstruction.	Echoing	Derrida’s	concerns	with	identifying	a	political	gesture	that	is	irreducible	to	the	level	of	content,	Samuel	Weber	distinguishes	such	‘bearing’	–	a	term	that	must	here	recall	the	terminology	of	gesture	in	general	and	Benjamin’s	analysis	of	Brecht’s	rehearsable	Haltung	in	particular	–	as	a	certain	level	of	‘being	political’	from	that	of	propositional	statements	and	elates	it	to	the	political	effectiveness	of	‘a	certain	thinking	of	virtuality,	possibility,	potentiality	[…]	–	a	certain	virtualization	of	conceptualization	itself	[and]	of	“meaning”’	[Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	355].	A	political	
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partially	a	matter	of	matter,	that	is,	of	exposing	the	opacity	of	the	bodies	of	signifiers,	institutions	and	technologies	of	inscription	of	all	kinds.	In	his	1934	lecture	‘The	Author	as	Producer’,	held	before	the	Paris-based	Institute	for	the	Study	of	Fascism,	both	of	these	aspects	appear	under	the	heading	of	Brecht’s	concept	of	‘refunctioning’	[Umfunktionierung],	which	has	as	its	aim	‘the	transformation	of	the	forms	and	instruments	of	production’.22	Whether	through	the	affranchising	of	the	means	of	production	or	the	productive	recasting	of	its	forms,	Brecht’s	concept	of	
Umfunktionierung,	as	Benjamin	relates,	‘raises	the	far-reaching	demand	on	intellectuals	to	no	longer	merely	supply	the	apparatus	of	production,	but	to	transform	it	as	far	as	possible	in	accordance	with	the	interests	of	socialism’.23	Those	interests,	according	to	Benjamin’s	text,	might	be	summed	up	by	what	he	designates	with	the	concept	of	participation,	collaboration	or	co-production	[mitwirken].	For	the	transformation	of	the	apparatus	of	production,	Benjamin	states,	aims	to	provide	other	producers	with	an	improved	apparatus,	that	is,	one	that	directs	consumers	towards	production	and	is	able	to	turn	readers	or	spectators	into	participants	[Mitwirkende]’.24	The	author	as	producer	is	thus	never	merely	working	on	his	products,	but	always	and	at	the	same	time	on	the	means	of	production.	He	does	so	by	accompanying	his	disposition	with	a	demonstration	of	the	attitude,	posture	or	pose	[Haltung]	by	which	one	is	to	follow	it.	It	is	the	model	character	of	the	production	as	demonstration	rather	than	the	experience	of	the	work	as	such	that	here	instructs	but	also	entices	others	to	produce	and	reproduce	in	turn,	all	the	while	providing	them	with	an	improved	apparatus	to	do	so.																																																																																																																																																	effectiveness,	Weber	adds,	that	does	seek	to	‘dispense	with	more	conventional	forms	of	“political”	analysis	and	interpretation,	much	less	with	“political	action,”	but	that	calls	for	the	necessity	of	the	latter	to	‘affect	and	possibly	transform	the	grids	within	which	such	actions	and	interpretations	must	be	situated’	[ibid,	355].	22	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Der	Autor	als	Produzent’	in	Gesammelte	Schriften	
Band	II,	683-701.	edited	by	Rolf	Tiedermann	und	Hermann	Schweppenhäuser	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1977),	691.	23	ibid,	691.	Throughout,	translations	of	Walter	Benjamin	are	mine	unless	otherwise	indicated.	24	ibid,	699.	
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What	is	at	stake,	here	as	elsewhere	in	Benjamin’s	inheritance	of	Brecht,	is	the	becoming	opaque	of	the	medium	and	the	production	of	what	Samuel	Weber	calls	in	the	context	of	his	reading	of	Benjamin’s	writings	on	theatre		‘the	production	of	the	theatrical	process	in	its	distinctive	mediality	–	Vorstellung	as	representing	before	rather	than	simply	as	representation	–	[….]’,	‘the	process	of	representing	(Vorstellung)	rather	than	the	alternation	of	concrete	representations’.25	In	the	context	of	Benjamin’s	writings	on	Brecht’s	Epic	Theatre,	to	which	we	will	soon	turn	in	more	detail,	these	stakes	are	raised	both	in	contestation	to	an	Aristotelian	tradition	of	drama	that	sought	to	render	the	medium	of	theatrical	spectacle	diaphanous	and	draw	the	spectator	into	and	along	with	the	progressive	flow	of	narrated	events,	as	well	as	increasingly	to	a	modern	media	apparatus	that	similarly	and	dangerously,	but	never	necessarily,	precludes	the	capacity	to	respond	to	its	relentless	flow	of	‘information’.	Whether	thinking	of	the	theatre	or	the	new	media,	for	Benjamin,	the	possibility	of	participation	as	response-ability	is	to	be	found	in	the	aftermath	of	the	interruption	of	a	reproduced	flow.	The	interruption	of	the	concatenated	structure	of	synthetic	progression	exposes	the	coming	between	of	a	spatial	interval	that	begins	to	swell	under	the	virtual	intrusion	of	the	outside,	expanding	and	inflating	any	given	context	by	reaching	out	to	others	on	whose	response	it	depends.				
Bell-headed	Pins	of	Distanciation:	Reading	the	Noise	of	Means	
“Without”	Ends		 The	second	context	employed	here	for	the	task	of	tracing	possible	trajectories	of	Brecht’s	spectral	returning	is	Roland	Barthes’	essay	‘Brecht	and	Discourse:	A	Contribution	to	the	Study	of	Discursivity’.	From	the	outset	Barthes’	essay	perhaps	provides	us	with	an	alibi	for	the	very	enterprise	pursued	here,	namely,	of	evoking	Brecht	in	the	absence	of	his	signature	beyond	any	simple,	violent	but	necessary	considerations	of																																																									25	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	115.	
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economy.	For,	according	to	Barthes,	Brecht	‘never	allow[ed]	himself	the	facility	of	signing	the	origin	of	his	discourse	[…]’	in	any	“first”	place	and	time;	neither	in	his	own	name,	nor	in	the	name	of	the	‘institution’	or	‘discipline’	of	Marxism	to	which	he	was	otherwise	committed.26	For	Brechtian	Marxism,	as	Barthes	relates,	eschews	recourse	to	any	Marxist	catechism.	For	Barthes,	Brecht	is	a	permanent	inventor	in	Marxism,	who	‘re-invents	quotations,	accedes	to	the	inter-text:	“He	thought	in	other	heads;	and	in	his	own,	others	besides	himself	thought.	This	is	true	thinking.”’27	More	or	less	true	to	his	own	reflections	on	the	inter-text	elsewhere,	Barthes	does	not	here	reference	the	quotation	that	he	nevertheless	puts	in	inverted	commas.28	Yet	in	another	context	he	attributes	the	very	same	words	to	Brecht	himself:	‘I	would	be	so	happy,’	he	claims	in	an	interview	with	Claude	Jannoud	from	July	27th	1974,	‘if	these	words	of	Brecht	could	be	applied	to	me:	“He	thought	in	the	heads	of	others;	and	in	his	own,	others	than	he	were	thinking.	That	is	true	thought”’.29	In	this	somewhat	theatrical	mis	en	scene	of	a	proliferation	of	heads	thinking	inside	of	other	heads,	an	original	source	of	thought	becomes	difficult	if	not	impossible	to	locate.	What	shielded	Brecht	from	the	danger	of	an	apologetic	discourse,	Barthes	fittingly	relates,	was	doubtless	the	theatrical	form,	‘[…]	since	in	the	theatre,	as	in	any	text,	the	origin	of	the	speech-act	cannot	be	located:	impossible	the	[…]	collusion	of	subject	and	signified	[…],	or	the	–	hoaxing	–	collusion	of	sign	and	referent	[…];’30	Theatre	therewith	comes	to	figure,	not	unlike	in	J.L.	Austin’s	analysis	of	speech	acts	–	albeit	no	longer	relegated	to	the	status	of	a	parasitism	that	it	would	be	possible	to	ward	off	or	overcome	once	and	for	all	–	as	a	paradigmatic	space	or	context	in	which	it	is	difficult,	if	not																																																									26	Roland	Barthes,	‘Brecht	and	Discourse:	A	Contribution	to	the	Study	of	Discursivity’	in	Brecht,	The	Rustle	of	Language,	212-222.	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press	1992),	213.	27	ibid,	213.	28	See	Roland	Barthes,	‘From	Work	to	Text’	in	Image	Music	Text,	155-164.	(London:	Fontana	Press	1977),	160.	29	Roland	Barthes,	The	Grain	of	the	Voice.	Interviews	1962-1980,	trans.	by	Linda	Coverdale.	(New	York:	Hill	and	Wang	1992),	195.	30	Barthes,	‘Brecht	and	Discourse’,	212-213.	
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impossible,	to	assure	the	link	of	an	utterance	to	its	source.	The	theatre	turns	out	a	paradigmatic	place	for	the	exposure	of	this	structural	state	of	affairs.	In	turn,	where	the	latter	is	exposed	outside	the	institution	of	theatre,	theatricality	ensues.	For	if	the	possibility	of	theatrical	doubling	that	troubles	the	effects	of	(self-)presence	can	no	longer	be	relegated	to	the	status	of	an	accident,	the	theatre	begins	to	pervade	even	the	most	“serious”	contexts	of	articulation.	Barthes	himself	is	quick	to	abstract	a	more	generalised	theatricality	from	the	theatrical	form	as	such,	noting	that	even	in	his	political	essays,	‘Brecht	never	allows	himself	the	facility	of	signing	the	origin	of	his	discourse’.31																																																									31	ibid,	213.	A	similar	abstraction	was	already	under	way	in	the	earlier,	elliptical	reference	to	the	‘text’,	which	–	like	the	theatre	–	renders	the	collusion	of	subject	and	signified,	sign	and	referent	impossible.	Here,	it	is	perhaps	worth	conducting	a	brief	detour	via	Barthes’	more	elaborate	reflections	on	the	concept	of	the	‘text’	in	his	famous	essay	‘From	Work	to	Text’	as	it	further	echoes	with	the	absence	of	an	identifiable	source	of	origin	of	articulation	and	links	it	to	the	necessity	of	replacing	a	receptive	attitude	of	consumption	with	that	of	production	as	we	have	seen	it	attributed	to	Brecht’s	theatrical	experiments	above.	‘The	intertextual	in	which	every	text	is	held	[…],’	Barthes	warns	the	reader	there,	‘is	not	to	be	confused	with	some	origin	of	the	text:	to	try	to	find	the	‘sources’,	the	‘influences’	of	a	work,	is	to	fall	in	with	the	myth	of	filiation;’	Instead,	the	citations,	references,	echoes,	cultural	languages	from	which	the	text	is	nevertheless	entirely	woven,	‘are	anonymous,	untraceable,	and	yet	
already	read:	they	are	quotations	without	inverted	commas’	[Barthes,	‘From	Work	to	Text’,	160].	Whether	or	not	we	want	to	subscribe	fully	to	Barthes	professed	warning	against	trying	‘to	find	the	“sources”	[and]	“influences”	of	a	work,’	Derrida’s	more	subtle	analysis	glossed	above	should	have	made	it	clear	that	any	such	endeavour	cannot	possibly	reduce	the	‘text’	once	and	for	all	to	a	single	origin	and	that	the	theatrical	parasite	of	a	decontextualized	repetition	is	a	constitutive	possibility	of	its	limited	function	as	‘work’	in	the	“first”	place.	In	Barthes’	oppositional	schema,	the	‘work’	is	nevertheless	what	traditionally,	in	conjunction	with	the	relatively	recent	institution	of	legal	copyright,	has	sought	to	produce	the	effect	of	a	strict	filiation,	demanding	respect	for	an	author’s	intentions,	as	well	as	aiming	to	assert	the	legality	of	the	relation	of	author	to	work	as	the	condition	of	copyright	law.	The	Text,	on	the	other	hand,	as	Barthes	puts	it,	‘reads	without	the	inscription	of	the	Father’	[ibid,	160-1].	Although	the	author	may	‘come	back’	in	the	Text,	in	his	text,	[…]	he	[…]	does	so	as	a	‘guest’	[ibid,	161].	In	the	encounter	with	an	orphaned	text,	always	already	drifting	away	from	the	control	of	its	author-Father,	the	respect	paid	or	hospitality	offered	to	the	author’s	possible	return	must	thus	at	all	points	be	negotiated.	In	other	words,	the	Text	necessarily	
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Following	Barthes	on	Brecht,	the	threat	of	theatre	and	theatricality	to	the	function	of	constative	and	performative	utterances	is	critically	put	to	work	in	a	movement	of	distanciation	of	marks	from	the	elaborate	layers	of	codes	on	which	their	contextual	reception	depends.	In	his	early	essay	on	‘What	is	Epic	Theatre’,	Benjamin	similarly	describes	such	a	movement	of	distanciation	in	contestation	to	the	illusory	practice	of	a	naturalistic	stage	that	must	repress	its	own	awareness	of	being	theatre	to	devote	itself	undistractedly	to	its	goal	of	representing	the	real	[das	Wirkliche].32																																																																																																																																																demands	a	labour	of	reception	that	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	passivity	of	a	mere	consumption.	Barthes	drives	home	this	point	by	asserting	‘that	the	Text	requires	that	one	try	to	abolish	(or	at	least	to	diminish)	the	distance	between	writing	and	reading	[…]	by	joining	them	in	a	single	signifying	practice’	[ibid,	162].	The	latter	formulation	resonates	with	Derrida’s	conception	of	a	paradoxical	structure	of	the	counter-signature	that	comes	before	the	signature	and	thus,	we	might	say	in	a	different	register,	a	‘reception’	that	‘produces’	the	‘work’	out	of	the	‘text’,	without	however	fully	containing	the	latter’s	play.	That	the	role	and	the	force	of	the	Derridian	counter-signature	also	seeks	to	account	for	the	historical	codes	of	an	instituted	space	of	reception	here	chimes	with	the	force	of	the	‘text’	as	what	John	Mowitt,	in	a	reading	of	Barthes’	essay	amongst	many	others,	calls	an	‘anti-disciplinary	object’.	[John	Mowitt,	TEXT.	The	
Genealogy	of	an	Antidisciplinary	Object.	(Durham	and	London:	Duke	University	Press	1992)].	In	exposing	the	necessity	of	more	or	less	instituted	counter-signatures	for	the	production	of	works,	the	Text	is	at	the	same	time	what	will	always	remain	in	excess	of	the	work,	calling	for	its	future	reworking	qua	response-ability.	Remaining	in	excess	of	its	disciplinary	capture,	the	Text	works	or	plays	‘afformatively’	–	a	modality	of	performance	that	is	demonstratively	exposed	to	the	coming	of	time	beyond	any	limited	effects	of	presence	–	before	as	well	as	within	every	work	and	thus	lends	itself	to	the	critique	and	deconstruction	of	the	fundamental	historicity	of	any	given	disciplinary	schema	and	is	able	to	undermine	all	existing	legal	and	linguistic	institutions.	In	any	case,	abolishing	the	distance	between	reading	and	writing	here	seeks	to	contrast	a	practice	of	reading	(well)	in	the	sense	of	consumption	with	a	practice	of	‘playing	with	the	text’	that	itself	already	plays.	‘‘Playing’’,	Barthes	elaborates,	‘must	be	understood	here	in	all	its	polysemy:	the	text	itself	plays	(like	a	door,	like	a	machine	with	‘play’)	and	the	reader	plays	
twice	over,	playing	the	Text	as	one	plays	a	game,	looking	for	a	practice	which	re-produces	it,	but,	in	order	that	that	practice	not	be	reduced	to	a	passive,	inner	mimesis	(the	Text	is	precisely	that	which	resists	such	a	reduction),	also	playing	the	Text	in	the	musical	sense	of	the	term’	[Barthes,	‘From	Work	to	Text’,	162	-	my	emphasis].	32	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater	(1)’,	Versuche	Über	
Brecht,	7-21.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1966),	10.	
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Epic	theatre’s	continual,	living	and	productive	awareness	of	itself	as	theatre,	on	the	other	hand,	Benjamin	suggests,	enables	it	to	treat	the	elements	of	the	real	for	the	purpose	of	a	test-assembly.	If	its	task	must	lie	in	depicting	conditions	[Zustände]	rather	than	in	developing	actions,	these	conditions	stand	at	the	end	and	not	at	the	beginning	of	such	a	test	[Versuch].	‘They	are	not	made	accessible	[nahegebracht,	lit.	brought	near]	to	the	spectator,’	Benjamin	concludes,	‘but	are	distanced	from	him.	He	recognizes	them	as	the	true	conditions	[die	wirklichen	Zustände],	not,	as	in	the	theatre	of	naturalism,	with	self-satisfaction	but	with	astonishment’.33	Barthes	further	describes	Brecht’s	critical	practice	of	distanciation	as	one	that	seeks	to	loosen	and	dissolve	the	stickiness	of	the	logosphere	and	similarly	links	it	to	the	affect	and	effect	of	a	certain	shock.	‘Brecht’s	work	seeks	to	elaborate	a	shock-practice	[…]	which	opens	a	crisis:	which	lacerates,	which	crackles	the	smooth	surface,	which	fissures	the	crust	of	languages,’	he	says,	by	distancing	representation	through	‘a	reading	which	detaches	the	sign	from	its	effect’.34	By	detaching	the	sign	from	its	effect,	we	might	add,	such	a	reading	practice	sees	itself	confronted	with	the	Schriftbild	[writing-image]	of	the	body	of	a	signifier	severed	from	its	present	effects	of	signification.	Suspended	as	a	means	poised	in	relation	to	the	possibility	of	other	effects	of	presence	to	come,	the	Schriftbild,	to	evoke	a	formulation	of	Weber,	begins	to	dance	under	a	readers’	gaze.	Brecht’s	exposition	of	the	opacity	of	the	means	of	mediation,	the	signifying	body	in	its	non-instrumental	purity	as	a	means	without	a	once	and	for	all	determinable	end,	perhaps	is	able	to	facilitate	such	a	dance.35	Whether	in	the	context	of	Brecht’s	discourse	or	theatrical																																																									33	ibid.	34	Barthes,	‘Brecht	and	Discourse’,	213.	35	Although	the	formulation	–	means	without	(determinable)	end	–	is,	to	be	sure,	neither	Benjamin’s	nor	Barthes’	on	Brecht,	it	here	nevertheless	recalls	another	context	of	Benjamin’s	writings	that	seems	closely	related	to	the	efforts	at	exposing	the	means	of	representation	as	both	attribute	it	to	Brecht,	whether	in	the	theatrical	form	of	his	discourse	or	the	
Vorstellung	of	his	theatrical	spectacles.	That	context	is	Benjamin’s	early	essay	on	language,	where	he	evokes	a	notion	of	‘pure	language’	that	is	not	an	instrument	serving	the	end	of	communication,	but	consists	in	the	ability	of	language	to	immediately	communicate	its	own	
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experiments,	the	means	of	representations	do	not	transparently	give	to	view	a	represented	content	that	could	be	cognized	and	consumed	once	and	for	all.	Instead,	the	encountered	must	be	read,	as	Barthes	notes,	twice	over:	a	reading	never	of	the	thing	itself	but	of	a	first	reading	that	in	its	turn	must	be	read.	A	similar	demand	is	expressed	in	Weber’s	account	of	the	‘shocks’	and	‘surprises’	by	which	Epic	Theatre	paralyses	a	spectator’s	readiness	to	identify	with	the	action	by	‘depriv[ing]	empathy	of	its	essential	prerequisite:	a	well	defined,	self-contained	place	into	which	it	can	feel	and	project	itself	[…].	The	representative,	mimetic	activity	of	epic	theatre	thus	splits	and	turns	back	on	itself,’	Weber	relates,	‘retracing	in	this	double-take	an	interval	and	a	gap	between	the	function	of	representing	and	that	which	is	being	represented’.36	In	doing	so,	Brecht’s	theatre	and	discourse	could	be	said	to	facilitate	what	Weber	calls	elsewhere	‘an	encounter	with	language	as	a	medium	of	excess’.37	Brecht	stages	such	an	encounter,	as	Barthes	elegantly	relates	it,	by	leaving	the	bell-headed	pins	of	a	Japanese	dressmaker	in	his	remaking	of	the	logosphere,	‘the	signs	furbished	with	their	tiny	jingle:	thus,	when	we	hear	a	certain	language,	we	never	forget	where	it	comes	from,	how	it	was																																																																																																																																																communicability,	or,	as	Weber	translates	it	–	stressing	the	implied	movement	of	a	separation	from	itself	–	its	impartibility	or	possibility	of	parting	with	(“teilen	=	to	part,	“mit-“	=	with).	Yet	the	quasi-transcendental	movement	of	a	departure	that	‘stays	“with”,	as	Weber	points	out,	‘that	from	which	it	simultaneously	departs’	here	begins	to	‘establishes	a	relation	to	itself	as	other’	[Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	197].	Under	the	constitutive	immediacy	of	its	“-ability”	to	stay	with	that	from	which	it	parts,	the	“purity”	of	language	as	medium	might	thus	here	also	be	described	as	a	Schwelle	[swelling],	that	‘zone	of	indefinite	expansion	and	inflation	reaching	out	to	others	on	whose	response	it	depends’	[ibid,	235].	As	a	medium	it	would	be	a	‘means	without	end’	only	insofar,	Weber	relates	‘as	the	word	“without”	defines	a	relation	not	of	simple	exclusion	or	negation,	but	of	participation	“with”	the	“out”-side	of	an	irreducible	and	yet	constitutive	exteriority’	[ibid,	197	-	my	emphasis].	36	ibid,	106.	The	passage	continues	as	follows:	‘The	latter	can	never	be	fully	absorbed	into,	or	obscured	by,	the	former,	never	allowed	to	become	fully	identical	with	it.	And	this	must	be	seen	not	as	a	defect	of	theater,	but	as	its	resource	and	its	reserve’	[ibid,	106].	37	Samuel	Weber,	‘The	Feel	of	“Today”’,	Transcript	for	talk	given	at	The	London	Graduate	School	Summer	Academy	in	the	Critical	Humanities	on	26th	of	June,	2013.	
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made:	the	shock	is	a	reproduction:	not	an	imitation,	but	a	production	that	has	been	disconnected,	displaced:	which	makes	noise’.38	The	noise	of	the	ringing	bell-pin	here	foregrounds	the	mediality	of	language	–	language	as	
medium	–	and	it	does	so,	as	Barthes	suggests,	by	interrupting	the	successive,	concatenated,	‘pseudo-logic	of	the	discourse	–	links,	transitions,	the	patina	of	elocution,	in	short	the	continuity	of	speech’	and	its	effect	‘of	a	kind	of	force,	[…]	an	illusion	of	assurance’.39	Pushing	Barthes’	discourse	beyond	the	context	of	his	essay,	or	else,	letting	it	swell	by	a	certain	intrusion	of	the	outside,	one	might	consider	its	critique	of	the	illusory	effects	of	an	assurance	caused	by	the	‘continuity	of	speech’	in	light	of	Derrida’s	deconstructive	analysis	of	the	long	history	of	a	disavowal	of	spatiality	in	the	phantasm	of	auto-affection	associated	with	the	transparency	of	the	voice.	For	the	illusory	experience	of	the	self-effacement	of	the	signifying	body	in	auto-affection,	which	‘necessarily	
has	the	form	of	time	and	does	not	borrow	from	outside	of	itself,’	evokes	similar	assurances	based	on	an	ideal	successive	temporal	flow.40	Thus,	Derrida	is	able	to	designate	the	phantasm	and	effect	of	pure	temporality	–	the	effacement	of	the	signifier	in	the	speaking	voice	–	as	‘the	condition	of	the	very	idea	of	truth’.41	Although	Barthes’	reflections	on	error’s	mendacious	production	of	an	illusion	of	truth	seems	to	want	to	hold	on	to	an	oppositional	logic	that	is	irreconcilable	with	Derrida’s	more	paradoxical	effort	at	exposing	the	necessarily	illusory	structure	of	the	limited	effects	of	truth	itself,	his	description	of	the	process	of	the	truth’s	“unveiling”	is	perhaps	nevertheless	fitting	in	this	context	if	applied	beyond	the	opposition	of	fiction	and	non-fiction,	truth	and	lie.	‘“To	unveil”’,	Barthes	says,	‘is	not	so	much	to	draw	back	the	veil	as	to	cut	it	to	pieces’.42	For	Barthes,	the	image	of	the	veil	is	thus	not	primarily	associated	with	an	act	of	concealment,	but	with	the	smooth,	the	sustained,																																																									38	Barthes,	‘Brecht	and	Discourse’,	214	(original	emphasis).	39	ibid,	216	(my	emphasis).	40	Jacques	Derrida,	Of	Grammatology,	trans.	by	Gayatri	Chakravorty	Spivak.	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press	1998),	20.	41	ibid.	42	Barthes,	‘Brecht	and	Discourse’,	216.	
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the	successive.	To	attack	the	latter,	Barthes	notes,	‘is	to	separate	the	fabric,	to	tear	apart	the	folds	of	the	veil’.43	If	what	is	revealed	by	such	perforations,	is	the	error	of	the	ideal	of	truth	itself,	Barthes’	rhetoric	could	be	said	to	find	an	echo	in	Derrida’s	widespread	considerations	of	the	breach,	crack,	rupture,	fissure,	split,	hole	and	opening	in	all	that	is	ostensibly	self-contained.	In	any	case,	‘[t]he	critique	of	the	continuum	(here	applied	to	discourse),’	Barthes	relates,	‘is	a	constant	one	in	Brecht’.44	‘Brecht’s	theatre,’	he	goes	on	to	explain,			 is	a	series	(not	a	consequence)	of	cut-up	fragments	deprived	of	what	in	music	is	called	the	Zeigarnik	effect	(when	the	final	resolution	of	a	musical	sequence	retroactively	gives	it	its	meaning).	Discontinuity	of	discourse	keeps	the	final	meaning	from	“taking”:	critical	production	does	not	wait	–	it	will	be	instantaneous	and	repeated:	this	is	the	very	definition	of	epic	theatre	according	to	Brecht.45			
The	Ausfall	[failure]	of	a	Zeigarnik	Effect	and	the	Einfall	[intrusion]	
of	the	Beyond		 In	Barthes’	account,	the	discontinuity	of	discourse	prevents	a	final	meaning	from	“taking”,	that	is,	to	be	sure,	from	taking	place,	once	and	for	all,	but	also	from	being	‘taken	in’,	or	else,	from	being	consumed,	appropriated,	remembered-digested	[erinnert]	or	read	well,	understood	or	grasped	[begriffen]	once	and	for	all.	One	cannot	simply,	passively	take	it	in	[ein-nehmen]	by	merely	perceiving	it	[wahr-nehmen]	as	a	(represented)	reality	or	truth	[Wahrheit],	an	objective	identity	or	a	transcendental	meaning	that	is	at	all	times	present	and	to	which	a	
																																																								43	ibid.	44	ibid,	217.	45	Ibid.	
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cognitive	subject	has	merely	to	arrive	there	where	it	has	always	been.46	Nor	is	it	possible,	as	Benjamin	points	out	with	regards	to	the	disturbances	of	discontinuity	in	Epic	Theatre,	to	evoke	a	reader’s	readiness	of	empathetic	identification.	Brecht	disturbs	the	possibility	of	identification,	understanding	or	consumption,	as	we	have	seen,	by	employing	a	double-take	–	the	retracing	of	an	interval	and	a	gap	between	the	function	of	representing	and	that	which	is	being	represented	–	demanding	that	every	sign	be	read	twice	over,	‘giv[ing]	us	to	read	[…],	by	a	kind	of	disengagement,’	as	Barthes	puts	it,	‘the	reader’s	gaze,	not	directly	the	object	of	his	reading;	for	this	object	reaches	us	only	by	the	act	of	intellection	(an	alienated	act)	of	a	first	reader	who	is	already	on	the	stage’.47	Although	Brecht,	as	Benjamin	relates,	often	considered	accompanying	the	occurrences	on	the	stage	with	the	presence	of	a	detached	third	party	as	a	sober	observer	or	“thinker”,	the	first	reader	of	his	theatre	is	always	already	the	body	of	the	actor	distancing	himself	from	his	role,	speech	and	action	by	his	‘play-acting’	[Theaterspielen].48	Thus	despite	Benjamin’s	own	didactic	example	of	an	onstage	intrusion	of	a	stranger	upon	the	familiar	bourgeois	family	scene	as	the	cause	for	the	effect	of	alienation	and	the	concomitant	exposition,	doubling,	splitting	and	troubling	of	the	gaze	of	the	spectator,	it	does	not	necessarily	depend	on	such	a	device.	Instead,	it	is	the	‘Vorstellung	[representing-before]	of	
Theaterspielen	[lit.	playing	theatre]’	itself,	in	other	words,	the	exposition	of	the	language	of	theatre	in	its	distinctive	mediality,	which	gives	reading	to	be	read.49	‘[T]he	actor’,	Benjamin	states,	‘must	reserve	for	himself	the	possibility	to	skilfully	fall	out	of	the	role’	and	‘insist	at	a	given	moment	to	play	[himself]	the	thinker	(about	his	part)’.50	What	facilitates	this	fall,	is	the	(self-)interruption	of	an	(intentional)	act.		
																																																								46	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	298-9.	47	Barthes,	‘Brecht	and	Discourse’,	219.	48	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater	(2)’	in	Versuche	über	
Brecht,	22-30.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1966),	24.	49	ibid,	29	&	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	115.	50	ibid,	29	(my	emphasis).	
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For	Benjamin,	it	is	precisely	such	an	interruption	of	an	agent	in	his	ostensible	autonomous	agency	that	produces	the	gesture	as	the	defining	aspect	of	Brecht’s	theatre,	the	coming	between	of	an	immediate	mediacy	of	a	pose	and	attitude	[Haltung]	as	a	spatial	form	of	retention.	‘[…]	Epic	theatre	is	by	definition	gestural.	For	the	more	we	interrupt	an	agent,	the	more	gestures	we	obtain’.51	Here	as	elsewhere,	Benjamin’s	concept	of	‘interruption’,	as	Samuel	Weber	has	pointed	out,	finds	its	filial	link	in	the	Hölderlinian	notion	of	“caesura”.	Benjamin	defines	the	latter	elsewhere	as	a	counter-rhythmical	interruption	that	becomes	noticeable	in	the	
falling	silent	of	the	hero	in	tragedy,	the	contestation	in	the	rhythm	of	a	hymn	and	finally	and	most	accurately	as	the	invasion	[einfallen]	of	
something	beyond	the	writer	into	the	writing.52	In	the	theatre,	such	an	invasion	or	intrusion	[Hereinfallen]	of	a	beyond	as	the	result	of	an	interruption	of	continuity	finds	itself	temporarily	embodied	by	an	audience	asked	to	participate	in	the	production	of	singularly	discontinuous	fragments	in	their	contextual	relationality.	If	the	interruption	of	acting	agents	produces	Epic	Theatre’s	gestures,	it	is	what	Benjamin	with	Brecht	calls	the	‘citability	of	gesture’	that	immediately	exposes	their	structural	non-identity	and	appeal	to	the	relational	matrix	of	response-ability.	As	the	singularity	of	this	contextual	relation,	however,	paradoxically	depends	on	the	possibility	of	the	gesture’s	altered	repetition	in	other	contexts	to	come,	the	-ability	of	a	response	never	merely	lies	with	any	one	present	audience.	Instead,	the	intrusion	of	the	beyond	on	the	ostensibly	self-contained,	of	the	outside	on	the	inside,	constitutes	an	immediate	(virtual)	intrusion	of	the	future	on	any	given	present	that	finds	“itself”	exposed	in	its	structural	non-identity	to	the	possibility	of	an	open-ended	transformation.	The	theatrical	scene	begins	to	swell	and	stretch	under	the	appeal	[Einspruch]	to	the	coming	of	other	respondents,	the	virtual	possibility	of	its	graft	in	a	‘space	of	alterity’.	Although	‘[i]n	the	theatre’,	as	Weber	relates,	‘such	a	space	of	alterity	is																																																									51	ibid,	27.	52	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Goethes	Wahverwandtschaften’	in	Gesammelte	
Schriften	Band	I,	125-201.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1977),	182	(my	emphasis).	
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always	provisionally	embodied	in	and,	even	more,	exposed	as	an	“audience”	–	singular	noun	for	an	irreducibly	heteroclite	stand-in,	[t]he	“audience”	[merely]	stands	in,		for	the	others,	those	who	were	and	those	who	will	be	–	and	perhaps	even	more	for	those	who	will	never	come	to	be’.53				
Gesture,	Interruption,	Citability:	Walter	Benjamin’s	Writings	on	
Epic	Theatre	and	the	Virtuality	of	Media		 If	the	signature	of	Brecht	here	encounters	us	exclusively	through	its	more	or	less	distorted	echo	in	the	counter-signature	of	others	–	from	Ridout	to	Barthes	to	Benjamin	–	the	encounter	with	Benjamin’s	writings	on	Brecht	will	in	turn	already	be	inextricably	caught	up	with	their	own	echo	in	the	writings	of	one	of	their	most	admirable	contemporary	readers:	Samuel	Weber.	Following	what	we	might	call	with	Benjamin	himself	the	afterlife	or	living-on	of	an	‘original’	text	is	perhaps	not	altogether	unjustified	in	a	context	–	namely,	the	citability	of	gesture	–	which	pursues	a	logic	of	repeatability	that	accounts	for	the	possibility	of	the	gesture’s	repetition	in	a	coming	space	of	alterity	from	“its”	beginning.	What	is	more,	as	Weber	points	out,	the	‘history	of	Benjamin’s	attempt	to	pose	the	question	“What	is	Epic	Theatre?”	is	itself	marked	by	the	very	traits	that	constitute	his	response	to	it:	gesture,	interruption,	and	
citability.	The	two	essays	with	the	same	title	written	eight	years	apart,	as	well	as	the	citations	and	reworkings	of	parts	of	the	original	text	for	other	occasions	in	the	intervening	period,	already	make	for	a	history	of	citation	and	recitation,	re-inscription	and	transformation	that	can	be	read	as	a	
demonstration	of	that	of	which	Benjamin	is	writing.	A	demonstration	that	follow	Benjamin’s	own	appeal	in	‘The	Author	as	Producer’	–	one	of	the	most	famous	occasions	for	‘What	is	Epic	Theatre?’s	intermediate	reworking	–	namely,	that	the	producer	must	not	work	merely	on	his	product	but	simultaneously	on	the	means	and	modes	of	production.	For																																																									53	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	341,	
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Benjamin,	the	work	on	rather	than	for	a	given	apparatus,	begins	to	expose	the	latter’s	mediacy	by	divorcing	it	from	the	instrumental	grip	of	a	determining	relation	to	an	end.	Contesting	a	tradition	that	seeks	to	conceive	of	an	ostensible	transparency	of	media,	Benjamin	both	describes	and	demonstrates	the	stakes	of	the	latter’s	fundamental	opaqueness	and	spatiality.	Here,	the	medium	is	what	‘comes	between,’	as	Weber	describes	it,	‘everything	that	would	be	present	to	itself,’	interrupting	and	bringing	to	a	standstill	‘what	we	commonly	think	of	as	the	“flow”	of	“life”’.54		Such	a	conception	of	the	still-standing	opacity	of	the	medium	interrupting	the	flow	of	life	perhaps	finds	its	distorted	echo	in	Jacques	Derrida’s	description	of	the	spacing	of	time	and	life’s	precarious	structure	of	‘survival’.	The	fact	that	Derrida	himself	sought	not	merely	to	describe	but	also	to	demonstrate	the	effects	of	spacing	in	his	own	writings	furthermore	warrants	the	following	of	their	loose	link	with	Benjamin’s	work	as	it	is	here	pursued.55	Following	this	link,	the	double	movement	of	Derrida’s	logic	of	spacing	begins	to	resonate	with	a	similar	dynamic	inscribed	in	Benjamin’s	concept	of	the	‘citability	of	gesture’.	For	if	the	movement	of	‘time	becoming	space’	seems	to	find	its	correlate	in	the	suspended	standstill	of	life’s	interrupted	flow,	the	immediate	counter-rhythm	of	‘space	becoming	time’	as	the	result	of	a	structural	iterability	that	‘disrupts	‘the	classical	oppositions	of	[…]	the	factual	and	the	possible	(or	the	virtual),	necessity	and	possibility,’	as	Derrida	puts	it,	begins	to	resonate	with	‘what,	for	Benjamin,’	as	Weber	states,	‘from	his	very	earliest	writings	to	his	last,	can	be	designated	as	the	
virtuality	of	media,	media	as	virtuality,’	of	which	the	citable	gesture	is	a	crucial	articulation.56	For	Benjamin,	as	Weber	explains,	‘[t]he	medium	is																																																									54	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	113.	55	ibid,	113.	56	ibid	&	Derrida,	Limited	Inc,	48.	In	terms	that	strongly	echo	Benjamin’s	discussion	of	the	citability	of	gesture,	in	‘Signature,	Event,	Context’,	Derrida	says	of	the	written	sign	that	it	‘carries	with	it	a	force	that	breaks	with	its	context,	that	is,	with	the	collectivity	of	presences	organising	the	moment	of	its	inscription’	[Jaques	Derrida,	‘Signature,	Event,	Context’	in	
Limited	Inc,	1-23.	(Illinois:	Northwestern	University	Press	1990),	9].	‘This	breaking	force,’	he	continues,	‘is	not	an	accidental	predicate	but	the	very	
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never	simply	actual,	never	simply	real	or	present,	much	less	“the	message”	that	it	seems	to	convey.	Rather,	it	consists	in	the	suspension	of	all	messaging	and	in	the	virtuality	that	ensues’.	‘[…]	This	is	why	the	medium’,	Weber	continues	with	a	formulation	that	recalls	Derrida’s	uncertainties	with	regards	to	his	“confrontation”	with	John	R.	Searl	with	which	these	reflections	began,	‘in	this	sense,	is	never	an	element	in	which	things	would	take	place,	would	take	their	place’.57	Yet	if	the	flow	of	life,	whether	in	Benjamin’s	or	Derrida’s	constative	accounts,	is	necessarily	interrupted	by	the	coming	between	of	media,	the	latter	nevertheless	seemingly	lend	themselves	to	be	put	to	work	in	the	illusory	reproduction	of	this	ostensible	flow,	whether	in	the	form	of	old	media	–	qua	‘continuity	of	speech’,	the	concatenated	structure	of	discourse,	the	incessant	flow	of	information	of	the	press	apparatus,	as	well	as,	as	we	will	soon	see,	the	dramatic	tradition	of	representational	arrangements	of	actions	into	a	plot	–	or	indeed	the	more	sophisticated	reproduction	technologies	of	the	new	media:	film,	phonography	and	their	most	potent	application	in	the	(re)production	of	an	ostensible	flow	of	radio	and	tele-vision.	In	light	of																																																																																																																																																structure	of	the	written	text’.	It	concerns	both	a	“real”	context	–	a	certain	“present”	of	the	inscription	that	must	abandon	the	mark	to	its	essential	drift	–	as	well	as	any	internal	semiotic	context	that	limits	the	determination	of	the	mark.	As	‘a	written	syntagma	can	always	be	detached	from	the	chain	in	which	it	is	inserted	[…]	without	causing	it	to	lose	all	possibility	of	functioning,’	Derrida	says,	‘[o]ne	can	perhaps	further	come	to	recognise	other	possibilities	in	it	by	inscribing	it	or	
grafting	it	onto	other	chains’	[ibid,	my	emphasis].	What	is	more,	Derrida	describes	the	force	with	which	the	mark	ruptures	any	“originary”	context	in	terms	that	here	must	recall	the	typographic	discreteness	of	the	gesture’s	of	Epic	theatre,	that	is,	the	clearly	framed	pose	[Haltung]	with	a	discernible	beginning	and	end	that	the	actor	must	be	able	to	block	out	like	a	typesetter	the	words	[Benjamin,	Versuche	Über	Brecht,	27].	For	Derrida,	in	any	case,	contextual	rupture	is	‘tied	to	the	spacing	that	constitutes	the	written	sign:	spacing	which	separates	it	from	other	elements	of	the	internal	contextual	chain	(the	always	open	possibility	of	its	disengagement	and	graft)	but	also	from	all	forms	of	present	reference	(whether	past	or	future	in	the	modified	form	of	the	present	that	is	past	or	to	come),	objective	or	subjective’	[Derrida,	‘Signature,	Event,	Context’,	9-10].	In	its	structural	ability	to	separate	from	its	context,	the	mark	necessarily	departs	from	itself,	that	is,	the	possibility	of	its	drift	undermines	from	the	start	any	claims	to	its	self-identity.	57	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	113.	
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the	powerful	effects	of	presence	intrinsic	to	the	reproduced	flows	of	different	forms	of	mediation,	it	is	thus	never	enough	to	expose	a	medium’s	opacity	on	a	mere	descriptive	level,	but	equally	necessary	to	practically	intervene	on	the	level	of	its	operation,	in	other	words,	to	perforate	the	smoothness	of	its	flow	and	expose	the	phantasm	of	its	ostensible	transparency.	In	this	vain,	Benjamin’s	writings	on	Epic	Theatre	are	largely	concerned	with	Brecht’s	insight	into	the	political	necessity	of	interrupting	the	constructed	flow	of	an	action	and	its	narrative	representation	in	order	to	expose	the	coming	between	of	a	scenic	medium	in	its	non-transparent	spatiality.	However,	before	elaborating	on	Epic	Theatre’s	complex	relation	to	the	dramatic	tradition	from	which	it	seeks	to	set	itself	apart	–	evoking	therewith	the	possible	analysis	of	different	traditions	of	interpreting	theatre	itself	as	medium	–	I	want	to	briefly	reflect	on	Benjamin’s	insistent	transfer	of	the	very	same	terms	of	the	debate	to	the	context	of	the	new	media	of	his	time,	most	notably,	here,	in	the	context	of	a	discussion	of	the	necessity	of	interrupting	the	medial	flow,	by	looking	at	his	work	for	and	on	the	radio.58		
	
	
	
																																																									58	Benjamin’s	engagement	with	film	and	its	technique	of	montage,	on	the	other	hand,	is	indeed	not	so	much	concerned	with	the	possibility	of	employing	the	latter	in	the	production	of	continuity	but,	to	the	contrary,	focus	on	its	effects	of	discontinuity	and	the	clashing	of	heterogeneities.	Indeed,	Benjamin’s	reflections	on	Epic	Theatre’s	stop-starting	discontinuous	series	of	clearly	defined	spatio-temporal	fragments,	likens	its	movement	to	that	of	the	images	of	a	filmstrip.	In	parts	this	may	have	to	do	with	the	rudimentary	development	of	the	technological	apparatus	available	at	the	time,	as	well	as	a	particular	focus	on	a	specific	potential	use	of	film	over	another.	Yet	it	may	also	largely	have	been	applied	with	respect	to	examples	of	film	that	were	not	yet	fully	able	to	harness	the	unique	effects	of	presence	that	come	from	combining	the	reproduced	continuities	of	image	and	sound	in	the	service	of	a	constructed	phantasm	of	the	flow	of	life.	A	flow	as	it	has	perhaps	become	prevalent	in	today’s	commercial	narrative	cinema,	and	as	it	has	been	applied	most	potently	in	today’s	“live”	televisual	broadcasting.	
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A	Racket	About	Kasperl:	Exposing	the	Noise	of	Mediacy		 Benjamin’s	reflections	on	the	“new	media”	themselves	often	take	place	in	close	proximity	to	his	analysis	of	Epic	Theatre	and	are	generally	keen	to	establish	a	series	of	trans-medial	links	that	identify	the	return	and	transformation	of	the	“same”	conflictual	dynamics	at	work	across	medial	forms	of	different	periods	of	technological	development.	In	this	context,	Brecht’s	theatre	often	turns	out	as	a	venerable	test-site	for	the	notably	inter-medial	practice	of	exposing	a	generalised	mediacy	of	the	medial.	In	any	case,	the	inter-medial	aspects	of	Benjamin’s	reading	of	Epic	Theatre	defy	progressive	narratives	of	a	decisive	break	between	tradition	and	its	transformation,	as	Weber	insists,	but	identify	the	break	as	always	already	at	work	within	that	tradition	itself.59	That	Benjamin’s	reflections	on	Epic	Theatre’s	efforts	of	interrupting	the	flow	of	life	would	often	take	place	in	close	proximity	to	a	consideration	of	radio,	may	furthermore	bespeak	a	certain	awareness	that	the	effects	of	presence	in	the	reproductions	of	an	ostensible	flow	of	life	are	perhaps	nowhere	more	palpably	felt	than	in	the	technological	reproduction	of	the	voice.60	Theoretically	and	practically	reflecting	on	the	possibilities	for	what	he	calls,	for	instance,	‘the	mutual	control	of	[theatre	and	radio’s]	educational	program,’	the	radio	is	to	become	a	privileged	site	for	Benjamin’s	own	efforts	to	follow	the	model	character	of	Brecht’s	Haltung	by	playfully	‘refunctioning’	its	means	of	production	through	his	own	work	in	broadcasting.61	Critical	of	the	noble	standards	of	education	of	radio	in	the	Weimar	Republic,	as	Katja	Rothe	relates,	Benjamin’s	radio	play	‘Radau	um	Kasperl’	[A	racket	about	Kasperl],	for	instance,	constitutes	an																																																									59	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	95-96.	60	On	this	latter	point,	from	a	deconstructive	point	of	view,	see	Michael	Naas,	Miracle	and	Machine:	Jacques	Derrida	and	the	Two	Sources	of	
Religion,	Science,	and	the	Media.	(Fordham:	Fordham	University	Press	2011),	139-151.	61	Benjamin	‘Theater	and	Radio’	in	Walter	Benjamin,	The	work	of	Art	in	
the	Age	of	Its	Technological	Reproducibility	and	Other	Writings	on	Media.	ed.	by	Michael	W.	Jennings,	Brigid	Doherty	&	Thomas	Y.	Levin,	trans.	by	Edmund	Jephcott,	Rodney	Livingstone	&	Howard	Eiland,	393-396.	(Cambridge	Massacusetts:	Harvard	University	Press	2008),	393.	
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‘exercise	[Übung]	in	the	use	of	the	new	medium’	that	displays	a	subversive	taste	for	noisy	purposelessness	and	undermines	‘the	self-image	of	radio	turned	with	instructional	intent	towards	a	willing	mass	of	learners’.62	Kasperl,	the	play’s	central	character,	who	annexes	the	radio	station	to	deliver	a	verbal	slap	to	his	old	friend	Seppel,	as	Rothe	puts	it:	‘is	interference,	interruption,	“Zäsur”	[caesura]’.	In	the	very	sense	of	the	intrusion	[Hereinfallen,	lit.	‘falling-into’]’	by	which	Benjamin	designates	this	term,	Kasperl	counter-rhythmically	interrupts	the	radio	program.	Like	the	noise	of	the	bell-headed	pins	that	Barthes	identified	as	disrupting	the	concatenated	assurances	of	discourse	in	Brecht,	here,	interference,	noise	and	static	expose	the	radio	‘as	a	medium	that	frees	itself	from	the	grip	of	the	symbolic’.63	Instead,	it	is	exposed	as	non-instrumental	means,	no	longer	merely	and	seemingly	communicating	[mitteilen]	an	educational	content,	but	imparting	[mitteilen]	itself	precisely	as	a	technology	of	imparting	[Technik	der	Mitteilung].64	In	doing	so	it	comes	between,	not	only	the	ostensible	self-presence	of	speech	of	those	speaking	on	the	radio,	but	the	illusory	assurance	of	their	transparent	mediation.	The	medium	of	radio	–	as	we	might	here	put	it	in	a	register	that	recalls	Derrida’s	efforts	to	displace	the	conception	of	another	medium,	namely,	‘the	currently	accepted	concept	of	writing’	–	is	thus	‘no	longer	comprehensible	in	terms	of	[a]	communication	in	the	limited	sense	of	a	transmission	of	meaning,	[…	and	can]	no	longer	be	reduced	to	a	mere	means,	however	potent,	extending	enormously,	if	not	infinitely,	the	domain	of	oral	or	gestural	communication’.65		Having	already	sought	to	interrupt	radio’s	concatenated	flow	of	(educational)	information	by	the	intrusion	of	a	noisy	purposelessness,	Benjamin’s	play	further	troubles	its	illusory	assurance	of	the	link	of	an	utterance	to	its	source	with	a	final	twist	of	its	narrative.	To	his	own	and																																																									62	Katja	Rothe,	‘Nicht-Machen.	Lassen!	Zu	Walter	Benjamin’s	pädagogischem	Theater’	in	Ökonomien	der	Zurückhaltung:	Kulturelles	
Handeln	zwischen	Askese	und	Restriktion	ed.	by	Barbara	Gronau,	Alice	Lagaay	331-349.	(Bielefeld:	transcript	Verlag	2010),	333.	63	ibid,	334.	64	ibid,	336.	65	Derrida,	Limited	Inc,	3.	
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the	listeners	surprise,	at	the	end	of	the	play,	Kasperl	awakes	in	his	bed	to	find	that	in	his	absence	radio	employees	had	installed	a	microphone,	undetected,	in	his	house	and	recorded	his	telling	of	tales	to	his	wife,	now	pressed	onto	forever	repeatable	records.	The	play	ends	with	a	demonstration	of	this	very	feat	by	repeating	a	passage	previously	heard	under	the	assumption	of	its	“liveness”.	Here,	the	dramaturgical	device	of	a	repetition,	not	unlike	that	employed	in	Brecht’s	theatre,	exposes	the	spectacle	of	Kasperl’s	racket	and	interference	as	an	effect	of	transfer	and	retention,	or	what	Rothe	calls	‘the	live-effect	of	radio’.		 The	radiophonic	Kasperl-theatre	reveals	itself	in	its	mediacy	[Mittelbarkeit],	in	its	medial	conditions	and	abysses.	For	in	the	end	it	becomes	unclear	what	it	is,	after	all,	that	one	hears.	Something	appears	on	the	stage	of	the	local	radio	station	that	is	not	there,	that	is	elsewhere,	of	which	no	one	knows,	if	it	is	now	or	past,	immediate	experience	of	the	live	[Live-Erlebnis]	or	stored	recordings.	Instead	of	ontological	security,	what	appears	[tritt	
auf]	in	the	radio	is	the	recording	as	recording.	The	radio-play	presents	itself	[stellt	sich	[…]	vor]	as	radio-play.66		
Afformative	Exappropriation		 Exposing	a	process	of	representing-before	(vor-stellen)	that	eschews	the	assured	alternation	of	concrete	representations	taking	place	in	the	element	of	a	transparent	medium,	the	double-take	of	the	Vor-
stellung	of	the	radio-play	as	radio-play	demands	of	its	listeners	to	‘read’	twice	over,	compelling	her	or	him	to	take	up	an	attitude,	not	only	to	the	reproduced	content,	but	to	the	excess	of	a	self-imparting	mediacy.	Following	a	pedagogical	concept	that	aims,	in	opposition	to	Weimar	radio’s	alignment	with	classical	educational	contents,	as	Rothe	suggests,	‘at	practicing	[Einüben]	a	“new	attitude”’,	it	purports	the	performative	
																																																								66	Rothe,	339.	
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appropriation	of	a	new	medium	in	the	medium’.67	In	doing	so,	it	follows	a	didactic	program	that	Benjamin	discerned	in	the	theatrical	experiments	of	Brecht	and	himself	developed	in	his	essay	on	a	proletarian	children’s	theatre.	Yet	the	‘performative	appropriation’	of	a	medium	that	can	no	longer	be	construed	as	a	means	to	an	end	must	necessarily	be	accompanied	by	a	simultaneous	attitude	[Haltung]	of	what	we	might	designate	as	an	‘afformative’	‘exappropriation’.	Whereas	the	latter	term,	borrowed	from	Derrida,	describes	‘the	necessary	failure	in	the	movement	of	appropriation	to	interiorize	that	which	remains	outside,	over	there,	always	out	of	reach,’68	the	former	comes	close	to	the	order	of	an	attitude	and	describes	a	certain	performativity	before	or	beyond	the	performative,	the	‘pre-positional,	pre-performative	–	and,	in	this	sense,	afformative	[mediality]’	of	technologies	of	imparting	that	Werner	Hamacher	identifies	and	locates	with	recourse	to	Benjamin’s	theory	of	language	and	violence	‘as	prior	to	and	in	instrumentality’.	‘[N]ever	primarily	or	exclusively	the	means	to	projected	ends	or	the	imposition	of	such	ends	[…],’	Hamacher		relates	with	a	formulation	that	rings	with	a	politics	of	bell-headed	pins	of	distanciation,	‘imparting	is	a	means	which	has	no	need	of	positings	and	which	may	undermine	any	established	
linguistic,	political	or	legal	institution	at	any	time’.69	Benjamin	develops	his	theory	of	an	irreducible	mediality	qua	impart-ability	in	his	early	essay	‘On	language	as	such	and	the	language	of	Man’	from	1916.	It	is	here,	as	Samuel	Weber	relates,	in	his	efforts	to	elaborate	a	noninstrumental	conception	of	language	rather	than	in	his	later	studies	of	radio,	film	and	photography	that	his	concern	with	the	“media”	originates.70	The	early	study	on	language,	as	Weber	suggests,	‘leads	Benjamin	to	insist	on	the	irreducible	immediacy	of	the	medial,’	as	it	has	here	been	pursued	in	the	context	of	Epic	Theatre	and	the	citability	of	gesture.																																																										67	ibid,	340.	68	De	Armitt,	132.	69	Werner	Hamacher,	‘Afformative	Strike:	Benjamin’s	‘Critique	of	Violence’	in	Destruction	&	Experience,	ed.	by	Andrew	Benjamin	and	Peter	Osborne,	108-136.	(Manchester:	Clinamen	Press	2000),	115	(my	emphasis).	70	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	118.	
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	 The	“medial”	is	“immediate”	in	the	sense	of	not	being	instrumental.	The	media	must	above	all	be	distinguished	from	the	means.	This	does	not,	however,	make	it	an	end	in	itself,	unless	“end”	is	understood	not	as	goal,	but	as	interruption.71			
Interrupting	the	Ostensibly	Transparent	Flow	of	Mediation:	Epic	
Theatre,	Deconstruction	and	the	Aristotelian	Heritage		 It	is	precisely	under	the	banner	of	such	an	interruption	that	Benjamin	elliptically	differentiates	Brecht’s	theatre	from	Aristotle’s	conception	of	drama	and	links	it	to	the	practice	of	exposing	the	non-instrumental	immediacy	of	the	medial	aspects	of	theatrical	spectacle.	Brecht’s	non-Aristotelian	dramaturgy	does	not	however	simply	contest	its	Aristotelian	heritage,	but	repeats	it	otherwise	–	following	a	strategy	of	‘transformational	citation’,	as	Weber	relates,	that	performs	one	of	the	central	themes	of	the	essays	themselves.	It	does	so	by	severing	the	interruption	of	the	“reversal”	[parapeteia]	from	its	end	in	catharsis,	‘the	discharge	of	affects	through	empathy	with	the	moving	fate	of	the	hero’.72	Such	an	end	simply	‘fell	off	and	away’	[fiel	fort,	fiel	weg],	Benjamin	says	with	an	expression	that	links	the	Einfall	of	the	caesura	–	both	interruption	(of	the	flow)	and	intrusion	of	the	outside	on	the	ostensibly	self-contained	–	with	a	constitutive	Ausfall	[failure]	of	eschatology,	the	absence,	so	to	speak,	of	a	Zeigarnik	effect	of	a	plot	that	fails	to	unfold	itself	as	‘a	sequence	of	events	with	beginning,	middle,	and	end,	adding	up	to	an	integrated,	meaningful	whole’.73	The	gesture,	as	the	definitive	trait	of	Epic	Theatre,	is	what	is	constituted	by	and	as	this	very	interruption.	What	it	interrupts,	Weber	relates,	is	that	‘which	ever	since	Aristotle	has	been	considered	to	form	the	primary	object	of	theatre	as	a	dramatic	
genre:	namely,	action.	Or	more	precisely:	plot’.74	‘It	is	precisely	such	an																																																									71	ibid.	72	Benjamin,	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater	(2)’,	25.	73	ibid,	21.	74	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	98.	
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action	and	its	narrative	representation	that	Brecht’s	Epic	Theatre,	as	a	theatre	of	gesture,	interrupts.75	What	is	already	implicit	in	Benjamin’s	text	becomes	more	elaborately	explicated	in	Weber’s	re-reading	of	Artistotle	and	Benjamin	in	light	of	the	latter’s	writings	on	Brecht.	In	Weber’s	account,	Aristotle’s	purported	convergence	of	“reversal”	[peripeteia]	and	“recognition”	[anagnōrisis]	seeks	to	imbue	tragedy	with	a	meaningful	unity	that	may	elevate	it	from	the	otherwise	contingent	medium	of	theatrical	spectacle.	Aristotle	therewith	wants	to	construe	the	medium	of	theatrical	spectacle	as	a	mere	means	to	an	end,	a	scenic	medium	that	‘allows	mimesis	[…]	to	take	place,	but	only	to	the	extent	that	it	fades	into	pure	transparency.	[…]’.76	Not	only	is	this	conception	of	theatre	concomitant	with	Aristotle’s	definition	of	media	in	general,	but	also,	as	Weber	points	out,	‘will	[it]	become	the	traditional	conception	of	“media”	as	such’,77	namely,	as	a	transparent	‘spatial	interval	between	two	points,	generally	an	emitter	and	receiver,	or	correlatively,	a	manifestation	and	its	reception	[…]	bridg[ing]	the	distance	between	the	two,	between	origin	and	end,	departure	and	arrival,	and	thereby	allow[ing]	an	indirect	contact,	a	transmission	or	communication,	to	take	place’.78	Derrida,	as	we	have	already	seen,	questions	the	place	and	the	taking	place	of	a	communication	thus	construed	and	seeks	to	displace	a	‘currently	accepted	concept	of	writing’	that	he	identifies	in	precisely	the	terms	of	the	Aristotelian	medium,	namely,	as	a	‘communication	in	the	limited	sense	of	a	transmission	of	meaning,	[…]	a	mere	means,	however	potent,	extending	enormously,	if	not	infinitely,	the	domain	of	oral	or	gestural	communication’.79	In	Derrida’s	analysis,	the	medium	is	construed	this	way	by	and	rendered	more	or	less	acceptable	for	a	phonocentric	tradition	that	seeks	to	adopt	the	seeming	priority	of	the	voice	in	its	illusory	or	phantasmatic	experience	of	a	pure	temporality	as	the	ideal	of	signification	in	general,	in	other	words,	of	the	experience	of																																																									75	ibid,	99.	76	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	101.	77	ibid,	100.	78	ibid,	101.	79	Derrida,	‘Signature,	Event,	Context’,	3.	
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the	effacement	of	a	signifier	able	to	give	access	to	the	productive	source	of	signification	itself.	The	deconstruction	of	phonocentrism	can	thus	be	recast	as	a	critique	of	the	seeming	transparency	of	the	medium	of	the	voice	in	its	ostensible	proximity	to	the	flow	of	a	self-archiving	life:	‘pure	auto-affection	that	necessarily	has	the	form	of	time	and	which	does	not	borrow	from	outside	itself	[…]’.80	If	this	phantasm	of	the	purity	of	temporal	self-relation,	as	Naas	summarizes	Derrida’s	argument,	‘is	radically	contradicted	by	‘time’	itself,	[and]	repetition,	space,	exteriority,	and	the	other	are	also	essential	to	the	constitution	of	time	[…],’	then	the	phantasmatic	experience	of	life’s	ostensible	flow	will	have	always	already	been	mediated.81	For	Derrida,	as	Naas	relates	with	recourse	to	the	latter,	‘the	choice	is	not	between	media	and	presence’	[…],	because	‘the	presentation	of	presence	itself	supposes	a	mediatic	structure’.82	Deconstruction	insists	on	the	opacity	of	all	forms	of	mediation,	which,	modelled	on	the	ideal	conception	of	a	pure	temporality,	more	or	less	convincingly	“pretend”	to	efface	the	coming	between	of	a	technological	apparatus	and	structure	of	reproduction	in	order	to	present	a	simulacrum	of	“real	presence”.83	Following	Samuel	Weber’s	account,	the																																																									80	Derrida,	Of	Grammatology,	20.	81	Naas,	Miracle	and	Machine,	146.	82	ibid,	150.	83	Michael	Naas,	in	reflecting	on	Derrida’s	expressed	fascination	with	television,	traces	a	spectrum	of	continuity	from	the	voice	to	TV	as	two	examples	of	media	with	a	unique	power	to	seemingly	efface	the	means	and	modes	of	their	production,	or	more	precisely,	of	their	reproduction.	The	unique	power	of	television,	for	Derrida,	according	to	Naas,	lies	in	its	ability	to	present	the	simulacrum	of	live	presence	by	linking	the	image	to	the	voice	and	the	voice	to	a	live	event.	In	doing	so,	as	Derrida	puts	it,	television	always	involves	a	protest	against	television	and	purports	to	show	the	thing	itself,	“live,”	directly,	effacing	the	technological	apparatus	and	the	structure	of	reproduction	that	made	it	possible	[ibid,	140].	Here,	the	technological	advancement	of	writing	technologies	extends	the	phantasm	of	the	voice	as	an	auto-affective	medium	qua	sound-recording	and,	linked	to	the	image,	pretends	to	give	access	to	the	productive	source	of	signification	itself.		The	language	of	a	putative	transparency,	self-effacement	and	presumed	auto-affection	applied	to	the	unique	power	of	television,	as	Naas	notes,	are	precisely	those	used	by	Derrida	to	develop	a	critique	of	phonocentrism	at	the	very	origin	of	deconstruction.	For	the	voice,	in	Derrida’s	earliest	analysis,	has	always	already	presented	itself	
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tradition	of	such	a	simulated	effacement	can	at	least	be	traced	back	to	Aristotle’s	efforts	to	subsume	the	scenic	medium	of	theatre	–	opsis	–	to	
synopsis,	‘the	act	of	taking	in	the	spectacle	“with	a	single	view”,	or	else	‘as	a	means	of	perception,	of	vision,	and	of	understanding’.84				
Dialectic	at	a	Stand-Still:	Reading	Against	the	Flow	and	Grain	of	
Meaning		 If	Aristotelian	drama	legitimises	the	scenic	medium	of	theatre	only	as	synopsis	and	locates	the	essence	of	the	‘theatron’	in	the	synthesis	of	perception	that	it	permits,	the	gestural	form	of	Epic	Theatre,	as	Benjamin	relates	it,	interrupts	the	consequent	sequence	of	dramatic	events	and	fixes	them	into	a	suspended	series	of	frame-like	enclosures	or	
Haltungen	[stilled	poses	and/or	attitudes].	The	ensuing	tension	between	stillness	and	temporal	flux	creates	a	rhythm	of	discontinuity	that	moves	forward	in	jolts	and	jerks,	as	Benjamin	puts	it,	‘comparable	to	the	images	of	a	filmstrip’.	‘The	basic	form	of	Epic	Theatre,’	Benjamin	says,	‘is	that	of	the	shock	with	which	the	single	contrasting	situations	of	the	play	clash	with	one	another’.85	The	fact	that	the	stilled	gesture	fragment	is	thus	nevertheless	caught	up	within	a	“living	flux,”	Benjamin	calls	‘one	of	the	dialectical	founding	features	of	the	gesture’.86	Benjamin’s	“dialectic,”	however,	as	Weber	reminds	us,	‘here	as	elsewhere,	is	very	different	from	the	more	familiar	Hegelian	category,	which	always	has	the	synthesis	of	conceptual	comprehension	as	its	informing	and	ultimate	goal’.87	Instead,	the	fixation	the	gesture	establishes	through	its	interruption	of	an																																																																																																																																																‘in	a	way	that	seems	to	efface	its	signifying	body,	that	is,	its’	dead,	mechanical	body,	giving	access	to	the	thing	itself’	[ibid,	145].	In	hearing	oneself	speak	the	signifier	would	become	perfectly	diaphanous	due	to	the	absolute	proximity	to	the	signified,	in	a	temporal	process	of	signification	purified	of	all	exteriority	or	spatiality.	84	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	99	&	101.	85	Benjamin,	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater	(2)’,	29.	86	ibid,	32.	87	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	100.	
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intentional,	goal	directed	movement	remains	suspended	and	‘singularly	extended’	qua	citability.	For,	as	Weber	continues	‘insofar	as	it	is	citable,	the	gesture	interrupts	itself,	and	indeed	only	“is”	in	its	possibility	of	becoming	other,	of	being	transported	elsewhere’.88	Not	only	does	it	interrupt	the	constructed	flow	of	narrative,	suspend	the	rush	to	judgement	and	derange	the	desire	for	identification,	but	also	does	it	
initiate,	as	Weber	formulates	it,	a	different	sort	of	movement,	marked	by	a	virtual	possibility	not	dependent	on	its	actual	realisation.	Distancing	or	separating	itself	from	itself,	the	citable	gesture	exposes	the	breach	that	structures	its	present	and	immediately	begins	to	gesture	towards	its	possible	transformation	in	time	and	space.	A	possibility	that	comes	between	“it-self”,	interrupts	the	gesture’s	immediate	manifestation,	and	constitutes	it	as	something,	as	Weber	says,	that	cannot	simply	be	seen	or	understood.89	In	other	words,	it	cannot	be	captured	or	seized		(-ceptum),	rendered	possessible	as	an	object	of	cognition	in	accordance	with	a	model	of	perception	as	a	‘moving	through	(per-)	something	to	arrive	at	what	lies	behind	it’.90	Instead,	following	a	demand	for	a	notably	different	activity,	it	must	be	read.	Although	for	one	who	is	reading,	Weber	says,	cognitions	are	also	indispensible,	‘they	do	not	provide	anything	to	hold	on	to’.91	In	the	context	of	his	reflections	on	his	own	experience	of	reading	Benjamin,	Weber	likens	the	situation	of	a	reader	to	‘someone	who	stares	at	things	until	they	begin	to	dance.	But	instead	of	disclosing	their	essence	through	their	dance,	they	seem	to	“implode,”	collapsing	into	an	endless	interior	space	and	becoming	“secret	signs”	(Geheimzeichen)’.92	The	latter	term,	borrowed	from	Benjamin,	is	also	employed	by	the	latter	in	a	theatrical	context	to	which	I	will	turn	in	more	detail	later	on,	namely,	the	essay	on	a	‘Program	for	a	Proletarian	Children’s	Theatre’.	There,	Benjamin	links	the	secrecy	of	the	signal	to	the	coming	of	the	future	with	a	formulation	that	itself	perhaps	begins	to																																																									88	ibid,	103.	89	ibid,	113.	90	ibid,	298.	91	ibid,	298-9.	92	ibid,	299.	
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dance	upon	being	read.	When	thinking	about	the	child’s	genius	of	variation,	Benjamin	writes	of	a	‘secret	signal	[geheimes	Signal]	of	the	to-come	[des	Kommenden]	that	speaks	from	the	gesture	of	the	child’.93	With	reference	to	the	brief	passage	from	‘Short	Shadows’	under	the	heading	of	the	Geheimzeichen,	Weber	further	links	the	activity	of	reading	to	what	we	might	call	a	counter-rhythm	to	the	progressive	flow	of	cognitions.	‘Not	the	progress	from	cognition	to	cognition	is	decisive,’	he	quotes	Benjamin,	‘but	rather	the	crack	and	leap	–	the	Sprung	–	in	each	one	individually’.94		 To	negotiate	the	crack	and	take	the	leap	is	to	read.	To	read	then	is	
not	to	go	with	the	flow,	as	one	speaks	–	or	believes	that	one	speaks	–	but	rather	groping,	stumbling,	interrupting	oneself,	like	an	older	person	whose	sight	has	weakened	bends	over	a	text,	following	its	movement	with	her	fingers,	always	stopping	anew,	but	only	in	order	to	continue.	Such	reading	goes	against	the	grain	of	meaning,	so	that	the	text	does	not	disappear	into	it	but	remains	as	figure:	as	writing-image	(Schriftbild).95			The	gestures	of	Epic	Theatre,	which	stand	still	and	suspended	in	the	interrupted	flow	of	the	sequence	of	events	do	not	give	passage	to	a	perceptive	movement	through	them	that	would	arrive	at	what	lies	behind,	for	instance	at	the	end	of	a	plot’s	resolution,	but	instead	are	imbued	with	the	spatio-temporal	status	of	a	remaining	as	figure	or	image	that	survives,	qua	citability,	the	singular	space	of	its	staging.	In	order	to	render	gestures	citable,	Benjamin	says	precisely	with	reference	to	a	certain	Schriftbild,	the	actor	of	Epic	Theatre	must	be	able	to	block	out	his	gestures	[Gebärden]	like	a	typesetter	his	words.96	One	way	to	accomplish	this,	he	adds,	is	for	the	actor	to	cite	his	own	gestures.	Brecht	himself	has																																																									93	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Programm	eines	proletarischen	Kindertheaters’,	
Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	II,	763-767.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1977),	769.	94	Benjamin	cited	in	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	299.	95	ibid,	(my	emphasis).	96	Benjamin,	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater	(2)’,	27.	
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described	the	latter	device	to	the	role	of	footnotes	in	a	text,	which	in	the	theatre	are	provided	for	a	relaxed	spectator	alongside	the	habit	of	turning	back	in	order	to	check	a	point.97	The	relaxed	audience	of	Epic	Theatre,	no	longer	tensely	following	the	flow	of	(represented)	events,	is	a	reading	one.	Intervals	between	discontinuous	fragments	of	the	remains	of	a	plot,	force	an	audience	to	take	up	a	position	[Stellungnahme]	with	regards	to	the	interrupted	scene	and	its	mode	of	representation.	Caught	up	in	the	movement	of	the	immediate	mediacy	of	the	clearly	framed	spatio-temporality	of	the	gesture	as	theatrical	medium,	of	the	virtuality	that	ensues	from	its	appeal	to	response-ability	beyond	any	given	response,	the	place	of	this	position	or	stance	[Stellungnahme]	though	turns	out	anything	but	secure.	For	if	the	audience,	like	the	gesture	itself,	merely	stands-in,	as	Weber	asserts,	the	positing	[setzen]	of	their	response	immediately	finds	itself	deposited	[entsetzt].	Theirs	is	an	encounter	with	the	theatrical	medium	as	excess	and	Schwelle.	‘The	citability	of	gesture,’	Weber	says,	‘interrupts	its	immediate	manifestation	and	constitutes	it	as	interruption,	which	is	to	say,	as	something	that	cannot	simply	be	seen,	but	that	can	give	rise	to	Nachdenken,	to	after-thoughts,’	for	which	reading,	Weber	suggests,	is	another	word.98			 Such	thoughts,	Weber	states,	‘consider	the	“after,”	the	aftermath,	the	citability	of	the	gesture	as	disjunctive	and	discontinuous.	Through	this	disjunction,	the	essence	of	the	gesture	resides	in	its	tendency	to	always	come	too	late,	and	yet	at	the	same	time	never	to	arrive	fully;	it	belongs	to	the	future,	never	simply	to	the	present	or	to	the	past.	The	mode	of	being	that	characterizes	this	disjunctive	theatre	of	the	future,	therefore,	is	not	that	of	“necessity”	or	of	“probability,”	as	Aristotle	insisted,	but	rather	that	of	“possibility”	both	as	potentiality	and	as	alterity:	the	possibility	of	becoming	other	than	what	is	currently	present	or	presented.																																																									97	Carrie	Lambert-Beatty,	Being	Watched	-	Yvonne	Rainer	and	the	1960s.	(Cambridge:	The	Mit	Press	2008),	63.	98	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	105.	
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But	this	future	is	not	what	one	expects,	which	one	hopes	to	foresee,	to	calculate	or	even	to	bring	about.	It	is	unforeseeable,	unpredictable,	unfathomable.	Writing	of	the	indispensable	freedom	of	such	theatre	to	alter	“historical	processes”	in	their	staging,	Benjamin	observes	that	the	“accents	must	be	placed	not	upon	those	momentous	decisions	that	are	located	at	the	vanishing	points	of	expectation	[Fluchtlinien	der	Erwartung],	but	on	the	incommensurable,	the	singular.	‘It	can	happen	this	way,	but	it	can	also	come	about	in	an	entirely	different	manner’	–	this	is	the	basic	attitude	of	anyone	writing	epic	theatre’.	Paradoxically,	perhaps,	what	epic	theatre	does	in	bringing	a	certain	history	to	a	standstill,	[…]	is	to	keep	open	the	possibility	of	what	is	yet	to	come,	which	in	German,	as	in	French,	is	the	name	assigned	the	future:	Zu-kunft,	a-
venir.99		
The	Uncertain	Place	of	Theatre	and	the	Theatricality	of	the	Ethos		 In	Weber’s	writings	on	Benjamin’s	-abilities	and	‘theatricality	as	medium’	more	generally,	which	in	many	respects	here	form	the	starting	point	for	and	are	closely	interwoven	with	my	own	project,	the	theatre	takes	on	an	ambiguous	status	for	its	close	relation	to	the	concept	of	theatricality,	which,	as	Weber	alerts,	‘is	not	the	same	as	theatre,	although	also	not	separable	from	it’.		The	purported	inseparability	of	theatricality	from	theatre	allows	Weber	to	bring	certain	experiences	of	working	in	the	theatre	to	an	ostensibly	very	different	context,	namely,	an	analysis	of	texts,	‘in	which	the	reader	is	called	upon	to	play	an	active	part’.100	For	the	latter,	Weber	suggests,	‘[…]a	transformative	involvement	of	the	reader	is	required	in	order	for	the	text	“itself”	to	function,	just	as	an	“audience”	is	required	for	a	representation	to	be	“theatrical”’.101	To	consider	the	workings	of	a	text	as	theatrical,	Weber	proposes,	counters	an	academic																																																									99	ibid,	105.	100	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	ix.	101	ibid.	
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tendency	‘to	be	guided	by	a	notion	of	a	long-lasting,	if	not	eternal	truth’,	with	the	‘far	more	ephemeral,	more	localized,	and	more	singular’	goal	of	a	theatrical	production.	As	the	latter	can	nevertheless	be	subject	to	powerful	efforts	at	containing	such	situated	singularities,	what	stands	at	the	centre	of	Weber’s	concern	is	‘the	tension	between	the	effort	to	reduce	the	theatrical	medium	to	a	means	of	meaningful	representation	by	enclosing	its	space	within	an	ostensibly	self-contained	narrative,	and	the	resistance	of	this	medium	to	such	reduction’.102	Weber,	as	we	saw,	here	has	in	mind	the	dominant	aspect	of	an	Aristotelian	conception	of	drama	and	its	continual	hold	over	contemporary	commercial	media	from	theatre	and	film	to	television	and	News	production.	In	the	final	chapter	of	the	thesis,	I	will	further	link	this	long	tradition	of	seeking	to	foreclose	the	situated	appeal	to	the	socio-individual	co-production	of	the	accustomed	place	of	the	ethos	to	Bernard	Stiegler’s	account	of	the	‘symbolic	misery’	of	our	times,	portrayed	as	a	mass	of	isolated	consumers	barred	from	participation	in	the	production	of	cultural	history	by	monopolist	memory	industries.	The	theatrical	practices	under	consideration	here,	as	well	as	the	medium	of	theatre	more	generally,	become	a	paradigmatic	if	uncertain	place	for	the	demonstrated	resistance	to	the	instrumentalisation	of	media	and	the	passivity	of	consumption.	For	Weber,	what	allows	the	medium	of	theatre	to	resist	its	reduction	to	a	means	in	the	first	place,	however,	is	precisely	what	associates	it	with	language	or	media	in	general,	namely,	the	priority	of	the	signifying	function	over	that	of	representation.	Language’s	ability	of	signifying,	which	it	shares	with	theatre,	Weber	notes,		 far	from	reducing	the	materiality	and	corporeality	of	theatre,	[…]	marks	their	irreducibility.	[…T]he	process	of	signifying	always	leaves	something	out	and	something	over:	an	excess	that	is	also	a	deficit,	or	as	Derrida	has	formulated	it,	a	“remainder”	–	une	reste.	
																																																								102	ibid,	x.	
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It	is	the	irreducibility	of	this	remainder	that,	ultimately,	renders	language	theatrical,	and	theatricality	significant.103					If	Weber’s	project,	apart	from	a	fascination	with	an	experience	of	‘reading	[texts]	in	the	strong	sense,’	finds	another	source	of	influence	in	‘the	experience	of	working	as	a	dramaturg	in	German	productions	of	theatre	and	opera	during	the	1980s	and	1990s,’	the	trajectory	of	his	thought	is	nevertheless	one	that	harnesses	sparsely	accounted	for	experiences	of	theatrical	practice	for	the	close	reading	of	philosophical	and	dramatic	texts	in	order	to	draw	from	them	a	generalised	concept	of	‘theatricality	as	medium’	in	the	context	of	philosophy	and	literary	studies.104	Yet	there	are	also	some	indications	of	the	possibility	for	a	reverse	movement	of	application,	that	is,	a	harnessing	of	certain	experiences	of	reading	and	working	with	texts	that	are	theatrical	to	an	analysis	of	theatrical	performances	that	are	textual.	Whereas	my	own	trajectory	has	initially	also	been	one	that	brought	practical	experiences	of	working	in	the	theatre	to	the	reading	of	philosophical	texts,105	it	is	the	aspect	of	this	latter	movement	that	will	at	least	implicitly	guide	my	analysis	of	theatrical	practices	under	consideration	in	the	later	stages	of	the	thesis.	In	these	analyses	–	a	brief	engagement	with	Yvonne	Rainer’s	1960s	experiments	in	dance	and	a	more	prolonged	reading	of	the	contemporary	theatrical	practice	of	the	American	performance																																																									103	ibid.	104	ibid.	105	In	brief:	From	1999	to	2002	I	attended	Dartington	College	Arts	to	study	(Devised)	Theatre	in	a	practice-oriented	environment	rooted	in	a	theatrical	tradition	indebted	to	the	experiments	of	the	Neo-Avant-Garde.	Between	2002	and	2009,	before	embarking	on	a	part-time	MA	in	Cultural	Studies	and	finally	this	PhD	project,	I	worked	extensively	as	a	theatre	practitioner,	dramaturg	and	part-time	lecturer	in	contemporary	performance	studies.	Thus,	albeit	developing	a	conceptual	force	that	does	not	depend	on	these	experiences,	the	recurrent	terms	of	my	analysis	–	i.e.	gesture,	Haltung,	rehearsal	–	nevertheless	resonate	with,	carry	and	thus	facilitate	the	survival	of	situated	experiences.	In	doing	so,	following	a	structure	that	ties	singularity	to	repetition,	they	allow	for	the	passage	between	different	yet	inseparable	contexts	and	become	the	site	of	a	secret	encounter,	able	to	gather	together	and	allow	for	a	sharing	across	the	abyss	of	absolutely	heterogeneous	singular	experiences.	
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companies	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	–	the	textuality	of	theatre	lies	at	the	heart	of	its	very	theatricality	and	must	no	longer	be	opposed,	as	a	longstanding	tradition	within	Theatre	and	Performance	Studies	perhaps	has	it,	to	its	ephemeral,	localized,	singular,	corporeal	qualities.		In	hailing	the	ephemeral	as	the	hallmark	of	contemporary	theatrical	practice	in	strong	opposition	to	the	perceived	permanence	and	authority	of	“writing,”	“recording”	and	the	“archive,”	the	discipline	of	Performance	Studies	has	often	been	seen	to	lie	in	pursuit	of	wresting	the	study	of	performance	away	from	the	traditions	of	analysis	of	the	(dramatic)	text.		Such	an	endeavour	might	indeed	be	justified	if	the	latter	is	exclusively	conceived	as	guided	by	a	notion	of	the	long-lasting,	if	not	eternal	truth	of	representation.	Yet	if	the	limited	functioning	of	the	medium	of	language	is	conditioned	on	its	unconditional	opening	to	the	coming	of	time,	the	experience	of	finitude	and	singularity	can	no	longer	be	the	exclusive	(paradoxically	elusive)	“object”	of	Performance	Studies.	What	is	more,	the	simple	opposition	of	the	experience	of	the	ostensible	permanence	of	writing	with	the	ephemeral	singularity	of	performance	tends	to	overlook	the	latter’s	structural	dependence	on	the	ability	of	performance	to	remain	otherwise	in	the	long	aftermath	of	its	response-	qua	iter-ability.	In	the	dynamic	scenario	of	such	a	necessarily	transformative	survival	the	experience	of	singularity	can	only	ever	be	what	resists	yet	nevertheless	paradoxically	depends	on	“its”	repeatability.	As	such,	the	structure	as	well	as	the	force	of	theatrical	experience	finds	itself	inextricably	linked	to	the	textual	dynamic	of	its	possibilities	of	remaining.	In	emphasising	the	iterable	aspects	of	theatrical	practice,	the	thesis	implicitly	follows	and	further	contributes	to	what	Carl	Lavery,	in	a	recent	article	for	Performance	Research,	has	identified	as	a	shift	within	Performance	Studies	from	a	long-standing	infatuation	with	the	disappearing	liveness	of	the	event	of	performance	to	a	concern	with	its	untimeliness,	its	“present”	haunted	by	both	its	past	and	future.	What	is	more,	by	focusing	on	Benjamin’s	conception	of	the	citability	of	gesture	and	the	theatre	as	Schwellung,	it	closely	follows	
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Lavery’s	call	for	an	emphasis	on	the	haunting	of	the	future	that	he	identifies	with	recourse	to	Derrida	as	an	act	of	teleiopoesis	–	a	telephone	call	or	message	transmitted	to	distant	others.	Lavery’s	summary	of	the	possible	place	for	a	thought	of	teleiopoesis	in	contemporary	theatre	studies,	albeit	irreducible	to	my	project	at	large,	may	nevertheless	help	to	indicate	its	position	with	regards	to	longstanding	and	on-going	debates	of	the	discipline:		 The	recent	interest	in	archives	and	re-enactments	by	theatre	and	performance	scholars	and	practitioners	in	the	past	decade	or	so	has	foreclosed	previous	debates	(perhaps	even	obsessions)	about	the	authentic	status	of	‘live’	versus	‘recorded’	performance.	As	Amelia	Jones,	Adrian	Heathfield,	Diana	Taylor,	and	Rebecca	Schneider	have	argued	so	plausibly,	performance	never	comes	to	an	end;	its	present	is	always	haunted	by	both	its	past	and	future.	However,	in	this	dominant	attempt	to	think	of	performance	as	ruin,	to	posit	it	as	a	‘dialectical	image’	or	'specter'	that	refuses	to	exit	the	scene,	the	onus	has	been	largely	placed	on	the	first	haunting	–	the	haunting	from	history.	What	tends	to	be	forgotten	in	this	alternative	approach	to	theatre	historiography	is	the	other	side	of	this	anachronistic	coin:	namely,	the	extent	to	which	performance	is	engaged	in	an	act	of	teleiopoesis,	a	telephone	call	or	message	transmitted	to	distant	others	–	ghosts	from	the	future.	As	Derrida	explains	in	his	The	Politics	of	Friendship,	teleiopoesis	does	not	consume	the	present	in	the	name	of	an	Hegelian	telos,	the	result	of	which	is	already	predetermined;	rather	it	burns	itself	up	for	the	sake	of	a	future	whose	meaning	can	neither	be	predicted	nor	foretold,	and	which	might	offer	new,	unexpected	ways	of	being.106																																																											106	Carl	Lavery	&	Lee	Hassall,	‘A	Future	for	Hashima’	in	Performance	
Research:	A	Journal	of	the	Performing	Arts,	112-125	(2015).	20:3,	112-113.	
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If	the	emphasis	of	analysis	might	indeed	shift,	as	Lavery	proposes	it,	from	a	concern	with	the	haunting	of	the	past	to	that	of	the	haunting	of	the	future,	this	should	not	detract	from	the	structural	inextricability	of	the	two.		The	thesis	emphasises	such	inextricability	with	recourse	to	a	conception	of	theatre	as	rehearsal,	a	dynamic	process	that	maintains	a	simultaneous	reference	to	the	past	and	to	the	future.	In	doing	so	I	further	seek	to	employ	the	concept	of	rehearsal,	as	well	as	of	the	theatre	as	rehearsal,	as	a	model	Haltung	for	the	participatory	task	of	inheritance.	As	an	instance	of	public	rehearsal,	the	theatre,	far	from	closing	the	latter’s	dynamic	of	re-working	the	past	as	the	call	for	its	future	transformation,	further	opens	this	call	to	the	coming	of	the	other’s	countersignature.		Yet	if	theatricality	–	the	exposing	of	a	(re-)inscribed	present	to	the	unmasterable	coming	of	time	and	the	other’s	response	–	results	from	a	general	coming	between	of	media	of	inscription	that	divides	and	exposes	the	ostensible	self-presence	of	individual	and	collective	identities,	to	rehearse	by	reworking	the	socio-individual	fund	of	temporal	inscriptions	of	an	inheritance	might	be	said	to	merely	follow	the	necessarily	precarious	program	of	what	Derrida	has	described	as	the	general	structure	of	life	as	survival.	A	survival,	as	we	might	say,	that	is	precariously	theatrical	for	the	uncertainties	pertaining	to	the	exact	place	of	its	taking-place.	Derrida’s	descriptive	and	performative	account	of	such	necessarily	theatrical	exposure	to	the	other	for	all	limited	self-relation	qua	inscription,	always	entails	a	deconstruction	of	sovereignty	and	self-mastery,	that	is,	of	‘the	self’s	or	the	subject’s	ability	to	return	to	and	assert	itself	in	its	freedom’	[…],	‘automobilic	and	autotelic,	[…]	of	itself,	by	itself,	giv[ing]	itself	its	own	law	with	its	own	self	in	view’.107	In	light	of																																																									107	Michael	Naas,	‘“One	Nation…Indivisible”:	Jacques	Derrida	on	the	Autoimmunity	of	Democracy	and	the	Sovereignty	of	God’	in	Research	in	
Phenomenology	36,	15-44	(2006),	20.	The	performative	or	better	afformative	aspect	of	Derrida’s	writing	style,	which	can	often	be	seen	to	be	overtly	involved	with	itself	as	style,	committed	to	‘performative	gestures’	that	engage	language	never	simply	as	a	transparent	means	to	an	end,	but	rather	as	what	we	might	call	with	Benjamin	the	setting	–	
Schauplatz	-	for	the	staging	of	thought,	takes	account	of	and	plays	with	the	structural	theatricality	of	language.	Hyperaware	of	the	unmasterable	
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such	a	generalised	account	of	theatricality	as	the	structure	of	all	limited	socio-individual	self-relation,	the	analysis	of	a	politics	of	rehearsal,	although	at	times	rooted	to	certain	practices	and	experiences	of	theatre	as	a	privileged	realm	of	its	demonstration,	does	not	exclusively	depend	on	them.	Put	differently,	in	order	to	develop	the	thought	of	a	politics	of	rehearsal	it	will	have	not	been	necessary	to	go	to	the	theatre	in	the	narrow	sense.	And	indeed,	the	thesis	does	not	always	go	there.	Instead,	it	sees	the	theatre	ubiquitously	emerge	as	the	uncertain	place	of	a	precarious	organisation	of	an	ethos	in	the	thralls	of	autoimmune	processes	of	self-deconstruction.	Thus,	before	and	beyond	the	theatrical	practices	under	consideration	here,	the	irreducibility	of	the	participatory	call	of	non-present	remainders	that	renders	inscription	in	general	
theatrical	–	arche-writing	as	arche-stage	–	makes	of	the	politics	of	rehearsal	a	generalised	practice	of	the	socio-individual	co-production	of	an	essentially	precarious	ethos.	By	the	exposition	of	its	structural	crisis	that	cannot	be	relegated	to	the	status	of	an	accident,	the	‘accustomed	place’	or	‘habitat’	of	the	ethos,	the	more	or	less	instituted	organisation	of	(everyday)	life,	turns	into	the	divided	space	of	theatre.	It	is	along	these	lines	that	I	read	Benjamin’s	fascinated	engagement	with	the	German	baroque	and	the	writings	of	Franz	Kafka	as	paradigmatic	scenes	for	the	threat	and	chance	of	a	crisis	of	experience	[Erfahrung]	in	the	wake	of	the	coming	undone	of	traditional	organisations	of	life	during	the	technological,	spatial,	industrial	and	philosophical	upheavals	of	modernity.	The	Haltung	of	a	politics	of	rehearsal	that	responds	to	an																																																																																																																																																afterlife	of	the	marks	of	a	text	in	his	authorial	and	authoritative	absence,	Derrida’s	style	heeds	to	an	attitude	–	here	closely	linked	to	a	conception	the	Haltung	of	a	politics	of	rehearsal	–	that	Samuel	Weber	describes	as	‘the	more	or	less	deliberate	attempt	of	thinking	to	look	over	its	shoulder,	[…]	to	hold	itself	open	to	its	heterogeneity,	to	sensitize	itself	to	the	fact	that	it	depends	upon	an	alterity	that	is	neither	its	property	nor	simply	its	negation’	[Samuel	Weber,	Mass	Mediauras:	Form,	Technics,	Media.	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press	1996),	171].	For	Weber,	Derrida’s	style	‘implies	a	structure	of	language	and	a	process	of	articulation	that	includes	a	practical,	performative	moment	which	[…]’,	as	he	puts	it,	‘is	where	one	has	to	start	–	and	probably	end	–	if	one	is	to	respond	to	the	trace	of	the	other,	to	that	dimension	of	alterity	to	which	thinking	is	so	profoundly	indebted’	[ibid,	171].	
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exposed	structural	crisis	of	meaning,	self-mastery	and	institution	without	seeking	to	overcome	it,	amounts	to	the	demonstrated	affirmation	of	the	constitutive	limit	of	sovereignty	as	the	call	for	the	perpetual	reworking	of	an	inheritance.	It	affirms	and	aggravates	the	becoming	opaque	of	sedimented,	habitual	orders	of	socio-individual	self-relation	to	reveal	their	fundamental	historicity	as	well	as	to	bear	the	virtual	intrusion	of	their	future	possibilities.				
The	Amateur	
	 The	‘accustomed	place’	and	‘habitat’	of	the	ethos,	the	house	and	home	and	the	being	at	home	with	one-self	of	a	more	or	less	familiar	place	of	dwelling	inextricably	relates	the	experience	of	a	familiar	space	to	time.	Relative	spatial	security	depends	on	the	temporal	possibilities	of	remaining,	repetition	and	return,	of	the	construction	of	‘customs’	and	‘habits’	that	rely	on	the	limited	continuity	of	identity	qua	inscription.	In	other	words,	the	place	of	the	ethos	is	never	given	as	such,	but	emerges	through	and	remains	deconstructible	with	the	movement	of	spacing,	the	becoming	space	of	time	and	the	becoming	time	of	space.	‘Without	such	inscription,’	as	Martin	Hägglund	notes,	‘there	would	be	nothing	to	retain	or	protend,	no	mediation	between	past	and	future,	and	consequently	no	perception	or	self-awareness	at	all’.108	The	ethos	thus	springs	from	a	hetero-affective	scene	by	which	‘the	subject	[or	a	culture]	can	constitute	itself	only	through	inscription,	[…]	is	dependent	on	that	which	is	exterior	to	itself	[…][:]	arche-writing	as	“the	opening	to	exteriority	in	general”	since	it	stems	from	the	impossibility	of	anything	ever	being	in	itself’.109	If	arche-writing	thus	inscribes	the	movement	of	identity	formation	in	a	scene	of	necessary	exposure,	the	place	of	such	a	more	or	less	precarious	taking-place	is	that	of	an	arche-stage,	‘[t]his	being	outside	itself	of	time’																																																									108	Martin	Hägglund,	Radical	Atheism.	Derrida	and	the	Time	of	Life.	(Stanford	California:	Stanford	University	Press	2008),	71.	109	ibid.	
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qua	spacing.110	To	inhabit	the	scene	of	such	a	spatialised	exposure,	upon	which	all	limited	identity	formation	depends,	entails	theatricality,	or	what	Weber	calls	a	‘theatrical	iterability’,	that	is,	a	modality	of	acting,	for	which		 […]	the	“act”	of	an	‘actuality’	[…]	must	be	repeatable	in	order	to	be	
enacted’.	The	“en-”	of	“enactment”	is	thus	inseparable	from	the	implicit	“ex-”	of	an	iterability	that	can	never	be	self-contained.		“Theatricality”	results	when	the	impossibility	of	self-containment	is	exposed	by	iterability	as	a	‘scene’	that	is	inevitably	a	“stage,”	but	which,	as	such,	is	determined	by	what	we	call	a	“theatre”.111			 If	every	house	(of	being)	has	a	door,	the	latter’s	opening	and	exposure	to	the	outside	(on	the	inside)	makes	of	it	a	theatrical	stage	or	podium.	On	this	podium,	I	hear	Benjamin	say,	one	must	make	oneself	a	home	away	from	home.	In	other	words,	one	must	cunningly	make	do	with	little	in	the	absence	of	the	securities	of	the	proper.	What	emerges	towards	the	end	of	the	thesis	is	that	the	exemplary	figure	best	equipped	for	such	fragile	home-making	endeavours	will	have	been	the	amateur.	The	figure	of	the	amateur	perpetually	seeks	for	renewed	possibilities	of	a	transforming	and	transformative	participation	in	the	socio-individual	construction	of	a	precarious	ethos	from	within	an	affirmed	position	of	limited	security.	Albeit	not	appearing	by	name	until	very	late	on,	there	are	others	that	here	prefigure	his	or	her	eventual	“arrival”	on	the	scene.	In	Chapter	1,	which	reads	Benjamin’s	account	of	the	historical	situation	of	the	German	baroque	as	an	aggravated	experience	of	structural	processes	of	self-deconstruction,	it	is	the	plotter	of	the	German	baroque	Mourning	Play	who	turns	out	best	equipped	to	continue	to	participate	in	the	construction	of	the	ethos	in	the	wake	of	an	epochal	crisis	of	eschatology	and	sovereignty.	In	Chapter	2,	it	is	the	film	actor	that	seeks	to	save	his	“humanity”	in	front	of	an	apparatus	by	his	test-performances																																																									110	ibid,	72.	111	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	341.	
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in	‘the	time	of	reproducibility,’	who	is	able	to	find	a	limited	reach	of	play	[Spielraum]	by	working-with	rather	than	for	the	apparatus.	In	Chapter	3,	Kafka’s	assistants	and	the	clumsy	creatures	in	the	bestiary	of	Edwina	Ashton	–	including	Walter	Benjamin	–	can	be	found	vulnerably	exposed	but	nevertheless	at	work	in	high-spirited	and	cunning	pursuits	to	find	pathways	everywhere.	Chapter	4	brings	together	the	theatrical	experiments	of	Bertolt	Brecht,	Yvonne	Rainer	and	others	at	Judson	Dance	with	Benjamin’s	account	of	the	genius	of	variation	of	the	child	in	proletarian	children’s	theatre,	from	who’s	testing,	exappropriative	gestures	speaks	‘the	secret	signal	of	the	to-come’.112	In	Chapter	5,	Echo’s	ruse	of	speaking	of	and	for	herself	under	the	tight	constraint	of	having	to	follow	the	other	is	also	the	modality	of	the	restrained	appropriative	method	and	style	of	the	‘non-performers’	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door,	demonstratively	relaunching	an	inheritance.	Across	these	diverse	contexts	of	theatrical	exposure	in	the	wake	of	epochal	or	demonstrative	aggravations	of	auto-immune	processes	of	sovereignty’s	self-deconstruction,	the	amateur’s	high	spirited	and	cunning	participation	becomes	a	model	of	resistance	to	the	stultifying	transmission	of	a	sealed	inheritance.	Revolting	against	his	or	her	reduction	to	a	passive	consumer,	the	amateur’s	reworking	of	an	inheritance	by	a	gesture	of	exappropriation	that	calls	for	the	coming	participation	in	the	perpetual	reconstruction	of	the	ethos	here	constitutes	the	model	Haltung	of	a	politics	of	rehearsal.			
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								112	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Programm	eines	proletarischen	Kindertheaters’,	769.		
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CHAPTER	ONE	
	
	
	
Engaging	the	Self-Deconstruction	of	Sovereignty:		
Crisis,	Finitude,	Immanence,	Swelling	and	Allegory	in	the	
German	Baroque	Trauerspiel		
Preamble:	The	Politics	of	Virtuality	in	the	Context	of	Ontotheology		 To	pursue	the	thought	of	a	politics	of	rehearsal	is	to	pursue	the	thought	of	what	Samuel	Weber	calls	the	political	effectiveness	of	‘a	certain	thinking	of	virtuality,	possibility,	potentiality	[…]	–	a	certain	virtualization	of	conceptualization	itself	[and]	of	“meaning”’.113	Throughout	his	reading	of	Walter	Benjamin’s	writings	on	Brecht,	Weber	identifies	and	describes	the	modality	of	such	political	bearings	with	reference	to	the	gestures	of	Epic	Theatre	as	the	modality	of	being	of	a	‘disjunctive	theatre	of	the	future’.	No	longer	a	drama	‘of	“necessity”	or	of	“probability,”	as	Aristotle	insisted,	but	rather	that	of	“possibility”	both	as	potentiality	and	as	alterity:	the	possibility	of	becoming	other	than	what	is	currently	present	or	presented’.114	Interrupting	the	expressive	intentionality	of	an	action,	the	teleology	of	a	narrative,	or	the	causal	necessity	or	probability	of	a	sequence	of	events,	the	gesture’s	arrest	of	time	and	of	history	undermines	the	auto-telos	of	intentionality	to	keep	open	the	possibility	of	what	is	yet	to	come.	The	possibility	of	the	gesture’s	citation	–	its	citability	–	intrudes	upon	its	event,	which	begins	to	swell	under	the	virtualisation	of	its	non-identity,	that	is,	its	structural	dehiscence	as	an	inscribed	possibility	of	alterity.	The	discrete	gesture	of	Epic	Theatre,	a	fixed	element	with	a	clear	beginning	and	ending,	begins	to	resemble	a	written	syntagma,	of	which	Derrida	is	to	say	in	terms	that																																																									113	Samuel	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium.	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press	2004),	35.	114	Samuel	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	105.	
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strongly	echo	Benjamin’s,	that	it	‘can	always	be	detached	from	the	chain	in	which	its	is	inserted	[…]	without	causing	it	to	lose	all	possibility	of	functioning’.	‘One	can	perhaps	further	come	to	see	other	possibilities	in	it,’	Derrida	says	of	the	syntagma,	‘by	inscribing	it	or	grafting	it	onto	other	chains’.115	Yet	this	recognition	of	other	possibilities	does	not	depend	on	a	horizon	of	their	deferred	realisation.	On	the	contrary,	it	can	be	recognized,	Derrida	asserts,	‘even	in	a	mark	that	in	fact	seems	to	have	occurred	only	once.	[…S]eems,	because	this	one	time	is	in	itself	divided	or	multiplied	in	advance	by	its	structure	of	repeatability’.116	Weber,	an	avid	reader	of	Benjamin’s	persistent	and	ubiquitous	conception	of	the	virtuality	of	media	that	ensues	from	the	suspense	of	all	messaging	–	what	Derrida	might	designate	as	the	‘articulatory	break,’	‘the	interruption	of	address	as	address’	–	alerts	to	and	sketches	its	resonance	with	the	Derridian	conception	of	iterability	thus	construed	with	recourse	to	the	very	context	that	first	brought	this	term	to	the	fore.	That	privileged	context	is	the	two	essays	that	retrospectively	make	up	Derrida’s	uncertain	“confrontation”	with	the	speech	act	theorist	J.R.	Searle,	
Signature,	Event,	Context	and	Limited	Inc.	Yet	the	fact	that	iterability,	as	Weber	notes,	would	remain	one	of	only	a	few	terminological	constants	throughout	Derrida’s	subsequent	writings,	together	with	the	evidence	of	Benjamin’s	proliferate	use	of	the	suffix	-ability	for	a	great	variety	of	his	most	important	concepts,	seems	indicative	of	a	structural	resonance	between	these	two	thinkers	that	by	far	exceeds	the	specificity	of	these	or	any	other	given	contexts.	In	what	follows,	I	briefly	want	to	go	in	pursuit	of	this	excess,	by	cursorily	indicating	how,	for	both	Benjamin	and	Derrida,	an	interest	in	what	Weber	calls	the	political	effectiveness	of	a	certain	thinking	of	virtuality,	possibility	and	potentiality	seems	inextricably	linked	to	a	shared	engagement	with	the	inheritance	and	perhaps,	as	we	might	here	put	it,	Umfunktionierung	[refunctioning	or	reworking]	of	an	Abrahamic	religious	tradition.	Michael	Naas,	for	instance,	speaks	of	the	later	Derrida’s	‘constant	emphasis	[…]	on	the																																																									115	Jacques	Derrida,	Limited	Inc,	9.	116	ibid,	48.	
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ontotheological	origins	of	so	many	of	our	seemingly	nontheological	and	even	secular	concepts’.117	Similarly,	Sigrid	Weigel	describes	what	she	identifies	as	one	of	Benjamin’s	life	long	attitudes	as	a	‘commitment	to	questions	that	have	escaped	theology	after	it	lost	its	privileged	claim	to	interpretation’.118	To	further	render	a	shared	interest	in	the	structural	thought	of	a	politics	of	virtuality	in	the	context	of	grappling	with	the	continuous	aftereffect	of	a	theological	organization	of	temporal	experience	and	its	“secularization,”119	I	will	begin	by	outlining	in	minutia	how	Derrida’s	‘radical	atheism’120	or	‘radical	secularity’121	develops	in	close	relation	to	the	deconstruction	of	the	ontotheological	origin	of	the	concept	of	sovereignty.122	Here,	it	will	be	a	matter	of	indicating	how	Derrida’s	critique	of	the	theo-logic	of	sovereignty	–	whether	of	the	self,	the	nation-state,	or	God	–	that	in	essence	is	thought	to	be	indivisible,	unsharable,	and	unlimited,	develops	in	close	relation	to	a	conception	of	life	as	autoimmune	survival.	This	unconditional	opening	to	the	coming	of	time	and	necessary	risk	of	corruptability	(as	the	only	chance	for	perfectibility)	prohibits	the	relegation	of	the	failure	of	sovereignty	to	the																																																									117	Michael	Naas,	Miracle	and	Machine,	58.	118	Sigrid	Weigel,	Die	Kreatur,	das	Heilige,	die	Bilder.	(Berlin:	Fischer	2008),	12.	119	For	Benjamin,	secularization	precisely	describes	the	shattering	of	such	temporal	organization	–	i.e.	of	a	notion	of	history	derived	from	the	Christian	promise	of	individual	redemption	–	that	involves,	as	we	will	see	in	more	detail	later	on,	‘the	conversion	of	originally	temporal	data	into	spatial	inauthenticity	and	simultaneity’	[Walter	Benjamin,	Ursprung	des	
deutschen	Trauerspiels.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1978,	56].	120	See	Hägglund.	121	See	Michael	Naas,	Derrida	From	Now	On.	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2008).	122	‘Radical	Atheism	–	Derrida	and	the	Time	of	Life’	is	the	title	of	a	book	by	Martin	Hägglund.	Michael	Naas	puts	forward	the	notion	of	a	‘radical	secularity’	in	his	essay	‘Derrida’s	Lacïté’.	Whereas	I	will	have	recourse	to	Hägglund’s	reading	of	Derrida	throughout,	Naas’s	reflections,	although	crossing	but	also	perhaps	exceeding	the	themes	developed	here	is	never	broached	directly.	‘[Derrida’s]	deconstruction	of	the	Abrahamic	filiation	was	carried	out,’	Naas	argues,	‘[…]	in	the	name	of	what	I	will	hazard	to	call	an	originary	or,	better,	a	radical	secularity	that	inscribes	faith	(though	not	religion)	at	the	very	origin	of	the	sociopolitical	and	thus,	Derrida	argues,	at	the	very	origin	of	all	sovereignty’	[Michael	Naas,	
Derrida	From	Now	On.	(Fordham:	Fordham	University	Press	2008),	63].	
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status	of	a	mere	accident	as	well	as	a	metaphysical	conception	of	‘history	and	knowledge	[…]	as	detours	for	the	purpose	of	the	reappropriation	of	presence’.123	Finally,	I	seek	to	indicate	how	Derrida’s	ultratranscendental	description	of	the	autoimmunity	of	finitude	that	deconstructs	a	theological	tradition	from	within	may	find	in	Benjamin’s	account	of	the	epochal	crisis	of	Christian	eschatology	during	the	German	baroque	a	paradigmatic	context	of	its	experience.	Far	from	seeking	to	reduce	the	ultra-	or	quasi-transcendental	status	of	Derrida’s	argument	to	that	of	an	empirical	historical	condition,	I	seek	to	suggest	how	certain	historical	conditions	might	favour	its	empirical	exposure.124	Here,	the	epochal	situation	of	the	German	baroque,	as	Benjamin	and	Weber	describe	it,																																																									123	Jacques	Derrida,	Of	Grammatology,	trans.	by	Gayatri	Chakravorty	Spivak.	(Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1998),	10.	124	Hägglund	employs	the	terminology	of	the	ultratranscendental	to	mark	Derrida’s	insistence	on	the	limitless	generality	of	differance	and	the	structure	of	the	trace	that	applies	to	all	fields	of	the	living.	To	think	the	ultratranscendental	condition	of	spacing,	Hägglund	notes,	‘is	thus	to	think	a	constitutive	finitude	that	is	absolutely	without	exception.	From	within	its	very	constitution	life	is	threatened	by	death,	memory	is	threatened	by	forgetting,	identity	is	threatened	by	alterity,	and	so	on’	[Hägglund,	19,	my	emphasis].	In	describing	the	ultratranscendental	status	of	the	condition	of	spacing	and	its	relation	to	the	empirical,	Hägglund	precisely	seeks	to	set	it	apart	from	its	onto-theological	reduction	to	a	Fall,	a	metaphysical	move	that	responds	to	the	facts	of	corruption	by	positing	a	lost	original	plenitude	as	a	recoverable	telos	instead	of	accounting	for	its	necessary	structural	possibility:	‘If	time	must	be	spatially	inscribed,	then	the	experience	of	time	is	essentially	dependent	on	which	material	supports	and	technologies	are	available	to	inscribe	time.	That	is	why	Derrida	maintains	that	inscriptions	do	not	befall	an	already	constituted	space	but	produce	the	spatiality	of	space.	Derrida	can	thus	think	the	experience	of	space	and	time	as	constituted	by	historical	and	technological	conditions,	without	reducing	spacing	to	an	effect	of	a	certain	historical	or	technological	epoch.	If	spacing	were	merely	
an	effect	of	historical	conditions,	it	would	supervene	on	something	that	
precedes	it	and	thus	adhere	to	the	metaphysical	notion	of	spacing	as	a	Fall.	Spacing	is	rather	an	ultratranscendental	condition	because	there	has	never	been	and	will	never	be	a	self-presence	that	grounds	the	passage	between	past	and	future.	That	is	why	any	moment	always	must	be	recorded	in	order	to	be.	The	ultratranscendental	movement	of	spacing	thus	accounts	for	why	there	is	neither	a	beginning	nor	an	end	to	historicity	and	technicity.	The	inscriptions	that	trace	time	are	susceptible	to	all	sorts	of	transformations,	and	erasures,	but	the	general	condition	of	spacing	cannot	be	eliminated’	[ibid,	27,	my	emphasis].	
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comes	to	figure	a	specific	historical	context	that	seems	particularly	receptive	or	prone	to	‘the	effects	of	deconstruction.’	Furthermore,	if	the	context	of	the	German	baroque,	as	I	want	to	suggest,	is	‘most	vulnerable	to	certain	autoimmune	or	self-deconstructive	processes,’	the	Trauerspiel	perhaps	constitutes	a	model	for	an	attitude	of	‘their	thoughtful	engagement’.125	Put	differently,	on	the	level	of	experience,	the	situation	of	the	German	baroque	as	Benjamin	conceives	it,	becomes	a	paradigmatic	scene	of	an	increasing	difficulty	to	disavow	a	constitutive	finitude,	vulnerability	and	exposition	to	the	unpredictable	coming	of	time.	The	response	of	the	German	baroque	Trauerspiel	[Mourning	Play]	to	this	epochal	crisis	of	eschatology	–	that	Weber	will	designate	as	an	allegorical	
theatricalization	–	is	one	that	no	longer	seeks	to	overcome	this	crisis	once	and	for	all.	As	such,	it	no	longer	falls	within	a	theological	conception	of	history	as	a	detour	for	the	purpose	of	the	reappropriation	of	presence,	or	else,	within	a	narrative	of	the	Fall	and	a	conception	and	experience	of	time	as	the	more	or	less	regulated	path	towards	salvation.	Instead,	it	might	be	said	to	resemble	an	attitude	[Haltung]	that	no	longer	disavows	the	conditional	nature	of	sovereignty	in	light	of	a	constitutive	finitude	and	the	structural	status	of	the	crisis	of	meaning,	but	begins	to	affirm	the	essential	play	of	a	structural	undecidability.	Benjamin’s	own	interest	in																																																									125	Naas,	From	Now	On,	109.	To	be	sure,	the	context	from	which	I	have	here	grafted	certain	formulations	of	Michael	Naas,	which	are	put	forwards	in	relation	to	more	current	historico-political	settings,	has	very	little	to	do	with	ours.	Thus,	when	Naas	speaks	about	a	‘thoughtful	engagement’	of	the	themes	of	deconstruction	as	opposed	to	certain	self-deconstructive	processes,	he	is	likely	to	be	speaking	about	an	engagement,	albeit	perhaps	irreducible	yet	nevertheless	closely	related	to	the	reception	of	and	response	to	Derrida’s	work.	In	our	context,	a	‘thoughtful	engagement’	with	the	self-deconstructive	process	of	an	epoch	might,	in	the	first	instance,	come	down	to	its	mere	affirmation.	Thus,	of	an	avowal	of	the	limits	of	sovereignty	that	constitute	an	alternative	to	a	paranoid	reflex	that	wants	to	reclaim	and	reassert	the	phantasm	of	an	indivisible	and	omnitemporal	sovereignty	in	the	wake	of	its	historical	crisis.	As	a	response	to	the	experience	of	a	crisis	of	sovereign	action,	it	engages	this	crisis	through	the	disjunctive	gesture	of	a	‘calculation	with	the	incalculable’.	[see	Jacques	Derrida,	‘Force	of	Law:	The	Mystical	Foundation	of	Authority’	in	Cardozo	Law	Review	11	(1989-1990),	trans.	by	Mary	Quaintance,	947].	
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the	German	baroque	is	of	course	anything	but	merely	historico-empirical.	Together	with	his	writings	on	modernity	and	the	application	of	a	general	theory	of	allegory,	as	Howard	Caygill	has	pointed	out,	it	forms	part	of	‘a	broader	“theological”	critique	of	humanism,’	and	thus	precisely	of	a	theological	inheritance	that	continues	to	inform	an	ostensibly	secularized	concept	of	freedom	as	self-mastery	and	collective	historical	progress.126	Yet	for	all	of	Benjamin’s	efforts	to	sharply	demarcate	his	historicist	operation	‘from	what	might	generally	be	considered	to	be	empirical	history,’	as	Samuel	Weber	insists,	‘the	last	is	by	no	means	unimportant	to	the	way	in	which	[he]	approaches	the	relationship	between	allegory	and	theater,	to	which	his	interpretation	of	modernity	will	remain	indebted’.127	That	the	context	in	which	Benjamin,	as	I	want	to	argue,	accounts	of	this	empirical	history	as	a	privileged	scene	for	the	exposure	of	the	structural	paradigm	of	the	virtuality	of	media,	is	the	one	notable	exception	to	his	otherwise	widespread	employment	of	the	virtualizing	suffix	of	–ability,	seems	at	first	perhaps	counter-intuitive.	Yet,	as	Weber	points	out,	‘[a]lthough	Benjamin	does	not	employ	such	a	formulation	in	that	text	[The	Origin	of	German	Tragic	Drama],	one	such	shines	in	its	absence:	the	notion	of	“Deutbarkeit,”	the	ability	to	signify	and/or	to	be	interpreted.	“Deutbarkeit,”’	as	Weber	puts	it	with	a	formulation	that	returns	us	to	the	structural	thought	of	(a	politics	of)	virtuality,	‘is	the	silent	but	virtual	medium	of	allegory’.128			
																																																								126	Howard	Caygill,	‘Walter	Benjamin’s	Concept	of	Cultural	History’	The	
Cambridge	Companion	to	Walter	Benjamin	ed.	by	David	Ferris,	73-96.	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	2006),	49.	127	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	162.	128	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	331.	As	Benjamin’s	thesis	is	precisely	at	pains	with	dismissing	a	commonly	held	view	of	the	Trauerspiel	as	a	bad	cover	version	of	tragedy	by	discerning	its	self-conscious	differentiation	from	the	latter,	the	English	translation	of	Trauerspiel	with	‘tragic	drama’	seems	unfortunate	at	best.	A	more	literal	and	more	potent	translation	of	
Trauerspiel	would	be	Mourning	Play.	In	what	follows	I	will	keep	references	to	the	Trauerspiel	in	the	German	original.	
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Learning	How	to	Live/Die:	Derrida’s	Radical	Atheism	and	the	
Aporias	of	Survival				 One	must	not	stray	far	from	the	central	arguments	of	Signature,	
Event,	Context	and	Limited	Inc	to	find	the	conception	of	iterability	as	the	necessarily	inscribed	virtual	possibility	of	alterity	of	a	written	syntagma	or	mark	in	general	at	least	implicitly	linked	to	the	refutation	of	a	religious	desire	for	absolute	immunity.	In	the	context	of	Signature,	Event,	Context	the	latter	seemingly	informs	what	is	there	called	a	certain	philosophical	tradition	that	accounts	for	the	failure	of	communication	only	at	a	distant	outside	from	the	presupposed	simplicity	of	an	original	essence	that	always	remains	recoverable	as	arche	or	telos.	In	contrast,	Derrida	seeks	to	revise	the	status	of	this	failure	of	communication	and	communion	by	seeking	to	account	for	the	possibility	of	corruption	as	the	very	condition	for	its	limited	success.	For	the	necessary	movement	of	idealization	that	guarantees	the	functioning	of	the	mark	beyond	the	death	of	its	author	or	addressee	is	at	the	same	time	what	must	compromise	the	strict	ideality	of	the	mark	and	the	total	arrival	of	a	communicated	content.	Only	through	the	structural	opening	onto	an	unmasterable	alterity	qua	iterability	do	limited	effects	of	presence	or	meaning	become	possible	in	the	first	place.	In	the	essay,	Derrida	briefly	alerts	us	to	the	fact	that	this	general	structure	must	not	be	limited	to	any	narrowly	defined	field	of	communication,	but	is	in	fact	the	law	of	“experience”	in	general:		 This	structural	possibility	of	being	weaned	from	the	referent	or	from	the	signified	(hence	from	communication	and	from	its	context)	seems	to	me	to	make	every	mark,	including	those	which	are	oral,	a	grapheme	in	general;	which	is	to	say	[…]	the	nonpresent	remainder	[restance]	of	a	differential	mark	cut	off	from	its	putative	“production”	or	origin.	And	I	shall	even	extend	this	law	to	all	“experience”	in	general	if	it	is	conceded	that	there	is	
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no	experience	consisting	of	pure	presence	but	only	of	chains	of	differential	marks.129			The	latter	formulation	hints	at	Derrida’s	conception	of	life	as	survival	that	springs	from	the	necessary	movement	of	the	tracing	of	time.	Hägglund	eloquently	summarizes	this	double	movement	of	spacing	as	follows:		 Given	that	the	now	can	appear	only	by	disappearing	–	that	it	passes	away	as	soon	as	it	comes	to	be	–	it	must	be	inscribed	as	a	trace	in	order	to	be	at	all.	This	is	the	becoming-space	of	time.	The	trace	is	necessarily	spatial,	since	spatiality	is	characterised	by	the	ability	to	remain	in	spite	of	temporal	succession.	Spatiality	is	thus	the	condition	for	synthesis,	since	it	enables	the	tracing	of	relations	between	past	and	future.	Spatiality,	however,	can	never	be	in	itself;	it	can	never	be	pure	simultaneity.	Simultaneity	is	unthinkable	without	a	temporalisation	that	relates	one	spatial	juncture	to	another.	This	becoming-time	of	space	is	necessary	not	only	for	the	trace	to	be	related	to	other	traces,	but	also	for	it	to	be	a	trace	in	the	first	place.	A	trace	can	only	be	read	after	its	inscription	and	is	thus	marked	by	a	relation	to	the	future	that	temporalizes	space.	This	is	crucial	for	Derrida’s	deconstruction	of	the	logic	of	identity.	If	the	spatialisation	of	time	makes	the	synthesis	possible,	the	temporalisation	of	space	makes	it	
impossible	for	the	synthesis	to	be	grounded	in	an	indivisible	presence.	The	synthesis	is	always	a	trace	of	the	past	that	is	left	for	
the	future.	Thus,	it	can	never	be	in	itself	but	is	essentially	exposed	to	that	which	may	erase	it.130			Against	a	conception	of	spacing	as	Fall,	Derrida	thus	goes	on	to	spell	out	in	Limited	Inc	the	necessity	to	include	in	any	philosophical	description	–																																																									129	Derrida,	Limited	Inc,	10.	130	Hägglund,	18.	
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‘i.e.	in	what	is	described,	but	also	in	the	practical	discourse,	in	the	writing	
that	describes’	–	‘not	merely	the	factual	reality	of	corruption	and	of	alteration,	but	corruptability	[…]	and	dissociability,	traits	tied	to	iterability’.131	With	reference	to	what	we	might	here	designate	as	the	performative	aspect	of	a	practical	discourse	or	act,	Derrida	therewith	proposes	a	certain	modality	of	doing,	an	attitude	and	style,	an	ethico-political	bearing	of	the	effects	of	virtualisation	in	the	production	of	meaning	as	the	necessarily	inscribed	possibility	of	iter-	as	alteration.	In	the	absence	of	an	eschatology	of	meaning-to-say,	that	is,	‘the	telos,	which	orients	and	organizes	the	movement	and	the	possibility	of	a	fulfilment,	realisation,	and	actualisation	in	a	plenitude	that	would	be	present	to	and	identical	with	itself,’	without	foregoing	all	desire	for	temporal	remaining	and	however	limited	effects	of	presence,	one	must	bear	a	paradoxically	essential	limit	to	one’s	intentionality	and	the	aporias	of	responsibility	that	spring	from	it.132	To	bear	such	a	constitutive	exposure	to	finitude	in	the	absence	of	the	consoling	narratives	of	a	deferred	possibility	of	redemption	is	to	demonstrate	a	necessary	refutation	of	the	religious	value	of	the	unscathed,	the	pure	and	the	untouched,	the	sacred	and	the	holy,	the	safe	and	sound:	absolute	immunity	as	the	supremely	
																																																								131	Derrida,	Limited	Inc,	78.	132	In	brief,	I	am	here	thinking	of	the	aporia	at	the	heart	of	the	experience	of	hospitality,	justice	and	democracy,	which	are	always	also	experiences	of	the	impossible	and	the	undecidable	impasse	between	an	unconditional	hospitality	to	the	coming	of	time	(and	thus	to	a	justice	and	democracy	that	must	remain	to	come)	and	the	laws	which	come	to	limit	and	condition	it	in	its	inscription	as	a	law.	In	as	far	as	pure	unconditional	hospitality	exempts	from	all	responsibility	it	cannot	amount	to	a	political	concept.	Derrida	therefore	does	not	deny	the	necessity	of	‘defensive	measures,’	as	Hägglund	puts	it,	that	try	‘to	reckon	with	unpredictable	and	potentially	violent	events.’	Home-making	endeavours	that	must	however	remain	deconstructable	as	they	‘may	always	turn	out	to	be	inadequate	and	are	fundamentally	exposed	to	the	undecidable	coming	of	time,	which	can	challenge	or	overturn	what	has	been	prescribed’	[Hägglund,	40].	Derrida	fittingly	describes	the	improbable	yet	necessary	experience	of	an	impossible	justice	[but	the	same	can	be	said	for	hospitality	and	democracy]	as	a	moment	in	which	the	decision	between	just	and	unjust	is	never	insured	by	a	rule	and	thus	requires	a	calculation	with	the	
incalculable	[Derrida,	‘Force	of	Law’,	947].		
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desirable’.133	In	other	words,	it	is	the	description	and	demonstration	of	the	fact	that	‘[f]initude	is	[…]	not	a	negative	limitation	that	prevents	us	from	having	access	to	the	fullness	of	being,’	but	‘[o]n	the	contrary,	[…]	is	an	unconditional	condition	that	makes	the	fullness	of	being	unthinkable	as	such’.134	The	experience	of	an	essential	exposure	to	finitude	constitutes	a	challenge	to	sovereignty	that	is	both	threatening	and	full	of	hope.	‘[A]utoimmunity,’	the	essential	corruption	of	the	ostensibly	unscathed,			 is	not	an	absolute	ill	or	evil.	It	enables	an	exposure	to	the	other,	to	
what	and	to	who	comes	–	which	means	that	it	must	remain	incalculable.	Without	autoimmunity,	with	absolute	immunity,	nothing	would	ever	happen	or	arrive;	we	would	no	longer	wait,	await,	or	expect,	no	longer	expect	one	another,	or	expect	any	event.135				‘Derrida’s	crucial	move,’	Hägglund	summarizes,			 is	to	mobilize	the	unconditional	exposure	to	what	happens	–	to	whatever	or	whoever	comes	–	in	order	to	deconstruct	the	concept	of	sovereignty.	If	there	were	a	sovereign	instance,	nothing	could	ever	happen	to	it	since	it	would	be	completely	given	in	itself.	The	concept	of	sovereignty	is	thus	predicated	on	the	exclusion	of	time.	As	Derrida	puts	it	in	Rogues,	“sovereignty	neither	gives	nor	gives	itself	time;	it	does	not	take	time”.	While	the	indivisible	presence	of	sovereignty	traditionally	has	been	hailed	as	absolute	life,	Derrida	underscores	that	it	is	inseparable	from	absolute	death.	Without	the	exposition	to	time,	nothing	could	ever	happen	and	nothing	could	emerge.	Or	as	Derrida	writes	in	Of	Grammatology:	“pure	presence	itself,	if	such	a	thing	were	possible,	would	be	only																																																									133	Hägglund,	8.	134	ibid,	30	135	Jacques	Derrida,	Rogues:	Two	Essays	on	Reason.	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press	2005),	152.	
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another	name	for	death”.	Absolute	sovereignty	is	thus	not	a	desirable	consummation	that	is	unattainable	because	of	our	human	limitations.	Absolute	sovereignty	is	unattainable,	unthinkable,	and	undesirable	because	it	would	extinguish	every	trace	of	life.136		Iterability,	as	the	essential	opening	of	every	effect	of	presence	or	meaning	to	the	possibility	of	its	corruption,	is	thus	another	name	for	this	structural,	autoimmune	challenge	to	sovereignty.	As	the	chance/threat	of	temporal	survival	–	the	becoming	space	of	time	and	the	becoming	time	of	space	–	it	conditions	the	experience	of	time	on	an	unmasterable	alterity.	As	a	paradoxically	repeatable	singular	mark	of	a	particular	place	and	time,	the	iterable	‘signature’	is	able	to	remain	in	spite	of	temporal	succession	on	the	condition	of	the	possibility	of	the	other’s	‘counter-signature’.	Any	ostensibly	indivisible	presence	of	a	sovereign	instance	finds	itself	compromised	from	its	inception	by	its	necessary	exposure	qua	repeatability	to	the	coming	of	time.	‘In	saying	this	I	wish	to	be	recognized,’	Derrida	says	in	an	interview	to	perhaps	express	a	desire	for	a	limited	effect	of	sovereignty,	only	to	add:	‘but	what	I	have	said	is	something	that	I	cannot	reappropriate’.137	‘When	I	say	this,’	Derrida	goes	on	to	say,	‘I	know	I	am	speaking	of	my	death	[…]	where	I	will	no	longer	be	able	to	reappropriate	the	future.	Only	a	mortal	can	speak	of	the	future	in	this	sense,	a	god	could	never	do	so’.138	Given	that	the	limit	of	reappropriation	is	also	the	condition	for	anything	to	arrive	in	the	future	and	thus	for	the	affirmation	of	life	as	a	necessarily	compromised	survival,	Derrida’s	radical	atheism	spells	out,	as	Hägglund	insists,	not	only	that	God	does	not	exist	but	also	‘that	the	immortality	of	God,’	as	well	as,	concomitantly,	the	indivisible	presence	of	sovereignty,	‘is	not	desirable	in	the	first	place’.139	The	crisis	of	meaning	and	meaning-to-say,	to	return	to																																																									136	Hägglund,	20-30.	137	Jacques	Derrida	&	Maurizio	Ferraris,	A	Taste	for	the	Secret.	trans.	by	Giacomo	Donis.	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press	2001),	23.	138	ibid.	139	Hägglund,	8.	
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the	context	and	rhetoric	of	Signature,	Event,	Context,	‘is	not	an	accident,	a	factual	and	empirical	anomaly	of	spoken	language,	it	is	also	its	positive	possibility	and	its	“internal”	structure,	in	the	form	of	a	certain	outside’.140	With	this	conception	of	a	structural	failure	of	communication	as	a	necessarily	inscribed	possibility	of	dissociation	–	and	thus	of	
dissociability	as	the	condition	of	all	limited	association	–	we	are	perhaps	not	far	from	a	certain	experience	of	isolation	and	Trauer	[sadness,	melancholy,	mourning]	as	Benjamin	detects	it	in	the	wake	of	an	institutional	crisis	of	the	German	baroque.	The	crisis	of	eschatology	that	follows	the	Reformation’s	rejection	of	“good	works,”	deprives	the	institutions	of	the	Church	and	the	state	of	the	‘power	to	endow	collective	life	with	a	meaning	that	could	comprehend	and	surpass	individual	mortality’.141	The	allegorical	mode	of	perception	and	signification	that	Benjamin	identifies	as	a	model	response	to	this	difficult	temporal	experience,	must	therefore	answer	‘to	the	problematic	situation	of	an	isolated	self	and	its	difficult	relation	to	the	community’.142	With	this	in	mind,	it	seems	noteworthy	to	see	Derrida,	when	prompted	in	an	interview,	to	readily	associate	his	conception	of	the	constitutively	precarious	form	of	all	association	with	what	he	there	calls	‘a	community	that	does	not	constitute	itself	on	the	basis	of	a	contemporaneity	of	presences	but	rather	through	the	opening	produced	by		[…]	
allegoresis’.143	Derrida	goes	on	to	define	the	latter	as	‘the	interpretation	of	a	text	not	given,	not	closed	in	on	itself,	an	interpretation	that	itself	transforms	the	text’.144	To	participate	in	such	ongoing	transformations	of																																																									140	Derrida,	‘Signature,	Event,	Context’,	11.	141	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	171.	142	ibid,	168.	143	Derrida	&	Ferraris,	24.	144	ibid.	‘We	would	have,	then,’	Derrida	goes	on	to	say,	‘a	community	of	writing	and	reading	–	a	community	that	would	be	bound	by	a	testament	to	the	law	that	is	neither	given	in	advance	nor	understood	in	advance.	[…T]he	force	of	the	future	that	has	to	be	at	work	in	it	has	to	be	a	force	of	disruption	no	less	than	a	force	of	integration,	a	force	of	dissension	no	less	than	a	force	of	consensus.	Why	call	it	a	community?	[….]	If	I	have	always	hesitated	to	use	this	word,	it	is	because	too	often	the	word	‘community’	resounds	with	the	‘common’	[commun],	the	as-one	[comme-un]’	[ibid,	24-
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a	text	and	law	not	given	in	itself	is	to	challenge	the	dominant	but	far	from	sovereign	efforts	of	its	politico-institutional	closure,	as	well	as	learning	how	to	die,	that	is,	how	to	accept	the	radical	finitude	of	every	art	of	living.	Learning	how	to	finally	live,	Derrida	says	in	a	last	interview	saturated	with	the	imminence	of	his	own	death,	‘ought	to	mean	learning	how	to	die	–	to	acknowledge,	to	accept,	an	absolute	mortality	–	without	positive	outcome,	or	resurrection,	or	redemption,	for	oneself	or	for	anyone	else’.145	And	yet,	he	clarifies	and	problematizes,	albeit	believing	in	this	truth	he	is	unable	to	resign	himself	to	it.	‘I	have	never	learned	to	accept	it,	to	accept	death,	that	is,’	he	says.146	Derrida	therewith	describes	the	experience	of	an	aporia,	or	else,	the	structure	of	experience	as	aporia	–	between	the	acceptance	and	inacceptance	of	the	radical	immanence	of	mortal	life	–	and	links	the	necessary	gesture	of	its	bearing	to	the	structure	of	a	paradoxical	survival.	On	the	one	hand,	resigned	to	the	absence	of	all	guarantees	to	the	(positive)	outcomes	of	any	of	our	acts,	helplessly	and	precariously	exposed	to	the	coming	of	time.	On	the	other,	no	absolute	acceptance,	if	not	an	outright	revolt,	against	the	mere	passive	consignment	to	the	infinite	finitude	of	this	coming	without	some	temporary	reprieve,	that	is,	a	minimal	if	necessarily	weak	hold	over	the	passage	of	time	in	the	radical	absence	of	redemptive	horizons.	Such	a																																																																																																																																																5].	In	his	reading	of	Benjamin’s	insistent	analysis	of	the	difference	between	Trauerspiel	and	Tragedy,	Weber	indicates	its	relation	to	two	different	conceptions	of	“community.”	Albeit	unable	here	to	reconstitute	the	larger	context	of	this	analysis,	the	following	quotation	should	nevertheless	be	able	to	indicate	the	general	direction	of	this	comparison	and	its	relevance	in	our	context,	namely,	how	both	the	Trauer	[mourning]	and	Spiel	[play]	of	Trauerspiel	are	inextricably	related	to	an	experience	of	the	disintegration	and	reproblematization	of	the	status	of	community	during	the	German	baroque:	‘What	the	baroque	mourns	is	not	just	the	death	of	tragedy,	but	also	the	significance	of	death	for	tragedy.	The	baroque	mourns	the	loss	of	a	notion	of	death	that	entailed	the	promise	of	a	New	Order,	that	of	self-identical	subjectivity:	the	One	God,	the	universality	of	Man,	determining	itself	as	a	People,	and	gathering	itself	into	the	totality	of	community’	[Weber,	Benjamin’s	
abilities,	157].	145	Brault,	Pascale-Anne	&	Naas,	Michael	trans.	Learning	to	Live	Finally.	
An	interview	with	Jean	Birnbaum.	(Hoboken,	NJ:	Melville	House	Publishing	2010).	146	ibid.	
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double	gesture,	memory	and	forgetting,	defensive	measure	and	vulnerable	exposure,	calculation	with	the	incalculable,	follows	the	logic	of	a	trace	that	is	‘not	just	the	inscription	of	memory	and	legacy	but	the	mark	of	abandon	or	loss,	a	way	of	marking	not	just	one’s	presence	but	one’s	absence	and	death’.147	It	is	a	way,	as	Derrida	puts	it,	of	living	one’s	death	in	writing	at	each	moment	of	one’s	life:		 The	trace	I	leave	signifies	to	me	at	once	my	death,	either	to	come	or	already	come	upon	me,	and	the	hope	that	this	trace	survives	me.	This	is	not	a	striving	for	immortality;	it’s	something	structural.	I	leave	a	piece	of	paper	behind,	I	go	away,	I	die:	it	is	impossible	to	escape	this	structure,	it	is	the	unchanging	form	of	my	life.	Each	time	I	let	something	go,	each	time	some	trace	leaves	me,	“proceeds”	from	me,	unable	to	be	reappropriated,	I	live	my	death	in	writing.148		Derrida’s	formulations	here	clearly	seem	to	stress	the	ultratranscendental	status	of	his	description	of	an	inescapable	structure	of	life	as	survival.	Yet	at	the	same	time,	they	engage,	reinscribe	and	perhaps	refunction	the	religious	concept	of	a	hope	for	salvation	by	evoking,	as	we	might	here	put	it,	a	weak	hope	for	a	non-sovereign	survival.		Benjamin’s	portrayal	of	the	German	baroque	as	an	epoch	in	the	grips	of	anxiety	and	melancholy	in	face	of	a	crisis	of	eschatology,	describes	a	problematic	experience	of	time	that	might	be	said	to	call	for	the	refunctioning	of	an	inherited	concept	of	hope.	By	making	the	latter	dependent	on	“faith	alone”	in	the	wake	of	the	Reformation,	depriving	it	of	all	institutional	guarantees	of	access	to	grace,	the	overriding	feeling	of	the	epoch	was	marked	by	a	hopeless	despair	before	the	coming	of	time.	The	Trauerspiel,	as	the	paradigmatic	locus	for	a	reworking	of	hope,	was	not	a	theatre	that	made	sad	but	one	that	was	performed	before	those	who	are.	The	modality	of	its	allegorical	theatricalizations	that	seek	to																																																									147	ibid.	148	ibid,	32-33	(my	emphasis).	
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reanimate	what	is	otherwise	experienced	as	an	‘empty	world,’	could	thus	be	said	to	bear	every	hope	although	remaining	itself	without	hope.	‘Not	hopeless,	in	despair,	but	foreign	to	the	teleology,	the	hopefulness	and	the	
salut	of	salvation’.149			
	
The	Baroque	Trauerspiel	as	a	Response	to	a	Religious	Crisis	of	
Eschatology		 In	his	essay,	Storming	the	Work,	Samuel	Weber	reads	Benjamin’s	
Ursprung	des	Deutschen	Trauerspiels	[Origin	of	the	German	Mourning	Play]	by	seeking	to	stress	the	Trauerspiel’s	theatrical	employment	of	allegory	as	a	response	to	a	specific	historical	situation	that	he	identifies	as	a	crisis	in	Christian	eschatology	in	the	wake	of	the	Reformation.	Following	Benjamin,	Weber	designates	the	epochal	situation	of	the	baroque	as	‘a	paradoxical	historical	configuration,	characterized	on	the	one	hand,	by	the	hegemony	of	Christianity	in	Europe	and,	on	the	other,	by	the	threatened	implosion	of	this	hegemonic	force	through	the	challenge	of	the	Reformation	[…]’.150	‘For	all	that	the	increasing	worldliness	of	the	Counter-Reformation	prevailed	in	both	confessions,’	Benjamin	says	of	the	baroque,	‘religious	concerns	did	not	lose	their	importance:	it	was	just	that	this	century	denied	them	a	religious	solution,	demanding	a	secular	solution	instead’.151	What	distinguishes	the																																																									149	Derrida,	Rogues,	13.	150	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	160.	151	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	60	and	Benjamin,	The	Origin	of	German	Tragic	
Drama.	trans.	John	Osborne.	(London:	Verso	2009),	79.	Translations	of	Walter	Benjamin’s	Ursprung	des	deutschen	Trauerspiels	take	their	starting	point	from	John	Osborne’s	translation,	yet	are	more	or	less	modified	by	myself	throughout.	References	are	made	both	to	the	German	and	English	editions.	If	only	the	German	edition	is	referenced,	translations	were	made	without	consultation	of	Osborne.	Additionally,	citations	of	Benjamin	are	at	times	also	made	with	recourse	to	how	they	appear	in	the	writings	of	Samuel	Weber	as	indicated.	In	those	cases	they	are	Weber’s	translations	of	the	original	German.	
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specifically	German	experience	of	this	religious	crisis	of	epochal	proportion,	Weber	relates,	was	the	absence	of	a	modern	unified	state	apparatus	that	would	have	been	able	to	respond	to	these	demands.	The	particularity	of	that	situation	paved	the	way	for	another	worldly	institution	to	offer	up	such	a	response	in	its	stead.	That	institution	was	the	theatre.	The	capacity	of	theatre	‘to	offer	a	possible	way	out	of	the	dilemmas	resulting	from	a	failing	religious	and	cosmic	order,’	Weber	says,	‘will	guide	Benjamin	in	his	approach	to	the	German	Trauerspiel	and	to	modernity	in	general.152		What	the	worldly	institution	and	medium	of	theatre	was	called	upon	to	respond	was	an	increasing	feeling	of	anxiety	induced	precisely	by	the	problematic	experience	of	a	certain	failure	of	an	instituted	mediation,	namely,	between	the	profane	world	and	the	sacred	realm,	between	finite	life	and	transcendent	meaning,	between	a	fallen	creation	and	the	prospect	of	salvation.	Whereas	the	traditional	Christian	eschatological	narrative	had	sought	to	assuage	such	anxieties,	the	latter’s	waning	significance	exposes	them	brutally.	What	is	more,	whereas	the	institution	of	the	Catholic	Church	had	been	put	in	the	service	of	regulating	and	guaranteeing	the	relation	of	worldly	means	to	sacred	ends,	the	Reformation’s	radical	antinomianism	severed	what	was	perceived	as	an	immanent,	fallen	world	from	all	socially	organised	access	to	grace.	‘If	the	German	baroque	had	to	be	characterized	through	a	single	trait,’	Weber	notes,		 this	might	be	the	one:	for	it	the	Fall	has	become	a	permanent	decline.	There	is	no	Beyond	any	longer.	Therefore	all	eschatology,	at	least	in	the	Christian,	redemptive	sense,	is	excluded.	And	therefore	its	originary	milieu	was	the	“strict	immanence”	resulting	from	the	Reformation.153			
																																																								152	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	166	(my	emphasis).	153	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	304.	
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The	Trauerspiel’s	solution	to	the	prevalent	problematic	of	the	German	baroque	was	to	find	a	way	out	within	–	and	thus	never	fully	or	once	and	for	all	–	that	is,	a	way	out	of	a	melancholic,	alienating,	despairing	and	stultifying	experience	of	the	immanence	of	mere	life	without	recourse	to	a	posited	instance	of	absolute	salvation	and	the	rehabilitation	of	a	concept	of	history	as	a	more	or	less	organised	path	towards	it.	‘Whereas	the	Middle	Ages	portrayed	the	vulnerability	of	world	events	and	the	transcendence	of	all	creatures	as	stations	on	the	way	to	salvation,’	Benjamin	states,	‘the	German	mourning	play	buries	itself	entirely	in	the	disconsolate	character	of	worldly	existence…’.154	In	doing	so	it	responds	to	an	ensuing	crisis	of	institutions	in	the	aftermath	of	Martin	Luther’s	rejection	of	“good	works”	in	favour	of	“faith	alone”,	which	deprives	the	ostensible	sovereignty	of	human	action	and	its	products	(‘works’)	of	their	conventionally	regulated	meanings	or	effects.	In	the	wake	of	a	general	crisis	of	‘works’,	the	Trauerspiel	finds	its	resources	for	its	response	in	the	irreducibly	fragmentary,	situated	and	disjunctive	character	of	its	staging,	exposing	itself	as	a	theatrical	medium	that	is	done	with	the	status	of	a	work.	In	this	way,	it	begins	to	mirror	the	fate	of	human	action	and	its	products	more	generally,	which,	vulnerably	exposed	to	an	unmasterable	coming	of	time,	are	increasingly	rendered	ambiguous,	if	not	opaque.	The	medium	of	theatre	takes	on	a	paradigmatic	function	for	dealing	with	the	crisis	of	works	precisely	by	emphasising	its	irreducibility	to	the	latter’s	status	of	a	meaningful	self-identity	not	dependent	on	anything	outside	itself.	In	contrast	to	the	work	thus	conceived,	the	significance	of	the	
Trauerspiel’s	ostentatious	representation	before	a	mutable	and	inconsistent	audience	increasingly	begins	but	never	ends	to	depend	on	the	latter’s	participation.	‘[…T]rauerspiel,’	Benjamin	says,	‘must	be	understood	from	the	standpoint	of	the	viewer.	The	latter	experiences,	how	on	the	stage,	an	interior	space	of	feeling	devoid	of	any	connection	to	the	cosmos,	situations	are	placed	before	him’.155	Theatrical	
allegorization,	as	Weber	identifies	the	hallmark	of	this	theatre,	describes																																																									154	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	171.	155	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	101.	
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the	movement	of	such	an	infinite	conditionality	of	the	effects	of	presence	on	their	situated	reception.	Put	in	the	deconstructive	register	that	implicitly	informs	our	reading	here,	one	might	say	that	the	Trauerspiel	therewith	begins	to	affirm	the	autoimmune	opening	to	an	unconditional	coming	of	time	as	the	condition	of	its	situated	significance.	Allegorical	
Deutbarkeit,	the	excessive	and	unmasterable	possibility	to	signify	and	be	interpreted,	offers	what	is	experienced	as	an	immanent,	meaningless	and	‘empty’	world	the	prospect	of	its	quasi-transcendence,	that	is,	not	the	institutional	guarantee	of	a	deferred	access	to	the	immunity	of	an	afterlife	in	communion,	but	the	precarious	chance/threat	of	a	shared	survival.156	As	a	response	to	‘the	problematic	situation	of	an	isolated	self	and	its	difficult	relation	to	the	community,’	allegoresis	here	begins	to	facilitate	the	secretly	shared	production	of	an	accustomed	place	that	
must	remain	precariously	exposed	to	its	possible	“corruption”.	By	its	essential	dehiscence,	the	staging	of	such	an	‘allegorical	theatre	–	theatre	as	allegory,	and	allegory	as	theatre’	–	albeit	‘delimited	and	constituted	essentially	by	those	who	witness	it	as	audience	and	as	spectators,	as																																																									156	The	word	sharing,	which	will	also	play	a	significant	part	in	later	sections	of	the	thesis,	is	here	at	least	implicitly	employed	with	reference	to	the	French	partage.	Derrida	says	of	his	use	of	the	latter	verb:	‘We	make	use	[…]	of	the	word	partaking,	as	elsewhere	imparting,	to	render	the	ambiguities	of	the	French	partage,	a	word	which	names	difference,	the	line	of	demarcation,	the	parting	of	the	waters,	scission,	caesura	as	well	as	participation,	that	which	is	divided	because	it	is	shared	or	held	in	common,	imparted	and	partaken	of’	[Jacques	Derrida,	‘Shibboleth	for	Paul	Celan’	in	Derrida,	Sovereignties	in	Question.	The	Poetics	of	Paul	Celan	ed.	by	Thomas	Dutoit,	1-64.	(Fordham:	Fordham	University	Press	2005),	34].	The	resources	of	the	word	partage	thus	further	begin	to	resonate	with	the	German	verb	mitteilen	[imparting,	to	communicate]	as	it	plays	a	significant	role	in	the	writings	of	Walter	Benjamin.	For	Benjamin,	as	we	saw,	the	virtuality	of	media	are	marked	by	a	becoming	opaque	of	means	no	longer	transparent	to	their	ends,	in	other	words,	by	impartability	[Mitteilbarkeit]	as	the	possibility	of	communication	severed	from	a	communicated	message	[Mitteilung].	As	the	verb	teilen	[sharing]	plays	a	significant	part	in	both	mitteilen	[imparting],	Mitteilung	[message]	and	
Mitteilbarkeit	[impartibility],	Benjamin’s	conception	of	the	virtuality	of	media,	which	the	latter	term	seeks	to	describe,	must	be	read	in	close	proximity	to	a	thinking	of	association	as	conditioned	on	dissociability,	the	possibility	of	sharing	conditioned	on	the	impossibility	of	the	common	and	as-one	[comme-un]	of	community.	
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onlookers,’	as	Weber	puts	it	with	a	felicitous	formulation	in	the	context	of	our	analysis	of	a	politics	of	rehearsal,	‘never	definitely	takes	place’.157				
Reanimating	an	Empty	World		 The	playwrights	of	the	Trauerspiel,	Benjamin	stresses,	were	Lutherans.	Deeply	affected	by	Martin	Luther’s	proposed	rejection	of	“good	works”	as	an	instituted	means	of	redemption,	they	found	themselves	struck	by	an	overriding	sense	of	anxiety	and	melancholy	in	face	of	an	unmasterable	exposure	to	the	contingent	coming	of	time.	The	Lutheran	motto	of	‘faith	alone’	could	not	prevent	life	from	becoming	stale	and	stultified.	What	emerges,	Benjamin	notes,	is	an	‘empty	world’.	Its	inhabitants	experience	their	existence	as	placed	within	an	expanse	of	ruins	filled	with	so	many	incomplete,	inauthentic	actions.	Life,	Benjamin	says,	revolted	against	such	a	state	of	affairs	[Dagegen	schlug	das	Leben	
aus].158			 	The	rigorous	morality	of	its	[Lutheranism]	teaching	in	respect	of	civic	conduct	stood	in	sharp	contrast	to	its	renunciation	of	‘good	works’.	By	denying	the	latter	any	special	miraculous	spiritual	effect,	making	the	soul	dependent	on	grace	through	faith,	and	making	the	secular-political	sphere	a	testing	ground	for	a	life	which	was	only	indirectly	religious,	being	intended	for	the	demonstration	of	civic	virtues,	it	did,	it	is	true,	instil	into	the	people	a	strict	sense	of	obedience	to	duty,	but	in	its	great	men	it	produced	melancholy.	Even	in	Luther	himself,	the	last	two	decades	of	whose	life	are	filled	with	an	increasing	heaviness	of	
																																																								
157 Weber, Theatricality as Medium, 173, (my emphasis). 158	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	20.	
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soul,	there	are	signs	of	a	counterstroke	against	the	storming	of	the	work.159		The	sharp	reaction,	tinged	with	melancholy,	of	a	counterstroke	against	the	storming	of	the	work,	is	that	of	isolated	individuals	severed,	as	we	might	put	it,	at	each	moment	of	their	lives,	from	a	social	organization	with	the	‘power	to	endow	collective	life	with	a	meaning	that	could	comprehend	and	surpass	individual	mortality’.160	For	Benjamin	construes	the	situation	of	the	baroque	as	one	that	‘exalts	the	situation	of	the	individual,	while	subjecting	that	individual	to	an	uncertain	destiny,	alone	before	God,	unable	to	influence	the	future	by	action,	dependent	upon	a	faith	whose	status	remains	fundamentally	opaque’.161	Whereas	before	the	Reformation,	as	Weber	notes,	‘the	legitimacy	of	the	Catholic	Church	[…]	offered	a	guarantee	of	an	orderly	transparent	relationship	of	immanence	to	transcendence	through	the	sacraments	and	rites	that	it	organizes	and	defines	as	“good	works,”’	the	rejection	of	the	transparency	of	‘works’	in	favour	of	an	opaque	means	of	“faith	alone,”	precariously	exposes	isolated	individuals	to	the	unpredictable	effects	of	their	acts.	In	the	wake	of	a	crisis	of	‘works,’	a	situation	emerges,	as	Weber	puts	it,	which	is	‘quite	literally	unworkable’.162	Mourning	the	loss	of	transparent	means	of	salvation	as	well	as	anxiously	experiencing	a	more	general	opacity	of	means,	the	unworkable	situation	of	the	German	baroque	finds	itself	inscribed	within	a	larger	problematic	of	mediation	and	of	media,	which	can	no	longer	be	perceived	as	transparent	means	to	an	end.	This	situation	is	unworkable	in	as	far	as	the	work	–	an	activity	or	its	product,	as	Weber	defines	it,	‘that	is	localized,	determined	spatially	and	temporally,	and	invested	with	a	certain	narrative	meaning	as	the	result	of	an	intention	of	which	it	is	the	effect’	–	as	we	saw,	is	no	longer	imbued	with	the	instituted	guarantees	of	its	miraculous	effects,	or	else,	with	the	phantasm	of	its	sovereignty.	‘[E]ffective	action	as	defined	by	the																																																									159	ibid,	119.	160	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	171.	161	ibid,	169	(my	emphasis).	162	ibid,	171	(my	emphasis).	
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production	of	meaningful	works	becomes	problematic,’	Weber	says	with	regards	to	the	Reformation’s	storming	of	the	work.163	The	counterstroke	against	this	storming	of	the	work,	therefore,	is	a	desperate	attempt	to	deal	with	or	else	overcome	–	the	difference	will	remain	decisive	here	–	increasing	feelings	of	anxiety,	insecurity,	vulnerability,	isolation	and	alienation	in	view	of	the	helpless	experience	of	individual	actions	as	opaque	means	severed	from	their	institutionally	regulated	ends.	In	the	absence	of	functioning	conventional	orders	of	social	organisation,	isolated	individuals,	deprived	of	the	ostensible	guarantees	of	the	positive	outcomes	to	their	acts,	find	themselves	vulnerably	exposed	to	the	coming	of	time.	The	Trauerspiel’s	response	to	this	‘unworkable’	situation	of	an	evacuation	of	meaning	from	human	action	and	its	products	in	the	realm	of	politics,	history	and	art,	I	want	to	suggest,	is	that	of	an	allegorical	or	theatrical	“attitude”	[Haltung],	informed	as	much	by	a	more	or	less	desperate	attempt	to	stem	the	forward	thrust	of	time	by	arresting	it	in	the	congealed	simultaneity	of	space,	as	well	as	by	a	concomitant	and	contradictory	affirmation	of	an	unmasterable	opening	towards	temporal	finitude.		The	Trauerspiel’s	compositional	tendency	towards	temporal	arrest	and	spatial	juxtaposition	reflects	and	responds	to	a	historico-theological	dilemma	that	prompted	the	religious	man	of	the	baroque,	as	Benjamin	puts	it,	to	‘hold	onto	the	world’.164	All	immediate	paths	to	the	beyond	[Jenseits]	denied,	the	fragmented	and	stacked	up	representations	of	the	Trauerspiel	reject	the	progressive	movement	of	a	plot	in	favour	of	what	Benjamin	calls	an	immanent	swelling	[eine	Anschwellung	von	innen	
																																																								163	ibid.	164	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	48-9	(my	emphasis).	The	Trauerspiel’s	efforts	to	arrest	the	flow	of	time	finds	a	symptom	in	its	common	fixation	of	the	dramatic	plot	to	the	night	and	especially	midnight.	For	in	the	midnight	hour,	according	to	popular	myth,	time	stands	still.	Fateful	manifestations	seek	out	this	particular	space-time	[Zeitraum],	Benjamin	says,	and	‘stand	within	the	midnight	hour	as	the	hatch	of	time’.	Within	its	framed	opening	appears	again	and	again	the	same	image	of	a	ghost.	[ibid,	115]	
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her].165	In	the	absence	of	all	concrete	forms	of	hope,	history,	which	has	previously	been	conceived	as	the	movement	towards	salvation	[Heilsgeschichte],	turns	into	its	opposite,	that	is,	Unheilsgeschichte,	the	unstoppable	movement	towards	a	catastrophic	telos.	The	only	hope	available	to	the	situation	of	the	German	baroque,	as	Weber	puts	it,	‘is	to	attempt	to	stem	this	forward	tide,	slow	if	not	abolish	the	irresistible	pull	toward	a	catastrophic	terminus.166	History	wanders	onto	its	stage	and	piles	up	[Häufung]	on	the	showplace	[Schauplatz].	Benjamin	describes	this	process	as	concomitant	with	the	movement	of	secularization	itself,	which	he	describes	as	the	‘conversion	of	originally	temporal	data	into	spatial	inauthenticity	and	simultaneity’.167	Yet	when	history	wanders	onto	the	stage	[Schauplatz],	as	Weber	relates,	it	is	exposed	[zur	schau	
gestellt]	and	(re-)staged,	not	as	transparent	representations	of	unquestionable	realities	but	as	allegories,	their	fragmented,	cluttered	assemblage	open	to	re-arrangement	by	others.168	For	instance,	by	those	who	witness	it	as	situated	audience.	Here,	Deutbarkeit	as	the	silent																																																									165	Benjamin,	Walter.	‘Das	Passagen	Werk.	Aufzeichnungen	und	Materialien’,	Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	V,	79-654.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag),	410.		166	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	173.	167	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	56.	Temporal	processes,	Benjamin	relates,	are	captured	and	analysed	within	spatial	images.	The	Schauplatz,	of	which	the	court	is	the	Trauerspiel’s	preferred	setting,	becomes	the	key	to	historical	comprehension.	Yet	the	overriding	sense	of	such	a	process	of	spatialisation,	that	is,	of	the	simultaneous	and	layered	exposition	of	previously	temporal	data,	is	anything	but	comprehension,	but	one	of	entanglement	and	confusion	[Verwirrung].	Here,	a	moral	or	ethical	confusion	of	how	to	act	in	the	absence	of	calculability	doubles	up	as	the	pragmatic	confusion	of	the	spectacle	[ibid,	75-6].	The	latter	finds	its	spatial	equivalents	in	the	alchemical	laboratories	of	magicians	and	physicists,	children’s	playrooms,	polter	cabins	and	pantries	[ibid,	165].	The	Trauerspiel’s	acts	do	not	so	much	follow	each	out	of	the	other,	but	are	stacked	like	terraces.	‘The	dramatic	structure	is	displayed	in	broad	plains	of	simultaneous	survey	[…]’	[ibid,	170].	We	will	find	not	dissimilar	compositional	strategies	both	of	a	cluttered,	non-linear	assemblage	of	historical	data,	as	well	as	the	discrete	separation	of	parts	that	call	for	their	future	re-assemblage	by	an	audience	in	the	contemporary	theatre	practices	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	in	the	final	chapter	of	this	thesis.	168	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	172.	
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medium	of	allegory,	virtualizes	the	spatial	arrest	that	offered	an	initial	way	out	of	time	by	a	frantic	flight	into	an	unredeemed	“nature”	and	prevents	it	from	definitely	‘taking	place’.	The	double	movement	of	arrest	and	virtualisation	in	the	allegorical	theatricalizations	of	Trauerspiel	here	begins	to	recall	what	Benjamin,	in	a	later	context	–	both	with	regards	to	his	own	life	as	well	as	with	regards	to	the	context	of	the	analysis	–	as	we	saw,	was	to	designate	as	the	‘citability	of	gesture.’169	More	generally,	it	might	thus	also	be	said	to	follow,	affirm	and	expose	what	Derrida	has	described	as	a	quasi-transcendental	structure	of	experience	as	spacing,	that	is,	the	simultaneous	becoming	space	of	time	and	becoming	time	of	space.	Spacing	secures	limited	effects	of	shared	significance	on	the	condition	of	its	essential	corrupt-	and	dissociability.	In	the	wake	of	a	crisis	of	eschatology,	the	Trauerspiel	rehearses,	so	to	speak,	a	quite	different	relation	of	immanence	to	transcendence.	For	the	authors	and	audiences	of	Trauerspiel	it	is	no	longer	a	matter	of	making	their	situation	‘workable’	once	and	for	all	by	seeking	to	recuperate	the	transparency	of	media	and	the	sovereignty	of	‘works,’	but	rather,	as	we	might	here	put	it,	of	rendering	them	perpetually	‘re-workable’	through	the	radically																																																									169	A	distorted	similitude	might	be	said	to	run	throughout	Benjamin’s	descriptions	of	Trauerspiel	and	Epic	Theatre,	most	notably,	in	light	of	a	shared	contestation	of	the	Aristotelian	conception	of	drama	as	tragedy,	with	regards	to	their	compositional	employment	of	strategies	of	interruption,	stilling	and	discontinuity.	For	instance,	when	describing	a	not	uncommon	feature	of	Trauerspiel	–	that	is,	for	the	“dialogue”	within	a	specific	image-assemblage	to	constitute	its	explanation	[Erklärung],	signature,	title,	or	maxim,	which	declares	the	image-scene	to	be	allegorical	as	if	spoken	by	the	image	itself	–	Benjamin	reverts	to	a	comparison	with	the	light-effect	of	baroque	paintings	that	much	more	vividly	seems	to	conjure	the	palpable	arrest	of	time	through	the	flash	of	photography,	as	well	as,	by	extension,	the	discontinuous	progression	of	a	spatio-temporal	montage	[Benjamin,	Ursprung,	173].	‘Brightly	it	flashes	up	within	the	darkness	of	allegorical	entwinement,’	Benjamin	says	of	the	“dialogue”	as	motto,	arresting	and	framing	the	scene	as	an	allegorical	image	that	must	be	read	[ibid,	175].	The	action	moves	into	these	frames	as	into	always	renewed	compositional	arrangements,	with	the	jerky,	intermittent	rhythm	of	a	constant	pausing	[Einhalten],	turning	and	renewed	congealment	[ibid,	175].	Its	displayed	situations	change	suddenly	in	a	flash,	Benjamin	says,	like	the	aspect	of	the	type	area	when	turning	the	pages	of	a	book	[ibid,	162-3].	
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performative	affirmation	of	an	essential	opacity	of	means	and	the	virtuality	of	media.	The	Lutheran	motto	of	‘faith	alone,’	Benjamin	says,	could	not	prevent	life	from	becoming	stale	and	stultified.	What	emerges	was	an	‘empty	world’.	Life,	as	Benjamin	puts	it,	revolted	against	such	a	state	of	affairs	[Dagegen	schlug	das	Leben	aus].170	The	violence	of	this	blow,	however,	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	the	tyrannic	phantasms	of	omnitemporality	as	another	response	to	the	crisis	of	sovereignty.	Instead	of	seeking	to	institute	a	new	order	of	hegemonic	convention,	it	finds	itself	precisely	predicated	on	‘an	irreducible	violation	of	whatever	convention	has	consecrated	as	natural,	organic	and	self-contained’.171	Far	from	a	recuperation	of	transparency	then,	as	Weber	relates,	‘the	very	opacity	of	the	“emptied	world”	becomes	the	condition	of	its	masked	resurrection.’			 The	Trauer	staged	by	this	theatre	is	not	just	melancholic,	nor	does	it	simply	mourn,	as	the	following	brief	but	incisive	passage	makes	clear:	“Sadness	and	Mourning	is	the	sensibility	[Gesinnung]	in	which	feeling	reanimates	the	emptied	world	by	masking	it	[maskenhaft	neubelebt],	in	order	to	draw	an	enigmatic	satisfaction	from	its	appearance…	The	theory	of	Trauer…	can	accordingly,	be	unrolled	only	through	the	description	of	the	world	that	arises	[sich	auftut]	in	response	to	the	melancholic	gaze.”	The	world	that	emerges	in	response	to	the	melancholic	glance	is	“reanimated”	through	the	“masks”	it	now	wears:	since	nothing	in	this	world	can	be	deemed	to	be	transparent	any	longer,	the	very	opacity	of	the	“emptied	world”	becomes	the	condition	of	its	masked	resurrection.	But	that	resurrection	remains	a	mask,	tied	to	the	theatre.	What	otherwise	will	be	known	as	“secularization”	becomes,	in	Benjamin’s	account,	something	more	like	allegorical	
theatricalization.	Such	allegorical	theatricalization	cannot	simply	
																																																								170	ibid,	120.	171	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	179.	
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overcome	time	and	mortality,	but	it	can	temporarily	arrest,	interrupt,	or	suspend	their	progress.172				
Towards	an	Attitude	of	Allegorical	Theatricalization	
	 To	be	sure,	Benjamin,	in	his	study	of	the	Trauerspiel,	does	not	revert	to	the	formulation	of	an	‘allegorical	attitude	[Haltung]’	as	I	would	here	like	to	put	it	forward.	Yet	the	Trauerspiel’s	persistant	endeavor	to	arrest	the	temporal	flux	as	the	first	step	towards	the	possibility	of	investing	an	immanent,	unredeemed	situatedness	without	an	institutionally	regulated	access	to	transcendence	with	a	meaningful	content	[Gehalt]	by	its	theatrical	reanimation,	perhaps	warrants	the	employment	of	a	term	that	in	our	context	seeks	to	link	a	performative	bearing	of	virtualisation	in	the	production	of	meaning	to	the	paradoxical	arrest	of	a	stance	that	never	quite,	never	definitely	takes	(its)	place.	The	precarious	erectness	of	such	a	stance	further	seems	to	lie	in	pursuit	of	what	we	might	here	designate	a	quasi-transcendental	ambition,	that	is,	the	affirmation	of	‘a	disappointed	transcendental	ambition,’	the	constitutive	failure	of	a	desire	to	make	last	–	for	resurrection	and	salvation	–	a	‘falling	from	a	height	reached,’	as	Geoffrey	Bennington	describes	this	movement	with	reference	to	what	Derrida	repeatedly	refers	to	as	a	falling	erection:	l’erection	tombe.173	The	constitutive	failure	of	such	quasi-transcendental	ambitions	is	bound	to	follow	the	precarious	protocols	of	an	attitude	[Haltung]	of	rehearsal,	the	disjunctive	theatre	of	the	future	that	re-inscribes	repeatable	traces	for	an	unpredictable	time	to	come.	Such	an	ambition	must	begin	(and	end)	with	a	gesture	that	seeks	to	hold	onto	[festhalten]	the	world	–	arresting	[anhalten]	the	ephemeral	flux	of	time,	and	imbuing	what	is	otherwise	perceived	to	be	an	‘empty’																																																									172	ibid,	190-1.	173	Geoffrey	Bennington.	Derridabase.	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press	1993),	268.	
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world	with	a	content	[Gehalt	or	Inhalt]	that,	given	the	virtualizing	effects	of	“its”	other	possibilites,	never	fully	comes	to	rest.174	It	is	the	allegorical	and	theatrical	stance	of	such	a	precariously	contained	(situated)	discontainment,	the	radically	performative	production	of	Gehalt	[content]	qua	Halt	[arrest]	that	here	further	warrants	the	recourse	to	the	terminology	of	Haltung,	that	is,	an	attitude	or	bearing	that	doubles	up	as	arrest,	hold	and	discrete	pose	marked	by	the	possibility	of	its	graft	qua	iter-	as	alterability.	The	allegorical	theatricalizations	of	Trauerspiel,	as	we	will	soon	see	in	more	detail,	are	the	limited,	that	is,	paradoxically	open	gestures	of	containment	in	the	absence	of	a	hegemony	of	convention	in	the	wake	of	a	crisis	of	institutions.	In	other	words,	an	epochal	crisis	of	institutions	and	the	collective	organization	of	conventional	schemas	exposes	a	quasi-transcendental	structure	of	spacing	that	links	repeatbility	as	the	condition	of	all	situated	significance	to	the	virtual	possibilities	of	its	difference.	In	the	absence	of	transparent	means	of	salvation,	life	during	the	German	baroque,	as	we	saw	Benjamin	and	Weber	describe	it,	is	unable	to	endow	itself	with	a	meaning	that	could	comprehend	and	surpass	individual	mortality.	In	light	of	this	dilemma,	memory,	Weber	notes,	‘takes	on	a	new	function,	that	of	consoling	a	world	in	which	action	is	no	longer	the	unquestionable	pathway	to	grace’.175	Yet	the	kind	of	remembering	that	is	practiced,	he	adds,	does	‘not	seek	to	recover	a	self-contained	meaning	or	resurrect	the	dead.	Rather,	such	memory	knows	itself	to	be	inseparable	from	forgetting	rather	than	its	simple	opposite;	it	does	not	strive	to	neutralize	or	surmount	time	in	a	transcendence	of	the	self’.176	In	other	words,	it	rehearses	a	different	relation	of	immanence	and	transcendence	by	adhering	to,	affirming	and	perhaps,	more	or	less	thoughtfully	as	well	as	more	or	less	responsibly,																																																									174	‘The	root	of	the	words	Inhalt	and	Gehalt	is,	of	course,’	Weber	reminds	us	in	a	different	context,	‘the	verb	halten,	“to	hold,”	but	also	“to	stop,	to	halt,	to	arrest.”	The	action	that	constitutes	“content”	is	a	holding	action,	an	act	of	containment.	[…]	For	something	to	be	held,	the	passage	of	time	must	be	interrupted	and	suspended.	Only	by	arresting	the	passage	of	time	can	a	Gehalt	be	constituted’.	[Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	240].	175	ibid,	194.	176	ibid.	
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engaging	certain	autoimmune	or	self-deconstructive	processes	inherent	to	an	ultra-	or	quasi-transcendental	condition	of	spacing.177			
A	Secret	Convention	of	Allegory	
	 The	importance	of	allegory	during	the	German	baroque,	as	a	mode	of	signification	and	perception	engaged	in	the	absence	of,	but	also	perhaps	against	a	certain	institutional	hegemony	of	conventional	orders	of	interpretation,	might	be	said	to	lay	in	its	ability	of	a	certain	scheming	in	the	absence	of	dominant	schemata.	As	a	response	to	a	crisis	of	institutions,	works	and	meaning,	it	never	amounts	to	a	gesture	of	re-instituting	collective	schemata	for	an	ostensible	unity	of	communication,	but	displays	sensitivity	for	the	precarious	and	problematic	status	of	all	such	coming	together.	If	‘Benjamin	presents	his	elaboration	of	[the	function	of]	allegory	[in	Trauerspiel]	as	an	alternative	to	the	predominant	theory	of	the	symbol	as	unity	of	image	and	meaning	[…],’	as	Weber	states,	it	is	precisely	to	problematize	the	ostensible	systemic	closure	or	absolute	containment	of	such	unity.178	Allegory,	for	Benjamin,	as	Weber	relates,	involves	precisely			 not	a	“conventional	expression,”	but	an	“expression	of	convention,”	which	is	to	say,	an	expression	of	the	problematic																																																									177	Hägglund	fittingly	describes	the	latter	as	a	generalised	writing	with	the	function	‘to	mediate	between	past	and	future	through	inscriptions	that	are	characterized	by	the	becoming-space	of	time	as	well	as	by	the	becoming-time	of	space.	On	the	one	hand,	the	written	is	always	already	an	inscription	of	memory,	a	trace	of	the	past	that	spatializes	time.	On	the	other	hand,	the	written	can	only	be	read	after	its	inscription	and	is	thus	marked	by	a	relation	to	the	future	that	temporalizes	space.	The	reason	for	writing	in	the	first	place	is	to	preserve	what	happens	as	a	memory	for	the	
future,	which	constitutes	both	the	possibility	of	repetition	and	its	inevitable	counterpart:	the	threat	of	extinction,	of	forgetting	[Hägglund,	72].	178	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	237.	
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status	of	all	such	coming	together,	of	all	convenus,	however	indispensable	such	convergence	is	to	all	language	and	culture.	As	a	result,	allegory	in	the	German	baroque,	and	perhaps	in	general,	is	fundamentally	theatrical:	it	involves	representations	whose	referent	is	necessarily	problematic,	open,	heterogeneous.	And	theatricality	entails	first	and	foremost	representation	for	the	other.179			In	the	absence	of	hegemonic	conventions,	the	open	status	of	allegorical	representations	offers	another	way	to	participate	in	the	collective	production	of	what	we	might	designate	as	a	precarious	quasi-transcendental	significance.	Allegory’s	etymological	derivation	from	the	Greek,	as	Siegrid	Weigel	relates,	is	unanimously	construed	as	‘other	speech’:	allos	other,	agoreuein	to	speak	(publicly).	‘Some	are	more	precise	in	their	definitions	of	the	relationship	between	“other”	and	“speech,’’	Weigel	goes	on	to	state,	‘translating	allegory	as	“speaking	other	than	publicly”:	allaeh	other	than,	agoreuein	to	speak	in	the	agora	or	public	assembly;	allegory,	then,	as	“to	speak	other	than	comprehensibly	to	all”.180	Yet	in	Benjamin’s	use	of	this	term,	the	‘speaking	other’	of	allegory	is,	in	the	final	instance,	irreducible	to	any	idiosyncratic	use	of	a	hyper-conventional	language	of	secrecy.181	Benjamin	defies	such	popular																																																									179	ibid.	180	Siegrid	Weigel,	Body	and	Image	Space.	(London	&	New	York:	Routledge	1996),	94.	181	Benjamin,	when	discerning	a	brief	genealogy	of	allegory,	traces	a	development	from	a	strict	conventional	secrecy	to	the	expression	of	an	essential	secrecy	of	convention.	Tracing	a	historical	period	of	a	growing	interest	in	allegorical	interpretations	of	hieroglyphics	and	a	general	fascination	with	the	secretive	writing	of	Renaissance	picture-puzzles	[Rätselschriften],	Benjamin	discerns	a	turn	from	the	precise	use	of	historical	and	cultic	keys	for	allegorical	interpretation	to	that	of	a	more	general	employment	of	a	confusing	clutter	of	nature-philosophical,	moral	and	mystic	commonplaces.	An	emerging,	enigmatic	passion	at	replacing	phonetic	signs	with	image-signs	often	resulted	in	the	formation	of	whole	new	iconological	lexica,	Benjamin	relates,	its	secretive	signifiers	filling	medals,	columns,	gates	of	honour	and	manifold	Renaissance	artefacts	[Benjamin,	Ursprung,	147].	Yet	whereas	initially	these	mysterious	picture-puzzles	[Rätselschriften]	were	used	in	order	to	hide	their	
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conceptions	of	allegory	as	a	purely	conventional	relationship	between	a	signifying	image	and	its	meaning.	Whereas	the	latter	would	seek	to	reign	in	the	otherness	of	this	speech,	the	‘other’	in	Benjamin’s	version	of	‘speaking	other’	precisely	refers	to	the	uncontainable,	excessive	play	of	meanings	that	are	constituted,	as	Weigel	notes,	‘out	of	the	heterogeneity	of	logos	and	material,	of	signifier	and	signified	[…]’.182	For	Benjamin,	allegory	thus	construed,	constitutes	an	immersion	into	the	‘dialectical	roar,’	as	he	emphatically	puts	it,	within	the	‘abyss	between	image-being	and	meaning’.183	Its	secrecy	is	thus	never	that	of	a	particular	key	of	translation,	the	code	of	a	particular	knowledge	granting	access	to	a	hidden	conceptual	meaning	of	figurative	language,	but	precisely	the	latter’s	excess.184	If	allegorical	theatricalization	as	a	response	to	a	crisis																																																																																																																																																meanings	from	third	parties	–	their	correct	decipherment	depending	on	a	limited	access	to	a	more	or	less	secret	knowledge	–	following	the	period	of	their	popularisation	in	a	wide	range	of	contexts	(from	theology,	natural	science	and	ethics,	to	heraldic,	celebrative	poetry	and	the	language	of	love),	its	stock	of	imagery,	Benjamin	says,	became	increasingly	unlimited.	‘With	every	idea	the	moment	of	expression	coincides	with	a	veritable	eruption	of	images,	which	gives	rise	to	the	sedimentation	of	a	chaotic	mass	of	metaphors’	[ibid,	151	and	Benjamin,	
The	Origin,	173].	Allegorists	were	driven	to	use	ever	more	obscure	properties	of	a	represented	object	or	image	for	its	signified	content,	which	multiplied	the	possibilities	of	signification	alongside	more	traditional,	inherited	signifying	functions.	As	a	result,	one	and	the	same	signifier	was	increasingly	able	to	represent	oppositional	terms	and	could	be	put	to	use	to	denote	more	or	less	anything.	It	is	this	development,	Benjamin	says,	which	leads	towards	the	antinomies	of	allegory,	namely,	that	‘[e]very	person,	every	thing,	every	relationship	can	signify	an	arbitrary	other’	[Benjamin,	Ursprung,	152].	182	Weigel,	Body	and	Image,	96.	183	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	144.	184	I	employ	the	word	secret,	as	in	the	formulation	of	‘an	essential	secrecy	of	convention’	with	loose	reference	to	Derrida’s	use	of	this	term,	which	similarly	distinguishes	it	from	the	mere	secrecy	of	convention.	The	unveiling	of	the	secret,	Derrida	says,	‘confirm[s]	that	there	is	something	secret	there,	withdrawn,	forever	beyond	the	reach	of	hermeneutic	exhaustion.	A	non-hermeneutic	secret,	it	remains	[…]	heterogeneous	to	all	interpretative	totalization,	eradicating	the	hermeneutic	principle’	[Derrida,	Shibboleth,	28].	‘[T]his	secret	that	we	speak	of	but	are	unable	to	
say,	is	the	sharing	of	what	is	not	shared:	we	know	in	common	that	we	have	nothing	in	common’	[Derrida	&	Ferraris,	58].	‘In	consensus,	in	possible	transparency,	the	secret	is	never	broached/breached	[entame].	
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in	eschatology,	as	I	here	want	to	suggest,	furthermore	amounts	to	a	critical	engagement	with	certain	auto-immune	processes	of	the	self-deconstruction	of	sovereignty,	it	is	able	to	do	so	by	further	problematizing	and	putting	into	question	the	political	organisation	of	access	to	such	knowledge	within	a	history	of	power-knowledge	systems.	Its	gesture	is	that	of	an	exposition	of	the	fundamental	historicity	of	all	efforts	at	containing	the	possibilities	of	allegorical	play,	including	its	own.	In	exposing	the	absence	of	unequivocal	and	universally	valid	schemas	of	interpretation,	the	secrecy	of	a	‘speaking	other	than	comprehensively	to	all’	becomes	that	of	an	inscribed	possibility	of	other	effects	of	presence	in	any	given	context	of	their	limited	containment.	Or	else,	of	a	certain	virtualisation	of	conceptualization.	The	allegorical	signifier	lives	in	excess	of	any	given	schema	of	reference	[Verweisung]	to	a	meaningful	content.	With	the	affirmation	of	the	antinomies	of	allegory,	that	is,	the	ability	of	‘[e]very	person,	every	thing,	every	relationship	[to]	signify	an	arbitrary	other,’	any	given	reference	[Verweisung]	doubles	up	as	an	orphaning	[Verwaisen].	185	In	other	words,	the	immediate	non-present																																																																																																																																																If	I	am	to	share	something,	to	communicate,	objectify,	thematize,	the	condition	is	that	there	be	something	non-thematizable,	non-objectifiable,	non-sharable.	And	this	‘something’	is	an	absolute	secret,	it	is	the	ab-
solutum	itself	in	the	etymological	sense	of	the	term,	i.e.,	that	which	is	cut	off	from	any	bond,	detached,	and	which	cannot	itself	bind;	it	is	the	condition	of	any	bond	but	it	cannot	bind	itself	to	anything	–	this	is	the	absolute,	and	if	there	is	something	absolute	it	is	secret’	[ibid,	57].		185	The	German	word	Verweisung	[reference],	which	Benjamin	uses	to	describe	the	referencing	character	of	the	allegorical	‘detail’	(image,	person,	thing,	relationship,	in	short,	signifier)	phonetically	resembles	that	of	Verwaisung,	that	is,	‘orphaning.’	Werner	Hamacher	makes	a	similar	use	of	the	couple	Verweisung/Verwaisung	in	a	different	but,	implicitly	for	now	and	increasingly	explicitly	later	on,	inextricably	related	context.	That	context	is	Benjamin’s	conception	the	messianic.	Hamacher	reads	and	responds	to	a	small	section	of	Benjamin’s	Thesis	On	the	
Concept	of	History	that	speaks	of	‘the	‘index’	of	a	‘messianic	power’,	which	‘we	have	been	endowed	with	like	every	generation	that	preceded	us.’	If	this	index	‘marks	every	historical	possibility,’	Hamacher	comments,	‘then	messianic	referentiality	is	the	structure	of	the	possible	and	of	the	historical	time	in	which	it	lives	on.	Benjamin	attributes	weakness	to	this	structural	messianicity	not	in	order	to	note	an	accidental	defect,	which,	under	ideal	circumstances,	could	be	remedied,	but	in	order	to	emphasize	
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remaining	of	the	signifier	allows	for	the	recognition	of	other	possibilities	of	its	signification.	Allegorical	theatricalization	thereby	follows	a	movement	of	gathering	[Sammlung]	and	dispersion	[Zerstreuung],	as	Benjamin	puts	it,	by	which	‘things	are	gathered	for	their	meaning;	disinterest	in	their	being	causes	them	once	more	to	disperse’.186	Such	is	the	powerful,	if	ambivalent	entertainment	that	offers	itself	to	the	melancholic	writers	and	audiences	of	the	Trauerspiel:	banal	objects	rise	ostentatiously	out	of	the	depth	of	allegory	only	to	be	left	alone	once	more	to	their	bleak	everydayness.187	The	demonstrated	exposure	of	the	virtual	possibilities	of	signification	appeals	to	the	melancholic	readers	of	
Trauerspiel	as	it	renders	a	problematic	relation	of	immanence	and	transcendence	as	infinitely	re-workable.	The	opening	of	allegory	to	other	possibilities	of	signification	calls	for	an	infinite	participation	in	the	construction	of	its	significance.	As	such,	the	allegorical	theatricalizations	of	the	German	baroque	Trauerspiel	offer	the	paradoxical	chance	of	a	quasi-transcendental	experience	of	repeatable	singularities.	It	does	so	by	the	aporetic	performance	of	a	simultaneous	gesture	of	acceptance	and	non-acceptance	of	finitude	and	mortality	in	the	absence	of	a	meaning																																																																																																																																																a	structural	element	of	this	messianicity,	through	which	it,	in	turn,	is	referred	to	its	possible	failure.	The	possibility	of	happiness	is	only	indicated	with	the	corresponding	possibility	of	its	failure.	The	messianic	index	is	crossed	a	priori	by	its	reference	to	a	possible	failure	and	thus	a	possible	impossibility.	There	is,	in	short,	no	referring	(Verweisung)	to	a	‘messianic	power’	that	should	not	at	the	same	time	indicate,	as	Paul	Celan	used	the	word,	its	orphaning	(Verwaisung);	no	index	that	would	not	have	to	reach	the	borders	of	its	indexicality	and	become	an	ex-index;	no	messianicity	that	does	not	emerge	from	its	non-messianicity.	The	weakness	of	the	‘messianic	power’	lies	in	its	structural	finitude.	[…]’	[Werner	Hamacher,	‘‘Now’:	Walter	Benjamin	on	Historical	Time’	in	Walter	Benjamin	and	History.	ed.	Andrew	Benjamin,	38-68.	(New	York:	Continuum,	2005),	45,	my	emphasis.]	Albeit	unable	to	develop	it	here,	it	would	seem	fitting	in	this	context	to	at	least	indicate	a	possible	link	between	the	weakness	of	a	messianic	power	and	the	secrecy	of	the	rendez-vous	[geheime	Verabredung]	between	past	generations	and	the	present	one,	of	which	Benjamin	speaks	in	the	same	thesis	from	his	Thesis	
On	the	Concept	of	History	[Walter	Benjamin,	Illuminationen.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	2002),	251-2].	186	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	166.	187	ibid,	102.	
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that	would	be	able	to	fully	transcend	such	limitations.	‘Because	allegory	is	the	traditional	means	of	investing	a	manifestation	with	a	signification	that	it	cannot	possibly	have	in	terms	of	a	pure	immanent,	self-contained	structure,’	Weber	says,	‘[i]t	[…]	brings	the	signifying	potential	traditionally	associated	with	a	generalized	transcendence	to	bear	upon	the	claims	of	a	localizable	and	individualizable	secular	immanence’.188			 [W]hat	you	see	in	the	Trauerspiel	is	all	you	are	going	to	get:	all	and	nothing.	What	is	performed	on	the	stage	is	all	there	is:	it	has	no	further	intrinsic,	symbolic	significance,	except	perhaps	that	of	confirming	the	lack	of	symbolic	significance,	the	lack	of	a	transition	leading	from	the	secularised	stage	of	the	Counter-Reformation	to	a	world	beyond.	But	at	the	same	time	what	you	see	is	not	what	you	get,	since	the	significance	of	what	you	see	depends	upon	things	not	seen	and	not	shown.	This	lack	of	a	symbolic	immanence	opens	the	theatrical	site	to	a	potentially	endless,	if	by	no	means	simply	arbitrary,	series	of	possible	allegorical	interpretations,	which	in	turn	calls	into	question	the	stage	itself.189				‘Whereas	the	spectator	of	tragedy	was	solicited	and	legitimated	by	the	drama,’	Benjamin	says,	‘the	Trauerspiel	must	be	understood	from	the	standpoint	of	the	viewer’.190				
	
That	Strange	Detail	of	Allegorical	Verweisung/Verwaisung		 In	the	absence	of	hegemonic	schemata	of	translation,	the	scheme	of	allegory	must	begin	to	account	of	its	structural	opening	to	other																																																									188	ibid,	174.	189	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	176.	190	ibid.	
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possibilities.	The	antinomies	of	allegory	imply	that	every	reference	[Verweisung]	doubles	up	as	an	orphaning	[Verwaisung].	If	it	is	through	their	ability	to	point	elsewhere	[Verweisung]	that	‘the	properties	of	meaning’	of	allegorical	signifiers	‘acquire	a	power	that	makes	them	appear	incommensurable	with	profane	things	and	raises	them	to	a	higher	level,’	as	Benjamin	puts	it,	such	a	‘power’	must	remain	structurally	weak.191	For	the	immediate	possibility	of	a	mark’s	orphaning	from	any	given	context	intent	at	fixing	those	properties	of	meanings,	exposes	the	essential	impossibility	of	the	latter’s	containment.	The	structural	weakness	of	a	power	to	point	elsewhere	–	Verweisung/Verwaisung	–	marks	a	shift	in	status	for	the	(allegorical)	detail.		In	his	discussion	of	the	antinomies	of	allegory,	Benjamin	suggests	that	the	possibility	of	‘[e]very	person,	[…],	thing,	[…]	relationship	[to]	signify	an	arbitrary	other	[…]	announces	to	the	profane	world	an	annihilating	yet	just	verdict.	For	that	world	is	designated	as	one	in	which	details	are	not	so	important’.192	Yet,	as	Weber	points	out,	Benjamin’s	analysis	of	the	status	of	the	detail	in	baroque	allegory	is	not	an	account	of	its	simple	devalorization	but	of	a	transformation	of	its	function,	or	else,	of	its	re-functioning.193	What	is	devalorized,	Weber	suggest,	is	the	status	of	the	detail	as	signifying	property	‘with	respect	to	a	criterion	of	value	modelled	on	an	ideal	of	identity	as	essentially	self-contained	or	self-present.	In	this	perspective,’	Weber	adds,	‘the	value	of	a	detail	derives	from	its	organic	relation	to	that	from	which	it	has	in	some	way	detached	itself	but	of	which	it	still	remains	an	integral	part’.194	The	transformed	value	of	the	allegorical	detail	on	the	other	hand,	lies	in	a	new	and	unpredictable	significance	–	its	weak	power	to	point	elsewhere	–	that	finds	itself	precisely	predicated	on	the	destruction	of	all	ostensibly	organic	relations	between	part	and	whole.	‘The	result,’	Weber	notes,	‘is	a	proliferation	of	details	without	a	unifying	or	informing	point	of	view’.195	Subsequently,	the	detail	becomes																																																									191	Benjamin.	Ursprung,	152	&	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	177.	192	ibid	&	ibid.	193	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	241.	194	ibid,	242.	195	ibid,	247.	
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distinctly	theatrical:	‘There	are	“properties”	[of	meaning]	but	without	assured	owners	or	sites:	in	short,	props	–	stage-properties,	Requisiten’.196	‘[T]he	detail	is	no	longer	itself	“in”	anything	at	all:	rather	it	lies	exposed,	like	“dust,”	signifying	“enigmatically”	on	the	theatrical	stage’.197	Allegory,	Weber	relates,	is	a	scheme	in	a	dual	sense.	What	Benjamin	calls	the	Midas-touch	of	allegory	transforms	whatever	it	grasps	into	something																																																									196	ibid.	197	ibid,	248.	Benjamin	devotes	large	sections	of	his	reading	of	
Trauerspiel	to	its	representations	of	the	body	as	a	particularly	pertinent	context	of	the	allegorical	emancipation	of	parts	from	their	ostensibly	organic	relation	to	a	whole	that	finds	itself	predicated	on	‘an	irreducible	violation	of	whatever	convention	has	consecrated	as	natural,	organic	and	self-contained’	[ibid,	179].	In	his	account,	Benjamin	incisively	portrays	a	tendency	for	the	body	and	“its”	parts	to	take	on	a	prop-like	quality.	Descriptions	of	the	characters	of	the	Trauerspiel,	Benjamin	points	out,	often	evoke	an	impression	of	puppet	theatre.	The	physical	appearance	of	kings	and	princes	–	draped	in	regalia,	bearing	golden	paper	crowns,	looking	dim	and	sad,	performing	eccentrically	stilted	gestures,	‘heavy	with	crowns,’	seem	rigid	and	object-like	as	puppets	and	the	kings	of	a	deck	of	cards	[Kartenkönige]	[Benjamin,	Ursprung,	103-106].	What	is	more,	the	body	often	uncannily	fragments	into	a	collection	of	props,	like	that	of	‘the	burned	head	of	the	steadfast	princess	of	Georgia’	[ibid,	105-6].	The	Midas-touch	of	allegory	performs	violence	against	the	conception	of	the	body	as	organic	whole	through	its	gory	dismemberment.	It	strives	towards	the	emblematic	fragmentation	of	the	life	of	the	human	body,	Benjamin	notes,	allotting	its	parts	to	the	antinomies	of	allegory,	in	order	to	read	an	enigmatic	meaning	from	its	shards.	A	fragmented	and	unfree	
physis	reveals	itself,	like	Winckelmann’s	Description	of	the	Torso	of	
Hercules	at	the	Belvedere	in	Rome,	not	symbolically	in	the	fleeting	light	of	redemption,	but	piecemeal	[ibid,	154	&	Benjamin,	The	Origin,	176].	The	strictest	realisation	of	such	allegorical	allotment	of	the	body,	Benjamin	states,	is	consummated	only	with	the	corpse	[Benjamin,	Ursprung,	193].	The	characters	of	the	Trauerspiel	die,	Benjamin	says,	not	to	become	immortal,	but	to	turn	into	corpses.	‘Life,	from	the	perspective	of	death,	is	the	production	of	the	corpse’	[ibid,	194].	In	Benjamin’s	account,	the	corpse	becomes	the	Trauerspiel’s	supreme	emblematic	prop.	In	the	so-called	‘meal	of	the	dead,’	three	glasses	of	blood	are	served	alongside	three	beheaded	heads.	The	staging	of	such	meals	was	conducted	according	to	an	Italian	trick,	in	which	the	head	of	an	actor	appeared	through	a	hole	of	the	table	whose	cover	reached	all	the	way	to	the	ground,	accomplishing	the	effect	of	the	body’s	soulless	exposition.	The	uncanny	aspect	of	the	body’s	augmentation	finds	another	example	in	the	
Trauerspiel’s	strange	practice	of	doubling	the	appearance	of	characters	with	ghostly	versions	of	themselves.	Ghosts	of	the	living	that	evidence,	as	Benjamin	insists,	an	obsessive	allegorical	multiplication	of	what	previously	was	felt	to	be	uniquely	self-enclosed	[ibid,	172].	
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significant	by	wresting	an	isolated	phenomenon	from	its	context.	Weakening	the	phenomenon’s	resistance	to	allegorical	interpretation	by	isolating	it	‘in	its	singularity,’	as	Weber	puts	it,	it	is	able	to	‘transform	the	singular	phenomenon	into	a	(general)	signification’.198	The	double	scheme	of	allegory	here	functions	as	the	pivot	point	between	the	singular	and	the	general,	facilitating	their	rotation	whilst	exposing	their	paradoxical	interrelation.	Here,	singularity,	as	the	condition	and	excess	of	all	situated	allegorical	appropriation,	describes	the	becoming	opaque	of	the	body	of	a	signifier	severed	from	any	given	contextual	determinations	of	its	significance.	It	is	the	opaque	Schriftbild	of	what	Werner	Hamacher,	in	a	different	but	nevertheless	related	context	designates	as	the	caesura,	the	“cloudy	place”	[wolkige	Stelle]	or	incomprehensible	gesture	in	the	representation	[Darstellung]	of	historical	experience,	which	opens	the	latter	to	its	future	alterity.199	Instead	of	mediating	[vermitteln]	between	a	particular	figure	and	a	general	meaning,	Hamacher	states,	the	opaque	signifier	parasitically	draws	attention	to	itself	and	defers	the	arrival	of	meaning	in	the	representation.200	With	reference	to	the	status	of	the	singularity	of	a	name	within	the	system	of	language,	Hamacher	notes	how	the	latter	does	not	belong	to	those	aspects	of	it	that	impart	something	but	to	those	marks	that	secure	impartability	itself.201	However,	like	the	singular	phenomenon	of	allegorical	appropriation,	for	Hamacher,	the	name	always	remains	translatable	into	a	general	concept.	As	such,	it	must	in	turn	subject	itself	to	the	unlimited	combinatorics	that	constitutes	the	experience	of	language.	Its	property	and	transparency	is																																																									198	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	337.	199	Werner	Hamacher	‘Die	Geste	im	Namen’,	Entferntes	Verstehen,	280-324.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1998),	293.	The	context	in	which	Hamacher	develops	these	reflections	is	that	of	the	literary	work	of	Franz	Kafka.	I	am	unable	here	to	develop	the	resonance	between	Hamacher’s	or	indeed	Benjamin’s	reading	of	Kafka	and	the	German	baroque	Trauerspiel.	To	indicate	the	direction	of	such	a	comparison,	however,	one	might	suggest	that	both	respond	to	a	crisis	of	tradition	and	institution	with	a	gesture	that	seeks	to	defer	the	coming	in	order	to	multiply	its	possibilities.	200	Hamacher,	285.	201	ibid,	299.	
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put	into	question	by	the	swell	of	its	possibilities.	It	is	the	immanent	threshold	or	Schwelle,	the	pivot	point	of	an	oscillation	between	the	singular	and	the	general,	opacity	and	transparency,	Schriftbild	and	instrument.	As	every	name	is	translatable	into	a	concept,	every	concept	must	equally	be	translatable	into	a	name.	Following	this	brief	detour	via	Hamacher’s	reflections	on	the	relative	opacity	of	the	name,	it	becomes	possible	to	link	the	suspended	process	of	isolating	the	phenomenom	from	the	context	that	determines	its	use	or	meaning	to	what	Benjamin,	in	yet	another	context,	describes	as	the	gesture	of	rescuing	[Rettung].	What	is	rescued	or	saved	from	the	reduction	of	language	to	an	instrument	by	a	gesture	that	similarly	seeks	to	isolate	fragments	from	any	given	conventional	context	is	the	impartability	of	language.	Severed	from	any	given	context	of	its	determination,	the	isolated	fragment	becomes	opaque,	like	the	word	that,	the	closer	a	look	one	takes	at,	as	Benjamin	was	so	fond	of	quoting	Karl	Kraus,	the	greater	the	distance	from	which	it	looks	back.202	Benjamin,	with	reference	to	the	citational	writing	practice	of	Karl	Krauss,	non-fortuitously	describes	this	gesture	as	‘calling	a	word	by	its	name’.203	The	isolated	name,	like	the	singular	phenomenon	of	allegorical	appropriation,	finds	itself	exposed,	weakened	in	its	resistance	to	the	coming	of	an	appropriative	code.	As	the	limit	of	both	singularity	and	generality,	it	undermines	the	property	of	the	name	or	the	closure	of	a	system	and	begins	to	swell	under	its	impartability	[Mitteilbarkeit].	In	the	realm	of	allegory,	which	is	not	that	of	alphabetical	writing,	the	strange	detail	of	allegorical	Verweisung/Verwaisung	is	not	the	‘word	called	by	its	name’	but	all	kinds	of	the	most	inconspicuous	phenomena	[Dinge]	deprived	of	their	natural	and	productive	place	and	function	in	the																																																									202	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Karl	Kraus’,	Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	II,	334-367.	(Franfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag),	361.	203	Walter	Benjamin	in	Walter	Benjamin,	The	work	of	Art	in	the	Age	of	Its	
Technological	Reproducibility	and	Other	Writings	on	Media.	ed.	Michael	W.Jennings,	Brigid	Doherty	&	Thomas	Y.Levin,	trans.	Edmund	Jephcott,	Rodney	Livingstone	&	Howard	Eiland.	(Cambridge	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press	2008),	384.	I	will	return	to	the	context	of	Benjamin’s	concept	of	Rettung	in	much	more	detail	at	a	later	stage	of	the	thesis.	
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world	as	a	cipher	for	a	mysterious	[rätselhaften]	wisdom.204	Benjamin,	by	turning	to	Dürer’s	famous	painting	Melencolia,	reads	an	aspect	of	the	latter	as	an	illustration	of	the	thus	orphaned	status	of	phenomena,	isolated	in	their	‘singularity’	and	weakened	in	their	resistance	to	allegorical	appropriation.	These	are	the	depiction	of	objects	that	have	ceized	to	be	mere	instruments:	‘the	appliances	and	tools	of	working	life	[that]	lie	unused	on	the	floor	as	objects	of	contemplation’.205	Carpentry	tools	lacking	in	use-value	–	a	plane,	a	saw,	a	plank	of	wood,	some	nails	–	are	exposed	in	their	‘singularity’	in	excess	of	their	instrumentality.	Cast	by	a	melancholic	gaze,	they	offer	themselves	to	the	infinite	transformations	of	their	Deutbarkeit	as	the	silent	but	virtual	medium	of	allegory.	
	
	
	
The	Plotter	and	the	Sovereign		
	 That	the	detail	is	no	longer	itself	“in”	anything	at	all	but	lies	exposed	as	prop	on	the	theatrical	stage	of	course	implies	that	it	can	also	no	longer	be	simply	the	mere	part	of	a	plot.		As	such,	the	gesture	of	its	“isolation”	is	one	that	seeks	to	wrest	it	from	the	continuity	of	time	rather	than	the	synchrony	of	space	and	is	concomitant	to	the	Trauerspiel’s	efforts	to	bring	temporal	progression	to	a	halt	by	stacking	previously	temporal	data	into	the	clutter	of	spatial	assemblages.	The	remnants	of	the	Trauerspiel’s	plot,	severed	from	the	totalizing	goal	of	its	end,	Benjamin	relates,	become	part	of	the	scenario	rather	than	constituting	its	informing	frame.	Ornamental	layers	of	baroque	stakku	conceal	or	bury	what	remains	of	the	tensions	or	development	of	a	dramatic	plot.	Contrary	to	its	role	in	Classical	drama,	the	Trauerspiel’s	chorus,	furthermore,	no	longer	appears	as	a	commentator	on	its	overall																																																									204	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	121.	205	ibid.	
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unfolding	at	decisive	moments	between	the	acts,	but	behaves	towards	plot	and	act	as	ornamental	margins	in	Renaissance	print	do	towards	the	type.	The	unravelling	of	the	isolated	and	stacked	up	parts	of	what	remains	of	the	plot	in	Trauerspiel	finds	itself	closely	linked	to	the	figure	of	the	plotter	or	intriguer	[der	Intrigant]	who	facilitates	their	embroilment.206	In	the	absence	of	dramatic	tensions	that	derive	from	an	uncertainty	over	the	outcomes	of	a	plot,	the	plotter	replaces	the	significance	of	the	hero-protagonist.	His	scheming	and	plotting	no	longer	seek	to	achieve	anything	at	all,	least	of	all	leaving	behind	a	great	work.207	He	manipulates	links	and	connections,	arranges	and	combines	for	the	pleasure	alone.	For	the	plotter,	power	and	violence	[Gewalt]	no	longer	constitute	instruments	for	the	institution	of	sovereignty,	but	are	scheming	devices	without	end,	put	to	work	in	the	perpetual	re-working	of	the	ostensibly	sovereign	but	essentially	precarious	orders	of	institutional	containment.	Responding	to	a	general	crisis	of	works,	for	the	plotter,	all	that	remains	is	the	virtuosity	of	the	labour	of	reworking.	The	plotter,	we	might	say,	follows	the	distinctly	theatrical	protocols	of	the	rehearsal	in	contrast	to	or	in	excess	of	the	ostensible	security	of	the	work.	His	facilitations	and	seductions,	Benjamin	notes,	are	devoid	of	interest	for	power	and	control.	As	the	promoter	of	‘choreographic	embroilments,’	he	resists	the	historical	flow	towards	the	ends	of	history,	whether	of	salvation	or	apocalypse.	‘[T]he	plotter	–	der	Intrigant[,]’	Weber	states,			 is	related	to	the	plot	(die	Intrige)	not	just	lexically,	but	semantically	and	etymologically,	as	Benjamin’s	argument	makes	clear.	If	the	term	“intrigue”	derives	from	the	Latin	intrigare,	“confuse,	confound,”	such	confusion	is	inseparable	from	a	tendency	of	the	baroque	to	which	Benjamin	attaches	considerable	importance:	its	“projection	of	temporal	process	into	space,”	and	in	particular	into	that	particular	space	known	as	the	“court”.	The																																																									206	ibid,	76.	207	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	178.	
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intriguer	is	the	“exponent	of	[this]	showplace,”	the	exemplary	courtier,	in	that	he	has	no	proper	place,	no	“home”	outside	of	it.	Inside,	however,	his	function	is	to	in-trigue,	to	confuse,	and	the	condition	of	such	confusion	is	precisely	the	particular	spatialisation	and	localisation	of	processes	that	are	usually	considered	to	be	temporal	or	historical	in	character.	As,	for	instance,	political	processes:	“The	course	of	political	events	[geschehen]	is	frozen	and	fixed	by	the	plot	[die	Intrigue],	which	strikes	the	seconds	[schlägt	den	Sekundentakt]”.	The	plot	beats	time,	as	it	were,	by	em-plotting	it,	confining	and	con-fusing	it	within	the	narrow	and	local	space	of	the	court.208		Through	his	incessant	rearrangement	and	re-combination	of	discrete	fragments	severed	from	the	totalizing	schemas	of	a	whole	–	for	instance,	those	of	the	plot,	the	work	and	the	body209	–	the	plotter,	albeit	perhaps	irresponsibly	so,	affirms	and	perpetuates	the	self-deconstruction	of	the	sovereignty	of	institutions,	works	and	action	under	way	in	the	German	baroque.	He	begins	to	deal	with	the	crisis	of	sovereignty	from	within	the	experience	of	a	radical	immanence	to	which	the	world	of	the	baroque	sees	itself	condemned.	As	such,	the	plotter	forms	a	counterpart	to	the	figure	of	the	sovereign	in	Trauerspiel.	Marked	by	a	deep	anxiety	over	the	unpredictable	coming	of	time	and	the	ineffectiveness	of	his	acts,	the	sovereign’s	predominant	response	to	his	predicament	consists	of	a	paranoid	reflex	that	wants	to	overcome	the	crisis	of	sovereignty	by	the	tyranny	of	phantasm	of	omnitemporality.	If	the	epoch’s	theatrical	figures	stand,	as	Benjamin	puts	it,	within	the	glaring	light	of	their	changing	decisions,	nowhere	does	this	become	more	apparent	than	in	the	figure	of	the	sovereign.	Like	‘torn	fluttering	flags’	he	is	subjected	to	the	arbitrary																																																									208	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	141-2.	209	Benjamin	speaks	of	the	plotter	as	a	precursor	to	the	ballet	master,	who,	as	Weber	notes,	begins	to	stand	for	a	near	dictatorial	effort	to	train	and	torture	his	pupils,	‘to	make	them	learn	and	master	their	bodies,	not	as	organic	unities,	but	as	articulations	of	joints	and	of	membra	disjecta,	ready	to	be	placed	in	space	rather	than	deployed	as	a	whole’	[ibid,	179].	
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and	despotic	nature	of	the	storm	of	his	affects.210	Swaying	physical	impulses	determine	his	decision	making	process.	Whereas	the	expression	of	a	general	conflict	of	will	and	sensation,	Benjamin	notes,	is	to	be	found	in	both	the	dramatic	and	plastic	figures	of	the	time	–	fittingly	described	by	Riegel	as	‘the	discord	between	head	and	body	position	–	with	the	theatrical	figure	of	the	sovereign,	as	well	as	its	worldly	referent,	the	crisis	of	decision	takes	on	the	highest	stakes.	In	the	political	realm	of	the	baroque,	the	sovereign	embodies	the	unworkability	of	an	increasingly	problematic	definition	of	effective	action	by	the	production	of	meaningful	works.	‘[T]he	rise	of	the	authority	of	the	secular	state	with	respect	to	the	power	of	the	Curia,’	Weber	observes,			 endows	princes	with	a	power	that	tends	to	the	absolute.	But	such	absolute	power	reveals	its	limitations,	since	it	is	no	longer	able	to	claim	a	transcendent	justification,	and	hence	the	power	to	endow	collective	life	with	a	meaning	that	could	comprehend	and	surpass	individual	mortality.	The	sovereign	is	thus	primus	inter	pares,	but	still	subject	to	the	guilt	and	corruption	held	to	pervade	an	essentially	unredeemed	and	guilty	creation,	consisting	of	mortal,	perishable,	and	largely	unsalvageable	individuals.211			Previously	conceived	of	as	the	earthly	head	of	creation,	partaking	in	a	sacred	order,	reformative	forces	expose	the	head	of	state	as	creature	[Kreatur].	His	exalted	position	all	the	more	conflicted	by	the	powerless	non-mastery	[Ohnmacht]	over	the	outcomes	of	his	acts.	Severed	like	the	rest	of	creation	from	access	to	grace,	the	sovereign	begins	to	wield	absolute	power	with	the	gestures	of	a	clumsy	creature.	When	representing	the	thus	conflicted	figures	of	authority,	Benjamin	relates,	the	Trauerspiel	offered	two	major	responses	to	the	crisis	of	their	sovereignty:	the	creaturely	dimension	of	a	corporeal	martyrdom	and	the	despotic	efforts	of	a	tyranny	of	decisiveness.	The	latter,	as	the																																																									210	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	53.	211	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	171.	
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dictatorship	over	wavering	affects	and	contingent	historical	events,	the	restoration	of	order	through	a	permanent	state	of	exception	and	the	implementation	of	“natural”	law	that	constitutes	its	utopia,	gives	some	sense	of	the	political	stakes	of	possible	responses	to	the	baroque	crisis	of	eschatology.212	In	the	baroque	the	tyrant	and	the	martyr	are	but	the	two	faces	of	the	monarch.	They	are	the	necessarily	extreme	incarnations	of	the	princely	essence.	As	far	as	the	tyrant	is	concerned,	this	is	clear																																																									212	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	55.	The	theme	of	a	constitutive	crisis	of	sovereignty	–	here	exposed	by	an	epochal	crisis	of	institutions	–	can	also	be	found	in	Benjamin’s	previous	reflections	on	the	finitude	of	sovereignty	in	his	‘Critique	of	Violence.’	Following	Mathias	Fritsch’s	reading	of	the	latter,	Benjamin	can	be	seen	to	develop	a	conception	of	the	essential	finitude	of	power,	that	is,	the	necessary	self-alienation	of	all	law-positing	violence/power	[Gewalt]	from	which	springs	‘the	recognition	of	a	messianic	force	associated	with	the	powerlessness	of	power	[…]’	as	it	will	become	an	increasingly	dominant	theme	for	these	reflections	on	a	politics	of	rehearsal	[ibid,	105].	The	essential	finitude	of	all	law-positing	power,	as	Fritsch	relates,	‘signifies	the	necessary	openness	of	political	and	legal	power	to	its	own	transformation’	[ibid,	104].	The	tyranny	of	the	
Trauerspiel’s	sovereign,	therefore,	merely	consists	of	a	particularly	desperate	gesture	of	a	general	disavowal	of	finitude	pertaining	to	the	exercise	of	power	as	such.	For	what	Benjamin’s	reflections	on	violence	[Gewalt]	seek	to	reveal	is	that	the	disavowal	of	the	inherent	weakness	of	institutions	is	necessarily	at	work	in	the	implementation	of	legal	order	as	the	positing	and	preservation	of	law	that	seeks	to	achieve	stability	and	permanence.	For	Benjamin,	it	is	important	to	‘understand	this	necessity	of	power	to	institute	itself,	and	to	subsequently	monopolize	violence	in	the	interest	of	its	own	self-preservation,’	in	so	far	as	the	latter	insight	is	also	what	provides	a	foundation	for	a	critique	of	violence.	Benjamin’s	own	version	of	this	critique	subsequently	broaches	‘the	possibility	of	pure	means	and	pure	violence	free	of	this	necessity’	[ibid,	111].	In	the	context	of	German	baroque	Trauerspiel,	the	plotter	perhaps	constitutes	an	active	proponent	of	such	a	passively	exposed	gesture	of	“pure”	violence	without	determinable	end.	Such	a	gesture	would	be	a	‘means	without	end’	only	insofar,’	as	Weber	puts	it	in	a	different	but	related	context,	‘as	the	word	“without”	defines	a	relation	not	of	simple	exclusion	or	negation,	but	of	participation	“with”	the	“out”-side	of	an	irreducible	and	yet	constitutive	exteriority’	[Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	197,	my	emphasis].	Not	only	does	it	put	into	question	all	preserving	violence	of	existing	institutions,	but	also	does	it	interrupt	its	own	act	of	positing	or	address.	In	departing	from	and	establishing	a	relation	to	itself	as	other,	the	“purity”	of	this	gesture	constitutes	a	theatrical	Schwelle,	that	is,	a	‘zone	of	indefinite	expansion	and	inflation	reaching	out	to	others	on	whose	response	it	depends’	[ibid,	235].	
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enough.	The	theory	of	sovereignty,	which	takes	as	its	example	the	special	case	in	which	dictatorial	powers	are	unfolded,	positively	demands	the	completion	of	the	image	of	the	sovereign	as	tyrant.213			In	the	Trauerspiel,	the	completion	of	the	image	of	the	sovereign	as	tyrant	as	a	symptom	of	the	baroque	experience	of	a	crisis	in	eschatology	is	contrasted	by	the	figure	of	the	plotter.		In	the	character	of	the	plotter	or	intriguer,	it	was	able	to	depict	an	antipode	to	the	sovereign’s	tyranny	and	an	example	of	a	different	attitude	towards	crisis,	which	as	a	crisis	of	decision	–	krisis	–	is	always	a	crisis	of	sovereignty.	Both	sovereign	and	plotter	are	eager	to	ward	off	an	encroaching	meaninglessness	of	their	immanent	acts	severed	from	the	organized	telos	of	their	transcendent	ends.	Where	the	tyrant	violently	seeks	to	overcome	crisis	by	re-instituting	a	secure,	permanent	order,	the	plotter	finds	the	resources	for	his	response	–	a	participation	in	the	social	re-construction	of	meaning	that	is	able	to	overcome	atrophy	and	stultification	–	within	the	general	undecidability	of	crisis	itself.		In	affirming	the	weak	force	of	a	finite	power	–	the	necessary	openness	of	political	and	legal	power,	but	also	of	meaning	more	generally,	to	its	own	transformation	–	the	plotter’s	model	attitude,	like	the	playwrights	and	audiences	of	Trauerspiel,	express	a	very	different	response	to	the	sentiment	of	Trauer	[mourning]	than	that	of	paranoia,	the	violent	reinstitution	of	old	or	new	orders	of	convention	and	the	tyrannic	suppression	of	contingency.	The	plotter’s	attitude,	like	that	of	the	playwrights	and	audiences	of	Trauerspiel,	is	marked	by	the	affirmation	of	a	constitutive	precariousness	of	a	perpetually	reworked	ethos.	Theirs	was	a	response	to	an	empirical	crisis	of	sovereignty	that	begins	to	account	for	the	structural	processes	of	its	self-deconstruction.	Their	playful,	experimental,	theatrical	and	radically	performative	gestures	of	reanimating	what	was	otherwise	experienced	as	an	empty,	meaningless	and	ephemeral	world	was	marked	by	a	Haltung	that	interrupts,	not	only	the	historical	flow,	but	its	own	intentional,	goal																																																									213	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	51.	&	Benjamin,	The	Origin,	69.	
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directed	movement.	In	doing	so,	it	begins	to	swell	under	the	possibilities	of	becoming	other.	As	such	it	becomes	a	model	for	a	politics	of	rehearsal	that	engages	the	political	effectiveness	of	‘a	certain	thinking	of	virtuality,	possibility,	potentiality	[…]	–	a	certain	virtualization	of	conceptualization	itself	[and]	of	“meaning”’.214				
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CHAPTER	TWO	
	
Test-Performances	in	the	Time	of	Reproducibilty215		
Towards	a	New	Concept	of	Inheritance	
	 One	of	the	manifold	possible	trajectories	to	discern	and	follow	in	Walter	Benjamin’s	famous	essay	on	‘The	Work	of	Art	in	the	Age	of	Its	Technological	Reproducibility’	is	the	movement	of	emancipation	of	the	work	of	art	from	its	parasitic	subservience	to	ritual	and	its	consequent	reliance	on	a	different	practice.216	This	other	practice	Benjamin	designates	at	different	points	of	the	essay	as	either	politics	or	play,	implicitly	bringing	into	proximity	two	terms	of	seemingly	disparate	realms	under	the	banner	of	a	revolution	of	the	social	function	of	art.	Benjamin’s	elaborate	analysis	of	technical	reproducibility	of	works	of	art	takes	place	in	the	wider	context	of	a	concern	with	a	crisis	of	tradition	and	inheritance	as	the	movement	of	its	transmission.	Immediately	parting	with	the	present	context	of	its	production,	the	reproducible	work	of	art	–	primary	example	for	Benjamin	throughout	the	essay	is	film	–	as	Samuel	Weber	puts	it,	‘‘takes	place”	in	many	places	at	once,	in	multiple	here-and-nows,	and	[…]	therefore	cannot	be	said	to	have	any	“original”	occurrence’.217	As	the	time	of	its	production	is	always	already	breached	by	the	time	of	(its)	reproducibility,	it	has	inscribed	in	it	the	possibility	of	the	coming	of	an	infinite	alterity	at	its	very	“origin.”	What	previously	imbued	the	artwork	with	‘the	quintessence	of	all	that	is	transmissible	in																																																									215	In	a	commentary	on	Benjamin’s	essay,	Samuel	Weber	suggests	to	translate	its	title	as	‘The	Work	of	Art	in	the	Time	of	its	Technical	Reproducibility.’	‘Despite	its	obvious	awkwardness,’	Weber	says,	‘I	use	the	word	‘Time’	here,	rather	than	the	more	idiomatic	‘Age’,	to	translate	‘Zeit’	[…],	because	what	is	involved	[…]	is		precisely	a	question	of	time	and	of	an	alteration	in	its	relation	to	space’	[Weber,	Mass	Mediauras,	82].	216	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	106.	217	Weber,	Mass	Mediauras,	90.	
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it	from	its	origin	on,	ranging	from	its	physical	duration	to	the	historical	testimony	relating	to	it,’	here	finds	itself	undermined	and	with	it	‘the	authority	of	the	object,	the	weight	it	derives	from	tradition’.218	This	process	–	the	withering	of	the	aura	of	the	work	of	art	–	which	Benjamin	repeatedly	circumscribes	in	differently	nuanced	constellations,	is	symptomatic,	as	he	puts	it,	‘its	significance	extend[ing]	far	beyond	the	realm	of	art’.219	The	new	type	of	(art)	object,	the	reproducible	work	(of	art),	no	longer	finds	itself	embedded	in	a	particular	contextual	space	and	cannot	be	submitted	to		‘the	idea	of	a	tradition	which	has	passed	the	object	down	as	the	same,	identical	thing	to	the	present	day’.220	Instead,	technological	reproducibility	jolts	the	reproducible	object	from	the	sphere	of	tradition	by	substituting	what	Benjamin	calls	a	‘mass	existence’	[massenweises	Vorkommen]	for	a	unique	existence.221	Whatever	else	Benjamin	seeks	to	signal	towards	with	this	expression,	it	clearly	wants	to	designate	a	fundamental	shift	in	the	conception	of	the	spatiotemporal	relations	between	production	and	reception.	A	shift	that	is	indicated	throughout	Benjamin’s	essay,	as	Weber	notes,	as	‘the	same	German	verb	–	aufnehmen	–	is	used	to	designate	cinematic	production	as	well	as	reception,’	indicating	therewith	‘that	both	ends	of	the	process	may	share	some	very	basic	features’.222	The	shift	in	spatio-temporal	identification	not	only	affects	the	object	of	art	produced	–	i.e.	film	–	but	also	those	captured	in	the	process	of	its	production,	or	else,	those	submitted	to	the	
Aufnahme	[recording]	of	an	apparatus.	In	a	scenario	of	self-alienation	that	for	Benjamin	raises	the	stakes	of	a	favourite	theme	of	the	Romantics,																																																									218	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	106.	219	ibid,	104.	220	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	91.	221	ibid,	103.	A	less	idiomatic	rendering	of	‘massenweises	Vorkommen’	here	might	be	‘plurality	of	copies,’	but	I	want	to	stress	the	plurality	of	recipients	rather	than	that	of	the	object	received.	Furthermore,	as	both	chance	and	threat,	the	ambiguous	concept	of	the	mass	perhaps	plays	an	important	role	in	Benjamin’s	theory	of	modernity,	which	mourns	the	waning	of	tradition	in	the	wake	of	a	collapse	of	intimate,	small,	rural	and	religious	communities	whilst	drawing	hope	from	the	“inhuman”	character	of	anonymous,	industrial	and	secular	metropolises	that	finds	an	expression	in	the	phenomenon	of	the	mass.	222	Weber,	Mass	Mediauras,	91.	
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one’s	(mirror-)	image	not	only	‘has	become	detachable	from	the	person	mirrored,’	but	has	become	transportable,	as	he	puts	it,	‘[t]o	a	site	in	front	of	the	masses’.223	The	Aufnahme	[recording,	reception]	of	transportable	images	renders	organic	wholes	zerstückelt	[cut	into	pieces]	and	zerstreut	[dispersed].	Benjamin	links	the	cutting	‘operation’	of	the	camera	to	that	of	a	surgeon	by	‘the	violence	involved	in	their	respective	‘penetration’’	of	organic	wholes.	The	parcelling	out	of	pieces	in	view	of	their	dispersion	and	future	gathering	here	must	recall	the	allegorical	mode	of	signification	of	the	German	baroque	mourning	play.	For	the	mourning	play’s	allegorical	schema,	as	we	saw	Benjamin	relate,	is	one	of	‘dispersion’	[Zerstreung]	and	‘gathering’	[Sammlung]:	‘[t]hings	are	brought	together	according	to	their	meaning;	indifference	to	their	being-there	(Dasein)	disperses	them	once	again’.224	Zerstückelt	is	furthermore	not	only	a	subject’s	self-representation,	but	also	the	‘representation	of	his	environment	by	means	of	this	apparatus’.225	Benjamin	links	the	piecemeal	nature	of	the	latter’s	images,	together	with	its	possibilities	of	closing	in	or	slowing	down	that	far	exceed	human	capacities	of	perception,	to	the	assurance	of	‘a	vast	and	unsuspected	field	of	action	[Spielraum]’.226	‘Our	bars	and	city	streets,	our	offices	and	furnished	rooms,	our	railroad	stations	and	our	factories,’	he	says,			 seemed	to	close	relentlessly	around	us.	Then	came	film	and	exploded	this	prison-world	with	the	dynamite	of	the	split	second,	so	that	now	we	can	set	off	calmly	on	journeys	of	adventure	among	its	far-flung	debris.227			Here,	an	expanded	field	of	action	[Spielraum]	is	linked	to	the	aftermath	of	destruction,	that	is,	to	the	far-flung	remains	of	previous	orders	of	perception.	Benjamin	more	generally	describes	such	destructive-																																																								223	ibid,	103.	224	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	166.	225	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	117.	226	ibid.	227	ibid.	
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productive	forces	by	the	‘shattering’	and	‘liquidation’	of	embedding	traditions,	a	process	connected	with	the	freeing	of	non-originary	and	non-identical	‘objects’	and	‘subjects’	from	the	tight	hold	of	any	one	context	of	determination	qua	time	of	reproducibility.	It	is	the	destructive	forces	unleashed	by	the	withering	of	the	aura	of	the	work	of	art	that	for	Benjamin	make	up	some	of	the	most	positive	forms	of	its	revolutionized	social	function	founded	on	the	practice	of	politics	and	play.228	What	is	destroyed,	is	not	necessarily	or	merely	the	reified	products	of	a	particular	institutionalised	cultural	heritage,	but	the	organized	movement	of	their	passing	on.	In	other	words,	what	is	put	into	crisis	is	not	only	the	content	and	authority	of	the	transmitted,	but	the	very	mode	and	authority	of	the	form	of	transmission.	The	‘upheaval	in	the	domain	of																																																									228	Benjamin’s	thinking	and	writing,	here	as,	albeit	with	shifting	emphasis,	elsewhere,	is	marked	by	what	Samuel	Weber	has	identified	as	‘a	double	(or	“cracked”)	tone.’	For	Weber,	the	cracked	style	of	Benjamin’s	writings	follows	from	his	effort	to	elaborate	a	non-instrumental	conception	of	language	that	leads	him	to	insist	on	the	irreducible	immediacy	of	the	medial.	The	originating	crack	or	fracture	of	all	identity	–	whether	of	subjects,	objects,	things	or	meanings	–	marked	throughout	Benjamin’s	writings	by	a	certain	virtualization	of	conceptualization	by	the	suffix	–ability,	‘comes	to	acquire	historical,	political,	and	cultural	significance,’	when	applied	in	the	historical	context	of	a	waning	tradition.	Benjamin’s	essay	on	the	work	of	art	in	the	time	of	reproducibility	can	clearly	be	seen	to	grapple	with	the	political	stakes	of	the	–ability	by	stressing	the	tone	of	engagement	and	hope	over	that	of	melancholy	and	mourning.	Weber’s	gloss	on	Benjamin’s	double	tone,	as	will	become	increasingly	clear,	thus	resonates	deeply	with	our	present	concerns:	‘[Benjamin’s	thinking	and	writing]	are	marked	by	a	double	(or	“cracked”)	tone.	On	the	one	hand,	that	of	melancholy,	sadness,	and	mourning	(Trauer	is	a	leitmotif	from	first	to	last);	on	the	other	hand,	and	inseparable	from	the	first	because	its	consequence,	that	of	energetic	engagement,	militancy,	and	hope,	because	the	very	same	fracture	that	is	felt	as	loss	also	opens	up	the	(linguistic)	possibility	of	this	loss	itself	being	lost,	imparting	and	thus	altering	itself	and	thereby	keeping	the	way	open	for	the	coming	of	something	radically	different.	This	is	how	the	ostensible	transcendentalism	of	Benjamin’s	-abilities	comes	to	acquire	historical,	political,	and	cultural	significance.	Everything	that	contributes	to	dislodging	that	which	is	–	by	forcing	it	into	a	mode	of	self-imparting,	self-departing,	by	wrenching	it	free	from	its	established	sites	–	is	both	painful,	creating	a	sense	of	loss	(that	of	the	“aura,”	for	instance,	provoked	by	the	spread	of	techniques	of	“reproducibility”)	and	at	the	same	time	the	bearer	of	messianic	hope’	[Weber,	Benjamin’s	-abilities,	119].	
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objects	handed	down	from	the	past’	concerns	these	objects	as	much	as	the	gesture	of	their	handing	down,	the	very	modality	of	how	the	past	is	left	for	the	future.	A	productive-destructive,	if	not	self-deconstructive	force	unleashes	with	the	shattering	of	tradition,	which	thereby	reconfigures,	as	we	might	here	put	it	in	order	to	facilitate	the	afterlife	of	Benjamin’s	own	text,	the	status	of	signature,	event	and	context.	If	the	unique	work	of	art	found	itself	more	or	less	safely	embedded	in,	if	not	tightly	guarded	by	a	tradition	that	sought	to	(re-)institute	itself	for	eternity,	the	reproducible	work	of	art,	no	longer	unique	and	securely	embedded	in	a	counter-signing	context	that	tends	towards	the	closure	of	determination,	must	give	itself	over	from	its	“origin”	to	the	effects	of	space	and	time	–	or	once	more	put	in	a	register	that	is	not	Benjamin’s:	the	
becoming	spacing	of	time	and	the	becoming	time	of	space	–	eschewing	the	relative	permanence	of	contextual	determinations	(with	all	the	power	structures	that	come	into	play	in	such	rigid	contextual	and	institutional	embedding),	to	surrender	before	the	plurality	of	its	‘mass	existence.’229	Perhaps	not	the	least	important	feature	of	this	non-unique	plurality	of	a	‘mass	existence’	is	what	Benjamin	calls	the	artwork’s	subsequent	‘capability	for	improvement’.230	Here,	by	a	structural	movement	of	reproducibility	that	involves	difference	as	much	as	repetition,	the	artwork	exposes	itself	as	infinitely	reworkable.																																																											229	I	say	‘more	or	less	embedded’	and	speak	of	a	‘tendency	towards	closure,’	to	indicate	that	it	is	not	here	a	matter	of	identifying	an	absolute	break,	but	an	epochal	shift	in	tendency.	Following	the	ultratranscendental	logic	of	a	structural	crack	of	identity	regardless	of	its	techno-historical	conditions	of	inscription,	the	unique,	embedded	work	of	art	will	have	always	already	been	more	or	less	subject	to	dynamic	processes	of	a	however	curbed	time	reproducibility.	At	the	same	time,	the	reproducible	work	of	art	is	still	vulnerable	to	re-appropriations	by	governing	powers	in	the	service	of	enhancing	tradition	and	aura.	In	fact,	Benjamin’s	hope	of	a	revolution	of	the	social	function	of	art	finds	itself	menaced	at	various	instances	throughout	the	essay	by	the	fear	of	capitalist	and	fascist	appropriations	of	the	new	media.	The	chance	of	a	mass	participation	is	threatened	from	within	by	the	threat	of	a	hegemonic	representation	of	the	mass	and	vice	versa.		230	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	109.	
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Improvability		 	Although	Benjamin	is	thinking	about	the	‘capacity	for	improvement’	in	the	context	of	the	staggered	process	of	film	production	–	from	the	initial	‘taking’	of	images	to	the	‘final	cut’	of	its	assemblage	–	it	is	nevertheless	tempting	to	momentarily	stop	following	the	trajectory	of	his	essay’s	content	to	instead	reflect	upon	its	own	formal	composition	and	history	of	assemblage.	For	the	latter	quickly	begins	to	mirror	the	very	principle	of	a	capacity	for	(editorial)	improvement	that	it	itself	ascribes	to	film	as	the	prototype	of	the	reproducible	work	of	art	and	antithesis	of	a	monolithic	object	of	inheritance.	Comparing	the	reproducible	work	of	art’s	‘capacity	for	improvement’	to	the	eternal	values	of	Greek	sculpture,	Benjamin	writes:		 The	finished	film	is	the	exact	antithesis	of	a	work	created	at	a	single	stroke.	It	is	assembled	from	the	very	large	number	of	images	and	image	sequences	that	offer	an	array	of	choices	to	the	editor;	these	images,	moreover,	can	be	improved	in	any	desired	way	in	the	process	leading	from	the	initial	take	to	the	final	cut.			Benjamin’s	repeated	re-assemblage	of	his	own	essay	over	three	different	versions	perhaps	rehearses	a	similar	structural	possibility	of	the	movement	of	alteration	in	repetition	that	here	pertains	to	a	fundamental	lack	of	primary	originality	of	film	qua	‘time	of	reproducibility’.	Given	Benjamin’s	anti-instrumental	conception	of	language	as	an	‘immediate	impartibility’	[unmittelbare	Mitteilbarkeit]	that	virtually	takes	leave	of	itself	in	any	given	context	of	determination,	‘parts	with	what	it	was	to	become	something	else,	to	be	transposed,	transmitted,	or	translated	into	something	else’	–	substituting	therewith,	as	we	might	here	put	it	in	light	of	the	resonance	of	a	certain	sharing-with	[mit-teilen],	a	‘mass	existence’	for	a	unique	existence	in	its	origin	–	his	text,	or	indeed	any	text,	must	reckon	with	the	possibility	of	its	transformation	at	another	time	and	
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place,	whether	by	Benjamin’s	own	efforts	or	by	its	future	reception	[Aufnahme]	through	the	manifold	inheritors	to	come	of	its	already	multiplied	versions	or	takes.231		What	is	thus	decisive	in	the																																																									231	Weber,	Benjamin’s	-abilities,	42.	Benjamin	develops	his	concept	of	impart-ability	in	his	early	essay	‘On	Language	as	Such	and	on	the	Language	of	Man’.	The	essay	seeks	to	develop	a	theory	of	language	that	avoids	construing	the	latter	as	an	instrument	or	means	[Mittel]	to	an	end,	as	well	as	that	of	an	end	in	itself.	In	these	efforts,	as	Samuel	Weber	relates,	Benjamin	comes	to	formulate	for	the	first	time	a	certain	
virtualization	in	the	formulation	of	a	key	concept	by	the	suffix	–ability	[-
barkeit],	a	stylistic	particularity	‘that	will	distinguish	his	writings	from	beginning	to	end’	and	which,	as	we	have	seen,	also	plays	a	central	part	in	his	reflections	on	the	art	work’s	reproduce-ability	[Reproduzier-barkeit]:	‘These	are	Benjamin’s	–barkeiten,	Weber	relates,	‘his	“-abilities,”’	which	define	his	major	concepts	in	terms	of	what	Derrida	has	called	structural	
possibility	rather	than	in	view	of	their	actual	realization’	[ibid,	39].	Given	that	for	Benjamin	language	cannot	be	subordinated	to	an	external	measure,	what	imparts	itself	in	language	and	never	through	it	does	so	immediately	or	without	mediation	[unmittelbar]	[ibid,	40].	The	‘linguisticity	of	language,’	as	Weber	also	calls	it,	is	thus	described	by	a	term	–	Mitteilung	–	that	contrary	to	the	resonances	of	its	general	translation	as	communication	more	literally	suggests	“parting	with,”	“sharing”,	or	“to	impart”	[mitteilen].	The	immediacy	of	language’s	impart-ability	here	further	resonates	with	the	art	works’	mass	existence	in	the	
(first)	time	of	its	reproducibility.	In	the	context	of	his	reflections	on	Benjamin’s	theory	of	language,	Weber	describes	the	logic	of	unmediated	
impartability	as	follows:	‘The	impart-ability	that	constitutes	language	as	medium	is	un-mediated,	im-mediate:	not	a	means	to	an	end,	nor	a	middle	between	poles	or	periphery,	but	also	not	simply	the	opposite	of	a	means,	which	is	to	say,	an	end	in	itself.	Rather,	language	still	retains	one	decisive	aspect	of	the	means,	which	is	that	it	is	not	self-contained,	complete,	perfect,	or	perfectible.	It	is	simply	there,	but	as	something	that	splits	off	from	itself,	takes	leave	of	itself,	parts	with	what	it	was	to	become	something	else,	to	be	transposed,	transmitted,	or	translated	into	something	else.	[…]	What	is	“immediate”	is	that	which	is	defined	by	the	potentiality	of	taking	leave	of	itself,	of	its	place	and	position,	of	altering	itself.	[…]	In	short,	as	medium,	language	parts	with	itself	and	can	thus	be	said	to	constitute	a	medium	of	virtuality,	a	virtual	medium	that	cannot	be	
measured	by	the	possibility	of	self-fulfilment	but	by	its	constitutive	alterability’	[ibid,	42].		Such	immediate	leave-taking	of	a	place	and	position,	a	virtuality	rendered	by	a	constitutive	alterability	is	similarly	at	work	in	Benjamin’s	writings	on	the	reproducible	work	of	art.	Relating	Benjamin’s	reflections	on	language	to	a	discourse	on	the	artwork,	Weber	states	fittingly:	‘Against	the	claims	of	the	integrative	artwork	Benjamin	insists	on	the	medial	imparting	as	the	historical	heritage	of	the	work.	Works	are	not	self-enclosed	or	complete,	but	live	on,	survive	themselves	as	something	
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transformative	movement	of	(self-)inheritance	is	that	beyond	the	limited	context	of	Benjamin’s	above	remarks	on	the	process	of	film	production,	the	structural	logic	of	reproducibility	must	hold	open	the	possibility	of	future	alteration	in	excess	of	any	so-called	“final”	cut	of	an	editor	or	author.	All	receptions	[Aufnahmen]	of	the	latter	are	bound	to	return	the	relative	“finality”	of	assemblage	to	a	greater	state	of	potentiality,	before	themselves	choosing,	whether	knowingly	or	not,	upon	its	more	or	less	differing	re-assemblage;	following	a	movement	of	dispersion	and	gathering	by	which	any	given	“finality”	only	comes	to	be	in	passing	away.	The	rich	and	diverse	afterlife	of	Benjamin’s	essay,	whether	in	print,	(mis)translation,	or	indeed	(mis)interpretation,	perhaps	attests	to	the	multiple	alterities	inscribed	in	the	structure	of	its	‘reproducibility’	beyond	Benjamin’s	own	endeavours	at	putting	to	work,	if	not	into	play,	but	perhaps	also	seeking	to	more	or	less	“finalize”	and	thus	curb	and	bring	to	an	end	its	capacity	for	improvement.	That	today	it	takes	up	such	a	preeminent	position	on	the	syllabus	of	Fine	Art	and	Humanties	courses	of	Higher	Education	is,	unlike	what	Benjamin	says	of	Greek	sculpture’s	pre-eminence	in	Art	History,	no	longer	a	result	of	its	eternal	values,	but	to	the	contrary,	due	to	the	productive	lure	of	its	general	open-endedness.	The	latter	invites,	for	better	or	worse,	the	continual	reconfiguration	of	its																																																																																																																																																else,	for	instance,	as	criticism	or	as	translations.	Or	as	theatrical	performances.	In	such	performances,	they	are	no	longer	the	same	as	they	were:	they	take	leave	to	become	something	else’	[ibid,	47-8].	Following	Benjamin’s	conception	of	language,	the	latter’s	immediate	imparting	cannot	be	avoided	but	merely	disavowed.	From	which	follows	that	it	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	status	of	a	style,	as	it	is	always	already	taking	place	on	the	level	of	the	mark	of	language	itself,	regardless	and	in	spite	of	an	author’s	intentions.	Nevertheless,	Benjamin’s	method	and	style,	attuned	to	language’s	immediate	imparting,	could	be	said	to	seek	to	include	‘in	what	is	described,	but	also	in	the	practical	discourse,	in	the	
writing	that	describes’	the	structural	possibility	of	a	transformative	survival	[Derrida,	Limited	Inc,	78].	For	instance,	by	the	movement	of	an	active	self-inheritance	or	recycling	of	concepts	in	a	variety	of	contexts,	which	begin	to	swell	under	the	multiplication	of	actual	contextual	difference	and	are	exposed	in	their	structural	possibility	of	engendering	an	infinite	amount	of	other	contexts,	Benjamin	demonstrates	the	non-instrumental	life	of	language	even	when	putting	it	to	more	or	less	communicative	ends.			
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parts	in	new	contexts,	including	the	present	one.	It	follows	that	what	Benjamin	calls	the	reproducible	artwork’s	capacity	for	improvement	can	thus	equally	and	at	the	same	time	be	always	described	as	the	threat	of	its	coming	corruption.	Improvability	must	not	be	construed	as	perfectibility	along	a	teleologic	trajectory	of	a	sublating	synthesis,	that	is,	as	a	mediation	that	‘is	always	only	a	“moment”	on	the	way	to	becoming	what	it	“virtually”	will	always	have	been;	a	future	perfecting	itself	as	the	presence	of	the	past	(perfect)’.232	Both	its	chance	(of	improvement)	and	threat	(of	corruption)	are	born	of	the	same	structural	opening	to	the	coming	of	the	other.	For	‘when	one	speaks	of	“the	other,”’	as	Martin	Hägglund	reminds	us,	‘one	can	never	know	in	advance	what	or	whom	one	invokes.	It	is	thus	impossible	to	decide	whether	the	encounter	with	the	other	will	bring	about	a	chance	or	a	threat,	recognition	or	rejection,	continued	life	or	violent	death’.233	Benjamin,	speaking	in	the	context	of	his	discussion	of	the	reproducibility	of	film,	is	of	course	not	at	all	unaware	of	the	ambivalence	of	potential	of	a	work	of	art	severed	from	‘a	tradition	that	has	passed	the	object	down	as	the	same,	identical	thing	to	the	present	day’.234	When	reflecting	on	the	revolutionary	chance	of	the	social	function	of	art,	he	increasingly	begins	to	reckon	as	well	as	detect	in	his	time	the	most	worrying	signs	of	the	entanglement	of	the	chance	for	a	non-ritualistic	social	function	of	art	founded	on	a	practice	of	politics	and	play	with	that	of	the	threat	of	its	auratic	re-appropriation	put	in	the	service	of	monopolist	capitalism	and	fascism.		Benjamin,	in	any	case,	was	well	aware	that	the	marks	of	language,	like	the	dispersed	‘object’	of	film	and	its	zerstreut	and	zerstückelt	‘subjects’	captured,	has	always	already	lived	a	certain	‘mass	existence’	in	place	of	authenticity	by	virtue	of	its	immediate	impart-ability	[unmittelbar	mitteilbar].	However	attentive	to	the	epochal	technological	shifts	underway	in	‘the	age	of	reproducibility,’	his	analysis	avoids	the																																																									232	Weber,	Benjamin’s	-abilities,	37.	233	Hägglund,	p.91.	The	logic	of	a	possible	corruption	or	contamination	as	the	very	condition	of	the	limited	function	of	a	mark	is	thoroughly	developed	by	Derrida’s	‘Signature,	Event,	Context’	and	Limited	Inc.		234	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	103.	
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logic	of	a	radical	historical	break	by	being	grounded	in	what	we	might	call	a	quasi-transcendental	structure.	His	early	insistence	on	the	irreducible	mediality	of	language	qua	impart-ability,	as	Weber	notes,	‘indicates	that	his	concern	with	the	“media”	originates	not	in	his	later	studies	of	radio,	film,	and	photography,	but	rather	in	his	effort	to	elaborate	a	noninstrumental	conception	of	language’.235	In	so	far	as	the	immediacy	of	the	medial	belongs	to	language	as	such,	it	is	irreducible	to	a	particular	style	or	text,	whether	Benjamin’s	or	any	other.	Yet	despite	the	structural	ability	of	language’s	impart-ability	to	resist	even	the	most	laborious	efforts	at	reigning	in	what	Derrida	calls	a	text’s	structural	unconscious	–	for	instance,	by	the	authority	of	signatures	and	institutional	counter-signatures	–	those	efforts	are	nevertheless	able	to	exert	limited	embedding	effects.	On	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	there	are	those	texts	and	(art)works	that	are	more	readily	exposed	to	the	coming	of	time,	more	demonstratively	risking	the	possibility	of	a	transformative	survival	and	calling	therewith	for	the	participation	of	the	other,	that	is,	appealing	‘to	negotiate	the	crack	and	take	the	leap	[…]	by	a	reading	that	goes	against	the	grain	of	meaning	‘so	that	the	text	does	not	disappear	into	it	but	remains	as	figure:	as	writing-image	(Schriftbild)’.236	Benjamin’s	style,	saturated	with	an	excessive	use	of		(self-)citation	and	montage,	can	perhaps	be	read	along	these	lines,	that	is,	as	concerned	with	a	practical	staging	of	his	theoretical	concerns.				
Politics	and	Play		 Benjamin’s	elaborations	on	the	reproducible	artworks’	‘capacity	for	improvement’	take	place	in	the	context	of	a	brief	comparison	with	Greek	art,	for	which	the	latter,	as	he	puts	it,	would	have	been	the	least																																																									235	Weber,	Benjamin’s	-abilities,	118.	236	ibid,	299.		
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compelling	quality	of	the	artwork	or	in	any	case	one	dismissed	as	marginal.	The	antithesis	of	the	work	of	art	capable	of	improvement	qua	mode	of	reproducibility	can	thus	be	found	in	Greek	sculpture,	created	at	a	single	stroke	and	literally	all	of	a	piece,	passed	on	as	a	monolithic	object	of	inheritance.	Due	to	a	limited	availability	of	reproduction	technologies,	Benjamin	suggests,	the	Greeks	were	compelled	to	produce	eternal	values	in	their	art,	which	is	why	the	pinnacle	of	their	arts	was	the	form	least	capable	of	improvement.	‘To	this,’	Benjamin	adds,	‘they	owe	their	preeminent	position	in	art	history’.237	His	own	time,	on	the	other	hand,	strikes	Benjamin	as	lying	at	the	opposite	pole	from	that	of	the	Greeks.	The	reproducible	work	of	art’s	capability	of	improvement	is	necessarily	linked	to	a	radical	renunciation	of	eternal	values.	In	the	age	of	the	assembled	[montierbar]	artwork,	the	latter	presents	itself	as	wholly	provisional.	A	similar	polarity	between	the	eternal	and	the	provisional	informs	another	comparative	scene	of	Benjamin’s	essay.	Having	early	on	proclaimed	the	emancipation	of	the	work	of	art	from	its	parasitic	subservience	to	ritual	and	the	concomitant	reconfiguration	of	the	function	of	art	from	being	founded	on	ritual	to	being	based	on	a	different	practice,	namely,	politics,	Benjamin	reinscribes	a	similar	polarity	and	shift	in	the	function	of	the	work	of	art	in	slightly	different	terms.	He	begins	by	describing	a	shift	from	the	artwork’s	cult	value	to	its	exhibition	value,	a	transformation	that	eschews	the	sacralised	removal	of	objects	from	public	view	in	places	with	only	privileged	access	for	the	enormously	increased	visibility	of	technologically	reproduced	works	of	art.	Whereas	the	former	found	its	use	in	the	service	of	magic	and	ritual,	the	latter	signals	towards	a	historical	change	in	the	function	of	art.	By	retracing	this	shift	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	technological	function	of	the	art	object,	Benjamin	then	contrasts	a	prehistoric	use	of	art	in	the	service	of	magical	practice	(first	technology)	to	a	modern	use	in	the	service	of	a	distanciation	from	nature	through	play	(second	technology).	Here,	once	again,	the	polarity	of	the	two	functions	of	art	as	technology	is																																																									237	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	109.	
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one	between	fundamentally	different	attitudes	towards	time,	history	and	inheritance.	On	the	one	hand,	ritual	use	aims	at	a	firm	hold	over	the	coming	of	the	future,	whereas	on	the	other,	playful	use	develops	an	attitude	of	provisionality	and	endless	experiment:		 The	results	of	the	first	technology	are	valid	once	and	for	all	(it	deals	with	irreparable	lapse	or	sacrificial	death,	which	holds	good	
for	eternity).	The	results	of	the	second	are	wholly	provisional	(it	operates	by	means	of	experiments	and	endlessly	varied	test	
procedures).	The	origin	of	the	second	technology	lies	at	the	point	where,	by	an	unconscious	ruse,	human	beings	first	began	to	distance	themselves	from	nature.	It	lies,	in	other	words,	in	play.	238		Eschewing	first	technologies	aim	at	a	“mastery	over	nature,”	second	technology,	Benjamin	relates,	aims	instead	at	‘an	interplay	between	nature	and	humanity’.	239	Here,	in	the	context	of	this	inter-play,	it	is	perhaps	not	surprising	that	Benjamin	reverts	to	a	theatrical	trope	when	once	again	defining	‘the	primary	social	function	of	art	today,’	namely,	‘to	
rehearse	that	interplay’.240	In	other	words,	the	new	social	function	of	art	links	the	practice	of	politics	to	the	repetitive,	playful	experiments	of	rehearsal	and	‘training’	[Übung].		What	is	at	stake	for	Benjamin	in	such	training	exercises	is	the	ability	‘to	deal	with	a	vast	apparatus	[Apparatur]’	that	might	otherwise	enslave	one.241					
Training	to	Deal	With	The	Apparatus:	On	Test-Performances	
	 ‘The	function	of	film,’	Benjamin	says	emphatically,	‘is	to	train	human	beings	in	the	apperceptions	and	reactions	needed	to	deal	with	a																																																									238	ibid,	107	(my	emphasis).	239	ibid.	240	ibid,	107-8.	241	ibid,	108.	
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vast	apparatus	whose	role	in	their	lives	is	expanding	almost	daily’.242	But	what	is	an	apparatus?	In	Giorgio	Agamben’s	text	of	that	title,	he	reflects	and	expands	upon	Michel	Foucault’s	famous	concept	of	the	dispositif	[apparatus]	by	tracing	a	broadly	scoped	genealogy	of	the	term,	without	however	touching	at	any	point	upon	Benjamin’s	use	of	the	latter.	If,	for	now,	we	assume	a	correlation	between	their	respective	conceptions	of	the	apparatus,	it	is	perhaps	striking	how	both	Benjamin	and	Agamben	link	the	latter	to	the	movement	of	its	expansion	in	our	lives,	which,	if	we	believe	Agamben,	has	not	stopped	growing	ever	since	Benjamin	began	to	observe	it	in	1936.	For	at	several	points	in	his	text,	Agamben,	like	Benjamin	before	him	and	not	perhaps	without	a	similar	pathos,	attests	to	the	‘boundless	growth	of	apparatuses	in	our	time’.243	Before	following	Agamben’s	broadly	staked	out	genealogy	of	the	apparatus	in	more	detail	and	linking	it	to	Benjamin’s	use	of	the	term	where	possible,	I	want	to	follow	the	theme	of	the	apparatus	and	the	particular	training	one’s	dealings	with	it	demands	within	Benjamin’s	text	alone.	‘Dealing	with	this	apparatus,’	Benjamin	continues	and	concludes	the	above	reflections	on	‘second	technology,’	‘also	teaches	them	[humanity]	that	technology	will	release	them	from	their	enslavement	to	the	powers	of	the	apparatus	only	when	humanity’s	whole	constitution	has	adapted	itself	to	the	new	productive	forces	which	the	second	technology	has	set	free’.244	The	apparatus	thus	has	a	capacity	to	enslave,	but	it	can	also	be	dealt	with.	Instead	of	finding	oneself	enslaved	by	it,	that	is,	put	in	its	service,	one	must	learn	how	to	deal,	handle	or	work	with	it	by	submitting	oneself	to	training	[Übung].	Here,	learning	how	to	deal	with	it	qua	training	[Übung]	and	dealing	with	the	apparatus,	as	will	become	increasingly	apparent,	are	perhaps	the	same	thing.	What	is	necessary	for	a	movement	of	emancipation	from	a	potential	enslavement	is	to	transform	the	work	for	the	apparatus	into	a	work	with	it.	What	is	more,	by	the	transformed	
Umgang	with	the	apparatus	a	certain	potentiality	of	technology	is																																																									242	ibid.	243	Giorgio	Agamben,	What	is	an	Apparatus?	And	Other	Essays.	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press	2009),	15.	244	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	108.	
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revealed	–	linking	therewith	the	apparatus,	or	at	least	the	task	of	dealing	with	it,	to	the	question	of	technology,	as	well	as,	thereby,	to	the	socio-technological	function	of	the	reproducible	work	of	art:	no	longer	put	in	the	service	of	magic	(1st	technology)	but	instead	constituting	something	of	a	rehearsal	space	for	the	inter-play	between	nature	and	humanity	(2nd	technology).	Working-with	instead	of	for	an	apparatus	must	thus	involve	a	critical	questioning	of	the	goals	or	ends	to	which	the	apparatus	seeks	to	harness	one’s	service,	as	well	as	the	experimental	task	and	attitude	of	putting	it	to	ever	new	ones,	however	provisionally	posited.	In	other	words,	working	with	by	working	against	given	univocal	ends	of	an	apparatus	involves	a	practice	of	politics	and	play	that	seeks	to	expand	the	‘scope	for	play’	in	one’s	dealing	with	apparatuses,	or	the	apparatus,	opening	up	an	expanded	‘field	of	action’	that	Benjamin	calls	a	Spielraum,	literally,	a	‘playroom’	or	‘room	for	play’.245	Dealing	with	the	apparatus	means	training	to	deal	with	the	apparatus	and	training	to	deal	with	the	apparatus	takes	place	through	‘test	performances’	–	for	instance	those	peculiar	performances,	as	Benjamin	relates,	of	the	film	actor	in	front	of	an	apparatus.246		Benjamin	begins	his	reflections	on	the	test-performances	of	the	film	actor	by	distinguishing	his	performance	from	the	realm	of	art.	If	film	only	becomes	a	work	of	art	by	means	of	montage,	he	reflects,	then	its	individual	components	are	‘reproduction(s)	of	a	process	which	neither	is	an	artwork	in	itself	nor	gives	rise	to	one	through	photography’.247	The	peculiar	performance	of	the	film	actor	in	front	of	an	apparatus	–	here,	seemingly	both	the	mechanism	of	the	camera	as	well	as	‘a	group	of	specialists’	ready	to	interrupt	the	performance	–	finds	itself	unable	by	itself	to	reach	the	status	of	a	work	(of	art),	a	status	that	can	only	be	bestowed	to	it,	as	it	were,	belatedly,	through	the	process	of	editing	(montage).	In	the	meantime,	the	performance	finds	itself	precariously	exposed	in	face	of	an	uncertain	future.	Benjamin,	to	be	sure,	does	not																																																									245	ibid,	124.	246	ibid,	111.	247	ibid,	110.	
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explicitly	call	it	that,	yet	his	writing	clearly	implies	such	a	precarious	quality	of	film	acting.	He	does	so	however,	or	so	it	seems	momentarily,	only	to	link	precariousness	to	the	movement	of	overcoming	it	and	the	actor’s	eventual	triumph	that	lies	in	his	ability	of	‘preserving	his	humanity	in	the	face	of	an	apparatus.’	Perhaps	here	as	elsewhere	when	Benjamin	seeks	to	preserve	or	champion	‘humanity’	in	face	of	an	apparatus	–	and	more	explicitly	elsewhere	of	a	modern	media	apparatus	–	one	must	not	read	too	readily	an	oppositional	thinking	between	the	human	and	the	technological	as	nothing	could	be	further	from	Benjamin’s	thought,	given	its	more	explicit	critiques	of	humanism	and	the	various	engagements	with	what	we	might	call	a	certain	posthumanism	avant	le	lettre,	whose	cherished	exponents	are	the	character’s	of	the	novels	of	Paul	Scheerbart	and	Micky	Mouse.248	A	context	in	which	Benjamin	at	least	elliptically	elaborates	on	the	status	of	the	‘human	being’	that	preserves	himself	in	the	face	of	an	apparatus	is	for	instance	the	small	text	‘Theatre	and	Radio	-	The	Mutual	Control	Of	Their	Educational	Program,’	which	here	warrants	a	brief	discussion.					
Responding	to	A	Crisis	of	Sovereignty:	Theatre	and	Radio		 During	a	consideration	of	the	competitive	relation	of	theatre	and	radio,	as	well	as	the	potential	positive	influence	on	one	another	in	the	realm	of	‘their	educational	program,’	Benjamin	poses	the	question	as	to	what	the	theatre	might	have	to	offer	to	counter	the	technological	superiority	of	radio	and	its	higher	degree	of	exposure	[Exponierung].	His	answer	is	seemingly	and	perhaps	misleadingly	simple,	namely,	the	use	of	living	people.	Benjamin	is	quick	to	complicate	this	general	appeal	to	the	employment	of	living	people	by	discerning	two	sharply	contrasting	ways	of	doing	so	–	one	reactionary,	the	other	progressive	–	which	further	amount	to	two	diverse	responses	to	the	crisis	of	theatre	that	doubles	up																																																									248	Benjamin	‘Erfahrung	und	Armut’	in	Illuminationen,	295.	
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as	the	crisis	of	the	human	being.	Whereas	the	former	takes	no	notice	of	this	crisis	and	seeks	to	employ	man	as	autonomous	and	self-determining,	‘at	the	height	of	his	powers,	the	Lord	of	Creation,	a	personality	(even	if	he	is	the	meanest	wage	labourer),’	the	latter	employs	a	‘reduced’	and	‘debarred’	human	being	‘in	our	crisis’.249	Benjamin	thereby	draws	up	a	scenario	where	on	the	one	hand,	a	proud,	self-confident,	big-city	theatre,	oblivious	to	its	own	and	the	world’s	crisis	produces	itself	as	“symbol,”	“totality,”	and	Gesamtkunstwerk,	holding	sway,	as	he	puts	it,	over	today’s	cultural	sphere	in	the	name	of	the	‘human,’	and	on	the	other,	Epic	Theatre,	as	an	example	of	‘the	progressive	stage’,	places	at	its	centre	‘the	human	being	in	our	crisis’.250	It	is	therefore	a	matter	of	contrasting	the	disavowal	or	prospective	overcoming	of	crisis	with	a	certain	manner	or	attitude	of	working	or	dealing	with	it	in	more	or	less	precarious	circumstances.	Benjamin’s	appeal	to	the	preservation	of	humanity	in	face	of	an	apparatus	is	thus	never	simply	an	appeal	to	maintain	or	recover	from	the	accident	of	an	onto-theological	subject	thrown	into	crisis	by	socio-technological	processes	of	alienation.	In	fact,	as	Theatre	and	Radio	seems	to	suggest,	to	preserve	humanity	must	involve	the	maintenance	of	its	very	crisis.	The	short	text	never	however	specifies	how	one	is	to	construe	more	concretely	its	generalised	references	to	our,	the	theatre’s	or	indeed	the	world’s	crisis,	whether	positively	(in	opposition	to	its	disavowal)	or	negatively	(in	opposition	to	a	certain	exploitation	or	aggravation)	construed,	which,	although	seemingly	designating	a	specific	historical,	technological,	economic	and	political	context	of	the	present,	also	has	a	textual	tendency	towards	the	abstract	by	its	appeal	to	the	productive	forces	of	a	generalised	crisis.		Abstracted	from	a	socio-historical	context	or	narrative,	crisis,	from	the	Greek	krisis	[decision]	and	krinein	[to	decide],	is	necessarily	a	crisis	of	decision,	a	certain	difficulty	if	not	impossibility	of	deciding	and	therefore	must	befall,	before	anything	else,	the	idea	of	an	autonomous																																																									249	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	394-395	&	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Theater	und	Rundfunk’,	Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	II,	773-776.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1977),	774-5.	250	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	394-395.	
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subject	and	the	institutional	organisation	of	its	acts.	Although	Benjamin’s	text	never	explicitly	elaborates	on	the	status	of	this	“accident,”	one	might	speculate	on	the	basis	of	the	appeal	to	a	mode	of	response	that	does	not	seek	to	restore,	that	the	“accident”	never	simply	befell	a	previously	autonomous	subject	from	a	distant	outside.	By	appealing	to	a	mode	of	response	to	crisis	that	simultaneously	maintains	it,	Benjamin	seemingly	hints	at	a	structural	crisis	of	ontology	that	avows	and	experiments	with	man’s	constitutive	lack	of	autonomy	and	mastery.	Such	experiments	of	dealing	with	(here:	Auseinandersetzung,	literally:	setting-apart)	a	generalised	crisis	of	sovereignty	are	never	far	from	dealing	with	a	technological	apparatus.	Humanity	is	preserved	in	its	dealings	with	an	apparatus	that	might	otherwise,	but	not	necessarily,	untenably	perpetuate	and	exploit	its	crisis,	taking	advantage	of	its	precarious	exposure.	For	the	human	being	in	our	crisis,	Benjamin	seems	to	suggest,	is	precisely	‘the	human	being	who	has	been	eliminated	from	radio	and	film	–	the	human	being	(to	put	it	a	little	extremely)	as	the	fifth	wheel	on	the	carriage	of	technology’.251	Precarious	preservation	is	thus	opposed	to	full-blown	elimination.	Despite	this	self-declared	extremity	of	rhetoric	with	regards	to	the	modern	media’s	potential	elimination	of	the	human	being,	the	dividing	line,	as	we	have	already	seen,	between	a	progressive	and	reactionary	response	to	the	latter’s	crisis	is	never	however	one	between	theatre	and	modern	media,	nor	for	that	matter,	between	the	human	and	the	technological.	The	progressive	stage	sets	the	example	for	the	type	of	Auseinandersetzung	[dealing	with]	with	‘radio	and	cinema’	Benjamin	has	in	mind.	Such	an	Auseinandersetzung	with	modern	media	apparatuses	is	never	however	simply	the	scene	of	a	‘debate	with	them,’	as	a	recent	translation	has	it,	that	is,	the	mere	appeal	to	theatre’s	topical,	thematic	concern	with	media	on	the	level	of	its	content.252	Rather,	what	is	at	stake	for	Benjamin	is	the	‘engagement’	or	‘dealing	with,’	which,	as	a	literal	rendering	of	auseinander-setzen	as	setting-apart	or	decomposition	furthermore	suggests,	must	begin	and	probably	end	at	a	point	of																																																									251	ibid,	(my	emphasis).	252	ibid,	395.	
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constitutive	interrelation	or	interweaving.	The	dramatic	laboratory	of	Epic	Theatre	does	so	by	what	Benjamin	enigmatically	describes	as	its	
sober	attitude	toward	technology.	One	such	a	“sober”	(starting)	point	of	interrelation,	Benjamin	suggests,	is	Epic	Theatre’s	reappropriation	of	the	technique	of	montage.	Through	its	discovery	and	construction	of	gesture	by	means	of	interruption,	Benjamin	states,	Epic	Theatre	retransforms	the	method	of	montage	from	a	technological	to	a	human	process.	For	Epic	Theatre,	interruption	begins	to	have	‘a	pedagogic	function	and	no	longer	has	the	character	of	a	mere	stimulus.	It	brings	the	action	to	a	halt,	and	hence	compels	the	listener	to	take	up	an	attitude	toward	the	events	on	the	stage	and	forces	the	actor	to	adopt	a	critical	view	of	his	role’.253	Samuel	Weber	proposes	to	link	Benjamin’s	use	of	the	concept	of	‘interruption’	in	this	context	to	the	Hölderlinian	notion	of	‘caesura’,	a	link	that	further	resonates	in	Benjamin’s	description	of	‘the	disposition	of	Epic	Theatre	in	adapting	the	techniques	of	the	new	media	for	its	own	ends	as	“sober”	[…]	a	word	that,’	as	he	puts	it,	‘more	than	any	other,	articulates	“the	tendency	of	[Hölderlin’s]	late”	works’.254	For	Hölderlin,	Weber	continues,	‘the	effect	of	this	cut	or	caesura	is,	not	just	to	suspend	the	rush	to	judgment,	the	“alternation	of	representations,”	but	to	allow	“representation	itself	[die	Vorstellung	selbst],”	which	he	also	calls	“the	pure	word,”	to	emerge’.255	‘And	it	is	precisely	this,’	Weber	states,	‘the	production	of	the	theatrical	process	in	its	distinctive	mediality	–	
Vorstellung	[literally	“placing-before”	S.S.]	as	representing	before	rather	than	simply	as	representation	–	that	Benjamin	associates	with	the	“interruption”	practiced	by	Brechtian	theatre’.256	The	incessant	interruptions	of	Epic	Theatre	expose	a	human	being	no	longer	fully	in	control	over	his	actions,	devoid	of	self-presence	and	mastery,	exposed	before	the	uncontrollable	coming	of	time.	Through	its	suspension,	identity	comes	up	short,	Weber	explains,	‘and	it	does	so	through	
																																																								253	ibid.	254	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	114.	255	ibid,	114-5.	256	ibid,	115.	
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“gesture”’.257	Gesture	interrupts	action	as	a	movement	of	meaning	and	fulfilment.	Devoid	of	identity	and	mastery,	‘man	in	our	crisis’	is	subjected,	not	unlike	the	film	actor	in	front	of	an	apparatus,	to	various	trials.	In	the	absence	of	guaranteed	ends	to	his	permanently	interrupted	actions,	his	experiments	begin	to	amount	to	test-performances.	Epic	Theatre	subjects	a	reduced,	debarred	human	being	in	crisis	to	various	trials.	‘What	emerges	from	this	approach	is	that	events	are	alterable	not	at	their	climactic	points,	not	by	virtue	and	decision-making,	but	strictly	in	their	habitual	course,	by	reason	and	practice	[Übung]’.258	‘To	the	dramatic	
Gesamtkunstwerk,’	Benjamin	writes,	‘Epic	Theatre	opposes	the	dramatic	laboratory.	It	returns	in	a	new	way	to	the	great	and	venerable	resource	of	theatre	–	exposing	the	present	[die	Exponierung	des	Anwesenden]’.259	The	relegated	human	being	submitted	to	tests	and	examinations	in	such	a	laboratory	distinguishes	himself	starkly	from	the	notion	of	“man”	at	the	heart	of	the	reactionary	conception	of	theatre	from	which	Benjamin	seeks	to	distinguish	it.	His	constitutive	crisis	bars	him	from	a	simple	power	of	intentional	decision-making.		‘What	is	exposed	by	Epic	Theatre,	and	by	theatre	generally,’	Samuel	Weber	suggests,	‘is	the	claim	of	humanity	to	be	present	to	itself,	in	the	guise	of	the	autonomous	individual.	[….]	Epic	Theatre	[…]	exposes	the	“living”	by	stripping	it	of	its	heroic	claims	to	sovereignty,	claims	that	confound	the	divine	with	the	human	and	that	find	their	secular	and	dissimulated	embodiment	in	the	cult	of	“personality”’.260					
A	Leap	and	A	Crack:	The	Swell	of	Test-Performance		 The	film	actor’s	proposed	preservation	of	his	humanity	must	be	read	in	the	light	of	these	more	nuanced	reflections	on	the	status	of	the																																																									257	ibid.	258	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	395.	259	Benjamin	cited	in	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	115.	260	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	115-116.	
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latter.	It	is	furthermore	unclear	quite	how	much	of	an	actors	preserved	humanity	only	appears	as	such	to	a	cinema	audience	as	the	belated	result	of	the	editing	process.	Whether	as	appearance	or	not,	the	actor’s	publicly	exhibited	triumphant	dealings	with	an	apparatus	is	capable	of	revenging,	as	Benjamin	puts	it,	all	those	city-dwellers	that	come	to	watch	him	after	having	had	to	relinquish	their	humanity	throughout	the	workday,	‘in	offices	and	factories’	[…]	‘in	the	face	of	the	apparatus’.261	However	much	we	want	to	follow	Benjamin’s	assertions	on	the	actor’s	revenge	on	behalf	of	a	film	audience,	his	or	her	preservation	of	humanity	in	face	of	an	apparatus	or	indeed	the	general	faith	put	in	the	function	of	film	to	‘[train]	human	beings	in	the	apperceptions	and	reactions	needed	to	deal	with	a	vast	apparatus’,262	what	should	interest	us	here	with	regards	to	the	question	of	the	apparatus	is	what	links	the	actor’s	performance	in	front																																																									261	ibid,	111.	Although	Benjamin	here	clearly	seeks	to	harness	the	emancipatory	if	not	revolutionary	values	of	an	actors	triumphant	test	performance	before	the	apparatus,	it	seems	important	to	note	how	ambiguous	his	own	reflections	can	be	on	the	topic.	In	a	later	footnote	that	discusses	the	effects	of	reproduction	technology	on	the	political	realm	alongside	similar	effects	on	the	theatrical	institution,	Benjamin	seemingly	relates	the	test	performance	to	a	more	sinister	practice	of	selection	before	an	apparatus:	‘Radio	and	film	are	changing	not	only	the	function	of	the	professional	actor	but,	equally,	the	function	of	those	who,	like	the	politician,	present	themselves	before	the	media.	The	direction	of	this	change	is	the	same	for	the	film	actor	and	the	politician,	regardless	of	their	different	tasks.	It	tends	toward	the	exhibition	of	controllable,	transferable	skills	under	certain	social	conditions,	just	as	sports	first	called	for	such	exhibition	under	certain	natural	conditions.	This	results	in	a	new	form	of	selection	–	selection	before	an	apparatus	–	from	which	the	champion,	the	star,	and	the	dictator	emerge	as	victors’	[ibid,	128].	This	would	then	perhaps	constitute	the	annulment	of	the	potential	Benjamin	otherwise	sees	in	the	increased	‘control’	of	those	‘not	present	to	the	execution	of	the	performance’.	For	‘of	course’	it	should	not	be	forgotten,	Benjamin	alerts	us,	‘that	there	can	be	no	political	advantage	derived	from	this	control	until	film	has	liberated	itself	from	the	fetters	of	capitalist	exploitation.	Film	capital	uses	the	revolutionary	opportunities	implied	by	this	control	for	counterrevolutionary	purposes.	Not	only	does	the	cult	of	the	movie	star	which	it	fosters	preserve	that	magic	of	the	personality	which	has	long	been	no	more	than	the	putrid	magic	of	its	own	commodity	character,	but	its	counterpart,	the	cult	of	the	audience,	reinforces	the	corruption	by	which	fascism	is	seeking	to	supplant	the	class	consciousness	of	the	masses’	[ibid,	113].	262	ibid,	118.	
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of	cameras,	lights,	microphones	and	a	body	of	experts	to	the	performances	of	office	and	factory	workers,	indicating	therewith	the	stakes	and	the	scope	of	an	expanding	apparatus	and	the	necessity	of	learning	how	to	deal	with	it.	What	links	the	performance	of	film	actors	and	office	workers	is	a	certain	spatio-temporal	precariousness	in	one’s	dealing	with	an	apparatus.	Yet	whereas	the	latter	is	merely	a	powerless	
working	for,	the	former	also	allows	for	a	different	way	of	dealing	with	the	apparatus	by	working	with	it	or	else,	by	reworking	it.	Apart	from	its	uncertain	status	as	a	work	of	art,	the	precariousness	of	a	film	actors’	performance	springs	from	his	constant	exposition	to	the	possibility	of	interruption.		It	is	the	intervention	of	the	recording	body	of	experts	–	executive	producer,	director,	cinematographer,	sound	recordist,	lighting	designer,	and	so	on	–	which	puts	to	the	test	an	actors	aptitude.	‘The	film	director	occupies	exactly	the	same	position	as	the	examiner	in	an	aptitude	test,’	Benjamin	states,	before	fittingly	illustrating	the	kind	of	pressurised	environment	involved:	‘To	perform	in	the	glare	of	arc	lamps	while	simultaneously	meeting	the	demands	of	the	microphone	is	a	test	performance	of	the	highest	order’.263	The	film	actor	is	put	to	the	test,	but	he	himself	is	also	testing,	for	instance,	by	multiplying	his	gestures	as	so	many	‘versions’	or	‘takes’.264	A	multiplication	that	is	not	simply	or	merely	diachronic	but	also	happens	synchronically	through	the	virtual	swell	of	other	possibilities	for	any	given	‘take’.		Test-performances	find	themselves	severed	from	or	only	stand	in	the	most	provisional	relation	to	their	end	–	whether	that	of	meaning	or	effect	–	within	certain	contextual	constellations.	This	is	adequately	illustrated	by	Benjamin’s	later	reflection	on	film	production’s	tendency	to	‘split	the	actor’s	performance	into	a	series	of	episodes	capable	of	being	assembled’.265	Here,	the	context	of	assemblage	is	not	always	already	given	with	the	performance	of	the	interrupted	sequence.	The	latter	finds	itself	always	already	exposed	to	the	time	of	reproducibility,	severed	from	its	present	context	and																																																									263	ibid,	111.	264	ibid.	265	ibid,	113.	
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suspended	by	the	multiplied	relations	to	its	possible	afterlife.	A	leap	from	a	window	is	filmed	as	a	leap	from	a	scaffold,	Benjamin	relates,	and	only	much	later	contextualised	in	a	montage	with	footage	of	a	fall	at	some	outside	location.266	Or	else,	an	actor’s	startled	expression	following	a																																																									266	The	actors	leap	from	a	scaffold/window,	divorced	from	but	also	swelling	under	the	virtual	intrusion	of	the	possibilities	of	its	uncontrollable	afterlife	or	‘mass	existence’	–	a	virtual	reception	[Aufnahme]	already	structurally	at	work	in	the	time	of	its	recording	[Aufnahme],	the	other	Aufnahme	in	the	first	–	begins	to	resonate	with	Rebecca	Schneider’s	reading	of	a	notably	different	but	perhaps	also	not	dissimilar	leap,	namely:	Yves	Klein,	clad	in	a	three-piece	suit,	in	October	1960,	leaping	from	a	provincial	two-story	building.	A	leap,	according	to	Schneider’s	account,	which	is	neither	happening	for	the	first	nor	the	last	time	and	‘that	will	never	have	taken	singular	place,’	as	she	puts	it.	On	the	one	hand,	it	repeats	a	previous	leap	–	that	of	January	12,	1960,	performed	in	front	of	the	lone	witness	of	Bernadette	Allain	and	ending	with	minor	injuries	–	and	on	the	other,	it	already	anticipates	‘generations	of	witnesses	to	a	body	caught	in	that	act’	[Schneider,	30].	For	this	October	1960	capturing	of	the	January	1960	event,	Schneider	relates,	‘[Klein]	had	a	tarpaulin	held	by	12	judokas	from	a	judo	club	across	the	street	to	catch	him.	In	this	way	the	staging	was	projected	both	toward	a	future	(an	audience	to	witness	the	photograph	as	evidence)	and	in	reference	to	a	past	[…].	This	leap	was,	that	is,	not	for	a	present	audience	but	for	a	photograph	that	would	record	an	event	that	had	taken	place	at	a	prior	time	for	a	future	audience	that	would	see	the	leap	on	Theater	of	the	Void	Day,	November	27,	1960,	in	the	pages	of	the	tabloid	Dimanche.	For	the	re-enactment	of	the	real,	the	photographer	Harry	Shunk	took	not	one,	but	two	photos.	One	was	taken	with	a	net	situated	beneath	Klein.	The	other	was	taken	a	few	moments	later	from	the	same	angle,	but	with	the	street	empty.	Shunk	made	a	seamless	montage	of	the	two	photos	resulting	in	the	“performance”	of	an	act	that	will	never	have	taken	singular	place,	and	resulting	as	well	in	generations	of	witnesses	to	a	body	caught	in	that	act’	[ibid,	my	emphasis].	If	we	consider	that	Schneider’s	essay’s	larger	concern	lies	with	‘once	again’	debunking	art-historical	origin	myths	through	a	reading,	as	she	says,	for	“illegitimate”	histories	by	‘listening	for	a	syncopation	of	intention	not	“properly”	resolvable	in	direct	lineage,	and,	more	radically	perhaps,	joining	that	syncopation	as	a	critic	with	one	reading	among	many’	–	her	reading	of	the	split	temporality	of	Klein’s	leap	is	never	far	from	Benjamin’s	own	wider	concerns	with	the	provisional	gesture	of	an	artistic	“signature”	in	the	time	of	its	reproducibility	and	a	new	conception	of	the	function	of	art	in	its	socio-historical	transmission.	‘Can	we	listen	for	other	voices	in	seeming	“solo”	work,’	Schneider	asks,	‘like	the	multiple	directions	of	reference	figured	in	the	way	Klein’s	Leap	is	both	citational	(referencing	backwards)	and	invocational	(calling	forward),	readable	as	part	of	an	antiphonal	conversation	beyond	the	frame	or	whitewash	of	the	walls;	a	
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knock	at	the	door	was	initially	produced	by	‘a	shot	fired	without	warning	behind	the	actor’s	back	on	some	other	occasion	when	he	happens	to	be	in	the	studio’.267	The	entire	process	of	film	production,	Benjamin	asserts,	is	determined	by	the	repeated	intervention	of	a	body	of	experts:	‘many	shots	are	filmed	in	a	number	of	takes.	A	single	cry	for	help	[…]	can	be	recorded	in	several	versions.	The	editor	then	makes	a	selection	from	these’.268	A	similar	detachment	of	an	action	from	its	end	informs	Benjamin’s	example	of	another	context	of	test	performances.	Here,	in	the	context	of	sport,	test	performances	stand	in	a	peculiar	relation	to	their	‘corresponding	real	action(s),’	as	Benjamin	puts	it.	This	scene	of	a	contextual	doubling	inscribes	the	test-performance	in	a	general	movement	of	de-contextualisation:			 An	action	performed	in	the	film	studio	therefore	differs	from	the	corresponding	real	action	the	way	the	competitive	throwing	of	a	discus	in	a	sports	arena	would	differ	from	the	throwing	of	the	same	discus	from	the	same	spot	in	the	same	direction	in	order	to	kill	someone.	The	first	is	a	test	performance,	while	the	second	is	not.269		Benjamin	therewith	puts	forward	the	notion	of	a	test-performance,	which	removes	actions	from	what	me	might	designate	in	the	language	of	speech	act	theory	the	‘happiness’	of	their	effects	in	a	given	context.	No																																																																																																																																																response	to	a	call	and	a	call	for	a	response	(including	mine)	beyond	the	confines	of	singular	intention	or	policed	legitimacies?’	[ibid,	32].	Here,	the	leap	begins	to	figure	also	the	crack	or	fissure	that	the	German	word	for	leap	–	Sprung	–	signifies	at	the	same	time,	as	if	the	signifier	Sprung	is	itself	always	already	fissured,	breached,	cracked,	insecurely	placed	in	more	than	one	place	at	the	same	time.	That	Benjamin	pays	particular	attention	to	the	double	meaning	of	the	Sprung	as	both	leap	and	crack	precisely	at	the	“origin”	[Ursprung]	here	should	further	encourage	a	reading	of	the	‘antiphonal	conversation’	between	Schneider,	Klein	and	Benjamin,	the	leaping	(performance)	artist	and	the	actor	falling	of	a	scaffold	in	the	time	of	reproducibility.	267	Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art,	113.	268	ibid,	111.	269	ibid.	
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longer	subject	to	their	conventional,	contextually	embedded	ends,	they	acquire	the	status	of	non-present	remainders	or	stand-ins	that	must	incessantly	be	put	to	the	test	in	new	orders	of	experiment.270		
	
	
	
Ritual	and	Play:	A	Dynamic	Inheritance	Machine	
	 In	his	text,	‘In	Playland	–	Reflections	on	History	and	Play’,	Giorgio	Agamben	reflects	on	what	he	calls	‘a	relation	of	both	correspondence	and	opposition	between	play	and	ritual,	in	the	sense	that	both	are	engaged	in																																																									270	I	borrow	the	terminology	of	a	non-present	remainder	from	Derrida’s	essays	‘Signature,	Event,	Context’	and	Limited	Inc,	which	at	some	length	develop	the	concept	of	iterably	in	the	context	of	an	analysis	of	the	speech	act	theory	of	J.L.	Austin,	a	context	to	which	I	will	turn	briefly	later	on.	In	
Limited	Inc,	Derrida	retraces	his	initial	development	of	the	theme	of	a	graphematic	mark’s	structural	possibility	of	survival	in	the	absence	of	its	author	and	addressee	–	severed,	or	severable,	therefore,	from	all	limited	effects	of	presence	in	any	given	context	–	precisely	by	contrasting	it	in	stark	terms	from	R.	Searl’s	attribution	of	a	quality	of	‘permanence’	to	the	written	syntagma’s	possibility	of	remaining	thus	construed.	‘Sarl	might	have	considered	why	it	is	that	Sec	speaks	of	“restance”	[remainder],	and	even	of	“restance	non-présente”	[non-present	remainder]	rather	than	of	“permanence.”	[…	I]n	it,	what	is	discussed	[…]	concerns	not	permanence,	but	remainders,	non-present	remains.	How,	then,	can	a	non-presence	be	assimilated	to	permanence,	and	especially	to	the	substantial	presence	implied	by	the	temporality	of	permanence?	[…]	Thus	I	cite	Sarl	citing	Sec	[Signature,	Event,	Context].	Sarl	writes:	“He	writes,	‘This	structural	possibility	of	being	weaned	from	the	referent	or	from	the	signified	(hence	from	communication	and	from	its	context)	seems	to	me	to	make	every	mark,	including	those	which	are	oral,	a	grapheme	in	general:	which	is	to	say,	as	we	have	seen,	the	nonpresent	remainder	[restance]	of	a	differential	mark	cut	off	from	its	putative	“production”	or	origin.’”	[…]	It	[this	phrase]	[…]	contains	numerous	signals	designed	to	prevent	one	from	confusing	the	remains	of	a	grapheme	in	general	with	the	
permanence	or	survival	of	a	“written	language”	in	the	standard	sense	[…]’	[Derrida,	Limited	Inc,	51].	The	differential	structure	of	iterability,	Derrida	relates,	escapes	‘the	logic	of	presence	or	the	(simple	or	dialectical)	opposition	of	presence	and	absence,	upon	which	opposition	the	idea	of	permanence	depends.	This	is	why	the	mark	qua	“non-present	remainder”	is	not	the	contrary	of	the	mark	as	effacement.	Like	the	trace	it	is,	the	mark	is	neither	present	nor	absent.	This	is	what	is	remarkable	about	it,	even	if	it’s	not	remarked	[…]’	[ibid,	53].	
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a	relationship	with	the	calendar	and	with	time,	but	this	relationship	is	in	each	case	an	inverse	one:	ritual	fixes	and	structures	the	calendar;	play,	on	the	other	hand	[…]	changes	and	destroys	it’.271	Here,	ritual	and	play’s	different	relationship	to	time	recalls	Benjamin’s	similar	employment	of	these	terms	when	describing	the	shift	in	the	social	function	of	art.	The	latter’s	movement	of	emancipation	is	one	from	a	parasitic	subservience	to	ritual	to	a	consequent	reliance	on	a	different	practice:	politics	and/or	
play.		Whereas	ritual	was	marked	as	primarily	concerned	with	instituting	the	relative	permanence	of	its	effects,	play	on	the	other	hand	was	marked	by	an	essential	provisionality	and	a	consequent	capacity	for	“improvement”.	That	Agambens’	further	elaborations	on	the	close	links	and	correspondences	between	play	and	‘the	sacred’	begin	with	an	example	from	the	realm	of	sport,	may	further	indicate	that	we	are	not	altogether	far	from	what	Benjamin	seeks	to	designate	as	a	test-performance.	‘Numerous	well-documented	researches	show,’	Agamben	relates,	‘that	the	origins	of	most	games	known	to	us	lie	in	ancient	sacred	ceremonies,	in	dances,	ritual	combat	and	divinatory	practices.	So	in	ball	games	we	can	discern	the	relics	of	the	ritual	representation	of	a	myth	in	which	the	gods	fought	for	possession	of	the	sun’.272	What	this	genealogical	reading	of	sports	performances	already	shares	with	Benjamin’s	example	of	the	discus	throwing	test	performance	is	the	shift	of	a	set	of	movements	or	actions	from	one	context	to	another,	of	which	the	latter	in	both	cases	is	play.	In	both	scenarios,	play	furthermore	repeats	a	set	of	actions	outside	their	‘traditional’	context,	which	had	imbued	them	with	a	particular	meaning	or	effect.	With	reference	to	a	study	by	Benveniste,	Agamben	further	elaborates	the	relationship	of	ritual	and	play	by	defining	the	latter	as	the	repetition	of	ritual	acts	severed	from	their	conjunction	with	‘myth’,	that	is,	their	previously	given	sense	and	purpose.	Play,	according	to	Agamben,	radically	transforms	
																																																								271	Georgio	Agamben,	‘In	Playland	–	Reflections	on	History	and	Play’	in	Agamben,	Infancy	and	History.	Essays	on	the	Destruction	of	Experience,	65-89	(London:	Verso	1993),	77.	272	ibid.		
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ritual	‘to	the	point	where	it	can	plausibly	be	defined	as	‘topsy-turvy	sacred’’.273		 ‘The	potency	of	the	sacred	act’,	writes	Benveniste,	‘resides	precisely	in	the	conjunction	of	the	myth	that	articulates	history	and	the	ritual	that	reproduces	it.	If	we	make	a	comparison	between	this	schema	and	that	of	play,	the	difference	appears	fundamental:	in	play	only	the	ritual	survives	and	all	that	is	preserved	is	the	form	of	the	sacred	drama,	in	which	each	element	is	re-enacted	time	and	again.	But	what	has	been	forgotten	or	abolished	is	the	myth,	the	meaningfully	worded	fabulation	that	endows	the	acts	with	their	sense	and	their	purpose.274		It	is	striking	how	much	Benveniste’s	formulations	here	structurally	mirror	those	with	which	Benjamin	seeks	to	describe	the	writings	of	Franz	Kafka.	Echoing	or	calling	for	some	of	the	concerns	of	the	essay	on	technological	reproducibility,	Benjamin’s	writings	on	Kafka	similarly	touch	on	the	question,	if	not	the	crisis,	of	tradition	and	a	new	conception	of	the	movement	of	inheritance.	In	a	letter	to	Gershom	Scholem,	Benjamin	describes	Kafka’s	work	as	depicting	a	tradition	that	has	fallen	ill.	Wisdom,	understood	as	the	epic	side	of	truth	and	therefore	the	goods	of	tradition	[Traditionsgut],	or	else	truth,	as	Benjamin	also	calls	it	with	reference	to	the	Jewish	tradition,	in	the	form	of	the	Hagada	–	the	“telling”	–	has	gone	missing.	The	genius	of	Kafka,	Benjamin	explains,	lay	in	his	unique	experiment:	to	give	up	truth	in	order	to	hold	on	to	the	possibility	of	the	movement	of	“its”	‘passing	on’.	His	parables	no	longer	submit	to	the	doctrine,	like	the	Hagada	does	to	the	Halacha,	“the	telling”	to	the	collective	body	of	Jewish	religious	laws.	In	Kafka,	one	no	longer	encounters	wisdom	as	such,	but	only	the	remainders	of	its	decline	
																																																								273	ibid,	78.	274	ibid.	
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[Zerfallsprodukte].275	Nowhere	perhaps	is	the	decline	of	tradition	and	the	absence	of	its	‘doctrine’	or	‘teaching’	[Lehre]	more	palpably	felt	than	in	the	curiously	theatrical	gestures	of	Kafka’s	characters.	Kafka,	Benjamin	says	in	an	essay	on	the	latter,	‘takes	away	the	inherited	supports	of	human	gesture,	in	which	he	then	finds	an	object	of	reflections	that	have	no	end’.276	Never	ending	reflections	that	are	furthermore	actively	rehearsed	in	shifting	orders	of	experiments.	‘Kafka’s	whole	work	consists	of	a	codex	of	gestures,’	Benjamin	exclaims,	‘that	are	far	from	having	a	certain	symbolic	meaning	for	the	author’.	The	latter	are	in	fact	pursued	in	ever	changing	contexts	and	orders	of	experiments’.277	In	other	words,	Kafka’s	gestures,	in	experimental	pursuit	of	their	meaning	across	changing	contexts	of	determination,	constitute	test-performances.	They	are	the	non-present	remainders	of	an	ailing	tradition,	or	what	Benjamin	calls	the	latter’s	Zerfallsprodukte,	the	products	of	its	ruin,	which	are	put	to	the	test	in	precarious	contexts	of	significance.	Whether	as	ruin	or	non-present	remainder	of	a	living	tradition,	the	gesture	of	the	test-performance	bears	an	opaque	relation	to	its	significance	and	comes	to	stand-in	for	the	new.	Finally,	it	is	not	without	import	that	what	is	at	stake	for	Benjamin	in	Kafka’s	parables	without	doctrine	and	the	submission	of	non-present	remainders	of	an	ailing	tradition	to	an	infinite	series	of	tests	is	‘the	question	of	the	organisation	of	life	and	work	in	the	human	community’.278	Such	an	‘organisation	of	life	and	work’	must	here	strike	us	as	fundamentally	related	to	the	question	of	the	apparatus	and	one’s	dealings	with	it.		
																																																								275	Walter	Benjamin,	Briefe,	ed.	Gershom	Scholem	and	Theodor	W.	Adorno	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1977),	736.	276	Benjamin,	‘Franz	Kafka’,	417.	277	ibid,	(my	emphasis).	278	ibid,	417.	Tradition	is	of	course	always	more	or	less	ailing.	As	its	transmission	is	essentially	breached	and	open	for	transformation,	it	cannot	be	absolutely	immune	to	corruption.	Nevertheless,	Benjamin	often	turns	to	specific	contexts	–the	literary	work	of	Franz	Kafka,	the	German	baroque,	the	age	of	reproducibility	–	in	which	its	essential	breach	is	aggravated,	or	put	differently,	in	which	a	quasi-transcendental	structure	comes	to	acquire	historical,	political,	and	cultural	significance.	
	 128	
Agamben,	in	his	reflections	on	ritual	and	play,	similarly	pursues	the	latter’s	effects	beyond	the	correspondences	with	ritual	to	find	the	general	movement	of	its	de-contextualisation	furthermore	at	work	with	regards	to	what	he	terms	the	practical-economic	sphere.	Echoing	a	favourite	theme	of	Benjamin’s,	he	invites	us	to	consider	the	world	of	toys,	which	‘shows	that	children,	humanity’s	little	scrap-dealers,	will	play	with	whatever	junk	comes	their	way,	and	that	play	thereby	preserves	profane	objects	and	behaviour	that	have	ceased	to	exist’.279	We	have	seen	a	not	dissimilar	logic	of	the	playful	preservation	of	what	is	otherwise	under	threat	from	elimination,	namely,	the	human,	to	be	at	work	in	the	laboratory	of	Epic	Theatre.	There,	what	is	preserved	does	not	survive	unscathed.	Instead,	the	very	idea	and	ideal	of	the	unscathed	itself	is	put	into	question.	Similarly,	what	is	preserved	of	profane	objects	and	behaviour	through	toys	and	play,	Agamben	adds,	is	certainly	not	a	matter	of	their	cultural	significance	or	function.280	Instead,		 [w]hat	the	toy	preserves	of	its	sacred	or	economic	model,	what	survives	of	this	after	its	dismemberment	or	miniaturisation,	is	nothing	other	than	the	human	temporality	that	was	contained																																																									279	Agamben,	‘In	Playland’,	79. In	his	reflections	on	children’s	play,	Benjamin	also	emphasizes	such	an	inventive	reception	of	the	discarded	and	outmoded.	‘Children	[…]	are	irresistibly	drawn	by	the	detritus	generated	by	building,	gardening,	housework,	tailoring,	or	carpentry.	In	waste	products	they	recognize	the	face	that	the	world	of	things	turns	directly	and	solely	to	them.	In	using	these	things,	they	do	not	so	much	imitate	the	works	of	adults	as	bring	together,	in	the	artifact	produced	in	play,	materials	of	widely	differing	kinds	in	new,	disjunctive	relationships’	[Walter	Benjamin,	Einbahnstrasse.	Berliner	Kindheit	um	Neunzehnhundert	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Fischer	2011),	17].	Miriam	Hansen,	by	commenting	on	the	above,	adds	a	synchronic	aspect	to	such	play,	which	similar	to	Agamben,	emphasizes	the	temporal	aspect	of	the	operation:	‘In	other	words,	by	creating	their	own	world	of	things	within	the	larger	one,	children	simultaneously	transform	material	objects;	they	wrest	them	from	their	ostensibly	linear,	instrumental	destination	and	reconfigure	them	according	to	a	different	logic	–	not	unrelated	to	the	aesthetics	of	bricolage,	collage,	and	montage’	[Miriam	Hansen,	Cinema	and	Experience:	
Siegfried	Kracauer,	Walter	Benjamin,	and	Theodor	W	.Adorno.	(Berkley:	University	of	California	Press	2012),	150].	280	Agamben,	‘In	Playland’,	80.	
	 129	
therein:	its	pure	historical	essence.	The	toy	is	a	materialisation	of	the	historicity	contained	in	objects,	extracting	it	by	means	of	a	particular	manipulation.	While	the	value	and	meaning	of	the	antique	object	and	the	document	are	functions	of	their	age	–	that	is,	of	their	making	present	and	rendering	tangible	a	relatively	remote	past	–	the	toy,	dismembering	and	distorting	the	past	or	miniaturising	the	present	–	playing	as	much	on	diachrony	as	on	
synchrony	–	makes	present	and	renders	tangible	human	temporality	in	itself,	the	pure	differential	margin	between	the	‘once’	and	the	‘no	longer’.281			In	other	words,	the	toy	with	regards	to	objects	as	well	as	play	with	regards	to	behaviours,	here	function	as	non-present	remainders	that	expose	the	finitude	of	their	previous	or	present	contextual	organisation.	Playing	with	the	‘crumbs’	and	‘scraps’	belonging	to	structural	wholes,	Agamben	relates,	the	toy	‘transforms	old	signifieds	into	signifiers,	and	vice	versa.	But	what	it	‘plays’	with,’	he	adds,	‘are	not	simply	these	crumbs	and	scraps,	but	–	as	the	case	of	miniaturisation	makes	clear	–	the	‘crumbness,’	if	one	can	put	it	that	way,	which	is	contained	in	a	temporal	form	within	the	object	or	the	structural	whole	from	which	it	departs’.282	In	this	way,	Agamben	says,	‘play	is	a	relationship	with	objects	and	human	behaviour	that	draws	from	them	a	pure	historical-temporal	aspect’.283	What	Agamben	here	idiosyncratically	calls	the	‘crumbness’	of	objects	and	structural	wholes	is	the	possibility	of	their	ruin,	prefigured	in	the	monuments	of	a	tradition	subject	to	the	infinite	finitude	of	time.	To	avow	such	possibilities	might	mean,	following	a	theme	of	Derrida’s,	that	the	love	of	tradition	qua	inheritance	must	account	for	the	possibility	of	its	destruction,	that	is,	is	always	already	a	love	of	its	ruin	and	bound	to	‘an	experience	itself	precarious	in	its	fragility’.	‘One	cannot	love	a	monument,	a	work	of	architecture,	an	institution	as	such,’	Derrida	says,																																																											281	ibid.	282	ibid,	81.	283	ibid.	
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except	in	an	experience	itself	precarious	in	its	fragility:	it	has	not	always	been	there,	it	will	not	always	be	there,	it	is	finite.	And	for	this	very	reason	one	loves	it	as	mortal,	through	its	birth	and	its	death,	through	one’s	birth	and	death,	through	the	ghost	or	the	silhouette	of	its	ruin,	one’s	own	ruin	–	which	it	already	is,	therefore,	or	already	prefigures.284			The	prefigurement	of	the	ruin	in	the	monument	here	corresponds	to	the	prefigurement	of	play	in	the	practice	of	ritual.	For	ritual	and	play	must	never	be	fully	opposed,	but	find	themselves	inextricably	linked	and	entangled,	like	monument	and	ruin,	like	repetition	and	difference,	like	the	auratic	and	reproducible	work	of	art,	as	opposing	poles	of	a	dynamic	process.	A	ritual	can	always	be	played	and	play	can	always	be	more	or	less	re-ritualized.	Ritual	and	play	describe	the	opposite	end	of	a	spectrum	of	attitudes	towards	the	passage	of	time	and	the	movement	of	inheritance:	one	marked	by	a	tendency	to	annul	the	interval	between	two	moments	in	time	and	dissolve	spatio-temporal	differences	in	absolute	synchrony,	the	other	with	breaking	the	connection	between	past	and	present	in	the	absolute	diachrony	of	pure	events.	‘If	ritual	is	therefore	a	machine	for	transforming	diachrony	into	synchrony,’	as	Agamben	puts	it,	‘play,	conversely,	is	a	machine	for	transforming	synchrony	into	diachrony’.285	Yet	their	polarity	never	resolves	into	an	opposition	that	is	absolute,	and	their	efforts	at	establishing	or	undermining	temporal	continuity,	as	Agamben	relates,	are	never	complete.286	Every	game	contains	a	ritual	aspect	and	every	rite	an	aspect	of	play.	The	discontinuous	difference	of	the	“event”	of	play	depends	on	a	repetition	of	at	least	the	non-present	remainder	of	ritual.	Ritual,	on	the	other	hand,	in	its	efforts	at	establishing	continuity	qua	identical	repetition,	must,	in	order	to	be	repeatable,	leave	itself	exposed	as	non-present	remainder	to	the	possibilities	of	the	play	of	differences.	Ritual	and	play,	as	Agamben																																																									284	Derrida	cited	in	Hägglund,	278.	285	Agamben,	‘In	Playland’,	83.	286	ibid.	
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suggests,	must	thus	not	be	regarded	as	‘two	distinct	machines	but	as	a	single	machine,	a	single	binary	system,	which	is	articulated	across	two	categories	which	cannot	be	isolated	and	across	whose	correlation	and	difference	the	very	functioning	of	the	system	is	based’.287	Read	in	the	context	of	the	movement	of	transmission	of	an	inheritance,	of	which	this	machine	is	perhaps	here	another	name,	Agamben’s	reflections	on	the	inextricability	of	ritual	and	play,	in	other	words,	of	repetition	and	event,	further	imply	that	a	crisis	of	tradition	never	simply	befalls	the	latter	from	an	outside,	as	it	was	always	already	prefigured	and	at	work	as	virtual	possibility	of	ruin	in	the	very	efforts	of	its	upkeep.288					
What	is	an	Apparatus?	
	 Test	performances	rehearse	our	dealings	with	an	apparatus.	But	what	is	an	apparatus?	Benjamin,	as	we	saw,	employs	this	term	and	the	necessity	of	our	dealings	with	as	opposed	to	our	enslavement	to	it,	in	relation	to	both	technology,	as	well	as	to	what	we	might	here	designate	the	practico-economic	sphere,	the	labour	relations	in	factories	and	offices.	Both	these	realms,	technology	in	the	broadest	sense	and	the	socio-economic	organisation	of	labour	power,	are	regulating	and	directing	human	behaviour	as	a	means	towards	certain	ends	and	are	thus	inscribed	in	relationships	of	power	that	Benjamin’s	notion	of	a	test-performance	seeks	to	con-test.																																																										287	ibid,	84.	288	This	is	not	to	say	that	there	are	not	epochal	shifts	to	be	taken	into	account,	moments	of	greater	or	lesser	degrees	of	structural	instability.	In	this	light	one	might	consider	Benjamin’s	work	as	both	attentive	to	the	contextual	specificity	of	such	moments	of	heightened	instability	–	foremost	amongst	them	the	“crisis”	of	the	German	baroque	and	modernity	–	as	well	to	the	structural	generality	of	permanent	krisis	[decision]	in	the	suspense	of	undecidability	at	the	moment	of	every	decision,	as	Derrida	might	put	it,	worthy	of	the	name,	no	longer	following	the	predictable	orders	of	what	has	become	more	or	less	calculable	and	possible	to	control.	
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In	his	reflections	on	the	apparatus,	Giorgio	Agamben	takes	his	starting	point	from	the	English	translation	of	Michel	Foucault’s	famous	use	of	the	French	term	dispositif.	Foucault’s	employment	of	the	concept	of	the	dispositif	[apparatus]	is	even	more	broadly	conceived	than	the	Benjaminian	apparatus,	designating	‘a	thoroughly	heterogeneous	set’	consisting,	amongst	other	things,	of	discourses,	institutions,	architectural	forms,	laws	and	administrative	measures.	For	Foucault,	the	apparatus	constitutes	‘the	network	that	can	be	established	between	these	elements’.289	It	describes	‘a	formation	[…]	at	a	given	historical	moment’	with	a	strategic	function	and	is	‘thus	always	inscribed	into	a	play	of	power’.	What	Foucault	here	calls	the	strategic	function	of	the	apparatus	must	precisely	be	understood	as	the	latter’s	efforts	to	manipulate	this	play	of	power,	for	instance	by	a	‘concrete	intervention	in	the	relations	of	forces,	either	so	as	to	develop	them	in	a	particular	direction,	or	to	block	them,	to	stabilize	them,	and	to	utilize	them’.290	Already	we	see	how	test-performances,	by	rehearsing	our	dealings	with	an	apparatus,	might	challenge	the	latter’s	hegemonic	‘strategy’	by	seeking	to	unblock	the	play	of	power	and	redirecting,	if	only	provisionally,	the	relations	of	forces	into	new	directions.	In	his	genealogically	driven	reflections,	Agamben	further	links	Foucault’s	use	of	the	concept	of	the	dispositif	to	G.W.F.	Hegel’s	employment	of	the	concept	of	‘positivity’.	Here,	once	again	it	is	matter	of	a	collective,	social	organisation	‘imposed	on	individuals’	at	a	certain	historical	moment,	for	instance,	‘the	set	of	beliefs,	rules,	and	rites’	that	Hegel	designates	as	“positive	religion”.		 If	“positivity”	is	the	name	that	[…]	the	young	Hegel	gives	to	the	historical	element	–	loaded	as	it	is	with	rules,	rites,	and	institutions	that	are	imposed	on	the	individual	by	an	external	power	[…]	then	Foucault,	by	borrowing	this	term	(later	to	become	“apparatus”),	takes	a	position	with	respect	to	a	decisive	problem	[…]:	the	relation	between	individuals	as	living	beings	and	the																																																									289	Agamben,	What	is	an	Apparatus,	2.	290	ibid,	(my	emphasis).	
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historical	element.	By	“the	historical	element,”	I	mean	the	set	of	institutions,	of	processes	of	subjectification,	and	of	rules	in	which	power	relations	become	concrete.	[…]	For	Foucault,	what	is	at	stake	is	[…]	the	investigation	of	concrete	modes	in	which	the	positivities	(or	the	apparatuses)	act	within	the	relations,	mechanisms,	and	“plays”	of	power.291			Perhaps	another	way	to	designate	a	large	part	of	this	“historical	element”	as	Agamben	construes	it,	albeit	not	completely	covering	its	scope,	would	be	to	call	this	set	of	imposed	institutional	structures,	rules	and	rites	the	inherited	order	of	a	tradition.	Benjamin’s	attention	to	historical	moments	of	the	latter’s	undoing,	which	is	always	an	undoing	of	its	instituted	conventions,	whether	in	his	reflections	on	a	post-Reformation	baroque	or	the	strangely	unhinged	organisation	of	Franz	Kafka’s	worlds,	similarly	tends	to	problematize	what	Agamben	calls	‘the	relation	between	individuals	as	living	beings	and	the	historical	element’	precisely	at	the	point	where	the	latter’s	organisational	hold	of	the	former	becomes	more	or	less	undone.292	If	we	follow	Agamben’s	general	account,	an	overriding	sense	of	the	apparatus	imposes	itself	that	concerns	the	submission	of	parts	to	wholes	and	means	to	ends	under	the	logic	of	a	hegemonic	‘strategy’.	The	subsumptive	structure	that	organises	parts	within	wholes	is	further	reflected	in	the	use	of	the	concept	of	the	apparatus	itself,	that	is,	in	the	relation	of	its	parts	–	the	elements	of	a	set	–	to	the	overall	‘strategy’	of	the	‘network’	between	them.	Agamben	seemingly	reserves	the	term	apparatus	for	both	this	network	as	well	as	the	elements	of	the	set	themselves.	Whereas	‘the	apparatus’	broadly	and	generally	describes	the	set	of	regulating	institutional	structures	in	a	hegemonic	assemblage,	the	plural	of	‘apparatuses’	may	also	designates	the	more	concrete	parts	of	the	set.	Both	the	relation	of	parts	to	wholes	and	means	to	ends	is	further	reflected	in	at	least	two	of	the	common	definitions	of	dispositif	from	a	French	dictionary	to	which	Agamben	turns:																																																									291	ibid,	5-6.	292	ibid,	6.	
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	 b.	A	technological	meaning:	“the	way	in	which	the	parts	of	a	machine	or	of	a	mechanism	and,	by	extension,	the	mechanism	itself	are	arranged.”		 c.	A	military	use:	“The	set	of	means	arranged	in	conformity	with	a	plan”.293		The	third	definition,	which	defines	a	strictly	juridical	sense,	links	the	apparatus	to	a	certain	performativity	of	the	judicial	decision,	as	‘the	part	of	a	judgement	that	contains	the	decision	separate	from	the	opinion	[…],	the	section	of	a	sentence	that	decides,	or	the	enacting	clause	of	a	law’.294	Here,	the	link	of	a	performative	speech	act	in	the	form	of	a	deciding	judgement	to	the	question	of	the	apparatus	is	perhaps	not	irrelevant	in	light	of	our	discussion	of	the	play	of	test-performances	in	the	‘time	of	reproducibility’,	which	is	always	also	a	time	of	the	crisis	of	tradition	and	therefore	of	undecidability	and	uncalculability	in	face	of	a	waning	historical	hegemonic	organisation.		‘To	some	extent,’	Agamben	suggests,	‘the	three	definitions	are	all	present	in	Foucault’s	use	of	the	term	apparatus	as	‘a	set	of	practices	and	mechanisms	(both	linguistic	and	nonlinguistic,	juridical,	technical,	and	military)	that	aim	to	face	an	urgent	need	and	to	obtain	an	effect	that	is	more	or	less	immediate’.295	Pursuing	a	loose	genealogical	trajectory,	Agamben	is	furthermore	able	to	link	the	Foucauldian	apparatus	to	the	Greek	term	oikonomia,	that	is,	‘the	administration	of	the	oikos	(the	home)	and,	more	generally,	management’.296	He	does	so	by	locating	the	use	of	the	latter	in	the	writings	of	the	‘Fathers	of	the	Church’,	where	it	came	to	designate	‘the	administration	and	government	of	human	history’	entrusted	to	Christ	by	God,	in	a	movement	that	seeks	to	save	the	oneness	of	his	being	in	light	of	its	partitioning	through	the	trinity	by	separating	‘in																																																									293	ibid,	7.	294	ibid.	295	ibid,	8.	296	ibid.	
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Him	being	and	action,	ontology	and	praxis’.297	‘Oikonomia	[…]	became	a	specialized	term,’	Agamben	relates,	‘signifying	in	particular	the	incarnation	of	the	Son,	together	with	the	economy	of	redemption	and	salvation’	and	so	merging	‘with	the	notion	of	Providence	and	begin[ning]	to	indicate	the	redemptive	governance	of	the	world	and	human	history’.298	The	translation	of	this	fundamental	Greek	term	in	the	writings	of	the	Latin	Fathers,	Agamben	relates,	is	dispositio,	the	Latin	term	from	which	the	French	term	dispositif,	or	apparatus,	derives.	‘The	“dispositifs”	of	which	Foucault	speaks,’	Agamben	is	thus	able	to	claim,	‘are	somehow	linked	to	this	theological	legacy’.299	What	is	decisive	for	Agamben’s	claim	about	this	link	of	the	Foucauldian	apparatus	to	the	theological	afterlife	of	the	Greek	term	oikonomia	is	the	latter’s	implication	of	‘the	fracture	that	divides	and,	at	the	same	time,	articulates	in	God	being	and	praxis’.300	For	the	“apparatus”	similarly	designates,	according	to	Agamben,	that	‘in	which,	and	through	which,	one	realizes	a	pure	activity	of	governance	devoid	of	any	foundation	in	being’.	‘This	is	the	reason	why	apparatuses,’	he	adds,	‘must	always	imply	a	process	of	subjectification,	that	is	to	say,	they	must	produce	their	subject’.301	The	latter	is	never	given	as	such,	but	comes	to	be	by	coming	to	pass	away	through	the	inter-play	of	human	beings	with	the	oikonomia	of	the	apparatus,	the	‘set	of	practices,	bodies	of	knowledge,	measures,	and	institutions	that	aim	to	manage,	govern,	control,	and	orient	–	in	a	way	that	purports	to	be	useful	–	the	behaviours,	gestures,	and	thoughts	of	human	beings’.302	In	light	of	these	processes	of	subjectification	by	the	administration	or	management	of	apparatuses,	Agamben,	meanwhile	abandoning	the	context	of	Foucauldian	philology,	is	finally	able	to	propose,	as	he	puts	it,																																																											297	ibid,	10.	298	ibid,	10-11.	299	ibid,	11.	300	ibid,	11.	301	ibid.	302	ibid,	12.	
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nothing	less	than	a	general	and	massive	partitioning	of	beings	into	two	large	groups	or	classes:	on	the	one	hand,	living	beings	(or	substances),	and	on	the	other,	apparatuses	in	which	living	beings	are	incessantly	captured.	On	one	side,	then,	to	return	to	the	terminology	of	the	theologians,	lies	the	ontology	of	creatures,	and	on	the	other	side,	the	oikonomia	of	apparatuses	that	seek	to	govern	and	guide	them	toward	the	good.303		With	this	broad	partitioning	in	mind,	Agamben	is	able	to	expand	the	already	large	class	of	Foucauldian	apparatuses	by	‘literally	anything	that	has	in	some	way	the	capacity	to	capture,	orient,	determine,	intercept,	model,	control,	or	secure	the	gestures,	behaviours,	opinions,	or	discourses	of	living	beings’	–	from	the	pen,	agriculture,	philosophy,	cigarettes	and	cellular	phones	to,	as	he	puts	it,	‘language	itself,	[…]	perhaps	the	most	ancient	of	apparatuses	[…]’.304	In	their	interaction	with	apparatuses	–	Agamben	calls	it	‘a	relentless	fight’,	recalling	thereby	the	close	proximity	of	politics	and	play	as	we	have	encountered	it	in	Benjamin’s	account	of	a	revolutionised	social	function	of	art	as	the	rehearsal	space	for	dealing	with	an	apparatus	–	living	beings	or	‘creatures’	become	subjects,	without	their	subject-position	ever	fully	overlapping	with	their	substance.	Instead,	as	Agamben	suggests	in	a	theatrical	register,	the	same	substance	‘can	be	the	place	of	multiple	processes	of	‘subjectification’,	pushing	to	the	extreme,	in	light	of	the	boundless	growth	of	apparatuses	in	our	time,	‘the	masquerade	that	has	always	accompanied	every	personal	identity’.305																																																														303	ibid,	13.	304	ibid,	14.	305	ibid,	15.	
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Test-Performances	as	Failed	Performatives	
	 In	J.L.	Austin’s	How	to	do	things	with	words,	the	success	or	happiness	of	a	performative	speech	act	depends	on	its	contextual	embedding	that	often	ties	the	speaking	of	certain	words	to	a	set	of	tightly	observed	ritual	practices	and	circumstances	of	a	specific	time	and	place.	Although		 [t]he	uttering	of	the	words	is,	indeed,	usually	a,	or	even	the,	leading	incident	in	the	performance	of	the	act	[…],	the	performance	of	which	is	also	the	object	of	the	utterance,	[…]	it	is	far	from	being	usually,	even	if	it	is	ever,	the	sole	thing	necessary	if	the	act	is	to	be	deemed	to	have	been	performed.	Speaking	generally,	it	is	always	necessary	that	the	circumstances	in	which	the	words	are	uttered	should	be	in	some	way,	or	ways,	
appropriate,	and	it	is	very	commonly	necessary	that	either	the	speaker	himself	or	other	persons	should	also	perform	certain	
other	actions,	whether	‘physical’	or	‘mental’	actions	or	even	acts	of	uttering	further	words.	Thus,	for	naming	the	ship,	it	is	essential	that	I	should	be	the	person	appointed	to	name	her,	for	(Christian)	marrying,	it	is	essential	that	I	should	not	be	already	married	with	a	wife	living,	sane	and	undivorced,	and	so	on:	for	a	bet	to	have	been,	it	is	generally	necessary	for	the	offer	of	the	bet	to	have	been	accepted	by	a	taker	(who	must	have	done	something,	such	as	to	say	‘Done’),	and	it	is	hardly	a	gift	if	I	say	‘I	give	it	you’	but	never	hand	it	over.306			It	is	perhaps	hardly	surprising	that	in	Austin’s	account	of	such	conventionally	regulated	ritual	acts,	the	theory	of	the	speech	act	finds	itself	constantly	exposed	to	the	threat	of	its	failure	by	the	subversion	of	play	–	the	non-serious	as	Austin	calls	it,	parasitic	on	its	‘normal’	use	–																																																									306	John	Austin,	How	to	do	Things	with	Words	(Cambridge	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press	1975),	8-9.	
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that	more	or	less	repeats	the	ritual	act	in	circumstances	that	can	no	longer	guarantee	its	conventional	effects.	A	hollow	repetition	of	a	non-present	remainder,	we	might	say,	of	the	form	of	the	ritual	act	severed	from	a	forgotten	or	abolished	circumstance	that	endowed	the	act	with	its	sense	and	purpose.	If	the	paradigmatic	context	for	the	non-serious	in	Austin	is	the	theatre,	we	might	also	detect	a	more	general	theatricality	of	the	everyday	whenever	the	‘masquerade’	of	multiple	processes	of	subjectification	in	an	expanding	apparatus	becomes	exposed	and	rendered	more	fluid	in	circumstances	of	the	latter’s	dissolution.	For	if	one	necessity	of	circumstance	for	the	success	of	the	speech	act	is	the	appropriate	subject	position	–	Stellung	–	of	those	performing	as	well	as	attending	the	act,	it	is	clear	that	successful	speech	acts	can	never	be	performed	by	‘creatures’,	as	it	were,	but	always	depend	on	the	relative	security	of	an	instituted	subject	position.	It	is	thus	non-fortuitous	to	see	Austin,	when	conjuring	up	a	scene	that	at	first	seems	reminiscent	of	the	probing	misfires	of	the	gestures	of	Kafka’s	characters,	quickly	reverts	to	hypothetical	examples	of	monkeys	and	penguins	when	further	discussing	the	role	of	misplaced	subject-positions	at	the	heart	of	a	failed	ritual	speech	act.			 Suppose,	for	example,	I	see	a	vessel	on	the	docks,	walk	up	and	smash	the	bottle	hung	at	the	stern,	proclaim	‘I	name	this	ship	the	
Mr.	Stalin’	and	for	good	measure	kick	away	the	chocks:		but	the	trouble	is,	I	was	not	the	person	chosen	to	name	it	(whether	or	not	–	an	additional	complication	–	Mr.	Stalin	was	the	destined	name;	[…]	One	could	say	that	I	‘went	through	a	form	of’	naming	the	vessel	but	that	my	‘action’	was	‘void’	or	‘without	effect’,	because	I	was	not	a	proper	person,	had	not	the	‘capacity’,	to	perform	it:	but	one	might	also	and	alternatively	say	that,	where	there	is	not	even	a	pretence	of	capacity	or	a	colourable	claim	to	it,	then	there	is	no	accepted	conventional	procedure;	it	is	a	mockery,	like	a	marriage	
with	a	monkey.	Or	again	one	could	say	that	part	of	the	procedure	is	getting	oneself	appointed.	When	the	saint	baptized	the	
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penguins,	was	this	void	because	the	procedure	of	baptizing	is	inappropriate	to	be	applied	to	penguins	[…]?307		Austin’s	rhetoric,	as	already	indicated,	here	recalls	the	world	of	Franz	Kafka’s	writings,	in	which	misfired	performatives	proliferate	in	light	of	the	dissolution,	as	Benjamin	puts	it,	of	the	‘organisation	of	life	and	work	in	the	human	community’.308	In	ways	reminiscent	of	the	scenario	of	a	failed	performative,	in	Kafka’s	world	actions	often	take	place	without	quite	taking	place.	In	a	contextual	void	that	is	without	guaranteed	effects	or	significance	they	probe	for	the	possibilities	of	the	latter	by	which	action	quickly	turns	into	acting.	‘Elsewhere	K.	himself	does	a	bit	of	acting,’	Benjamin	begins	to	describe	a	particularly	theatrical	scene	from	
The	Trial:		 Without	being	fully	conscious	of	it,	‘slowly…	with	his	eyes	not	looking	down	but	cautiously	raised	upwards	he	took	one	of	the	papers	from	the	desk,	put	it	on	the	palm	of	his	hand	and	gradually	raised	it	up	to	the	gentlemen	while	getting	up	himself.	He	had	nothing	definite	in	mind,	but	acted	only	with	the	feeling	that	this	was	what	he	would	have	done	once	he	had	completed	the	big	petition,	which	was	to	exonerate	him	completely’.309			Samuel	Weber	fittingly	summarises	the	link	between	organisation	and	theatricality,	if	not	theatre,	in	Benjamin’s	writings	on	Kafka	as	well	as	those	on	German	baroque	Mourning	Play	[Trauerspiel]:		 In	the	absence	of	an	established	and	authoritative	set	of	values	–	whose	historical	emergence	Benjamin	had	retraced	in	his	study	of	the	German	mourning	play	as	a	reaction	to	the	radical	antinomianism	of	the	Reformation	–	“organisation”	becomes	an	end	in	itself.	Benjamin	varies	the	famous	phrase	of	Napoleon	in																																																									307	Austin,	23-4,	(my	emphasis).	308	Benjamin,	‘Franz	Kafka’,	Gesammelte	Schriften	II,	420.	309	Benjamin,	‘Franz	Kafka’,	419.	
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his	conversation	with	Goethe	to	read	“organisation	is	destiny,”	arguing	that	“the	organisation	of	life	and	of	work	in	human	community”	gains	importance	in	proportion	to	the	lack	of	transcendent	justification.	Since	this	organisation	lacks	legitimacy,	however,	it	remains	opaque,	impenetrable,	something	to	be	surmised	and	alluded	to,	the	object	of	parables	rather	than	the	basis	of	doctrine.	In	Kafka’s	writings,	Benjamin	argues,	the	model	of	such	an	unavoidable	but	opaque	organisation	of	everyday	life	is	not	the	tribunal	or	the	castle	but	theatre.310			In	other	words,	Kafka’s	theatrical	worlds	depict	an	apparatus	in	ruins,	in	which	previously	goal	directed	actions,	no	longer	guided	by	transcendent	justifications,	have	become	contextually	dislodged	repetitions	of	themselves,	probing	gestures	severed	from	their	guaranteed	ends,	‘void’	of	clarity	of	purpose,	or	else	test-performances,	more	or	less	precariously	exposed	in	search	of	their	only	ever	provisional	effects	in	non-saturable	contexts.	Furthermore,	not	only	dissolve	actions	into	acting,	but	subjects	into	actors,	that	is,	stand-ins	of	positions	[Stellungen]	that	can	never	be	fully	secured.	Kafka’s	characters	are	therefore	often	to	be	found	more	or	less	desperately	scrambling,	whether	in	a	more	or	less	desperate	
relentless	fight	or	high	spirited	playfulness,	for	more	or	less	secure	subject	positions	within	precarious	scenarios	of	working	with	as	well	as	for	an	apparatus.	In	an	echo	of	Agamben’s	partitioning	of	creatures	and	subject-position-endowing	apparatuses,	what	seeks	out	this	or	that	particular	subject	position	by	dealing	with	an	apparatus	in	certain	of	these	scenarios	is	in	fact	no	longer	a	human	being	at	all.	‘It	is	possible	to	read	Kafka’s	animal	stories	for	a	considerable	time,’	Benjamin	reminds	us,	‘without	realising	that	they	are	not	about	human	beings	at	all.	Encountering	the	name	of	the	creature	[Geschöpf]	–	monkey,	dog	or	mole	–	one	looks	up	startled	and	sees	that	one	is	already	at	a	great	distance	from	the	continent	of	the	human’.311																																																									310	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	70.	311	Benjamin,	‘Franz	Kafka’,	419.	
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Distortion	[Entstellung]	As	Stand-In	Of	‘The	New’		
	
		 A	context	that	repeats	otherwise	and	perhaps	brings	together	in	productive	ways	some	of	our	previous	concerns	with	the	radical	performative	–	or	else,	afformative	–	quality	of	gesture,	are	the	writings	of	Werner	Hamacher.312	In	his	essay	‘The	Gesture	In	The	Name:	On	Benjamin	and	Kafka’,	Hamacher	employs	the	concept	of	the	gesture	precisely	as	a	figure	saturated	with	the	immediacy	of	the	medial.	Hamacher	begins	his	reflections	with	a	reading	of	the	recurring	trope	of	‘the	cloudy	spot’	in	Benjamin’s	writings	on	Kafka,	the	becoming	opaque	of	transmission	that	is	used	more	or	less	synominously	with	the	figure	of	gesture.	‘For	Kafka,’	Benjamin	states,	‘something	was	only	ever	comprehensible	through	gesture.	And	these	gestures,	which	he	did	not																																																									312	Werner	Hamacher,	‘The	Gesture	in	the	Name:	On	Benjamin	and	Kafka’	in	Premises,	294-336.	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press	1999).	In	the	context	of	his	reading	of	Walter	Benjamin’s	conception	of	a	pure	means	of	violence	and	language,	Hamacher	puts	forward	the	conceptual	series	of	afformation,	afformance,	and	afformative	in	contrast	to	
performation,	performance	and	performative	act.	Hamacher’s	conception	of	the	conception	of	the	afformative,	which	I	can	here	only	point	towards	but	not	develop,	‘as	a	‘condition’	for	any	instrumental,	performative’	act	that	‘at	the	same	time	[…]	suspends	its	fulfillment	in	principle,’	is	fundamentally	related	to	everything	that	here	comes	under	the	rubric	of	the	virtual:	‘But	while	afformations	do	not	belong	to	the	class	of	acts	–	that	is,	to	the	class	of	positing	or	founding	operations	–	they	are	nevertheless,	never	simply	outside	the	sphere	of	acts	or	without	relation	to	that	sphere.	The	fact	that	afformations	allow	something	to	happen	without	making	it	happen	has	a	dual	significance:	first,	that	they	let	this	thing	enter	into	the	realm	of	positings,	from	which	they	themselves	are	excluded;	and,	second,	that	they	are	not	what	shows	up	in	the	realm	of	positings,	so	that	the	field	of	phenomenality,	as	the	field	of	positive	manifestation,	can	only	indicate	the	effects	of	the	afformative	as	ellipses,	pauses,	interruptions,	displacements	etc.,	but	can	never	contain	or	include	them.	The	afformative	is	the	ellipsis	which	silently	accompanies	any	act	and	which	may	silently	interrupt	any	speech	act.	What	‘is’	afformative	can	therefore	never	be	represented	in	the	form	of	a	rule	or	a	law.	While	every	presentation	depends	on	a	positing	and	is	essentially	performative	in	character,	the	‘deposing’	of	which	Benjamin	speaks,	the	afformative,	would	not	lend	itself	to	presentation	of	any	sort.	[…]	[Hamacher	‘Afformative,	Strike’,	125-6].	
	 142	
understand,	form	the	cloudy	place	[Stelle]	of	the	parables	from	which	emerges	Kafka’s	literature’.313	Picking	up	on	Benjamin’s	assertion	that	Kafka’s	work	constitutes	a	tradition	that	has	fallen	ill,	Hamacher	pays	special	attention	to	the	status	of	a	language	that	continues	to	commit	itself	to	the	passing	on	[Tradierung]	of	what	has	become	impossible	to	be	passed	on	[des	Untradierbaren].	The	cloudy	spot	of	gesture	performs	such	a	transmission	of	an	opaque	doctrine.	Kafka’s	texts	infinitely	hesitate	before	their	own	meaning,	Hamacher	notes.	Blockage	of	the	movement	of	transmission	multiplies	its	signifying	potential.	Representation	passes	over	into	the	unrepresentable	[Undarstellbare],	revealing	the	absence	of	all	revelation.314	Such	a	transmission	of	the	untransmissable	follows	the	structural	movement	of	a	means	without	end,	as	we	have	already	encountered	it,	and	that	is	nevertheless	not	an	end	in	itself,	but	retains	an	aspect	of	itself	as	means.	Hamacher	describes	this	movement	as	a	passing	on	without	content,	a	giving	without	gift,	which	gives	nothing	but	the	giving	itself.315	He	further	construes	it	as	the	movement	of	a	defunct	inheritance,	by	which	the	prospect	that	a	law	of	the	past	would	be	valid	for	the	future	and	thus	a	conception	of	history	as	a	normative	continuum	can	no	longer	be	upheld.	Instead,	the	interruption	of	continuity	(of	meaning)	can	be	experienced	both	as	loss	and	as	chance.	What	might	be	lost,	are	the	past	doctrine	and	a	sense	of	the	historical	continuum.	What	might	be	gained,	is	an	opening	onto	an	unknown	future,	that	is,	the	‘preparation’	of	what	has	never	been.	This	possible	coming	of	the	other,	however,	Hamacher	insists,	is	certainly	never	for	us.	For	what	Kafka	says	about	hope	is	also	valid	for	the	law	of	tradition	and	the	literature	that	transmits	it	and	as	which	it	transmits	itself	[sich	übermittelt],	namely:	there	is	sufficient	hope,	infinitely	so	–	but	not	for	us.																																																										313	Benjamin	in	Werner	Hamacher,	‘Die	Geste	im	Namen:	Benjamin	und	Kafka’	in	Entferntes	Verstehen	280-323.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	2011),	284.	314	ibid,	290.	315	ibid,	288.	
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There	is	hope	always	only	for	another	–	and	for	“us”	only	when	there	is,	so	to	speak,	no	“us,”	when	“we”	stop	being	“ourselves”	and	begin	to	be	another.	“Plenty	of	hope,”	therefore,	“but	not	for	us.”	Hope,	rather,	case	by	case,	for	others,	for	another	literature	and	another	history.316			If	the	cloud	therefore	constitutes	an	opacification	of	Enlightenment,	Hamacher	says,	one	should	not	however	be	morally	critical	of	it.	The	failure	of	transmission	must	not	be	diagnosed	as	a	symptom	of	chance	[Zufallssymptom].	In	other	words,	the	accident	of	its	fall,	the	illness	that	has	befallen	tradition,	warrants	a	response	that	does	not	simply	propose	to	seek	to	recover	‘old	goods,’	as	Hamacher	puts	it,	but	at	least	considers	the	possibility	‘that	through	the	disintegration	of	representation	something	other	prepares	itself,	which	has	not	been	present	thus	far	nor	is	simply	anticipatable’.317	For	Benjamin,	Kafka’s	parables	without	doctrine	–	non-present	remainders,	as	we	might	also	here	put	it	–	may	not	only	continue	to	transmit	what	is	left	of	the	doctrine	as	relic,	but	also	prepare	it	as	its	precursor.	The	doctrine,	law	and	order	before	which	Kafka’s	parables	fail	or	withhold	themselves,	as	Hamacher	states,	‘belong	[…]	to	the	future	no	less	than	the	past’.318	Yet	neither	future	nor	past	is	figured	in	Kafka’s	writings.	Instead,	the	‘cloudy	spot’	and	the	incomprehensible	gesture	that	inhabit	it	must	be	read	‘precisely	as	a	testimony	of	refusal	or	an	impossibility	to	anticipate	the	coming	and	subject	it	to	past	forms	of	representation’.319	‘Distortion	[Entstellung],	which	proliferates	in	Kafka’s	prose,	is	therefore	the	stand-in	[Platzhalterin]	of	a	new,	which	has	no	place	[Platz]	in	an	as	yet	accepted	order	of	representation	and	itself	does	not	constitute	such	an	order’.320	Here,	the	status	of	a	stand-in,	which	we	have	previously	attributed	to	the	acting	characters	in	Kafka’s	disintegrating	organisations	of	the	human																																																									316	Hamacher,	‘The	Gesture’,	303.		317	Hamacher,	‘Die	Geste’,	292.	318	ibid.	319	ibid.	320	ibid,	293.	
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community,	grappling	with	the	remains	of	an	apparatus	in	insecure	subject-positions,	returns	in	the	context	of	a	consideration	of	language	as	the	medium	of	historical	transmission	of	tradition	and	the	historical	continuity	of	organisation.	Yet	the	opacity	of	a	transmitted	inheritance	as	stand-in	is	not	simply	a	historical	consequence	of	an	ailing	tradition,	but	also	the	deconstruct-ability	of	all	positing	as	the	very	condition	of	its	limited	success.	Test-performances,	as	we	saw,	might	play	with	the	non-present	remaining	of	a	tradition	that	has	fallen	ill,	or	else	expose	the	non-present	remaining	of	an	opaque	stand-in	within	limited	contextual	effects	of	presence.	Not	unlike	the	status	of	test-performances	and	test-performers,	distortions	[Entsellungen]	as	stand-ins	are	no	longer	properly	and	securely	placed	[gestellt]	within	a	contextual	order	of	representation,	but	precariously	exposed	to	the	coming	of	other	possibilities	of	use	or	signification.	Hamacher	links	the	provisional	status	of	the	stand-in	to	what	he	designates	as	its	modernity.	The	modernity	Hamacher	here	has	in	mind,	far	from	following	the	trajectories	of	teleological	progress,	does	not	follow	on	from	an	old	order	as	a	new	one,	but	is	that	which	‘in	all	order	and	firstly	in	the	order	of	representation	opens	up	what	behaves	heterogeneous	to	it’.321	Generalizing	the	role	of	distortion	[Entstellung]	in	the	representation	of	historical	experience,	Hamacher	suggests	that	all	art	has	a	dimension	that	could	be	called	modern,	if,	in	its	representation	of	historical	experience,	it	exposes	the	
caesura,	the	“cloudy	spot”	or	the	unintelligible	gesture.			 Resistance	against	the	assimilation	of	the	future	to	the	past	is	the	minimal	political	programme	of	a	modernity	thus	construed.		It	is	therefore	the	refusal		to	capitulate	before	the	demand	for	universality	of	a	tradition	of	representation	which	carries	out	this	assimilation.	The	old	does	not	fail	so	that	the	new	succeeds,	but	what	fails	is	the	principle	of	representation	itself,	which	instigates	
																																																								321	ibid.	
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the	continuity	between	„old“	and	„new,“	and	therefore	the	continuity	of	historical	time	thus	far,	in	the	first	place.322		The	chance	of	a	revolution	of	the	social	function	of	art	as	Benjamin	seeks	to	discern	it	in	the	wake	of	the	withering	of	the	aura	of	the	work	of	art	in	the	time	of	its	reproducibility,	follows	the	minimal	political	programme	of	a	modernity	thus	construed.	No	longer	subservient	to	the	omnitemporal	force	of	ritual	as	what	seeks	to	guarantee	‘the	continuity	between	„old“	and	„new,“	and	therefore	the	continuity	of	historical	time	thus	far’,	it	begins	to	rely	on	the	participatory	practice	of	politics	and	play,	which	perpetually	rehearses	or	reworks	the	inheritance	of	the	past	as	the	future	to	come.		
																																																								322	ibid.	
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CHAPTER	THREE	
	
	
	
Clumsy	Creatures:		
Walter	Benjamin	in	the	Bestiary	of	Edwina	Ashton323			
													 	Fig.	1.	Seven	Sites	launch	party,		 	 Fig.	2.	Walter	Benjamin,	1937.	August	2011.	Edwina	Ashton.	 	 	Photographed	by	Gisèle	Freund.
																																																								323	The	present	chapter	has	been	published	in	Performance	Research	18:4	On	Falling.	
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‘Clumsiness	speaks	of	the	infiltration	of	falling	in	human	action’.324		In	other	words,	actions	and	speech	acts,	movements	that	strive	toward	meaningful	ends,	are	here	destabilised.	Whether	describing	the	interruptions	of	sudden	pratfalls	and	slips	of	the	tongue,	or	slower	processes	of	rendering	futurity	uncertain,	the	clumsy	infiltration	of	falling	undermines	mastery	through	a	more	or	less	gradual	loss	of	control	over	end-directed	ambitions.		‘The	clumsy	one	is	weighed	down	[…]	by	a	body	that	he	does	not	fill	or	coincide	with	sufficiently	to	command’.325	Here,	Conner	describes	a	breakdown	of	mastery	under	the	weight	of	non-coincidence.	A	process	of	doubling,	self-distancing	and	self-multiplication	that	Charles	Baudelaire,	in	his	essay	‘Of	the	Essence	of	Laughter’	had	similarly	associated	with	a	professional	attitude	towards	falling,	practiced	alike	by	philosophers	and	buffoons.326	Falling,	in	this	context,	exposes	the	failure	of	the	myth	of	self-identity.	It	is	the	gesture	of	self-alienation	par	excellence.	In	this	light,	Baudelaire’s	notion	of	a	professional	stance	towards	falling,	if	one	can	put	it	thus	somewhat	paradoxically	–	a	more	or	less	controlled	loss	of	control,	degrees	of	mastery	in	non-mastery	–	perhaps	necessitates	what	Walter	Benjamin	says	of	the	actor	in	Epic	Theatre,	that	is,	‘to	preserve	for	oneself	the	possibility	to	artfully	fall	out	of	one’s	role’.327		Such	technologies	of	and	professional	attitudes	towards	falling	must	be	put	in	relation	to	Benjamin’s	lifelong	practico-theoretical	fascination	with	the	‘the	off-fall	[Abfall,	lit.	rubbish]	of	history,’	the	ruins,	fragments,	images	and	gestures	discarded	by	or	cut	from	a	dominant																																																									324	Steven	Connor	‘Shifting	Ground’.	This	is	the	English	version	of	an	essay	published	in	German	as	'Auf	schwankendem	Boden',	in	the	catalogue	of	the	exhibition	Samuel	Beckett,	Bruce	Nauman	ed.	by	Michael	Glasmeier.	(Vienna:	Kunsthalle	Wien,	2000):	80-7.	Accessed	November	2011.	325	ibid.	326	Charles	Baudelaire,	‘Of	the	Essence	of	Laughter,	and	generally	of	the	Comic	in	the	Plastic	Arts’,	in	Baudelaire:	Selected	Writings	On	Art	And	
Artists,	trans.	P.E.	Charvet,	(Harmondsworth:	Penguin	Books,	1972).	327	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater?	(2),	29.	
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historical	organisation	(Benjamin	1983:	575).	A	crisis	of	organisation	and	the	proliferation	of	fallen	fragments	inform	Benjamin’s	reading	of	two	paradigmatic	contexts:	the	German	baroque	Trauerspiel	and	the	literary	work	of	Franz	Kafka.	Both	depict	a	world	that	is	marked	by	the	loss	of	redemptive	horizons	in	light	of	a	failure	[Aus-fall]	of	eschatology.	Here,	actions	find	themselves	severed	from	their	collective	symbolic	organisation.	Barred	from	redemptive	guarantees	and	inhibited	from	access	to	grace,	movements	are	no	longer	set	upon	a	teleological	trajectory	and	thus	infiltrated	by	falling.	In	this	context	Benjamin	develops	a	notion	of	the	creature	[die	Kreatur]	as	so	many	distortions	[Entstellungen]	from	the	ordered	position	[Stellung]	of	human	mastery.	Distorted	and	clumsy,	the	creature	finds	itself	vulnerably	exposed	to	an	utter	lack	of	security	and	future.	Unless,	that	is,	it	turns	out	to	be	more	professionally	at	ease	in	precarious	conditions	of	non-mastery,	playfully	at	work	in	exuberant	attitudes	of	experiment.	In	what	follows,	I	would	like	to	reflect	further	on	the	ambiguous	conditions	of	the	clumsy	creature,	both	productively	and	precariously	at	play	in	the	work	of	contemporary	artist	Edwina	Ashton’s	creature	costumes,	performances	and	films,	and	the	writings	of	Walter	Benjamin.	Finally,	I	would	like	to	consider	Benjamin	himself,	of	whom	Theodor	W.	Adorno	said	that	he	resembled	an	animal	that	collects	things	in	its	mouth,	whether	vulnerably	exposed	or	exuberantly	at	play,	as	one	more	creature	within	Ashton’s	bestiary.328				
An	Ambiguous	Politics	of	the	Clumsy	
	 ‘In	these	days’,	Walter	Benjamin	proclaims	in	a	note	from	One-
Way	Street,	‘no	one	should	be	set	upon	[sich	versteiffen]	what	he	“can	do.”																																																									328	Eckhardt	Köhn,	‘Sammler’	in	Benjamins	Begriffe.	ed.	by	Michael	Opitz	&	Erdmut	Wizisla.	695-724.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	2000).	
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Strength	lies	in	improvisation.	All	decisive	blows	will	be	dealt	by	the	left	hand’.329	The	small	aphorism	hangs	ambiguously	between	an	active	ethico-political	call	to	self-interruption	and	the	reactive	stance	of	making	do	with	an	imposed	loss	of	control.	In	any	case,	a	decisive	[entscheidende]	blow	can	no	longer	be	planned	or	anticipated,	but	springs	forth	from	positions	of	insecurity,	whether	actively	sought	out	or	passively	experienced.	From	being	thus	precariously	placed,	actions	unfold	severed	from	guaranteed	meaningful	ends	in	processes	of	experimental	non-mastery.	The	latter,	perhaps	a	kind	of	politics	of	the	clumsy,	is	to	be	found	in	Benjamin’s	thought	and	life,	in	all	its	active-reactive	ambiguity.	Throughout	his	work	and	letters,	Benjamin’s	attitude	seemingly	oscillates	between	the	lament	for	the	loss	of	secure	positions	[Stellungen]	embedded	within	inherited	traditions	and	the	radical	call	for	exploding	and	cutting	to	bits	the	precarious	remains	of	the	orders	of	things.	Not	least	of	all	the	teleological	organisation	of	actions	within	a	progressive	historical	continuum.	His	own	life	is	testament	to	the	pull	of	this	polarity.	It	strikes	out,	so	to	speak,	in	extremes;	at	times	stifled	within	conditions	of	vulnerable	exposition	within	forced	upon	exiles,	at	others	exuberant	in	attitudes	of	destruction	within	cunning	orders	of	self-experiment.				
To	Find	Pathways	Everywhere	
	 In	a	letter	to	Gershom	Scholem	from	1930,	Benjamin	expresses	a	frustration	with	his	general	lack	of	a	secure	social	position	[Stellung].	‘It	is	indeed	not	easy,’	he	says,	‘at	the	threshold	of	forty,	to	stand	[zu	stehen]	without	property,	position	[Stellung]	and	capital	[Vermögen]’.330	Yet	in	his	essay	‘The	destructive	Character’	written	around	the	same	time,	he	emphatically	describes	the	features	of	this	admirable	type	as	an	active																																																									329	Walter	Benjamin,	Einbahnstraße,	14.	330	Gershom	Scholem,	Walter	Benjamin	–	die	Geschichte	einer	
Freundschaft.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1975),	202.	
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rejection	of	the	securities	of	the	proper.	The	polarity	of	Benjamin’s	desire	for	and	against	a	minimum	of	proper	securities	can	further	be	construed	by	juxtaposing	his	life-long	passion	as	a	collector	with	the	destructive	character’s	call	to	make	room	for	a	joyful	uprooting	of	one’s	condition	[Zustand].331	Writing	to	Scholem	in	1931,	Benjamin	speaks	of	the	reunion	with	his	library	in	a	Berlin	flat	at	Prinzregentenstrasse	66	that	he	took	over	from	the	painter	Eva	Bloy	in	the	late	autumn	of	1930.	The	library,	which	by	then	had	grown	from	1200	to	2000	books,	‘even	in	these	times,’	as	he	suggestively	puts	it,	is	situated	in	the	office	of	the	flat.	The	presence	of	his	private	book	collection	makes	the	office,	despite	its	unfinished	condition,	quite	inhabitable.	Here,	Benjamin	seemingly	offsets	the	fragility	of	the	office’s	condition	–	a	work	in	progress	that	denies	masterful	use	–	with	the	reassuring	presence	of	one	of	his	dearest	possessions.	As	if	however	to	make	up	for	a	momentary	weakness,	Benjamin	goes	on	to	calmly	relate	the	absence	of	a	work-desk.	Contrary	to	what	one	might	expect	from	a	professional	writer,	he	is	not	however	put	out	by	this	in	the	least.	Drawing	Scholem’s	attention	to	his	long	acquired	habit,	due	to	a	variety	of	circumstances,	to	write	whilst	lying	down,	he	begins	to	joyfully	relate	the	presence	of	a	sofa	that,	albeit	unsuitable	to	sleep	on	due	to	its	hardness,	apparently	makes	for	a	marvellous	place	to	work.	Here,	Benjamin’s	happy	transvaluation	of	the	use	of	things	is	able	to	follow	his	own	descriptions	of	the	destructive	character’s	ability	to	find	pathways	[Wege]	everywhere.	‘Because	he	sees	pathways	[Wege]	everywhere,	he	himself	always	stands	at	the	crossroads	[Kreuzweg].	No	instant	may	know	what	the	next	will	bring’.332	Despite	the	contextual	rhetoric	of	empowerment,	the	description	clearly	retains	the	darker	aspects	of	standing	precariously	at	the	crossroads	in	perpetual	alert,	that	is,	of	a	fragile	exposition	to	the	utter	unpredictability	of	all	futurity.	Benjamin	says	as	much	with	the	first	entry	of	his	Diary	
from	the	seventh	of	August	Nineteenhundredthirtyone	until	the	Day	of	
																																																								331	Benjamin,	Illuminationen,	289.	332	ibid,	290.	
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Death,	which	remarks	on	the	hopelessness	[Ausweglosigkeit,	lit.	absence	of	a	way	out]	of	his	situation.333	
	
	
	
Being	Insecurely	Placed	
	 Similar	polarities	between	states	of	hope	and	hopelessness	within	given	positions	of	insecurity	are	at	work	in	Benjamin’s	reading	of	Franz	Kafka.	Kafka’s	hermetic	fictional	worlds	rigorously	put	into	play	questions	regarding	the	positions	[Stellungen]	of	their	characters.	The	German	word	Stellung	in	this	context	is	to	be	understood	in	all	its	senses	and	associated	meanings	–	of	position,	place	and	stance,	of	employment	and	status,	as	well	as	general	relations	of	social	hierarchy.	What	occupied	Kafka,	the	more	it	became	impenetrable	to	him,	was	the	‘question	of	how	life	and	work	are	organised	in	human	society’.334	Kafka’s	characters	scramble	for,	or	retreat	from,	their	given	positions	[Stellung],	following	an	ambiguous	desire	of	(dis-)	belonging	to	the	organising	institutions	of	their	world.	Central	characters	like	K.,	Josef	K.	and	the	young	Karl	Rossmann	often	find	themselves	out	of	(their)	place,	as	well	as	in	the	process	of	more	or	less	desperately	seeking	to	gain	securer	positions	[Stellungen].	Their	endeavour	to	appropriate	and	secure	a	certain	status	or	employment	[Stellung]	for	themselves	often	exposes	the	theatrical	organisation	of	their	world.		A	scene	that	combines	the	distribution	of	theatrical	roles	with	the	sinister	stakes	of	a	violent	threat	to	the	most	minimal	security	of	position	plays	itself	out	over	the	first	few	pages	of	The	Castle:	K.	is	woken	by	a	young	man	with	an	actorly	[schauspielerhaften]	face.335	Soon	enough,	following	an	aggressive	debate	concerning	his	lawful	right	to	sleep	in	the	most	rudiment	place	[Stelle]	on	a	sack	of	straw	in	the	corner	of	a	still																																																									333	Köhn,	719-20.	334	Benjamin,	Illuminationen,	420.	335	Franz	Kafka,	Das	Schloß.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Fischer	1998),	7.	
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busy	inn,	he	wants	to	put	an	end	to	this	comedy.336	Accused	of	being	a	vagabond,	K.	seeks	to	assert	himself	with	reference	to	his	employment	[Stellung]	by	letting	it	be	known	that	he	is	the	land	surveyor	who	was	called	upon	by	the	count	of	the	castle.	Judging	however	from	his	own	reaction	to	the	authority’s	belated	confirmation	of	this	audacious	claim,	his	proclaimed	land-surveyorness	[Landvermesserschaft]	turns	out	to	perhaps	have	been	nothing	but	a	cunning	yet	desperate	attempt	at	self-preservation.	The	Castle,	as	sovereign	power,	does	not	so	much	as	confirm	a	position	[Stellung]	and	title	previously	arranged,	but	seemingly	accepts	his	role-play	by	retrospectively	appointing	him	to	it.337	K.’s	lack	of	secure	position,	his	exile	and	theatricality,	perhaps	constitute	a	middle	ground	of	a	spectrum	of	displacements	and	distortions	[Entstellungen]	that	run	throughout	Kafka’s	world.	For	Benjamin	there	is	hope	for	very	few	characters	within	this	spectrum.	The	fragility	of	the	majority	of	their	positions	[Stellungen],	he	notes		 […]	weighs	heavily	on	this	world	of	creatures	as	a	dark	kind	of	law.		None	has	a	firm	position	[Stelle],	none	has	a	firm,	non-exchangeable	outline;	none	that	is	not	either	rising	or	falling;	none	that	is	not	trading	places	with	its	enemy	or	neighbour,	none	that	is	not	deeply	exhausted	and	yet	is	only	at	the	beginning	of	a	long	duration.	Here,	to	speak	of	any	order	or	hierarchy	is	impossible.338		Benjamin’s	reading	nevertheless	primarily	concerns	itself	with	drawing	our	attention	to	those	characters	that	form	exceptions	to	the	norm.	Although	far	from	exempt	from	a	lack	of	secure	position,	these	characters	are	somewhat	able	to	take	up	a	different	attitude	with	regards	to	the	fragility	of	their	predicament.	They	are	Kafka’s	assistants	[Gehilfen],	students	and	buffoons,	who	neither	belong	to	nor	are	foreign	to	any																																																									336	ibid,	8.	337	ibid,	10.	338	Benjamin,	‘Franz	Kafka	–	Zur	zehnten	Wiederkehr	seines	Todestages’	in	Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	II.	409-438.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1977),	415.	
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other	orders	of	belonging.	‘For	them	and	their	kind,	the	unfinished	and	clumsy,	there	is	hope’.339	Full	of	an	exuberant	resilience,	their	courageous	fumbling	and	groping	draws	on	a	mixture	of	cunning	and	high	spirits.340	Performing	happy	investments	without	guaranteed	returns,	or	else,	‘experiments,	always	of	course	accompanied	by	lisps	and	chuckling,’	they	ambitiously	venture	into	the	world	like	the	lad	who	left	his	home	for	he	wanted	to	learn	what	fear	was.341	Without	power,	yet	far	from	impotent,	as	well	as	hopeful	as	Josephine	the	singing	mouse,	they	are	full	of	‘unfathomable	yet	nevertheless	existing	and	not	to	be	terminated	high	spirits’	[Munterkeit].342																																																																											339	ibid,	415.		340	In	an	aside	of	‘The	Storyteller’	Benjamin	notes	that	‘this	is	how	the	fairy	tale	polarises	Mut	[courage],	dividing	it	dialectically	into	Untermut	–	that	is,	cunning	–	and	Übermut	[high	spirits]	(Benjamin,	Illuminationen,	404).’	341	Benjamin,	‘Franz	Kafka’,	414-5.	342	ibid.	
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			Fig.	3.	Walter	Benjamin	at	the		 	 Fig.4.	Warm	Hand	of	History	Bibliotèque	Nationale,	Paris	1937.			 (film	Still)	2008,	Edwina		Photographed	by	Gisèle	Freund.	 	 Ashton.	
	
The	Creature-World	of	Edwina	Ashton	
	 In	May	2012	I	travelled	to	the	capital	of	the	Basque	country,	Vitoria-	Gasteiz,	to	visit	the	exhibition	‘In	the	Belly	of	the	Whale	(Act	III),’	curated	by	Rosie	Cooper	and	Ariella	Yedgar,	at	Montehermoso,	a	centre	for	contemporary	art.	The	title	of	the	group	show	was	given	with	reference	to	Orson	Welle’s	said	habit	to	refer	to	his	theatre	hall	as	the	belly	of	a	whale	–	‘in	which	the	actors	are	unwittingly	trapped’–	and	resonates	with	the	physical	reality	of	the	exhibition	space,	a	former	water-tank	of	the	city.343	The	accompanying	exhibition	text	addresses	the	reader	as	follows:	‘You	have	entered	an	exhibition	concerned	with	rehearsal	and	its	related	notions	of	version,	repetition	and	failure	[…]’.344	Spread	out	over	the	vast,	tall	and	hollow	space	of	the	old	water-tank,	in	and	amongst	the	other	works,	are	five	small	TV	monitors	displaying	looped	video	recordings	of	diverse	creatures	–	performers	dressed	in	elaborate	costumes	made	from	scraps	of	old	fabric	and	make	shift																																																									343	Rosie	Cooper	&	Ariella	Yedgar,	In	the	Belly	of	the	Whale	(Act	III),	(exhibition	information	leaflet),	Vitoria:	Montehermoso	2012,	11.	344	ibid.	
		
156	
everyday	materials	like	old	tongs,	duvets,	scarves	and	jumpers	–	by	the	artist	Edwina	Ashton.	These	creatures	are	each	depicted	in	more	or	less	awkward,	clumsy,	yet	often	exuberant,	frantic	and	at	times	desperate	pursuits	of	futile	tasks	whose	ends	are	infinitely	postponed.	A	stickman	in	a	helpless	hunt	for	a	fly	on	the	window,	its	fragile	stiff	wooden	arms	approaching	it	again	and	again	without	the	slightest	signs	of	impatience	or	adherence	to	a	reality	principle.	Endlessly	pursuing	a	futile	desire,	this	stickman’s	mission	makes	for	an	ambiguous	scene,	both	melancholic	and	hilarious.	A	beetle	caught	up	in	a	mad,	busy,	effortful	and	noisy	activity	without	end	–	frantically	shuffling	a	giant	papier	maché	ball	up	a	narrow	stairway	only	to	immediately	let	it	roll	down	again.	A	chubby	silkworm	sporting	a	tiny	little	brown	hat,	concerned	with	the	construction	of	a	‘Beautiful	Pot.’	With	tentacle	arms	it	tries	to	mould	a	lump	of	clay	that	lies	on	a	table	in	front	of	it.	Seemingly	half-blind,	the	creature	gropes	for	a	ribbon	adjacent	to	the	clay	and	begins	to	clumsily	wrap	it	around	the	lumpy	shape.	A	task	that	proves	most	difficult	yet	is	nevertheless	pursued	awkwardly	with	what,	after	a	while,	perhaps	resembles	an	ambition	that	borders	on	the	desperate.	When	the	action	momentarily	ends	in	failure	–	pot	and	ribbon	fall	to	the	ground	–	the	camera	lingers	for	a	short	while	on	the	helpless	protagonist.	At	this	moment,	whether	audible	or	not,	it	is	as	if	the	creature	gives	off	a	sigh.	A	delicate	moment	of	helpless	frustration	exposes	the	silkworm’s	vulnerability.	However,	soon	enough	the	video	cuts	back	to	its	beginning	and	we	follow	once	more,	amused	yet	not	without	an	awkward	hint	of	pity,	the	renewed	energetic	commitment	to	a	repeated	attempt.		
	
	
	
A	Creaturely	Dimension	of	the	Human	
	 A	fourth	video	of	the	series	depicts	a	creature	more	difficult	to	attribute	to	a	specific	animal	species.	It	has	left	the	domestic	interior	behind	and	ventured	outside,	yet	is	nevertheless	occupied	with	an	
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activity	that	embodies	the	domestic	scene.	Holding	a	bucket	and	mop	it	stands	in	front	of	a	large	rock	face	happily	polishing	without	noticeable	effect	the	rock	in	its	immediate	reach.	Every	so	often	interrupted	by	following	an	airplane	with	its	gaze,	it	seems	not	in	the	least	put	out	by	the	unfathomable	size	of	the	task	that	seemingly	lies	ahead.	The	four	videos’	emphasis	on	domestic	habitats	and	home-making	endeavours	bring	to	mind	another	encounter	with	Ashton’s	world.	In	2011,	on	the	top	floor	flat	of	Arthur	Millwood	Court,	Salford,	SEVEN	SITES,	a	series	of	performances	for	unusual	contexts	and	locations,	curated	by	Laura	Mansfield	and	myself,	launched	with	a	performance	by	Edwina	Ashton.		Upon	arrival,	a	bird-like	creature	in	yellow	and	blue,	equipped	with	turquoise	rollers	for	claws	and	a	beak,	shows	guests	the	way	to	the	lift.	Once	in	the	small	flat	overlooking	the	skyline	of	Manchester,	in	place	of	curator	and	artist,	guests	are	hosted	to	a	shambolic	tea	party	by	five	other	creatures:	a	bear	frantically	at	work	in	the	kitchen,	two	cat-servants	running	around	between	the	guests	–	seeing	to	and	obstructing	their	comfort	in	equal	measure	–	an	immobile	beetle	sat	on	the	couch	tangled	in	wool,	as	well	as	a	caterpillar	busily	cleaning	a	window	from	out	on	the	balcony.		Once	again,	a	clumsy	exuberance	accompanies	these	creature’s	actions	that	distort	[entstellt]	the	realm	of	human	domesticity.	Battenberg	cake	is	served	in	unpredictable	sizes,	speeds	and	manners	to	selected	guests	only,	as	well	as	hidden	or	stored	in	bathroom	cupboards	and	corners	in	equal	measure.	In	the	kitchen,	the	bear	repeatedly	starts	and	stops	to	follow	a	recipe	for	scones,	creating	a	spectacular	mess	with	flower,	water,	pot	and	whisk.	These	playfully	neurotic	domestic	displacements	perhaps	gesture	to	what	more	generally	strikes	me	as	Ashton’s	creatures’	humorous	yet	melancholic	distortions	of	the	orders	of	the	human	and	its	meaning	producing	structures	and	institutions.	Their	clumsiness	displays	itself	as	a	result	of	the	infiltration	of	falling	in	human	action.	It	is	such	regressions	from	human	skill	sets	and	end-oriented	endeavours,	as	well	as	its	assumptions	of	self-identical	mastery	that	bring	forth	a	creaturely	dimension.	Like	Kafka’s	creatures,	these	“animals”	are	only	ever	more	or	less	removed	from	the	continent	of	the	
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human,	as	is	everything	in	Kafka,	Benjamin	says,	including	the	“human	itself”.345	Ashton’s	suggestive	yet	vague	visual	references	to	birds,	cats,	caterpillars	and	beetles	are	not	so	much	anthropomorphised	animals	as	creaturely	humans,	occupying	a	middle	world,	unfinished	and	clumsy.	By	interrupting,	suspending,	distorting	[entstellen]	as	well	as	repeating	the	fragile	remains	of	the	orders	of	“human”	organisation	and	teleology,	they	exhibit	a	creaturely	dimension	that	may	be	both,	sign	of	active	revolt	in	self-experiment	as	well	as	fragile	resilience	in	imposed	positions	of	vulnerable	exposure.					
Fall	from	Redemptive	Horizons:	the	Creature	of	the	Baroque		 Kafka,	Benjamin	notes,	removes	the	traditional	[überkommenen]	supports	of	human	gesture,	‘to	render	it	an	object	of	endless	contemplations’.346	Such	a	process	of	a	passive	loss	or	active	removal	of	inherited	supports	–	schemata	of	meaningful	orders	of	gestures,	words,	things	–	combined	with	an	attitude	of	contemplation	without	end,	is	precisely	the	situation	Benjamin	locates	in	his	analysis	of	the	German	baroque	Trauerspiel	and	the	operation	of	its	allegorical	Tiefblick	[deep	(in)sight].	Within	this	context,	a	historical	scene	that	doubles	as	a	structural	paradigm,	Benjamin	first	introduces	the	concept	of	creature	[Kreatur].		For	Benjamin,	the	baroque’s	paradigmatic	structure	has	to	be	understood	as	a	result	of	a	failure	[Ausfall]	of	eschatology.	The	
Trauerspiel	responds	to	this	failure	by	seeking	to	address	questions	that	have	escaped	theology	after	it	lost	its	privileged	claim	to	interpretation.	In	light	of	the	Reformation,	the	curie’s	organisation	of	redemptive	guarantees	is	rendered	uncertain.	Luther’s	rejection	of	“good	works”	in	favour	of	“faith	alone”	instigates	an	institutional	crisis.	The	failure	of	all																																																									345	Benjamin,	‘Franz	Kafka’,	419-20.	346	ibid,	420.	
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privileged	claims	to	the	social	organisation	of	the	sensible	exposes	isolated	individuals	cut	off	from	one	another	and	the	world.	Life,	no	longer	endowed	with	a	meaning	that	could	surpass	individual	mortality,	increasingly	becomes	engulfed	in	feelings	of	anxiety	and	alienation.	Actions,	severed	from	predictable	ends	become	meaningless,	ephemeral	and	undecidable.	Fragments	of	a	fallen	nature	find	themselves	cut	from	their	teleological	organisation,	exposing	themselves	to	a	radically	unforeseeable	and	uncontrollable	future.	Within	this	context,	the	creature	[die	Kreatur]	describes	a	fallen	humanity	severed	from,	yet	nevertheless	understood	with	reference	to	a	sacred	realm.	Creaturely	life	thus	re-emerges	to	the	degree	that	life	is	no	longer	embedded	within	institutions	that	organise	its	access	to	a	symbolic	order	able	to	raise	it	above	its	fallen	condition.	In	this	structural	paradigm	the	category	of	life	itself	is	split	between	a	creaturely	dimension	of	mere	life	and	its	redemptive	participation	in	a	sacred	symbolic	realm.	Creaturely	life	therefore	describes	the	survival	of	a	fallen	creation	severed	from	access	to	grace.	Nowhere	is	this	split	structure	of	the	human	more	apparent	than	with	regards	to	the	Trauerspiel’s	representation	of	the	sovereign.	‘No	matter	how	high	he	is	enthroned	above	subject	and	state,’	Benjamin	notes,	‘his	rank	is	decided	in	the	world	of	creation.	He	is	the	master	of	creatures,	but	remains	creature	himself’.347	No	longer	able	to	wield,	so	to	speak,	a	decisive	blow,	he	now	marks	the	limit	of	sovereignty	itself.	A	sovereignty,	as	Derrida	puts	it,	which	‘will	always	imply	the	possibility	of…positionality,	…thesis,	…self-thesis,	…autoposition	of	him	who	posits	or	posits	himself	as	ipse,	the	(self-)same,	oneself	‘.348	‘Nothing	teaches	the	fragility	of	the	creature	more	drastically,’	Benjamin	elaborates,	‘than	the	fact	that	even	he	was	overcome	by	it’.349	The	cause	of	his	downfall	cannot	be	found	in	a	particular	moral	offence	but	must	be	explained	through	his	general	position	as	creaturely	human	[Stand	des	kreatürlichen																																																									347	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	65-6.	348	Jacques	Derrida,	The	Beast	and	the	Sovereign	Volume	1	ed.	by	Michel	Lise,	Marie-Louise	Mallet	and	Ginette	Michand,	trans.	By	Geoffrey	Bennington.	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press	2009),	67.	349	Benjamin,	Ursprung,	123.	
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Menschen].350	This	Stand	–	position,	rank,	stance	–	is	at	the	same	time	what	undermines	his	previous	place	at	the	top	of	social	hierarchy.	In	a	perpetual	oscillation	from	power	to	powerlessness,	his	exemplary	self-mastery	unravels	into	sovereign	indecision	and	acts	of	clumsy	non-mastery.	With	the	infiltration	of	falling	in	sovereign	action,	end-directed	demeanours	find	themselves	interrupted.	What	is	left	is	a	more	or	less	anxious	display	of	clumsiness,	acts	of	non-mastery	with	uncontrollable	ends.																		
																																																								350	ibid,	70.	
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		Fig.5.	My	Beautiful	Pot	(film	still),		 				Fig.	6.	Walter	Benjamin,	1937	2008,	Edwina	Ashton.	 	 				Photographed	by	Gisèle	Freund.		
Benjamin	as	Creature	
	 Lisa	Fittko,	who	in	1940	facilitated	Benjamin’s	flight	from	the	Gestapo	across	the	French	Pyrenees,	enters	a	chorus	of	biographical	accounts	that	describe	the	philosophers’	lack	of	physical	prowess.	‘Never,’	she	says,	‘have	I	been	made	so	conscious	of	the	tragic	conflict	between	thought	and	action	in	a	person’.351	Michael	Taussig,	who	relates	Fittko’s	observations	on	Benjamin’s	apparent	lack	of	adaptability,	perceives	such	a	conflict	as			 […]	all	the	more	striking	in	Benjamin’s	case	when	we	consider	how	overwhelmingly	attuned	his	theories	were	to	what	he	himself	called	the	object	world	and	to	mimetic	behaviour,	such	behaviour	being	in	some	regard	the	quintessence	of	what	has	come	to	be	called	“embodied	knowledge”	and	what	I	think	Lisa	Fittko	meant	by	“adaptability.”	“Faut	debroullier,”	she	said,	“one	must	know	how	to	help	oneself,	to	clear	a	way	out	of	the	debacle.”	(…)	Benjamin’s	love	of	modernism,	and	in	particular	of	montage,																																																									351	Michael	Taussig,	Walter	Benjamin’s	Grave.	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press	2006),	11.	
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allegory,	and	fragmentation,	all	would	seem	to	strongly	predispose	one	to	“adaptability,”	meaning	coping	with	new	and	strange	circumstances	[…].	Moreover,	his	letters	and	essays	written	on	Ibiza	in	1932-33	are	glowing	testimony	to	a	love	of	material	culture	and	keen	eye	for	nature.	But	what	does	all	this	add	up	to	if	you	can’t	even	hold	a	cup	of	hot	tea?352		Vulnerably	exposed,	on	his	flight	across	the	mountains,	Benjamin	is	unable	or	else	unwilling	to	adapt.	Perhaps	we	must	read	the	scene	against	the	grain	of	an	assumed	inability	to	cope	with	new	and	strange	circumstances.	Taussig	himself	suggests	as	much	when	he	states	that	it	is	‘as	if	the	lack	of	“adaptability”	had	a	certain	ethical	principle	behind	it,	which	was,	precisely,	not	to	adapt’.353	In	any	case,	Fittko’s	demands	for	mastery,	the	skilled	handling	of	a	hot	cup	of	tea,	are	here	at	odds	with	Benjamin’s	keen	interest	in	a	very	different	sort	of	adaptation.	Adaptability	as	practiced	by	Kafka’s	servants,	for	instance,	who	are	able	to	install	themselves	on	two	old	skirts	on	the	floor	in	the	corner,	paying	heed	to	a	creaturely	dimension	of	non-mastery.			 It	was	their	ambition	to	take	up	as	little	space	as	possible.	They	undertook	to	this	purpose	several	trials	[Versuche],	always	of	course	under	lisps	and	giggles,	crossed	arms	and	legs,	huddled	themselves	together.	At	dawn	one	could	only	see	a	large	bundle	in	their	corner.354			The	assitant’s	decisive	trick	seemingly	lies	in	not	so	readily	striving	for	the	securities	of	mastery	and	Stellung,	but	to	be	able	to	take	up	high-spirited	attitudes	towards	expositions	of	vulnerability.	Benjamin,	albeit	gripped	at	times	by	longings	for	greater	security,	as	well	as	violently																																																									352	ibid.	353	ibid.	354	Benjamin,	‘Franz	Kafka’,	414.	
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driven	to	extreme	forms	of	exile,	for	the	most	part	sought	to	embrace	what	perhaps	can	be	tentatively	called	a	politics	of	the	clumsy.	Viewed	in	this	way,	it	is	precisely	the	clumsy,	awkward,	experimental	postponement	of	the	accomplishment	of	skills	or	goals	that	perhaps	lies	at	the	heart	of	his	thought	on	“embodied	knowledge.”	Benjamin’s	life	and	work	are	testament	to	being	thus	dis-placed,	insecurely,	in	an	ambiguous	attitude	of	vulnerable	exposition	and	hopeful	experiment.	A	not	dissimilar	attitude	can	be	said	to	inform	Ashton’s	creatures’	strange	ambitions.	They	struggle,	clumsily,	for	better	or	worse,	in	high	spirited	yet	vulnerable	pursuits	of	means	with	unfathomable	or	uncontrollable	ends:	a	stickman	in	futile	pursuit	of	a	fly,	a	silkworm	awkwardly	occupied	with	ribbon	and	clay	and	Walter	Benjamin,	on	top	a	mountain,	helplessly	fumbling	with	a	hot	cup	of	tea.	The	Ausweglosigkeit	[hopelessness]	of	the	latter’s	final	predicament	is	the	dark	underside	of	all	of	these	creatures’	high	spirited	hope	and	cunning	to	find	pathways	everywhere.		
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CHAPTER	FOUR	
	
	
Of	Secret	Signals,	Absent	Masters	and	the	Trembling	of	the	
Contours:	Walter	Benjamin,	Yvonne	Rainer	and	the	
Repeatability	of	Gesture.	355	
	
Introduction		 Repetition	relies	on	processes	of	idealisation,	techniques	or	technologies	of	externalisation,	degrees	of	retention	and	spacing,	the	tracing	of	relations	between	past	and	future.	Inextricably	bound	to	the	construction	and	deconstruction	of	habit,	tradition	and	identity,	the	movement	of	repetition	follows	a	task	of	(self-)inheritance	along	chains	of	counter-signatures	as	so	many	re-cognitions,	re-readings,	re-enactments,	re-uses,	re-affirmations,	re-appropriations	and	parodies	of	all	that	remains.	Yet	before	repetition	actually	takes	place,	as	Jacques	Derrida	has	shown,	the	signature	–	paradoxically	singular	performance	of	an	iterable	mark	–	is	always	already	haunted	by	the	possibility	of	“its”	coming	counter-signature,	‘the	time	and	place	of	the	other	time	already	at	work,	altering	from	the	start	the	start	itself,	the	first	time,	the	at	once’.356	To	avow	of	this	virtual	possibility	of	repetition	–	repeatability	–	in	modes	of	radical	performativity,	I	will	argue,	is	to	take	up	an	attitude	[Haltung]	of	non-mastery	in	any	given	context,	or	else,	to	a	being-in-rehearsal.	The	performance	practices	of	Yvonne	Rainer	and	others	at	Judson	Dance	take	an	often	overlooked	interest	in	engaging	with	archival	remains,	developing	‘strategies	for	dancing	yesterday’	by	which	the	live	moment	of	performance	lets	itself	be	haunted	by	an	other,	past	time	and	
																																																								355	The	present	chapter	has	developed	out	of	a	paper	delivered	at	the	interdisciplinary	conference	And	so	on:	On	Repetition	at	Anglia	Ruskin	University,	Cambridge,	30th	November	2013	and	has	subsequently	been	published	in	Eirini	Kartsaki	ed.	On	Repetition:	Writing,	Performance,	Art.	(London:	Intellect	2016).		356	Derrida,	Limited	Inc,	62.	
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place.357	A	not	dissimilar	concern	with	the	recognisability	of	re-enacted	marks	informs	the	theatre	of	Bertolt	Brecht.	In	Walter	Benjamin’s	writings	on	the	latter	an	important	shift	of	emphasis	takes	place:	a	concern	with	the	act	of	repetition	gives	way	to	an	analysis	of	the	structure	of	repeatability	that	conditions	it.	Gestures,	as	the	more	or	less	unique	and	therefore	privileged	repeatable	marks	of	(Epic)	theatre,	are	the	clearly	framed	time	or	movement	fragments	that	stand	still	in	the	interrupted	continuity	of	a	plot	or	the	temporal	unfolding	of	a	performance.	Momentarily	severed	from	the	flow	of	time,	a	minimal	movement	of	spacing	–	time	becoming	space	–	renders	gestures	citable.	As	citable	gestures,	they	begin	to	stand	in	a	fundamental	relationship	to	the	future,	namely,	towards	the	possibility	of	their	repetition	in	other	contexts	to	come.	Such	possible	future	displacements	in	time	and	space	are	bound	to	entail	difference	as	much	as	repetition.	Citable	gestures	virtually	part	with	their	present	context	of	determination	and	begin	to	signal	towards	the	possibility	of	a	future	alterity.	Finding	similar	structures	at	work	in	the	experiments	in	dance	of	Yvonne	Rainer	and	others	at	Judson	Dance,	I	here	seek	to	trace	a	certain	Brechtian	echo	in	the	practices	of	the	latter.	An	echo,	to	be	sure,	which	like	all	echoes,	links	the	movement	of	repetition	to	difference.	Moving	beyond	the	specific	practices	and	discourses	of	Brecht	and	Rainer,	I	further	want	to	suggest	that	perhaps	all	theatrical	practice	rests	on	a	general	structure	of	repeatability,	particularly	when	remaining	close	to	the	process	of	its	assemblage,	namely,	the	rehearsal.	In	a	detailed	reading	of	certain	extracts	from	Benjamin’s	essay	on	a	‘Program	for	a	Proletarian	Children’s	Theatre’	I	finally	pursue	the	theme	of	repeatability,	as	it	has	leapt	from	Brecht	to	Rainer	via	a	shared	concern	with	compositional	devices	of																																																									357	Lambert-Beatty,	51.	I	here	adopt	the	unfortunately	elliptical	phrase	–	‘Yvonne	Rainer	and	others	at	Judson	Dance’	-	for	purely	economical	reasons.	For	a	detailed	documentation	of	the	history	of	this	influential	informal	group	of	Avant-garde	experimentalists	working	in	New	York	during	the	1960s,	taking	account	of	its	many	members	and	diverse	practices,	see	Sally	Banes,	Democracy’s	Body.	(Durham:	Durham	University	Press	1993).		
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interruption	and	citation,	by	rearticulating	it	as	a	politico-pedagogic	attitude	of	radical	performativity.	As	a	movement	of	repetition	that	maintains	a	simultaneous	reference	to	the	past	and	to	the	future,	performance	as	rehearsal	begins	to	describe	an	experimental	attitude	[Haltung]	towards	the	inheritance	of	a	past.	Designating	a	radically	performative	and	provisional	time-space	for	the	experimental	attitudes	of	non-mastery,	the	theatre	as	rehearsal	turns	out	to	be	the	paradigmatic	context	of	education:	an	uncertain	locality,	where	knowledge	never	quite	settles	nor	performatives	ever	quite	take	(their)	place.358																																																									358	A	brief	clarification	of	the	terms	performance,	performative	and	radical	performative	is	perhaps	here	due.	In	the	first	place,	as	will	become	sufficiently	clear	in	the	latter	part	of	the	chapter,	‘performance’	should	be	understood	as	what	has	traditionally	been	opposed	to	the	rehearsal	as	end	product	but	can	be	strictly	speaking	so	no	longer.	The	word	that	Benjamin	uses	in	the	German	is	Aufführung,	a	presentation	on	the	raised	platform	of	the	stage,	which,	contrary	to	the	English	
performance,	has	little	resonance	with	what	contemporary	theory	designates	as	performativity	nor	what	in	Performance	and	Theatre	Studies	seeks	to	differentiate	more	or	less	successfully,	performance	from	theatre.	This	latter	distinction	or	debate	has	little	import	here.	In	fact,	a	politics	of	rehearsal	as	an	attitude	of	the	radically	performative	is	in	no	way	bound	to	the	institutions	of	the	theatre	and	its	derivatives,	which	are	here	merely	taken	as	paradigmatic.	Finally,	references	to	the	word	performativity	and	‘the	performative’	seek	to	signal	towards	contemporary	concerns	with	non-essential,	process	oriented	subject	formations,	whilst	being	rooted	in	J.L.	Austin’s	opposition	of	the	performative	and	the	constative	(speech	act).	Following	Jacques	Derrida’s	critique	of	Austin,	I	seek	to	furthermore	differentiate	‘the	performative’	–	an	utterance	or	action	that	holds	out	for	the	success	of	its	effective	occurrence	within	a	saturated	context	–	with	a	certain	beyond	of	the	performative,	that	is,	a	gesture	that	already	distances	itself	from	itself	and	the	certainties	of	its	own	taking	place	within	a	given	context	by	the	use	of	the	superlative	‘radical’.	The	theatre	is,	of	course,	already	in	Austin’s	own	analysis,	a	paradigmatic	context	for	the	failure	of	the	performative.	It	is	precisely	the	reevaluation	of	this	failure	that	is	at	stake	here.	Radical	performativity	eschews	the	order	of	the	“I	can”	and	of	mastery,	as	well	as	the	ontological	assumption	they	are	founded	upon.	A	performativity	beyond	the	performative,	as	Derrida	fittingly	puts	it,	‘punctures	the	horizon,	interrupting	any	performative	organization,	any	convention,	or	any	context	that	can	be	dominated	by	a	conventionality’.	[Derrida,	‘The	University	Without	Condition’	in	Without	Alibi	ed.	&	trans	by	Peggy	Kamuf,	202-237.	(Stanford:	Standford	University	Press	2002),	244,	my	emphasis].	For	Derrida’s	incisive	reading	of	J.L.	Austin	see	‘Signature,	Event,	Context’	and	Limited	Inc.	For	his	reflections	on	non-
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The	Kaiserpanorama		 In	a	small	text	of	his	collection	of	childhood	reflections	Berlin	
Childhood	around	1900,	Walter	Benjamin,	when	relating	his	memory	of	the	Kaiserpanorama	–	an	elaborate	early	stereoscopic	picture-display	of	mostly	foreign	landscape	scenes	–	describes	an	auditory	effect	of	an	interfering	kind,	which	to	him	seems	nevertheless	superior	to	the	later	developments	of	the	phoney	magic	of	musical	accompaniment	of	similar	image-scenes	on	a	filmstrip.	‘It	was	the	ringing	of	a	bell,’	he	says,	‘for	a	few	seconds	before	the	image	joltingly	disappeared,	to	give	to	view,	at	first	a	gap	and	then	a	new	one’.359	Upon	hearing	it	ring,	Benjamin	remembers,	a	melancholy	mood	of	departure	saturated	each	image.	In	those	brief	moments,	realising	that	it	would	be	impossible	to	exhaust	the	‘glory’	of	the	image	in	one	sitting	alone,	a	resolution	was	made,	albeit	never	followed	up,	that	is,	to	come	again	the	next	day.360			 The	structure	of	interruption	and	the	rhythm	of	a	jolting	dis-continuity	runs	throughout	Benjamin’s	vehemently	anti-progressivist	thought	on	time	and	history,	leaping	across	a	wide	variety	of	contexts	encompassing	diverse	periods	and	media.	Whether	describing	the	baroque	mourning	play’s	fixation	of	the	dramatic	plot	to	the	stilled	time-space	of	the	midnight	hour,	the	interruptions	of	plot	and	movement	in	Bertolt	Brecht’s	Epic	Theatre,	the	jolts	and	jerks	of	the	montage	technique	of	early	filmstrips,	or	the	manifold	images	of	a	revolutionary	cessation	of	happening	–	the	shooting	of	the	clock	towers,	the	pulling	of	the	emergency	breaks	–	that	run	throughout	his	famous	thesis	‘On	the	Concept	of	History’,	it	is	always	a	momentary	hault	of	continuity	that	opens	up	a	gap,	a	time-space	[Zeitraum]	and	a	time	becoming	space,	suspended	at	the	joints	of	a	temporal	flow	rendered	discontinuous.		
																																																																																																																																															masterable	performativity	in	the	context	of	education	see	‘The	University	Without	Condition’.	359	Benjamin,	Einbahnstraße,	81.	360	ibid,	82.	
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	 In	the	memory	of	the	Kaiserpanorama	as	elsewhere,	a	rhythm	of	interruption	and	discontinuity	finds	itself	linked	to	the	possibility	and	desire	for	repetition	to	take	place.	As	if	interruption	first	renders	repetition	contemplatable.	The	fact	that	it	is	never	followed	up	in	actuality	does	not	prevent	this	virtuality	from	actually	affecting	the	status	of	what	here	stands	exposed	and	suspended	in	time	under	the	blare	of	a	ringing	bell.	Inexhaustible	in	a	singular	viewing	that	no	longer	happens	quite	simply	once	and	for	all,	the	interrupted	and	suspended	temporal	experience	resists	the	linear	sublation	of	the	flow	of	a	present.	Unable	to	master	his	experience	of	the	image	in	a	single	viewing,	yet	knowing	of	its	imminent	departure	following	the	ringing	of	the	bell,	the	young	Benjamin	seemingly	does	not	want	to	surrender	it	to	the	oblivion	of	a	continuous	flow,	nor	the	simple	memory-trace	of	an	absent	present.	Instead,	he	keeps	the	image	in	reserve	by	arranging	with	it	a	future	rendez-vouz,	in	a	movement	that	is	to	supplant	the	melancholic	backward	looking	glance	of	recollection	with	the	spectral	sending	of	a	remembering	ahead.		Given	the	incompletion	of	the	interrupted	experience,	a	desire	for	repetition	can	no	longer	hope	for	the	simple	return	of	the	same.	As	the	time-space	of	spectatorship	affected	by	this	desire	is	already	split,	that	is,	impossible	to	master	or	exhaust	in	a	single	viewing,	deferred	and	sent	forth,	stretched	towards	the	possibility	of	a	future	return,	its	repetition	to-come	implies	a	necessary	alterity.	In	this	strangely	deferred,	stretched	and	non-localizable	time-space	that	opens	up	with	the	interruptive	ringing	of	a	bell,	a	melancholy	mood	of	departure	mixes	with	the	non-teleological	hope	of	a	performative	resolution	to	repeat.	The	young	Benjamin	seemingly	seeks	to	simultaneously	say	farewell	to	what	has	never	quite	arrived,	whilst	welcoming	the	deferred	possibility	of	“its”	return	in	a	repetition	that	paradoxically	is	bound	to	be	otherwise.		 Read	in	this	way,	the	childhood	memory	of	the	Kaiserpanorama	inserts	itself	into	a	series	of	other	texts	and	contexts	of	Benjamin’s	work,	which	repeat	otherwise	the	theme	of	a	structure	and	attitude	of	
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repeatability:	the	affirmation	of	a	constitutive	possibility	of	the	differing	return	of	marks,	split	in	their	origin,	in	other	contexts	to-come.	For	Benjamin,	such	a	possibility	never	merely	befalls	the	mark	accidentaly	from	an	outside,	but	pertains	to	it	structurally,	affecting	it	beyond	the	traditional	oppositions	of	possibility	and	realisation,	the	virtual	and	the	actual.	In	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	Samuel	Weber	discerns	this	thought	of	a	structural	possibility	of	alterity	that	affects	identity	in	its	“origin”	in	Benjamin’s	recurrent	nominalization	of	verbs	by	the	suffix	-ability	when	formulating	many	of	his	most	significant	concepts.	Reading	several	of	the	diverse	contexts	of	their	appearance,	Weber	dwells,	for	instance,	on	Benjamin’s	conception	of	the	structural	impartability,	criticisability,	translatability,	reproducability	or	readability	of	marks	and	the	structural	effects	the	‘-ability’	has	on	their	identity.361	One	such	context	constitutes	Benjamin’s	writings	on	Bertolt	Brecht’s	Epic	Theatre.	In	Benjamin’s	reading	of	Brecht,	a	concern	with	the	production	of	gestures	as	clearly	rendered	in	their	citability	becomes	central.	Not	unlike	the	disruptive	ringing	of	a	bell	in	the	Kaiserpanorama,	Epic	Theatre’s	gestures,	as	Benjamin	discerns,	are	rendered	citable	by	an	interruption	that	halts	the	forward	thrust	of	continuous	movement.	Severed	from	the	telos	of	the	plot,	the	gesture	stands	still	and	momentarily	exposed	before	an	audience,	signalling	towards	the	possibility	of	“its”	differing	(re-)inscription	in	other	contexts,	whether	past	or	to	come.	Virtually	parting	with	“itself”	and	its	present	context	of	determination,	the	stilled	pose	of	the	gesture	is	put	into	motion	by	the	structural	pull	of	its	citability.	The	possibility	of	this	movement	–	citation	comes	from	citare,	“to	put	in	motion”	–	links	repeatability	to	an	alterity	always	already	inscribed	in	every	so	called	“first	time,”	affecting	the	gesture	in	the	very	now	of	its	occurence.362	
																																																								361	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	4.	362	The	virtual	spatio-temporality	here	discerned	with	recourse	to	Weber’s	reading	of	Benjaminian	–abilities	structurally	resembles	the	logic	of	Jacques	Derrida’s	notion	of	“iterability.”	Weber’s	reading	of	Benjamin,	as	his	Introduction	states,	is	in	part	inspired	by	the	work	of	
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Two	Times	out	of	Joint:	Yvonne	Rainer	and	Bertolt	Brecht		 In	her	book	Being	Watched	–	Yvonne	Rainer	and	the	1960s,	Carrie	Lambert-Beatty	makes	several	if	sparse	references	to	Bertolt	Brecht,	indicating	a	certain	echo	across	the	centuries	between	two	seemingly	so	diverse	practitioners:	one	often	associated	with	the	modernist	efforts	of	a	new	political	theatre	during	the	last	throes	of	the	Weimar	Republic	and	beyond,	the	other	with	a	budding	minimalism	of	an	increasingly	interdisciplinary	US	Neo-Avant-garde	art	scene	during	the	1960s	and	the	imminence	of	postmodern	dance.	Yet	Lambert-Beatty	relates	Rainer’s	own	expression	of	an	awareness	at	re-inscribing	a	Brechtian	reworking	of	the	Aristotelian	conception	of	drama,	not	as	reference	to	a	past	moment	in	a	linear	art	historical	narrative,	but	as	the	unfinished	business	of	a	persisting	problematic	of	the	temporal	experience	of	spectatorship.			 Theatre	is	still	based	on	–	and		people	still	go	to	the	theatre	with	–	the	old	Aristotelian	notions.	If	not	actual	catharsis	or	purging	thru	fear	and	terror,	it	is	a	“loosing	of	oneself”	that	one	is	supposed	to	experience.	One	judges	a	theatrical	event	according	to	the	degree	to	which	one	became	“involved”	with	it.	Yes	I	know	all	about	Brecht	&	alienation	[….]	and	how	they	have	supposedly	changed	all	that.	But	it	just	ain’t	so.	Theatre	is	as	concerned	as	it	ever	was	with	magic,	transformations,	transcendencies,	if	not	outright	ascendancies	and	various	&	sundrie	[sic]	forms	of	seduction	to	assure	the	“drawing	in”	of	the	spectator.363		Rainer’s	links	to	the	experiments	of	neo-Brechtianism,	however,	go	far	beyond	her	own	identification	with	the	general	aims	of	hindering	a	spectator’s	involvement,	his	or	her	being	drawn	into	and	along	with	the	linear	flow	of	events,	to	include	some	of	the	very	devices	with	which																																																																																																																																																Derrida,	which	for	him	‘has	always	been	profoundly	related	to	Benjamin’s	writings’	[Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	4].	363	Lambert-Beatty,	119.	
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Brecht	sought	to	allow	for	a	more	relaxed	and	distanced	viewing	position.	For	instance,	when	examining	the	effects	repetition	may	have	on	the	viewer	of	Rainer’s	work,	Lambert-Beatty	makes	the	following	brief	recourse	to	the	discourse	of	Brecht.	‘Thirty	years	before,’	she	writes,		 Bertolt	Brecht	had	written	of	his	attempts	to	replace	the	singular	flow	of	drama	that	“carried	away”	the	spectator	with	something	more	like	the	looping	temporal	experience	of	reading	and	rereading.	The	sequential	repetitions	in	the	work	of	Rainer	and	others	at	Judson	are	very	much	in	this	spirit,	as	if	they	thought	dance	viewers,	like	Brecht’s	theatre-goers,	should	be	provided	some	version	of	“footnotes,	and	the	habit	of	turning	back	in	order	to	check	a	point.”	In	1965	Rainer	wrote	of	her	dance	Parts	of	Some	
Sextets	that	moments	of	repetition	made	“the	eye	jump	back	and	forth	in	time.”364		Although	Lambert-Beatty	does	not	further	pursue	the	suggested	analogies	between	Brecht	and	Rainer,	between	footnotes	and	‘some	version	of	“footnotes,”’	on	closer	inspection,	‘versions	of	“footnotes”’	in	both	Rainer	and	Brecht	take	on	very	similar	shapes	and	structures.	As	footnotes	function	in	a	written	text,	they	interrupt	and	cut	into	the	continuous	flow	of	linearity.	Whereas	the	status	of	a	literary	footnote	is	already	uncertain,	belonging	both	to	the	inside	and	outside	of	the	body	of	a	text,	these	‘versions	of	“footnotes”’	inserted	into	the	temporal	unfolding	of	the	performance	intensify	the	experience	of	a	split	in	time,	that	is,	of	being	in	more	than	one	place	at	the	same	time.	Leaving	to	one	side	for	now	the	stakes	of	such	an	onto-	or	hauntological	split	in	the	temporal	experience	of	‘versions	of	“footnotes,”’	it	is	clear	that	what	resembles	the	effect	of	footnotes	for	Rainer,	according	to	Lambert-Beatty,	is	a	particular	use	of	the	techniques	of	interruption,	repetition	and	discontinuity.	In	fact,	Rainer’s	self-proclaimed	consistent	engagement	with	the	interruption	of	linearity	qua	repetition	perhaps	repeats,	much	more	literally	than																																																									364	ibid,	63.	
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Lambert-Beatty	suggests,	a	Brechtian	concern	with	temporal	discontinuity.	As	Rainer	writes	in	her	own	retrospective	notes	on	Parts	of	
Some	Sextets:		 It	was	clear	to	me	that	there	must	not	be	a	flowing	or	developmental	type	of	progression	in	the	action,	but	rather	
whatever	changes	were	to	take	place	must	be	as	abrupt	and	jagged	
as	possible	occurring	at	regular	intervals.	So	I	resorted	to	two	devices	that	I	have	used	consistently	since	my	earliest	dances:	
repetition	and	interruption.	In	the	context	of	this	new	piece,	both	factors	were	to	produce	a	“chunky”	continuity,	repetition	making	
the	eye	jump	back	and	forth	in	time	[…].365		Walter	Benjamin’s	writings	on	Epic	Theatre	reveal	striking	similarities	to	Rainer’s	discourse.	Benjamin	describes	the	essential	accomplishment	of	Brecht’s	experiments	as	that	of	rendering	gestures	citable.	He	arrives	at	this	achievement	precisely	through	the	devices	of	repetition	and	interruption.	In	the	first	place,	gestures	appear	as	the	result	of	interruptions.	What	is	interrupted	is	theatre’s	temporal	flow,	the	end-oriented	continuities	of	plot,	action	and	movement,	which	are	spliced	into	clearly	framed	–	perhaps	what	Rainer	calls	‘jagged’	–	elements.	The	fact	that	temporal	fluidity	cannot	be	brought	to	a	halt	entirely	necessitates	the	reinsertion	of	each	framed	element	into	the	temporal	flux	to	create	a	“chunky”	continuity,	to	use	Rainer’s	words,	or,	following	Benjamin,	one	that	moves	in	jolts	and	jerks,	not	unlike	the	images	of	a	filmstrip.	At	its	largest	point	of	framing,	Epic	Theatre	is	divided	into	several	parts	interrupted	by	regular	intervals,	making	the	clearly	demarcated	situations	of	the	play	clash,	as	Benjamin	puts	it,	in	a	state	of	shock.366	Through	the	more	minute	interruptions	and	self-interruptions	of	each	action	and	actor,	the	clearly	framed	gesture-fragment	becomes																																																									365	Yvonne	Rainer,	‘Some	Retrospective	Notes	on	a	Dance	for	10	People	and	12	Mattresses	Called	“Parts	of	Some	Sextets.”’	The	Tulane	Drama	
Review.	10/2	(1965),	172	(my	emphasis).	366	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater?	(2),	29.		
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subjected	to	repetitions	that,	not	unlike	Rainer’s	use	of	such	techniques,	makes	the	eye	jump	back	and	forth	in	time.	‘One	and	the	same	[gesture],’	Benjamin	says,	‘summons	Galy	Gay	to	the	wall,	first	to	have	his	clothes	changed,	and	then	again	to	be	shot.	One	and	the	same	[gesture]	gets	him	to	renounce	the	fish	and	to	accept	the	elephant”’.367	Here,	‘“[o]ne	and	the	same”’,	as	Samuel	Weber	observes,	‘is	precisely	what	the	citable	gesture	both	situates	and	unhinges	in	an	instant	that	does	not	come	full	circle	[….]’.368	Such	unhinging	in	and	of	the	instant	renders	the	time	of	its	occurrence	out	of	joint.	Like	the	uncertain	spatio-temporal	status	of	the	footnote,	the	gesture	is	always	in	more	than	one	place	at	once	and	thus	never	fully	contemporaneous	with	itself,	never	fully	present	to	itself.	Its	performance	has	always	already	departed	from	its	present	context	of	determination	by	gesturing	from	or	towards	another,	whether	that	of	a	previous	occurrence	or	a	possible	future	one	to	come.	This	in	turn	implies	that	the	context	of	determination	can	never	be	saturated	and	mastered	in	a	single	viewing,	as	it	is	always	already	split,	its	time	out	of	joint,	stretched	between	at	least	more	than	one	place	and	time,	at	the	same	time.					
Remembering	Ahead		 Beyond	its	actual	use	as	a	compositional	device	in	the	time-structure	of	the	performance,	repetition,	in	both	Rainer	and	Brecht,	furthermore	exceeds	the	spatio-temporal	confines	of	the	event	itself.	For	instance,	as	Benjamin	states	with	regards	to	Epic	Theatre,	even	before	repetition	occurs	during	the	performance	as	such,	Brecht’s	endeavour	to	rid	the	stage	of	its	narrative	sensations	always	already	seeks	to	alienate	the	plot	from	a	simple	self-presence	by	doubling	a	more	or	less	
																																																								367	ibid,	p.20	&	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	109.	368	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	109-10.	
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recognisable	past.369	Before	being	repeated	on	stage,	gestures	largely	occur	already	as	citations	for	the	first	time.	Similar	strategies	of	citation	inform	the	movement	vocabularies	of	Yvonne	Rainer	and	others	at	Judson	Dance,	in	which	specific	gestures	more	or	less	recognisably	embody	a	historiographic	mark,	distancing	the	viewer	from	its	present	re-inscription.		Lambert-Beatty	attends	to	these	perhaps	often	neglected	aspects	of	the	work	of	Judson	Dance	in	the	context	of	a	more	general	endeavour	to	wrest	its	analysis	from	any	quick	recourse	to	the	discourses	on	liveness,	immediacy,	co-presence	and	lived	experience	circulating	in	the	1960s,	as	well	as	from	later	performance	theories	of	evanescence-as-dissent.		Paying	close	attention	to	the	historiographic	aspects	of	these	works,	her	analysis	of	the	use	of	repetition	begins	to	take	account	of	its	citational	elements.	‘[S]tillness	meant	quotation,’	Lambert-Beatty	relates.	‘Poses	not	only	arrested	onstage	action,	but	also	embodied	a	previous,	photographic	stoppage	[…]’.370	Through	its	citational	and	mnemic	modes	of	performance,	a	proclivity	for	still	poses,	photo-derived	and	photo-like	positioning	–	what	Lambert-Beatty	calls	‘strategies	for	dancing	yesterday’	–	Rainer’s	work	thus	avoids	simply	landing	on	either	side	of	a	dichotomy	of	lived	experience	and	historiographic	trace.371	For	Lambert-Beatty,																																																									369	Benjamin,	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater?	(2)’,	23.	370	Lambert-Beatty,	p.48.	371	ibid,	p.51.	For	an	excellent	troubling	of	the	binary	conception	of	the	photograph	and	performance	see	Rebecca	Schneider’s	chapter	‘Still	living’	in	Performing	Remains.	Schneider	considers	what	she	calls	‘the	liveness	of	death’	or	the	‘livingness	of	passing,’	that	is,	the	photograph	‘not	only	as	record,	but	also	as	durational	event	–	ongoing	through	the	circulatory	aspects	of	[…]	call	and	response’.	[Rebecca	Schneider,	
Performing	Remains.	Art	and	War	in	Times	of	Theatrical	Reenactmanet.	(London	&	New	York:	Routledge	2011),	140].	Yet	beyond	a	concern	with	the	living-on	or	survival	of	photographic	stills	in	contradistinction	to	‘long-standing	assumptions	that	photography	offers	thanatical	“evidence”	of	a	time	considered,	in	linear	temporal	logic,	irretrievable,’	Schneider	further	traces	an	often	forgotten	prehistory,	as	she	puts	it,	of	photography	located	in	the	“living	still”	[ibid,	138	-140]:	‘Clearly	there	are	other	technologies	of	the	still	that	are	reconstituted	(reenacted)	in	the	scene	of	photography	by	which	a	viewer	is	arrested	in	the	arrest	of	the	image	–	technologies	of	the	live,	such	as	tableaux	vivants	[...].	Are	
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these	tendencies	of	the	work	are	evidence	of	a	wider	epistemological	scepticism	and	anxiety	that	can	be	found	in	many	other	works	of	the	period.	Driven	by	a	questioning	of	available	epistemologies	for	experiencing	the	live,	these	works,	far	from	displaying	a	simple	faith	in	the	unmediated	access	to	the	event	qua	co-presence,	proximity	and	participation,	complicate	all	binary	conceptions	of	the	live	and	the	mediated.	Nowhere,	however,	Lambert-Beatty	stresses,	is	‘the	tension	between	singular,	embodied	experience	and	something	else	–	which	is	to																																																																																																																																																these	not	in	some	ways	“technologies”	of	image	capture?	Reflecting	on	the	legacy	of	living	stills,	and	the	relation	of	the	pose	to	the	scene	and	its	frame,	we	might	ask	in	what	ways	photography	inherits	(rather	than	invents)	the	still,	and	in	that	way	ask	in	what	ways	photography	can	be	considered	another	among	a	great	many	technologies	of	the	live’	[ibid,	140-1].		For	Schneider,	both	photography	and	performance	‘participate	in	the	ambivalent	gesture	of	the	time-lag’.	Following	this	troubling	of	the	binaries	of	life	and	death,	performance	and	document,	with	recourse	to	the	“technology”	of	the	‘living	still,’	Schneider	further	reveals	an	interest	in	the	latter’s	(possible)	chains	of	repetition	that	is	of	great	relevance	here	in	the	context	of	a	conception	of	‘remembering	ahead.’	She	links	the	‘posture’	of	the	‘gesture	of	the	time-lag’	to	‘a	wobbly	course’	of	repetition	(sameness	and	difference)	that	‘basic	citationality	affords’	[ibid,	143].	Without	explicit	recourse	to	Derrida	or	Benjamin	and	albeit	perhaps	with	an	emphasis	on	the	cross-temporal	moments	of	actual	“encounter”	over	the	haunting	of	future	possibilities	that	the	still	affords	in	its	citability,	Schneider	nevertheless	clearly	considers	the	latter’s	pose	as	‘call’	or	‘hail’	(her	loose	reference	here	is	Althusser’s	‘reverberatory	mechanics	of	interpellation’):	‘If	the	pose,	or	even	the	accident	captured	as	snapshot,	is	a	kind	of	hail	cast	into	a	future	moment	of	its	invited	recognition,	then	can	that	gestic	call	in	its	stilled	articulation	be	considered,	somehow	live?	Or,	at	least,	re-live?	Can	we	think	of	the	still	not	as	an	artifact	of	non-returning	time,	but	as	situated	in	a	live	moment	of	its	encounter	that	it,	through	its	articulation	as	gesture	or	hail,	predicts?	This	is	to	ask:	is	the	stilled	image	a	call	toward	a	future	live	moment	when	the	image	will	be	re-encountered,	perhaps	as	an	invitation	to	response?	And	if	so,	is	it	not	live	–	taking	place	in	time	in	the	scene	of	its	reception?	Is	it	time	deferred,	finding	its	liveness	in	the	time-lag,	the	temporal	drag,	“in	your	hands”	at	the	moment	of	its	encounter?’	The	gesture	of	temporal	drag,	whether	performed	in-time	or	caught	by	the	camera	as	out-of-time,	Schneider	suggests,	allows	for	a	‘complicated	leakage	of	the	live	(and	the	remain)	across	seemingly	discrete	moments’,	‘troubling	the	distinction	between	live	arts	and	the	still	arts	to	which	we	have	been	habituated,’	and	facilitating	therewith	what	she	calls	the	‘inter(in)animation’	of	the	animate	and	inanimate,	life	and	death,	remaining	and	disappearing	that	is	‘ongoing	by	passing	on’	[ibid,	140-142,	145	&	147].		
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say,	the	lived,	live	art	experience	as	a	problem’	more	evident	than	in	the	history	of	Judson	Dance.372	It	is	precisely	here,	then		–	but	where,	precisely?	–	in	the	tension	resulting	from	a	stretching	between	the	singularity	of	an	‘embodied’	experience	and	‘something	else,’	or	indeed	somewhere	and	sometime	else,	some	other	place	and	time	in(stead	of)	the	first,	that	the	structures	of	citation	and	citability	begin	to	undermine	mastery	over	a	simple	present.	Techniques	and	devices	such	as	stilling,	quotation	and	repetition	highlight	the	persistence	of	a	past	that	signals	in	the	time	of	the	present,	haunted	by	its	more	or	less	uncanny	returns.	Yet	beyond	such	doublings	of	times	and	places,	the	spectrality	of	this	structural	scenario	implicates	at	least	another	place	and	time.	For	in	their	clearly	framed	stillness,	citational	gestures	find	themselves	always	already	affected	by	their	own	citability.	Adhering	thus	to	a	spectral	logic	of	inheritance	turned	toward	the	future	no	less	than	the	past,	citational	gestures	are	always	already	held	in	virtual	suspense	and	tension,	stretched,	not	only	towards	the	previous	context	of	the	repeated	mark,	but	the	possibility	of	its	future	repetition	in	another	context	to	come.	In	Benjamin’s	analysis	of	Epic	Theatre,	the	relationship	of	the	performance	to	its	historiographic	source	takes	on	precisely	such	an	emphasis.	Benjamin	calls	gestures	the	prepared	raw	material	of	Epic	Theatre	that	the	latter	puts	to	use.	Each	gesture,	Benjamin	insists,	must	be	more	or	less	compatible	with	the	contemporary	field	of	gestural	possibilities.	If	historical,	gestures	must	belong	to	a	vocabulary	that	it	is	possible	for	contemporary	men	to	execute.	In	other	words,	imitated	gestures	must	themselves	be	imitable.	Imitated	gestures	are	worthless,	Benjamin	says,	unless	it	is	precisely	their	gestural	process	of	imitation	that	is	at	issue.373	These	gestures	are	never	mere	repetitions,	but	reckon	with	and	expose	their	own	repeatability.	Rather	than	re-presenting,	they	repeat,	in	Kierkegaard’s	sense	of	the	word,	by	‘remembering	ahead’.	For,	as	Kierkegaard	suggests,	‘[r]epetition	and	remembrance	are	one	and	the																																																									372	Lambert-Beatty,	36	(my	emphasis).	373	Benjamin,	‘Studien	zur	Theorie	des	epischen	Theaters’,	Versuche	über	
Brecht,	31-33.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag),	31.	
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same	movement	but	in	opposed	directions,	for	that	which	is	remembered	has	been:	it	is	repetition	in	reverse;	whereas	repetition	in	the	proper	sense	is	remembering	ahead’.374		
	
	
	
Towards	an	Attitude	of	Rehearsal		 Without	wanting	to	reduce	the	importance	of	an	analysis	of	specific	citational	performance	practices	in	Judson	Dance	or	more	contemporary	performance	practices	in	its	wake	–	and	here	I	am	particularly	thinking	of	Chicago	based	performance	companies	Goat	Island	(1988	–	2009)	and	Every	house	has	a	door	–	I	would	like	to	suggest	that	perhaps	all	performance	structurally	rests	on	the	hauntological	split	of	a	remembering	ahead.	Particularly,	that	is,	when	performance,	in	whatever	way,	no	longer	seeks	to	fully	separate	itself	as	end	product,	accomplishment	or	realisation	from	its	process	of	assemblage,	that	is,	its	rehearsal.	For,	as	Samuel	Weber	points	out	in	recalling	the	Kierkegaardian	definition	of	repetition,	the	theatrical	repetition	implied	by	the	word	rehearsal	involves	something	far	more	paradoxical	than	merely	recalling	the	past.		 Repetition	–	which	in	turn	implies	a	certain	memory	just	as	memory	for	its	part	entails	a	movement	of	repetition	–	is	still	not	simply	the	more	or	less	symmetrical	inversion	of	memory.	For	“remembering	ahead”,	as	Kierkegaard	writes,	involves	something	far	more	paradoxical	than	merely	recalling	the	past.	As	potentiality	and	possibility	of	the	future,	remembering	“ahead”	opens	the	way	to	the	return	of	what	has	never	been	present	as	such	and	which	therefore,	in	a	certain	sense,	remains	ever	yet	to																																																									374	Samuel	Weber,	‘Upping	the	Ante:	Deconstruction	as	Parodic	Practice’	in	Deconstruction	is/in	America.	ed.	by	Anselm	Haverkamp,	60-77.	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press	1995),	63.	
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come.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	French	word,	repetition,	maintains	this	simultaneous	reference	to	the	past	and	to	the	future	–	as	does	the	English	word,	rehearsal.	To	rehearse	a	play,	for	instance,	entails	more	than	the	mere	reproduction	in	the	present	of	something	that	is	past,	once	and	for	all.375			In	Benjamin’s	analysis	of	Epic	theatre,	the	repeatability	of	citable	gestures	similarly	defies	a	conception	of	repetition	as	mere	recollection.	Here	as	elsewhere,	when	concerned	with	questions	of	temporality	and	historicity,	Benjamin	insists	on	the	inscribed	possibility	of	future	alterities	in	every	mark.	The	repeatability	of	a	stilled	and	clearly	framed	instant,	a	spatialised	time-fragment,	cut	or	blasted	out	of	the	continuum,	begins	to	signal	towards	such	virtual	alterities,	splitting	the	mark	in	its	“identity”	from	the	start,	not	dependent	on	its	actual	repetition.	In	the	suspended	gap	that	opens	qua	interruption,	time	unhinges	and	finds	itself	doubly	out	of	joint.	Not	only	consisting	of	the	spectral	return	of	a	past	signalling	in	the	present,	but	reckoning	with	the	virtual	spectrality	of	the	present	“itself,”	singularly	extended.		A	time-fragment	that	‘only	“is”	in	its	possibility	of	becoming	other,	of	being	transported	elsewhere’.376				
The	Trembling	of	the	Contours		 Everything	here	seemingly	revolves	around	the	various	tensions	that	spring	from	a	series	of	stretching	exercises.	Exercises,	for	instance,	as	those	by	which	Benjamin	figures	Brecht’s	attitude	towards	the	plot,	to	which	‘his	theatre	relates	[…]	the	way	a	ballet	teacher	to	a	pupil,’	as	he	puts	it,	‘his	primary	task	[…]	to	loosen	up	her	articulations	to	the	limit	of	
																																																								375	ibid.	376	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	103.	
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the	possible’.377	Everything	revolves	around	issues	of	spacing	and	stretching	to	the	point	of	unhinging	the	joints	of	bodies	and	their	movement	through	time	and	space.	The	actor	of	Epic	Theatre,	Benjamin	insists,	must	be	able	to	block	out	his	gesticulations	as	a	typesetter	his	words.378	Such	blocking,	on	the	level	of	the	scene,	produced	by	the	insistent	interruptions	of	the	plot,	helps	to	reveal	what	Benjamin	calls	a	
Zustand,	the	fixed	state,	stance	or	condition	marked	by	the	relational	syllable	of	a	towards	[zu-],	literally,	a	standing-towards.	Zustände	are	stilled	image-scenes	or	frozen	tableauxs	marked	by	the	inner	split	of	a	spatio-temporal	instant	gesturing	towards	some	other	place	and	time.	Cut	off	from	the	continuum	of	linearity,	the	Zustand	no	longer	awaits	its	future	resolution	in	the	drama,	the	more	or	less	seamless	passing	of	a	plot	towards	its	final	conclusion,	but	finds	itself	momentarily	interrupted	and	suspended,	as	if	by	the	blare	of	a	ringing	bell,	before	joltingly	disappearing,	not	unlike	the	images	of	the	Kaiserpanorama,	‘to	give	to	view,	at	first	a	gap	and	then	a	new	one’.379	Fixed	yet	stretched	between	
																																																								377	Benjamin,	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater?	(2)’,	23.	378	ibid,	27.	379	Benjamin,	Einbahnstraße,	81.	In	the	Aristotelian	conception	of	drama,	to	be	sure,	the	plot	moves	far	from	simply	seamlessly	towards	its	conclusion.	Instead,	it	finds	itself	interrupted	at	a	single	point	by	a	sudden	turn	of	events:	peripeteia.	A	“reversal”	that	nevertheless	has	its	key	function	in	preparing	the	way	for	the	recognition	of	the	underlying	unity	of	the	plot.	In	this	regard,	as	Samuel	Weber	has	pointed	out,	Brecht	and	Benjamin	repeat	otherwise	the	inheritance	of	an	Aristotelian	tradition.	Here,	the	dialectic	tension	of	a	sudden	‘reversal’	and	the	power	of	the	negative	no	longer	sublate	into	a	final	synthesis,	but	find	themselves	suspended	at	a	standstill.	The	drama	is	no	longer	interrupted	at	a	single	point	or	joint	but	virtually	at	all	of	them.	Weber	relates	this	dialectic	tension	once	again	back	to	the	motif	of	a	certain	stretching:	‘The	“stretching	exercises”	of	the	ballet	pupil	thus	become	a	model	for	the	stretching	of	dramatic	action	in	Epic	theatre;	such	stretching,	Benjamin	adds,	is	intended	to	reveal	the	articulations	that	structure	what	is	apparently	a	unified	plot.	It	thereby	reveals	a	tension	very	different	from	the	conflict	of	tragedy.	Unlike	the	latter,	which	derives	from	uncertainty	about	origins	and	“outcomes,”	that	of	epic	theatre	concerns	“events	in	the	singular.”	It	is	directed	less	at	“ends”	than	at	the	middle,”	at	the	members,	but	in	their	singularity	and	not	simply	as	parts	of	an	organic	whole’	[Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	103].	
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itself	and	the	possibility	of	returning	otherwise,	the	Zustand	exposes	itself	as			 […]	a	configuration	that	is	not	simply	stable	or	self-contained	but	above	all	relational,	determined	by	the	tension	of	its	ex-tension,	by	its	relation	to	that	which	it	has	interrupted	and	from	which	it	has	separated	itself.	The	result	is	a	highly	unstable	state	of	affairs	marked	by	what	Benjamin,	in	a	felicitous	formulation,	describes	as	the	“trembling	of	its	contours”	(das	Zittern	ihrer	Umrisse).380					
The	Secret	Signal	of	the	To-Come	
	 To	the	organic	whole	of	bodies	and	the	teleological	flow	of	plots,	Benjamin,	Brecht	and	Rainer	oppose	the	singularity	of	the	spatio-temporal	fragment,	clearly	demarcated	in	its	contours,	but	trembling.		This	trembling	time-space	[Zeitraum]	is	more	or	less	haunted	by	both	“its”	past	and	future,	its	pre-	and	afterlife.	The	latter	signals	through	it,	makes	itself	known	as	unknowable	alterity	to	come.	Benjamin	furthermore	hints	at	such	hauntings	of	an	unknowable	future	in	the	present	by	employing	another	felicitous	formulation	that	appears	in	a	related	theatrical	context.	In	his		‘Program	for	a	Proletarian	Children’s	Theatre,’	he	links	the	repetitive	mode	of	theatrical	representation	to	the	genius	of	variation	at	play	in	the	gesture	of	the	child,	opposing	therewith	the	pseudo-revolutionary	demeanour	of	a	propaganda	of	ideas	with	the	truly	revolutionary	effect	of	what	he	calls,	emphatically	and	somewhat	mysteriously,	‘the	secret	signal	of	the	to-come	[des	Kommenden]	that	speaks	from	the	gesture	of	the	child’.381			
																																																								380	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	103-4.	381	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Programm	eines	proletarischen	Kindertheaters’,	769.		
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In	Benjamin’s	conception	of	proletarian	children’s	theatre,	revolutionary,	transformative	potential	is	not	to	be	found	on	the	side	of	ideologemes	–	here,	the	ideas	and	contents	of	what	is	being	presented	on	the	stage,	understood	or	consumed	by	performer	and	spectator	alike	–	but	rather	in	the	modes	and	manners	of	the	how	of	re-presenting:	a	presentation	irreducible	to	a	once	and	for	all	determinable	content.	For	Benjamin,	the	gesture	of	the	child	must	be	in	excess	of	its	relative	determinability	as	sign.	Nevertheless,	in	its	immediate	inaccessibility	as	secret,	in	its	withdrawal	from	or	supersession	of	present	sense	and	tense,	its	secret	nevertheless	signals,	makes	itself	known	as	secret	–	not	as	the	simple	withholding	of	knowledge,	but	as	the	sharing	of	a	certain	kind	of	not-knowing	–	non-self-present,	un-knowable,	gesturing	beyond	itself	towards	the	non-appropriable	other	of	the	to-come	[das	Kommende].	Earlier	in	the	text,	Benjamin	insists	that	ideology	as	such,	that	is,	in	the	context	of	a	proletarian	children’s	theatre,	class-consciousness,	is	indeed	of	utmost	importance	to	any	proletarian	education	in	general,	yet	runs	the	risk	of	only	reaching	the	child	as	an	empty	phrase	[Phrase].	To	avoid	such	hollow	arrivals,	he	suggests,	one	must	reject	the	type	of	schooling	that	seeks	to	educate	towards	an	idea.	Instead	of	communicating	readymade	knowledge	of	a	particular	field,	education,	at	least	for	children,	Benjamin	insists,	must	take	place	within	a	particular	subject	area	of	knowledge.	Here,	knowledge,	ideas,	ideologemes	are	no	longer	simply	communicated	from	transmitter	to	receiver,	for	it	is	precisely	the	ideality	of	the	content	that	would	guarantee	such	effective	repetitions	as	the	instrumental	transmission	of	a	transportable	content	that	is	put	into	question.	Instead,	in	Benjamin’s	model	of	education,	the	contents	of	a	specific	subject	area	are	given	up	for	and	over	to	a	repetition	that	no	longer	comes	full	circle.	Here,	repetition	becomes	subjected	to	what	Benjamin	calls	the	child’s	‘genius	of	variation’.	Benjamin	thus	emphasises	the	mode	of	the	repetition	itself	over	the	identity	of	a	repeatable	content.	The	latter	becomes	the	contextual	playground	for	variations	to	take	place	within	or	upon.	The	uncertain	
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locus	for	such	non-complete	taking	place	turns	out	to	be	the	theatre,	a	place	that	cannot	so	easily	be	identified	and	secured	once	and	for	all.		When	it	comes	to	the	education	of	the	child,	Benjamin	furthermore	insists,	it	is	necessary	that	its	whole	life	be	encompassed.	However,	the	genius	of	variation	must	still	and	somewhat	paradoxically	apply	itself	within	or	upon	a	circumscribed	or	framed	[begrenzt]	field	or	area.	To	overcome	this	impasse,	the	theatre,	for	Benjamin,	turns	out	to	be	the	dialectically	destined	place	for	the	education	of	children,	‘as	[…]	the	whole	life	in	all	its	non-predictable	fullness	only	appears	as	a	framed	[gerahmt]	field	in,’	or	more	ambiguously	in	the	German,	‘upon	[auf]	the	theatre’.382	The	theatre	frames	life	and	by	doing	so	not	simply	re-presents	it	once	and	for	all	but	renders	it	citable.	It	makes	possible	an	education	within	life,	a	life	framed	and	breached,	detachable	from	“itself,”	which	has	become	rehearsable.	As	rehearsable	life,	theatre	‘calls	upon	the	strongest	force	of	the	future	in	children’.383	The	exact	place	or	taking	place	of	this	calling	becomes	however	difficult	to	locate.	Benjamin	insists	that	it	cannot	be	found	simply	in	the	performance	itself,	at	least	not	as	the	latter	is	often	conceived,	that	is,	as	final	end	product.	In	Benjamin’s	ideal	conception	of	proletarian	children’s	theatre,	the	latter	merely	materializes,	as	he	says,	almost	incidentally	as	a	prank	[Schabernack]	of	the	children,	only	briefly	interrupting	their	un-ending	studies.384	Benjamin	clearly	favours	an	unfinished,	improvisational	aspect	of	the	final	performance	over	the	‘well-rounded	achievement’	that	has	been,	as	he	dramatically	puts	it,	‘tortured	out	of	the	children’.385	‘Performance	or	Theatre,’	he	tentatively	suggests	–	displaying	an	uncertainty	as	to	what	precise	topos	or	event	he	is	in	fact	referring	to	–	must	form	the	synthesis	of	more	or	less	improvised	gestures	that	stand	in	a	space	of	non-accidental	singularity	[Einmaligkeit].	Not	the	acccomplishments	of	art	[Kunstleistungen]	that	may	fill	the	cupboards	and	memories	of	parents	with	souvenirs,	not	the	“eternity”	of	products,	but	the	“instant”																																																									382	ibid,	764.	383	ibid,	764-5.	384	ibid,	765.	385	ibid,	767.	
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[“Augenblick”]	of	the	gesture	is	what	constitutes	the	accomplishment	of	the	child.	Theatre,	as	a	transitory	art,	says	Benjamin,	is	the	art	form	of	the	child.	A	transitoriness	[Vergänglichkeit],	however,	of	a	moment	of	singularity	–	the	instant	of	variation	–	that	paradoxically	depends	on	a	structure	of	repeatability.	The	transitory	moment	of	a	singular	gesture	is	not	here	linked	simply	to	the	latter’s	absolute	disappearance	within	the	ephemeral	temporal	flux,	but	depends	on	its	non-present	remaining.	As	the	gestures	of	Epic	Theatre,	as	well	as	those	of	Yvonne	Rainer	and	others	at	Judson	Dance,	their	momentary	suspension	as	clearly	framed	time-fragments	cut	from	the	temporal	flux	of	a	linear	continuum	qua	interruption,	is	always	already	affected	by	its	structural	relation	to	at	least	the	possibility	of	repetition	at	some	other	place	and	time.	As	an	instant	of	repetition	that	neither	comes	full	circle	nor	strictly	happens	once	and	for	all,	the	gesture	of	the	child	too	remains	open	to	a	space	of	alterity	qua	repeatbility.	In	the	theatre	more	generally,	such	a	space	of	alterity,	as	Samuel	Weber	describes	it	in	a	different	context,			 is	always	provisionally	embodied	in	and,	even	more,	exposed	as	an	“audience”	–	singular	noun	for	an	irreducibly	heteroclite	stand-in.	The	“audience”	stands	in	for	the	others,	those	who	were	and	those	who	will	be	–	and	perhaps	even	more	for	those	who	will	never	come	to	be.386			Echoing	a	concern	also	at	work	in	Benjamin’s	program	for	a	proletarian	children’s	theatre	pitched	against	its	bourgeois	variant’s	emphasis	on	consumable	end	products	and	reified	memorabilia,	Weber	continues:			 Of	course	it	is	in	the	nature	of	our	socio-economic	system	[…]	to	do	everything	possible	to	appropriate	and	domesticate	such	“standing-in”	so	that	it	seeks	to	fulfil	itself	in	and	as	actual	consumption.387																																																										386	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	341.	387	ibid.	
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Of	Absent	Masters		 The	facilitator	of	proletarian	children’s	theatre,	Benjamin	says,	retreats	most	fully	before	the	moment	of	the	performance,	knowing	that	‘[n]o	pedagogical	intelligence	can	predict	how	children	combine	with	thousands	of	surprising	variations	the	taught	gestures	[Gebärden]	into	a	theatrical	totality’.388	A	not	dissimilar	retreat	in	facilitation	seems	to	inform	the	formative	pedagogical	experiences	of	Yvonne	Rainer	and	others	at	Judson	Dance.	Describing	the	teaching	style	of	John	Cage	student	Robert	Dunne’s	now	notorious	class	in	choreography	taught	at	the	Merce	Cunningham	studio	in	the	fall	of	1960,	Steve	Paxton	admiringly	relates:			 Dunn	himself	managed	to	do	something	that	I’ve	admired	ever	since.	He	taught	us	ideas	almost	by	neglecting	us,	by	mentioning	things	but	tending	to	disappear	at	the	same	time,	leaving	with	a	smile.389			Here,	ideas	are	taught	not	to	arrive	in	identical	repetitions,	but	as	the	generative	constraints	within	which	a	multitude	of	variations	can	be	unleashed.	In	Benjamin’s	program	for	a	proletarian	children’s	theatre,	following	the	process	of	its	assemblage,	the	performance	becomes	precisely	such	an	occasion	for	the	radical	unleashing	of	play.	It	makes	sovereign	the	child’s	genius	of	variation,	as	he	puts	it,	out	of	which	gestures	the	secret	signal	of	the	to-come	[des	Kommenden].		Benjamin	does	not	further	explore	this	emphatic	expression,	which,	like	the	secret	itself,	seems	to	signal	only	in	its	retreat,	perhaps	with	a	smile.	On	the	nature	of	the	signal,	however,	he	says	that	it	emanates	from	a	world	in	which	the	child	lives	and	rules	as	dictator.390	In																																																									388	Benjamin,	‘Programm	eines	proletarischen	Kindertheaters’,	767.	389	Banes,	10.	390	Benjamin,	‘Programm	eines	proletarischen	Kindertheaters’,	766.	
		
186	
the	absence	of	masters	and	mastery,	the	child	is	here	given	free	reign	in	the	repetitive	practice	of	what	elsewhere	Benjamin	describes	as	‘citation	as	the	sovereign	usurpation	of	the	encountered’.391	Theatrical	play	unleashes	phantasy	and	brings	it	to	bear	on	the	repetitions	of	an	inheritance.	Here,	the	child’s	dictatorial	reign	perhaps	resembles	another	Benjaminian	figure	of	a	related	theatrical	context.	In	his	elaborate	study	of	the	German	baroque	Mourning	Play	[Trauerspiel],	Benjamin	discerns	the	role	of	the	‘plotter,’	a	counter-figure	to	the	tyrant’s	despotic	efforts	at	self-instituting	sovereignty,	of	whom	Samuel	Weber	says	that	he			 […]	manipulates	links	and	connections	simply	for	the	pleasure	of	doing	so,	not	in	the	hope	of	accomplishing	anything,	least	of	all	leaving	behind	a	great	work.	[…Here],	“power”	changes	its	meaning:	it	is	no	longer	transitive,	the	power	to	do	or	accomplish	anything,	but	rather	a	mode	of	being	that	arranges	and	combines,	manifesting	itself	in	virtuosity	rather	than	control.392			Like	the	instant	of	the	gesture	of	the	child,	like	the	child’s	genius	of	variation,	virtuosity	without	control	–	a	movement	of	arranging	and	combining	that	always	comes	up	short	–	finds	itself	suspended	in	an	experimental	attitude,	a	mode	of	being	that	accomplishes	nothing	other	than	its	own	accomplishing.		Rainer,	of	course,	in	her	famous	No-manifesto,	says	no	to	virtuosity.	She	says	so,	and	seemingly	retreats	with	a	smile,	leaving	generations	of	dance	and	theatre	students	in	her	wake	to	grapple	with	a	positive	response	to	her	negative	directive.	Perhaps	this	structural	retreat	further	invites	us	to	re-	and	transvalue	the	concept	of	virtuosity	itself,	repeating	it	otherwise,	no	longer	as	the	accomplished	skill	of	trained	bodies	in	traditional	works	of	art,	but	as	an	experimental	attitude	of	being-in-rehearsal,	that	is,	a	virtuosity	of	trembling.																																																									391	Manfred	Voigts,	‘Zitat’	in	Opitz	&	Wizisla	ed.	Benjamin’s	Begriffe,	826-850.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	2000),	830.	392	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	178	(my	emphasis).	
		
187	
Benjamin’s	reading	of	Brecht	discerns	similar	modes	of	positioning	oneself	insecurely	in	experimental	attitudes	of	non-mastery.	Modes	of	being	committed	to	a	certain	practice	or	exercise	–	Übung	–	a	relative	of	the	rehearsal	that	is	able	to	spill	out	of	the	institutions	of	theatre	into	an	everyday	life	framed.	Situating	what	Brecht	calls	attitude	[Haltung]	within	a	discourse	on	a	performative	political	praxis,	Benjamin	opposes	it	to	the	constative	convictions	of	knowledge	and	understanding.			 ”Not	what	one	is	convinced	of	is	of	importance.	Of	importance	is	what	one’s	convictions	make	of	oneself.”	This	What	Brecht	calls:	attitude	[Haltung].	It	is	new.	What	is	newest	about	it	is	that	it	can	be	learned.393			Brecht	facilitates	such	a	process	of	learning	through	his	attempt	[Versuch]	to	render	gestures	citable.	To	do	so,	he	says,	demands	practice	[Übung].	A	practice,	it	seems,	like	that	of	the	rehearsal,	which	is	no	longer	fully	subservient	to	an	end,	a	final	product	or	an	accomplishment	that	accomplishes	something	other	than	its	own	accomplishing.	Citation	is	no	longer	the	end	of	citability,	actuality	no	longer	the	goal	of	virtual	possibility,	for	nothing	ever	gets	accomplished	here	once	and	for	all.	The	German	word	Haltung	[attitude]	resonates	with	the	hold	of	Halt,	the	stoppage	of	Anhaltung	and	the	stilled	bodily	pose	of	a	particular	way	of	holding	oneself	that	interrupts	the	flow	of	the	present	as	a	stilled	gesture	severed	from	the	telos	of	continuums	of	movement,	plot	and	history.	Standing	thus	exposed,	attitude	as	gesture	reckons	with	its	own	alterity	qua	repeatability.	A	strategy,	then,	not	merely	of	dancing	yesterday,	as	Lambert-Beatty	so	fittingly	describes	the	use	of	citation	in	Yvonne	Rainer	and	others	at	Judson	Dance,	but	of	dancing	what	is	to-come	[das	
Kommende]	by	holding	on	to	the	possibility	of	dancing	yesterday	and	today	otherwise.	‘[…T]he	place	of	this	future,’	however,	as	Weber																																																									393	Benjamin,	‘Aus	dem	Brecht-Kommentar’,	Versuche	Über	Brecht.	34-38.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1966),	35.	
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reminds	us,	‘which	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	present	that	has	yet	to	arrive,	is,	paradoxically,	nowhere	if	not	now’.394			
	
	
	
	 	
																																																								394	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	105.	
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	 	 	 	 	 	 	 CHAPTER	FIVE	
	
	
A	Virtuosity	of	Trembling:		
The	Body	and	The	Archive	in	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	
has	a	door	
	 […]	And	the	“interiority”	of	a	theatre	is	very	different	from	that	of	a	private	home	or	a	domestic	house	(a	fact	that	worried	Plato	no	end).	In	a	theatre,	on	a	stage,	as	part	of	a	scene,	subjects	are	no	longer	authentic,	no	longer	at	home,	no	longer	fully	in	control.	Inside	and	outside	are	no	longer	simply	binary	opposites.		The	space	of	the	theatrical	scene,	which	is	not	necessarily	that	of	traditional	drama,	is	no	longer	simply	an	interior	space,	since	it	is	always	directed	outward,	away,	toward	others.	As	already	mentioned,	theatricality	can	even	be	defined	as	representation	for	
others.	In	this	case,	however,	dramatic	conflict	and	plot	are	not	its	constitutive	ingredients.395			 There	is	no	house	or	interior	without	a	door	or	windows.396			 Inheritance	is	never	a	given,	it	is	always	a	task.	It	remains	before	us.	397		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		[…]	but	finally	it	will	be	up	to	you	now,	it	will	also	be	up	to	the	others	to	decide	this.	The	signatories	are	also	the	addressees.	We	don’t	know	them,	neither	you	nor	I.398																																																										395	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	246-7.	396	Jacques	Derrida,	Of	Hospitality.	Anne	Dufourmantelle	invites	Jacques	
Derrida	to	respond,	trans.	Rachel	Bowlby.	(Stanford	California:	Standford	University	Press,	2000),	61.	397	Jacques	Derrida,	Specters	of	Marx.	trans.	Peggy	Kamuf.	(London	&	New	York:	Routledge	2006),	54.	
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No	To	Virtuosity:	An	Amateur’s	Rehearsal	of	the	Past	as	the	Future	
to	Come		 Several	possible	trajectories	of	inheritance	can	be	traced	between	the	performance	works	of	the	contemporary	Chicago	based	performance	company	Every	house	has	a	door	(previously	Goat	Island)	and	the	1960s	minimalist	experiments	of	Judson	Dance.399	For	instance,	as	the	companies’	director	Lin	Hixon	relates	with	regard	to	Goat	Island,	one	such	discernible	influence	concerns	‘a	certain	respect	for	pedestrian	movement,’	as	well	as	‘the	use	of	found	movement	and	task-like	activity’.400	Here,	the	re-affirmation	of	a	pedestrian	movement	style	seemingly	follows	Rainer’s	call	for	a	rejection	of	virtuosity	in	her	famous	1965	“No	Manifesto.”	Hixon’s	own	example	of	‘Rainer	pushing	a	vacuum	cleaner	as	dance,’	however,	seems	far	removed,	not	so	much	from	the	modality	of	‘doing’	but	the	type	of	found	movement	re-done	or	rehearsed	by	the	performer’s	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door.	Instead	of	therefore	identifying	the	modality	of	a	certain	pedestrianism	with	the	quality	of	the	found	movement	vocabulary	of	the	everyday,	one	is	perhaps	better	served	to	attend	to	the	‘pedestrian,’	that	is,	“non-skilled”	or	amateur	quality	and	attitude	of	the	task-like	retracing	of	all	manner	of	
																																																																																																																																															398	Jacques	Derrida,	‘The	University	Without	Condition’,	237.	399	The	Chicago	based	performance	company	Every	house	has	a	door	was	formed	in	2008	by	Lin	Hixon	and	Matthew	Goulish	to	create	project-specific	collaborative	performances	with	invited	guests.	Hixon	and	Goulish	had	previously	collaborated	for	twenty	years	as	the	founding	members	of	the	performance	company	Goat	Island.	Although	the	work	of	both	companies	is	more	or	less	distinctive	in	style,	there	is	also	much	continuity	between	them.	Before	focusing	more	specifically	on	Every	house	has	a	door’s	2013	performance	Testimonium	in	the	final	part	of	the	chapter,	I	will	move	freely	between	examples	of	and	commentaries	on	performance	works	by	both	companies.	400	Stephen	Bottoms	&	Matthew	Goulish	ed.	Small	Acts	Of	Repair.	
Performance,	Ecology	and	Goat	Island.	(London	&	New	York:	Routledge	2007),	70.	(My	emphasis).	
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movements,	‘found’	in	what	are	predominantly	a	variety	of	archival	source	materials.401		The	above	evocation	of	a	certain	amateurism	in	the	context	of	a	‘pedestrian’	re-enactment	of	‘found	movement’	is	thus	applicable	both	with	regards	to	the	quality	of	the	“final”	(re-)presentation,	as	well	as	the	modality	or	technique	of	the	process	of	its	acquisition.	This	‘lover	of’	–	for	instance,	contemporary	dance	–	sees	no	limit	to	his	or	her	desire	to	‘participate’	by	mimetically	interiorizing	and	transforming	the	received	(i.e.	the	found	movement)	into	the	return	of	a	performed	exteriorization.	If	the	latter	formulation	here	loosely	recalls	certain	aspects	of	the	work	and	idiom	of	Bernard	Stiegler,	it	is	to	briefly	evoke	the	latter’s	account	of	what	I	will	call	the	cunning	of	the	amateur	as	it	resonates	with	the	technique	of	(movement)	appropriation	demonstratively	at	work	in	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door.	For	Stiegler,	the	figure	of	the	amateur	has	an	important	role	to	play	in	resisting	what	he	identifies	as	a	general	loss	of	participation	that	stems	from	a	process	of	increased	proletarianisation,	that	is,	in	brief,	the	loss	of	memory	and	know-how	induced	by	the	machinic	grammatisation	of	the	gestures	of	production	and	the	radical	separation	of	producers	and	consumers	in	hyperindustrial	society.	This	strict	separation	is	both	the	cause	for	an																																																									401	To	be	sure,	although	movement	is	at	times	literally	found	–	for	instance	in	Martin	Figura’s	flat	in	Berlin,	where	the	encounter	with	a	documentary	video	of	Pina	Bausch’s	Wupperthal	Tanztheater	sparks	the	citational	reinscription	of	a	45	second	solo	by	Dominique	Mercy	from	the	performance	Die	Fenster	Putzer	–	it	is	not	always	found	as	such.	Instead,	movement	often	results	from	a	process	of	bodily	translation	and	response	to	all	manner	of	source	materials.	At	its	most	extreme,	the	company	follows	a	strategy	of	self-set	tasks	of	(impossible)	embodiments,	for	instance	in	‘the	attempt	to	build	the	Hagia	Sophia	out	of	bodies,	gestures	and	dance;	an	attempt,’	as	Jane	Blocker	fittingly	puts	it	by	emphasising	the	fragility	of	the	endeavour,	‘that	the	least	giggle	will	destroy’	[see	Jane	Blocker,	‘The	Lastmaker’,	Parallax,	(2013)	19:3,	11].	A	similar	fragility	of	enactment	also	informs	Goulish’s	attempt	to	resemble,	if	only	for	45	seconds,	Dominique	Mercy	-	‘the	male	dancer	[from	Die	
Fenster	Putzer]	whom	I	felt	I	least	resembled’	[see,	Matthew	Goulish,	‘Memory	is	this’,	Performance	Research:	A	Journal	of	the	Performing	Arts,	(2000)	5:3.	Accessed	May	2016	http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rprs20].	
		
192	
initial	disappearance	of	an	amateur	that	finds	himself	increasingly	reduced	to	the	status	of	a	mere	consumer,	as	well	as	for	his	or	her	potential	return	by	a	cunning	participation.	The	return	of	the	amateur	in	hyperindustrial	society	could	thus	be	said	to	figure	both	the	symptom	of	a	loss	of	participation	and	the	desire	for	its	coming	recovery.	On	the	one	hand	he	is	not	a	‘professional’	producer,	lacks	a	certain	skill	set	or	know-how	(for	instance,	in	Stiegler’s	privileged	example,	the	ability	to	read	or	play	music),	and	finds	himself	marginalized	with	regards	to	a	position	[Stellung,	also:	status	or	employment],	that	is,	a	public	forum	for	his	
Stellungnahme	[response].	Nevertheless	resistant	to	a	reduction	to	the	status	of	a	mere	consumer	that	is	unable	to	return	the	received	(i.e.	listening	to	music	without	knowing	how	to	make	it),	the	amateur	seeks	to	rework	the	apparatus	of	production	in	order	to	participate	in	spite	of	a	lack	of	classical	know-how.	In	doing	so,	he	begins	to	figure	the	necessary	cunning	for	the	coming	of	a	renewed	and	increased	interrelation	between	listening	and	creating,	receiving	and	returning,	perceiving	and	producing,	consuming	and	participating	beyond	the	virtuosity	of	specialist	knowledge.	For	the	amateur’s	cunning	lies	precisely	in	his	or	her	ability	of	transforming	a	position	of	passive	consumption	into	a	re-active	participation.	Following	a	schema	that	perhaps	resembles	Derrida’s	account	of	‘Echo’s	ruse’,	the	amateur	becomes	able	to	speak	of	and	for	himself	under	the	tight	constraint	of	having	to	follow	the	other.	If	Derrida’s	evocation	of	Echo’s	ruse,	as	Pleshette	DeArmitt	suggests,	indeed	constitutes	a	powerful	interpretation	of	a	seeming	powerless	figure,	it	would	perhaps	not	be	unwarranted	to	recast	the	figure	of	Echo,	deprived	of	initiative	by	divine	prohibition,	in	the	role	of	a	proletarian	
avant	la	lettre,	who’s	resisting	power	resides	in	acting	out	an	insatiable	desire	for	production	(and	individuation)	by	the	cunning	of	the	amateur:	she	who	seeks	to	produce	(and	thereby	participate)	by	abiding	to	an	inherited	law	otherwise.402	In	any	case,	for	Stiegler,	the	possibility	of	an	increased	interrelation	between	receiving	and	returning,	consuming	and																																																									402	I	will	return	to	the	figure	of	Echo	in	the	context	of	Derrida’s	conception	of	exappropriation	in	more	detail	below.	
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producing,	does	not	rest	on	a	return	to	a	more	primitive	stage	of	grammatization	but	the	very	technologies	(i.e.	analog	and	digital	forms	of	reproduction)	that	have	expropriated	the	producer	of	his	knowledge	of	production	in	the	first	place.	In	other	words,	it	is	of	the	order	of	a	
refunctioning	of	their	use.	For	instance,	one	of	Stiegler’s	preferred	anecdotal	examples	for	an	early	use	of	‘symbolic	repetitive	machines’	that	might	pave	the	way	for	‘a	new	epoch	of	repetition	which	is	productive	of	difference’	is	Charlie	Parker’s	invention	of	be-bop	through	‘listening	to	Lester	Young’s	refrains	on	the	phonograph	(which	he	slowed	so	he	could	break	down	what	the	saxophonist	was	playing	-	[…])’.403	The	description	of	this	scene	of	an	appropriative	use	of	a	technological	reproducibility	here	begins	to	resonate	with	a	similar	method	of	appropriation	that	informs	Goat	Island	performer	Matthew	Goulish’s	attempt	to	“interiorize”	a	particularly	difficult	movement	sequence	from	Pina	Bausch’s	performance	Die	Fensterputzer.404	Both	Parker’s	and	Goulish’s	techniques	of	learning	decisively	link	a	desire	for	appropriation	(that	is,	of	returning	the	received	or	consumed,	of	rejecting	a	reduction	to	the	status	of	mere	consumer)	to	the	possibility	of	the	interruption	of	the	flow	of	temporal	objects	that	a	particular	use	of	a	(here,	analogue)	reproduction	technology	allows	for.	Having	discovered	a	recording	of																																																									403	Bernard	Stiegler,	Symbolic	Mysery.	Volume	2:	The	katastrophe	of	the	
sensible.	trans.	Barnaby	Norman	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press	2015),	15	&	19.	404	Given	music	and	dance’s	different	relation	to	the	history	of	grammatization	and	proletarianisation,	the	resonance	between	the	respective	scenes	of	appropriation	in	the	context	of	Stiegler’s	wider	context	of	analysis	perhaps	only	goes	so	far.	Choreo-graphy,	although	more	or	less	dependent	on	external	memory	supports	in	the	form	of	scores	is	unable	to	raise	the	latter	to	a	level	of	standardization	that	would	allow	it	to	be	read	by	anyone	who	has	acquired	a	readily	available	know-how.	Remaining	to	large	degrees	idiosyncratic,	the	dance	score	does	not	yield	to	the	standardized	skill	of	an	acquired	technique	of	reading.	Professional	(contemporary)	dancers,	albeit	trained	in	a	loose	form	of	“repertoire”	of	possible	movement,	thus	encounter	similar	problems	to	the	amateur	when	faced	with	the	task	of	movement	acquisition	qua	repetition.	What	is	of	interest	here	is	not	primarily	the	more	or	less	non-skilled	performer’s	appropriation	and	“pedestrian”	re-enactment	of	recordings	of	skilled	movement,	but	more	generally	the	model	quality	of	a	participatory	desire	to	respond	qua	transforming	citation	to	all	manner	of	archival	source	materials.	
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Pina	Bausch’s	Die	Fenster	Putzer	as	part	of	a	documentary	on	the	choreographer	and	the	Wuppertaler	Tanztheater,	Goulish	sets	out	to	follow	the	task	of	a	‘choreographic	appropriation’	by	attempting	to	learn	a	45	second	solo	dance	by	Dominique	Mercier,	‘the	dancer	that	I	least	resembled’.	During	the	ensuing	struggle	at	mimetic	interiorization,	he	finds	himself	compelled	to	watch	a	small	extract	of	the	video	about	twenty	times,	pausing	it,	rewinding	it,	playing	it	repeatedly	until	he	is	able	‘to	commit	to	memory	a	relatively	accurate	imitation	of	four	sequential	beats	of	the	solo	–	about	three	seconds	in	length’.405	In	this	scene	of	a	mimetic	appropriation	by	the	amateur,	response-ability	and	participation	increases	relative	to	the	slowing,	stilling,	interrupting	and	spacing	of	the	temporal	flow	of	the	transmitted	material.	As	such,	as	will	become	increasingly	apparent,	it	also	begins	to	anticipate	the	model	
Haltung	of	the	interruptive	appeal	to	response-ability	that	informs	the	compositional	structure	of	the	performances	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door.	The	latter,	by	demonstratively	exposing	“its”	own	dependence	on	counter-signatories	through	the	repeated	interruption	of	its	flow,	calls	for	the	participatory	coming	of	future	appropriations.	In	the	context	of	Stiegler’s	wider	political	concerns,	the	urgency	of	a	call	to	resist	proletarianisation	in	the	face	of	the	culture	industries	–	what	he	elsewhere	also	designates	as	the	‘memory	industries,’	and	everything	that	is	here	put	forward	in	relation	to	an	attitude	of	appropriation	of	‘found	movement’	must	be	read	in	the	larger	context	of	an	appropriative	attitude	towards	an	archival	inheritance	–	in	large	parts	seeks	to	respond	to	the	danger	of	a	loss	of	participation	that	springs	from	the	coincidence	of	the	flow	of	its	products	(i.e.	cinema,	music,	TV)	with	that	of	the	consciousness	experiencing	them.	Particularly	apt	at	harnessing	the	attention	of	viewers,	the	temporal	objects	of	cultural	industries	become	privileged	instruments	of	control	societies	that	seek	to	‘captur[e]	the	attention	of	souls	so	as	to	control	the	behaviour	of	bodies,	with	the	intention	of	getting	them	to	consume	goods	and	services’.406																																																									405	Matthew	Goulish,	‘Memory	is	this’,	8.	406	Stiegler,	Symbolic	Mysery,	9	&	12.	
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Participation,	on	the	other	hand,	as	a	form	of	appropriative	perception	in	which	perceiving	and	producing	inextricably	entangle,	rests	on	the	interruption	and	spatialization	of	the	flow	of	consciousness	and	its	captured	attention	by	retentional	forms	that	allow	for	the	possibility	of	repetition	as	the	production	of	difference	(différance).	If	the	performance	practice	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door,	as	we	will	see,	finds	itself	intimately	related	to	strategies	of	‘repair,’	‘response’	and	compositional	‘interruption,’	such	strategies	might	here	be	read	as	functions	of	its	model	character	of	a	resistance	to	the	stupefying	flows	of	information	of	what	Stiegler	calls	the	control	society.	In	other	words,	it	presents	itself	as	the	model	of	an	attitude	[Haltung]	of	the	amateur	who	overcomes	his	proletarianisation	by	the	cunning	and	high	spirits	of	a	participatory	desire.	Here,	a	“pedestrian”	quality	of	enactment,	as	we	will	see,	which	doubles	up	as	a	certain	restraint	of	virtuosity	and	of	performance	–	becoming	what	Goulish	designates	as	‘non-performance’	–	is	nothing	but	the	Haltung	of	a	demonstrative	appeal	to	a	coming	participation	in	its	structural	rework-ability.	What	is	at	stake,	therefore,	is	a	“pedestrianism”	of	non-virtuosity	that	relates	to	the	mode	of	enacting	rather	than,	as	well	as	often	in	contrast	to,	the	“found	movement”	that	is	being	enacted.407	For	Hixon,	what	is	furthermore	of	interest	in	Rainer’s	use	of	‘found	movement	and	task-like	activity,’	is	the	concomitant	objective	of	‘“removing	the	body	from	the	gaze	by	returning	it	to	an	activity,	to	the	condition	of	always	
doing	something”’.408	Put	differently,	lacking	in	virtuosity,	the	pedestrian,	task-bound	body	refuses	to	turn	itself	into	a	spectacle	that	otherwise	might	direct	the	gaze	away	from	the	underlying	material	substrate	of	the	source	from	which	emits	the	call	or	task	of	re-inscription,	as	well	as	from	the	very	labour	of	the	(re-)enactment.	A	similar,	more	or	less																																																									407	Pedestrianism	here	relates	to	the	automatic,	non-expressive	and	task-like	quality	of	the	‘doing.’	It	does	not	however	imply	the	absence	of	the	physical	effort	of	labour.	To	the	contrary,	if	the	spectacle	seeks	to	hide	the	labour	of	its	production	precisely	behind	effortless	virtuosity,	here,	given	a	lack	of	virtuosity	thus	construed,	the	hard	labour	of	performance	is	all	the	more	exposed	for	it.		408	Bottoms	&	Goulish	ed.,	40.	
		
196	
“pedestrian”	style	of	(re-)enactment	of	archival	source	materials	was	of	course	already	at	work	in	Rainer	as	well	as	others	at	Judson	Dance.	Rainer’s	frequent	employment	of	stilled	gestures	as	quotations	of	more	or	less	recognizable	mnemic	traces,	as	we	saw,	demonstratively	entangled	the	live	performing	body	in	a	dance	with	its	historiographical	source.	Yet	the	exposed	interrelation	of	the	archive	and	the	body	–	an	exposition	that	turns	inside-out	the	outside	on	the	inside	–	is	much	more	overtly	at	work	as	the	predominant	if	not	sole	modality	of	performance	in	the	work	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door.	For	the	latter,	history	and	its	archival	remaining	are	the	prime	‘subject’	and	material	of	the	performative	enactment.	‘What	draws	me	repeatedly	to	the	work	of	Goat	Island,’	Jane	Bloker	relates,	‘is	the	group’s	abiding	interest	in	history,	in	the	task	of	historicising	by	performing	and	referencing,	the	task	of	‘self-conscious	removal	from	the	present	so	as	to	try	to	stand	in	the	place	of	the	past’.409	To	be	clear,	these	works	never	constitute	concrete	forms	of	historical	re-enactment	as	they	have	come	to	be	understood	as	both	forms	of	popular	past-times	and	current	trends	in	a	variety	of	aesthetic	practices.410	Whereas	the	latter	usually	revolve	around	the	restaging	of	specific	(art)	historical	events	–	whether	a	particular	battle	or	live	art	performance	–	the	work	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	assembles	a	wide	array	of	more	or	less	historiographic	source	materials	spanning	different	times	and	places	in																																																									409	Blocker,	20.	410	Here	I	am	thinking	both	of	contemporary	art	practices	interested	in	historical	reenactments	as	well	as	performance	art’s	interest	in	the	reenactment	of	precedent	performances.	Whereas	the	former	perhaps	finds	its	most	famous	example	in	Jeremy	Deller’s	The	Battle	of	Orgreave,	the	latter	is	most	overtly	at	work	in	recent	re-enactment	practices	of	Marina	Abramovic.	Every	house	has	a	door’s	performance	9	Beginnings	
Bristol/Chicago,	which	restages	the	beginnings	of	nine	historical	performances	by	nine	different	artists	or	companies	found	in	two	respective	performance	archives,	certainly	falls	within	the	broader	remit	of	performance	art’s	engagements	with	its	own	archive.	However,	here	the	concern	is	never	with	exact	repetition	but	rather	with	response.	The	emphasis	on	nine	different	beginnings	that	are	‘knitted	into	one’	already	implies	a	process	of	transformative	citation,	which	is	further	at	work	in	the	selected	details	of	the	reenactment	of	each	single	one	(http://everyhousehasadoor.org/projects/9-beginnings).	
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fragile	compositions	that	carefully	avoid	the	subsumption	of	its	parts	to	the	synthesizing	logics	of	narrative	or	transcendent	commentary.	Due	to	the	fragmented,	discontinuous	nature	of	the	compositional	assemblage,	as	well	as	the	more	or	less	overtly	“unfaithful”	translation	rather	than	exact	repetitions	of	underlying	fragments	of	source	materials	–	often	resulting	in	a	physical	struggle	that	“fails”	before	the	tasks	of	embodiments	that	tend	toward	the	(physically)	impossible	–	theirs	is	never	a	concern	with	the	more	or	less	exact	(if	equally	failing)	reconstruction	of	historical	events.	Instead,	what	is	at	stake	is	a	selective	weave	of	archival	material	in	time	and	space	in	a	manner	that	Goulish	compares	to	the	movement	of	an	essay	that	‘traces	the	journey	of	discovery	that	the	mind	makes	through	a	subject’.411	The	disjointed	spatio-temporality	of	a	live	event	that	retraces	an	essay	like	path	through	its	discovered	material	is	complicated	further	by	the	long	duration	of	the	period	of	the	latter’s	assemblage.	The	process	of	path-forging	that	will	allow	for	its	performative	retracing,	which	could	be	said	to	resemble	a	technique	of	‘writing’	that	Stiegler	describes	as	the	‘[organisation]	of	thought	by	consigning	it	outside	in	the	form	of	traces,	that	is,	symbols,	whereby	thought	can	reflect	on	itself,	actually	constituting	itself,	making	itself	repeatable	and	transmissible,’	takes	place	over	a	period	of	up	to	two	years	long.412	Beyond	the	temporal	dehiscence	of	an	again-time	of	cited	past	and	present	re-citation	(as	well	as,	as	it	will	be	increasingly	our	theme	here,	future	citability),	the	durational	aspect	of	a	path-forging	(thought-)process	qua	repeatable	marks	has	caused	the	latter	to	swell	under	the	accumulated	difference	of	their	repeated	return	at	different	times	and	places	during	the	process	of	their	assemblage.	Hixon	relates	the	dizzying	effect	of	the	prolonged	accumulation	of	material	through	a	
																																																								411	Matthew	Goulish	‘First,	Second,	Third’	Performance	Research:	A	
Journal	of	the	Performing	Arts,	(2010)	15:2,	35.	Accessed	11	April	2014	http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rprs20	
412 Bernard	Stiegler,	‘Anamnesis	and	Hypomnesis.	Plato	as	the	first	thinker	of	proletarianisation’,	http://arsindustrialis.org/anamnesis-and-hypomnesis/	Accessed	online	May	2014.	
		
198	
series	of	directives,	responses	and	counter-responses	that	make	up	the	company’s	process	as	follows:			 Our	process	could	be	described	as	a	series	of	directives	and	responses.	We	curve	forward,	like	whirling	dervishes	calling	back	and	forth.	I	produce	a	directive.	The	members	of	the	group	present	responses	to	the	directive	–	acts	in	return.	In	response	to	the	responses,	I	produce	more	directives,	combine	material	into	sequences,	submit	my	own	performative	material,	or	do	some	combination	of	these.	The	performers,	in	turn,	may	present	new	material	in	response	to	the	new	directives,	the	old	directives,	the	sequences,	or	other	responses,	which	serve	then,	a	secondary	function,	as	indirect	directives.413			As	a	consequence,	the	organisation	of	thought	finds	itself	challenged	by	the	duration	of	its	process.	‘Now	the	revived	activity	of	Mark,	retrieved	
from	the	long	distance	of	stored	time,’	Hixon	relates,			 sits	next	to	the	lecture	activity	of	Bryan	in	the	same	performance	space	and	the	same	performance	time.	Distance	continues	to	separate	the	two,	their	origins	coming	from	different	lands	and	different	times.	Their	divided-two-ness	united	seems	contrary	and	disruptive.	I	cannot	absorb	them	together.	They	delay	their	meaning.	I	will	need	to	travel	longer	with	this	two-ness	to	discover	in	the	performance,	the	logic	that	holds	them	together.414			The	divided	two-ness	of	the	spatial	proximity	of	a	temporal	distance	here	brings	to	mind	the	spatio-temporal	juxtapositions	of	Häufung	in	Walter	Benjamin’s	description	of	the	baroque	Trauerspiel,	that	is,	the	piling	up	of	previously	temporal	data	into	the	‘stacked	terraces’	of	spatial																																																									413	Lin	Hixon	in	‘When	will	the	September	roses	bloom?	Last	night	was	only	a	comedy:	Reflections	on	the	Process’,	Frakcija	Performing	Arts	
Magazine,	No.	32	(Summer),	no	pagination.	414	Hixon,	Frakcija	(my	emphasis).	
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inauthenticity.	However,	the	movement	of	‘piling	up’	here	not	only	concerns	spatial	(synchronic)	juxtaposition	of	previously	temporal	(diachronic)	data,	but	a	layering	of	other	times	and	places	within	a	single	time.	In	this	scenario,	performed	gestures	begin	to	swell	under	the	intruding	echoes	of	a	whole	series	of	previous	inscriptions.	The	aspect	of	such	a	swelling	is	reflected	in	and	modelled	by	Goat	Island’s	interest	in	Istanbul’s	Hagia	Sophia,	which	serves	as	an	impossible	‘score’	for	a	prolonged	movement	sequence	and	appears	as	a	scaled	model	in	the	company’s	final	performance	The	Lastmaker.	As	Jane	Bloker	has	pointed	out,	the	former	mosque,	former	church	and	current	museum	‘functions	[…]	as	a	chronotope	in	Bakhtin’s	sense:	a	structure	that	occupies	different	historical	periods	and	culturally	charged	spaces	simultaneously	(mosque,	church,	museum).	It	is	a	spatio-temporal	amalgam’.	415	Like	the	chronotope,	Goat	Island’s	performances	similarly	constitute	spatio-temporal	amalgams	in	which	difference	not	only	appears	in	juxtaposition	but	also	within	singular	gestures,	haunted,	not	only	by	the	again-time	of	re-enactment,	but	a	whole	series	of	layered	previous	inscriptions,	more	or	less	revealing	a	general	historicity	of	the	re-inscribed	mark.	‘These	three	individuals,’	the	company	writes	with	regards	to	Simone	Weil,	Lillian	Gish	and	Paul	Celan,	‘a	philosopher,	an	actress,	a	poet	–	appear	in	various	forms	enacted	and	overlaid	like	transparencies	atop	one	another	in	our	new	performance	When	Will	the	September	Roses	Bloom?’.416	The	haunted	bodies	of	Goat	Island’s	performers	might	thus	be	inhabited	by	a	multiplicity	of	other	times	at	a	single	time.	A	gathering	and	more	or	less	transparent	layering	of	different	moments	of	time	in	the	same	time	that	in	part	springs,	as	I	have	tried	to	show	here,	from	the	prolonged	duration	of	the	performance’s	process	of	assemblage	during	which	repeatable	marks	continue	to	return	otherwise,	becoming	saturated	with	traces	of	their	previous	inscriptions.	Whether	by	assembling	a	multiplicity	of	diverse	sources	through	temporal	montage,	spatial	juxtaposition	or	transparent	layering,	these																																																									415	Blocker,	8-9.	416	Frakcija	(my	emphasis).	
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performances’	engagements	with	the	archive	starkly	differentiate	themselves	from	the	kind	of	practices	aspiring	to	the	exact	repetition	of	a	single	historical	precedent.	Albeit	thus	falling	outside	the	precise	remit	of	Rebecca	Schneider’s	seminal	analysis	of	the	syncopated	time	of	performance	re-enactment,	the	work	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	must	nevertheless	impose	itself	on	any	scholar	interested,	as	she	puts	it,	‘in	history’s	theatrical	returns’.417	For	despite	their	differences,	these	performances	are	similarly	concerned	with	what	Schneider	calls	the	‘replay	of	evidence	(photographs,	documents,	archival	remains)	back	across	the	body	in	‘gestic	negotiation’	‘in	the	again	of	a	time	out	of	joint,’	or	else,	in	‘the	ambivalence	of	the	live’	in	‘its	inter(in)animation	with	the	no	longer	live’.418	If	the	‘subject’	of	these	performances	remains	however	‘largely	absented	from	the	finished	work,’	as	Every	house	has	a	door’s	website	describes	it,	the	self-conscious	removal	from	the	present	never	amounts	to	an	attempt	to	stand	firmly	in	the	place	of	the	past	but	rather	to	stand-in	for	it,	that	is,	to	facilitate	an	encounter	with	an	absent	trace	as	it	passes	across	bodies	in	again-time,	or	better,	by	the	back	and	forth	relay	of	an	again-and-again	time:	an	amateur’s	rehearsal	of	the	past	as	the	future	to	come.419					
The	Performance	as	Model	Notebook:	Hupomnēmata	and	the	Call	to	
a	Participatory	Art	of	Living		 In	selectively	assembling	and	rehearsing	an	array	of	heterogeneous	archival	materials	replayed	across	the	body	in	again-and-again-time,	these	performances,	I	want	to	suggest,	begin	in	part	to	resemble	a	form	of	Self	Writing	as	Michel	Foucault	has	identified	it	in	the	practices	of	and	discourses	on	the	hupomnēmata	of	Greco-Roman	times.																																																									417	Schneider,	1.	418	ibid,	1	&	9.	419	See	website	www.everyhousehasadoor.org/	
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Like	those	notebooks	in	which	‘[o]ne	wrote	down	quotes	[…],	extracts	from	books,	examples,	and	actions	that	one	has	witnessed	or	read	about	[…],’	these	performances	are	similarly	put	in	the	service	of	an	‘exercise’	or	‘training’	–	or	what	we	might	here	also	call	a	rehearsal	–	of	‘the	art	of	living’.420	Not	unlike	the	model	or	Haltung	[attitude]	of	a	training	[Übung]	to	deal	with	an	apparatus,	what	the	performance	as	rehearsed	notebook	exercises	is	the	body’s	participatory	entanglement	with	the	archive,	of	life	with	death,	of	physis	with	techne,	of	the	flow	of	time	with	the	movement	of	spacing	that	interrupts,	disjoints	and	augments	it.	Here,	the	construction	of	the	ethos,	that	is,	of	a	however	limited	familiarity	with	oneself	–	and	therefore	of	a	certain	style	and	indeed	art,	that	is,	techne	of	living	–	qua	repetition	and	productive	retracing	of	a	path	always	already	travelled	depends	on	an	archival	principle	of	gathering	together	a	selection	of	repeatable	marks.	If	the	collective	endeavour	of	the	companies’	process	of	assemblage	in	part	resembles	that	other	technique	of	‘Self	Writing’	Foucault	identifies	as	‘correspondence’	–	the	process	of	construction	made	of	a	prolonged	pursuit	of	chains	of	address	(task),	response	and	counter-response	mirroring	an	epistolary	practice	-	the	final	performance	somewhat	presents	itself	as	a	collectively	written	
hupomnēmata,	no	longer	inscribed	on	the	pages	of	a	notebook	but	“within”	the	bodies	of	performers	moving	through	space	in	(repeatable)	time.	Construed	as	a	hupomnēmata,	the	performance	itself	constitutes	a	‘record	of	things	read,	heard,	or	thought,	thus	offering	them	up	as	a	kind	of	accumulated	treasure	for	subsequent	rereading	and	meditation,’	or	else	for	rehearsal.421	Joe	Kelleher,	in	his	reading	of	Goat	Island’s	performance	The	Lastmaker	makes	a	similar	observation	with	regards	to	the	treasure-like	assemblage	of	archival	materials	when	describing	the	work	as	‘some	sort	of	physicalized	meditation,	based	upon	the	remembering	of	hoarded,	treasured,	or	picked	up	and	patched	up	
																																																								420	Michel	Foucault,	‘Self-Writing’	in	Ethics.	The	Essential	Works	of	
Foucault	1954-1984.	ed.	Paul	Rabinow,	trans.	Robert	Hurley	207-222.	(London:	Penguin	Books	2000),	208-9.	421	ibid,	210.	
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material’.422	That	the	rehearsed	treasure	is	finally	presented	to	a	public	makes	of	the	performance	a	model	of	a	practice	of	self-writing,	that	is,	an	exemplary	rehearsal	of	the	interrelation	of	individual	bodies	with	a	pre-individual	fund	of	collective	memory	traces.	Kelleher	makes	a	similar	observation	when	speaking	of	the	public	nature	of	its	‘craft	of	thought’	put	in	the	service	of	a	dissemination	of	structures	for	thinking.423		The	performers	physically	re-trace	or	recall	and	thereby	inscribe	the	body’s	encounter	with	an	array	of	archival	source	materials	that	are	quite	literally	rendered	“near	to	hand,”	as	Foucault	puts	it	with	regards	to	the	
hupomnēmata,	‘not	just	in	the	sense	that	one	would	be	able	to	recall	them	to	consciousness,	but	that	one	should	be	able	to	use	them,	whenever	the	need	was	felt,	in	action’.424	What	Foucault	says	of	the	hupomnēmata	seems	thus	more	or	less	applicable	to	a	performance	practice	that	gathers	and	mimetically	interiorizes	a	selection	of	archival	traces,	namely,	that	the	gathered	‘must	not	simply	be	placed	in	a	sort	of	memory	cabinet	but	deeply	lodged	in	the	soul,	“planted	in	it,”	[…]	and	they	must	form	part	of	ourselves:	in	short,	the	soul	must	make	them	not	merely	its	own	but	itself.	The	writing	of	the	hupomnēmata	is	an	important	relay	in	
this	subjectivation	of	discourse’.425	A	process	of	subjectiviation,	as	Foucault	specifies	with	recourse	to	Seneca,	whereby	the	absorption	of	the	gathered	discourse	is	linked	to	the	production	of	a	difference.426	Yet	at	least	with	regards	to	the	gestures	of	appropriative	recall	under	consideration	here,	such	physical	absorptions	of	gathered	external	marks	are	decisively	not	without	remainder:	the	remembering	of	treasured	material	never	amounts	to	a	full	blown	incorporation	in	the	sense	of	a	Hegelian	Erinnerung,	but	rather	remains	precisely	of	a	relay	movement	
																																																								422	Joe	Kelleher,	‘Their	Hands	Full	of	Ghosts:	Goat	Island	at	the	Last’	A	
Journal	of	Performance	and	Art,	(2009),	31:3,	100.	423	ibid,	101.	I	will	return	to	Kelleher’s	observation	and	their	relevance	for	a	conception	of	the	performance	as	hupomnēmata	in	more	detail	later	on.	424	Foucault,	‘Self-Writing’,	210.	425	ibid,	(my	emphasis).	426	ibid,	213.	
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without	end.427	The	relay	character	of	a	process	of	rehearsing	a	gathered	treasure	of	materials	therefore	remains	demonstratively	caught	up	in	a	retracing	of	an	interval	between	the	act	of	recall	and	the	material	recalled.		Like	the	notebook	as	hupomnēmata,	the	performance	consists	of	a	gathering	of	otherwise	scattered	archival	remains	and	could	be	said	to	similarly	seek	to	resist	the	distractions	of	an	endless	flow	of	reading	as	passive	consumption.	A	flow	that,	as	we	have	already	indicated,	inhibits	the	possibility	of	thinking	as	transformative	return,	appropriative	re-production	and	differance	–	repetition	and	difference	–	by	dissociating	reading	from	writing,	consumption	from	production.	Although	Foucault’s	account	of	the	use	of	hupomnēmata	does	not	here	literally	talk	of	the	distractions	of	a	temporal	flow,	its	employment	in	the	effort	to	resist	the	distraction,	mental	agitation	and	anxiety	of	a	consciousness	perpetually	turned	toward	the	novelty	of	the	future	clearly	relies	on	its	ability	of	interrupting	and	stilling	the	flow	of	consciousness	by	‘fixing	acquired	elements,	[…]	constituting	a	share	of	the	past,	[…]	toward	which	it	is	always	possible	to	turn	back	[…]’.428	‘This	practice,’	Foucault	relates	further,			 can	be	connected	to	a	very	general	theme	of	the	period;	in	any	case,	it	is	common	to	the	moral	philosophy	of	the	Stoics	and	that	of	the	Epicureans	–	the	refusal	of	a	mental	attitude	turned	toward																																																									427	In	a	short	interview,	Derrida	sketches	the	role	of	the	concept	of	‘Erinnerung’	in	Hegel’s	philosophy	as	follows:	‘The	concept	of	“Erinnerung,”	which	means	both	memory	and	interiorization,	plays	a	key	role	in	Hegel’s	philosophy.	Spirit	incorporates	history	by	assimilating,	by	remembering	its	own	past.	This	assimilation	acts	as	a	kind	of	sublimated	eating—spirit	eats	everything	that	is	external	and	foreign,	and	thereby	transforms	it	into	something	internal,	something	that	is	its	own.	Everything	shall	be	incorporated	into	the	great	digestive	system—nothing	is	inedible	in	Hegel’s	infinite	metabolism’.	[Daniel	Birnbaum	and	Anders	Olsson,	‘An	Interview	with	Jacques	Derrida	on	the	Limits	of	Digestion’	e-flux,	(2009),	01.	Accessed	online	May	2016	http://www.e-flux.com/journal/an-interview-with-jacques-derrida-on-the-limits-of-digestion/].	428	Foucault,	‘Self-Writing’,	212	(my	emphasis).	
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the	future	(which,	due	to	its	uncertainty,	causes	anxiety	and	agitation	of	the	soul)	and	the	positive	value	given	to	the	possession	of	a	past	that	one	can	enjoy	to	the	full	and	without	disturbance.	The	hupomnēmata	contribute	one	of	the	means	by	which	one	detaches	the	soul	from	concern	for	the	future	and	redirects	it	toward	contemplation	of	the	past.429		Foucault’s	formulation	here	must	recall	Walter	Benjamin’s	concern	with	the	temporal	predicament	of	the	German	baroque	to	which	the	
Trauerspiel	sought	to	find	an	appropriate	response.	Deprived	of	an	institutionally	regulated,	more	or	less	sovereign,	that	is,	at	least	seemingly	omnitemporal	hold	over	the	future,	Benjamin	depicts	the	experience	of	time	during	the	German	baroque	as	deeply	in	thrall	of	an	anxiety	before	the	future.		Confronted	with	a	general	crisis	of	‘works’	and	an	opaque	means	of	“faith	alone,”	isolated	individuals	find	themselves	precariously	exposed	to	the	unpredictable	effects	of	their	acts,	helplessly	as	well	as	hopelessly	exposed	to	the	coming	of	time	without	any	guarantees	over	the	positive	outcomes	of	their	acts.	In	light	of	this	dilemma,	Weber	notes,	memory	‘takes	on	a	new	function,	that	of	consoling	a	world	in	which	action	is	no	longer	the	unquestionable	pathway	to	grace’.	430	What	is	more,	the	Trauerspiel’s	response	to	an	epochal	crisis	of	eschatology,	as	Benjamin	relates,	entails	the	movement	of	a	conversion	of	previously	temporal	data	into	spatial	inauthenticity	(time	becoming	space).	In	the	absence	of	an	ostensible	control	over	the	coming	of	time,	to	ward	of	anxiety	in	view	of	a	historical	flow	perceived	to	be	moving	towards	catastrophe,	temporal	processes	are	brought	to	a	halt	by	their	spatial	inscription.	The	piling	up	of	previously	temporal	data	on	the	showplace	of	Trauerspiel	forms	the	condition	and	calls	for	a	coming	labour	of	its	perpetual	re-working	qua	allegorical	theatricalization	(space	becoming	time).	Benjamin	detects	a	very	similar	strategy	described,	as	well	as	rehearsed	and	therefore	demonstrated,	in																																																									429	ibid.	430	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	194.	
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and	by	the	work	of	Franz	Kafka,	who	repeatedly	returns	to	the	image	of	a	certain	preference	for	the	movement	of	a	happy	return	[Umkehr]	to	the	past	over	the	unhappy	pursuit	of	a	future	goal.431	The	resonance	of	Kafka’s	motif	of	Umkehr	with	the	function	of	hupomnēmata	as	a	‘means	by	which	one	detaches	the	soul	from	concern	for	the	future	and	redirects	it	toward	contemplation	of	the	past,’	as	well	as	with	its	more	literally	embodied	form	in	the	performance	practices	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door,	is	perhaps	nowhere	better	evoked	than	in	Benjamin’s	description	of	Umkehr	as	‘the	direction	of	study	[i.e.	of	Kafka’s	students]	which	transforms	[verwandelt]	being	[Dasein]	into	writing	[Schrift]’.432	Furthermore,	if	Kafka’s	parabolic	work	without	doctrine	more	generally	sets	out	to	transmit	an	opaque	tradition	no	longer	in	the	service	of	continuity,	but	instead	constitutes,	as	Werner	Hamacher	puts	it,	a	‘clouding	[Trübung]	of	Enlightenment’	by	its	transmission	of	an	opaque	inheritance	that	belongs	to	the	future	no	less	than	the	past,	the	
hupomnēmata	could	be	said	to	serve	a	not	dissimilar	‘circumstantial	use	value’	that	is	never	simply	given	in	advance	or	once	and	for	all	by	the	omnitemporal	sovereignty	of	a	doctrine	but	must	be	situated	and	in	some	ways	always	remains	to	come.	For	the	tendency	to	counteract	dispersal	through	the	gathering	of	treasured	materials,	as	Foucault	relates,	never	amounts	to	subscribing	to	the	doctrinal	unity	of	their	filial	links.	‘[…W]hile	it	enables	one	to	counteract	dispersal,’	Foucault	relates	with	a	formulation	that	resonates	deeply	with	the	“final”	assemblage	of	archival	source	material	in	the	performances	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door,	‘the	writing	of	the	hupomnēmata	is	also	(and	must	remain)	a	regular	and	deliberate	practice	of	the	disparate.	It	is	a	selection	of	heterogeneous	elements’.433	‘It	does	not	matter,	says	Epictetus,’	Foucault	notes,	‘whether	one	has	read	all	of	Zeno	or	Chrysippus;	it	makes	little	difference	whether	one	has	grasped	exactly	what	they	meant	to	say,	or	whether	one	is	able	to	reconstruct	their	whole	argument.	The	notebook																																																									431	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Franz	Kafka’,	435.	432	ibid,	437.	433	Foucault,	212,	(my	emphasis).	
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is	governed	by	two	principles,	which	one	might	call	“the	local	truth	of	precept”	and	“its	circumstantial	use	value”’.434	The	order	of	such	circumstantial	use	must	therefore	remain	largely	that	of	a	test	performance,	perhaps	not	unlike	the	exuberant,	cunning,	probing,	theatrical	gestures	of	Kafka’s	Gehilfen	[assistants]	–	devoted	amateurs	in	Kafka’s	world	of	bogus	professionals	–	their	effects	and	effectiveness	unable	to	be	guaranteed	in	advance.	Thus,	‘training’	in	‘the	art	of	living’	never	leads	to	a	final	accomplishment	but	may	only	ever	secure	an	essentially	precarious	ethos,	from	time	to	time.	‘Skill	as	a	result	of	learning	or	practice’	here	does	not	amount	to	professionalism	but	a	virtuosity	of	trembling.	
	
	
	
The	Outside	Inside	Out:		
Non-Performance,	Appropriative	Restraint	and	The	Double-Take.		 In	his	reflections	on	the	‘role	of	the	onstage	performer	as,	to	some	degree,	a	non-performer’	in	both	Every	house	has	a	door’s	performance	
Sweet	Movie	and	Raimond	Hoghe’s	‘essay	performance’	Bolero	Variations,	Matthew	Goulish	re-inscribes	the	call	for	a	debunking	of	virtuosity	by	linking	it	to	the	modality	of	a	certain	‘restraint	of	onstage	presence’	by	which	the	performers	begin	‘to	occupy	functional	roles	–	as	facilitators,	translators,	mediators,	stage-hand[s	and]	stand-ins’.435	What	they																																																									434	ibid.	435	Goulish,	‘First,	Second,	Third’,	34-6.	Notwithstanding	a	possible	confusion	of	the	terms	of	my	argument,	I	am	here	tempted	to	bring	into	contact	Goulish’s	call	for	a	performative	restraint	with	a	not	dissimilar	‘restraint’	that	David	Campany	identifies	in	the	films	of	Robert	Bresson.	Bresson’s	famous	employment	of	non-professionals	–	a	variant	of	the	non-performer	-	equally	sets	out	to	avoid	an	excess	of	virtuosity	–	here	of	the	(star)	performer	–	that	might	distract,	as	Campany	puts	it,	from	the	part	played.	Eschewing	what	for	him	are	the	theatrical	implications	of	the	excess	of	the	actor	as	spectacle,	Bresson	preferred	the	idea	of	the	non-professional	as	model,	a	term,	as	Campany	states,	that	recalls	the	still	photograph	or	the	painter’s	studio,	but	which	here	also	must	be	brought	
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facilitate,	translate,	mediate	or	stand-in	for	is	an	array	of	‘pre-existing	material’	or	‘traces	of	the	past’.	436	It	is	thus	with	regards	to	the	material																																																																																																																																																into	contact	with	the	model	character	of	a	Haltung	as	Benjamin	identifies	it	in	the	gestural	theatre	of	Bertolt	Brecht.	‘He	[Bresson]	had	his	models	drain	their	performances	of	theatre,’	Campany	relates,	‘insisting	they	perform	actions	over	and	over	in	rehearsal.	Finally	they	could	perform	before	the	camera	without	thought	or	self-consciousness.’	Campany’s	description	of	Bresson’s	efforts	to	‘restrain’	and	thereby	reduce	performance	to	the	repetitive,	habitual	mode	of	an	automatism	here	further	recalls	Hixon’s	proclaimed	interest	in	Rainer’s	objective	of		‘“removing	the	body	from	the	gaze	by	returning	it	to	an	activity,	to	the	condition	of	always	doing	something.”’	In	his	own	version	of	a	sort	of	“No-Manifesto,”	Bresson,	as	Campany	relates,	writes:	No	actors.	(no	directing	of	actors)	No	parts.	(no	playing	of	parts)	No	staging.	But	the	use	of	working	models	taken	from	life.	BEING	(models)	instead	of	SEEMING	(actors).	Later	he	notes	‘Nine-tenths	of	our	movements	obey	habit	and	automatism.	It	is	anti-nature	to	subordinate	them	to	will	and	thought’’.	[See	David	Campany	‘Posing,	Acting,	Photographing’	in	Stillness	and	Time.	
Photography	and	the	Moving	Image.	ed.	by	David	Green	&	Joanna	Lowry,	97-113.	(London:	Photoworks	2005),	102].	Although	the	anti-theatrical	register	of	this	discourse	seemingly	jars	with	the	terms	of	my	argument,	its	own	contradiction	of	terms	nevertheless	seem	to	allow	for	a	comparative	reading.	For	the	movement	of	Bresson’s	‘models’	display	a	lack	of	volition	that	can	be	similarly	attributed	to	the	non-performers	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door,	each	following	the	other-directed	call	of	a	habitual	automatism	that	Bresson	locates	in	the	everyday	and	relates,	if	dubiously	so,	to	‘nature’	and	‘being,’	albeit	–	and	thereby	complicating	the	terms	-	of	a	habitual	kind	and	model	character.	The	latter	inflections	surely	must	make	it	difficult	to	relate	the	repetitive	practice	of	habit	to	a	proclaimed	‘nature’	of	‘being.’	The	relationship	of	habit	to	the	aspect	of	a	however	much	sedimented	theatricality	of	rehearsal,	must	complicate	any	recourse	to	the	rhetoric	of	authenticity.	Rather,	stripping	the	performance	of	its	narcissistic	and	fetishistic	aspects	as	spectacle,	Bresson’s	non-performers	seem	to	expose	a	theatricality	that	was	always	already	at	work	before	the	intervention	of	theatrical	or	cinematic	artifice.	In	any	case,	Campany’s	description	of	the	model’s	performance	as	‘‘go[ing]	through	the	motions,’	as	we	say,’	certainly	resonates	with	the	style	of	a	‘pedestrianism’	that	is	never	far	from	the	other-directed	movements	of	the	puppet	as	it	is	often	attributed	to	the	modality	of	non-performance	and	the	restraint	of	onstage	presence	in	the	work	of	Goat	Island.		436	Goulish,	‘First,	Second,	Third’,	35.	
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traces	of	the	past	that	the	non-performer	takes	up	what	we	might	designate	as	an	attitude	of	appropriative	restraint.	Here,	in	the	context	of	the	‘non-performance’	of	an	appropriative	restraint,	Goulish	turns	to	the	rhetoric	of	a	rejection	of	virtuosity	in	seeking	to	undo	what	he	designates	as	a	general	conundrum	of	theatre,	namely:			 [t]he	way	virtuosity	of	any	sorts,	once	recognized,	becomes	the	subject,	at	the	expense	of,	or	by	way	of	replacing,	or	supplanting,	the	intended	subject.	This	in	turn	points	to	a	theatrical	narcissism,	a	tendency	of	performance,	or	performing,	to	be	about	itself,	while	pretending	to	be	about	something	else.	The	something	else	that	the	performance	claims	to	investigate	retreats	to	a	sentimentalized	background,	lurking	behind	the	foregrounded	act	and	presence	of	the	performers.	437		The	‘subject’	for	which	the	human	presences	on	stage	both	stand	in	and	retreat	before,	is	here	drawn,	or	better,	selected	from,	the	archive.	‘Theirs	is	a	dance	with	history,’	Goulish	exclaims.438	A	dance,	we	might	add,	that	hangs	by	the	threads	of	an	archival	source	that	other-directs	it.	Leading	the	spectators	as	‘guides’	–	as	Goulish	also	calls	the	non-performers	–	on	an	“embodied”	trajectory	through	pre-existing	material,	the	performers	appear	both	devoid	of	agency	and	personality	whilst	seemingly	possessed	by	the	absented	material	they	stand	in	for.	The	latter	is	never	fully	interiorized	and	only	ever	half-inhabited	by	the	“embodiment”,	leaving	a	gap	at	all	times	between	the	demonstrated	and	the	demonstration,	the	shown	and	the	showing,	the	trace	and	its	re-enactment.	If,	most	generally	put,	memory	and	history	are	the	‘subject’	of	the	performed	enactments,	it	is	what	Sally	Baines	calls	‘the	
demonstration	of	the	event	of	memory	(as	much	as	the	memory	of	an	event)’	that	prevents	the	remembered	from	appearing	as	simply	
errinnert	[remembered/interiorized]	or	transparently	recalled.	Instead,																																																									437	ibid,	36.	438	ibid,	35.	
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the	presence	of	the	performative	act	of	recall	and	remembrance	here	coincides	with	a	remembered	trace	that	simultaneously	remains	distinctly	non-present,	neither	present	nor	absent,	but	spectral,	‘their	hands	full	of	ghosts’.439	A	spectrality	that	is	thus	able	to	unhinge	the	spatio-temporal	coordinates	of	the	“live”	act	of	performative	recall	and	expose	the	inextricable	interrelation	of	the	outside	and	the	inside,	the	archive	and	the	body.	The	exposed	bodily	recall	of	an	archival	trace	prevents	body	and	archive	from	being	perceived	as	either	seemingly	opposed	or	transparently	confused,	demonstrating	the	necessary	eviction,	as	Derrida	calls	it,	of	the	finite	life	of	mneme	by	the	dead	sign	of	re-memoration.440	Thus,	what	Samuel	Weber	says	about	Epic	Theatre	is	also	and	perhaps	even	more	so	at	work	for	the	‘non-performers’	of	Every	house	has	a	door,	namely,	that	‘[t]he	representative,	mimetic	activity	[…]	splits	and	turns	back	on	itself,	retracing	in	this	double-take	an	interval	and	a	gap	between	the	function	of	representing	and	that	which	is	being	represented,’	as	well	as,	we	might	add,	between	the	function	of	remembering	and	that	which	is	being	remembered.441	The	represented	and	remembered	is	never	fully	absorbed	into,	or	obscured	by,	the	performance	of	remembering	and	representing,	‘is	never	allowed	to	become	fully	identical	with	it’.442	The	demonstrated	lack	of	identity	between	the	remembered	and	the	event	of	remembrance	exposes	the	spatial	opacity	of	a	medium	that	is	always	bound	to	come	between	the	ostensible	self-presence	of	the	flow	of	life	–	here,	the	life	of	the	performer,	which,	as	we	will	soon	see,	will	seriously	come	into	question	by	the	attribute	of	a	certain	puppetry,	as	well	as,	in	the	context	of	the	experience	and	analysis	of	the	event	of	performance,	the	ostensible	immediacy	of	the	flow	of	the	live	event.	The	temporality	of	the	living	flow	of	the	present	finds	“itself”	dislodged	by	its	entanglement	with	non-present	remainders	that	facilitate	both	the	intrusion	of	an	absent	past	–																																																									439	See	Kelleher.	440	Jacques	Derrida,	Dissemination.	trans.	Barbara	Johnson.	(London:	The	Athlone	Press	1981),	109.	441	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	106.	442	ibid,	106.	
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the	more	or	less	specified	source	of	enactment	–	as	well	as,	following	the	logic	of	iterability,	“its”	possible	future	repetition	and	difference.	Here,	the	half-inhabited,	non-present	source	of	a	past	tradition	is	bound	to	remain	in	excess	of	its	present	re-enactment,	following	a	movement	of	spectral	inheritance	turned	towards	the	future	no	less	than	the	past.	In	other	words,	the	cited	mark	remains	“itself”	citable,	that	is,	able	to	break	with	its	present	context	of	re-inscription	and	engender	infinite	new	contexts	to	come.	Taking	account	of	the	possibility	of	this	cut	qua	repeatability,	the	repetition	begins	to	swell	under	the	intrusion	of	a	before	and	beyond,	haunted	by	the	past	it	repeats	otherwise	whilst	signaling	towards	the	unknowable	coming	of	the	future	by	an	act	of	teleiopoesis,	a	telephone	call	or	message	transmitted	to	distant	others	–	ghosts	from	the	future.	The	modality	of	acting	here	employed	therefore	begins	to	resemble	that	of	a	‘theatrical	iterability,’	for	which,	as	Samuel	Weber	puts	it,	‘[…]	the	“act”	of	an	‘actuality’	[…]	must	be	repeatable	in	order	to	be	enacted’.	The	“en-”	of	“enactment”	is	thus	inseparable	from	the	implicit	“ex-”	of	an	iterability	that	can	never	be	self-contained’.443	What	is	exposed	by	the	re-memorating	bodies	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	is	what	Jacques	Derrida	has	so	rigorously	analysed	and	described	as	the	outside	–	the	spatial	interval	of	writing,	the	supplement	of	the	archive	–	within	the	work	of	finite	memory,	bound	to	re-calling	non-present,	iterable	signs	in	a	movement	of	self-relation	and	communication	that	simultaneously	binds	and	disjoins,	secures	and	exposes.444	What	is	more,	if	the	outside	can	no	longer	be	rigorously																																																									443	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	341.	444	‘The	“outside,”’	Derrida	writes,	‘does	not	begin	where	what	we	now	call	the	psychic	and	the	physical	meet,	but	at	the	point	where	the	mneme,	instead	of	being	present	to	itself	in	its	life	as	movement	of	truth,	is	supplanted	by	the	archive,	evicted	by	a	sign	of	re-memoration	or	of	com-memoration.	The	space	of	writing,	space	as	writing,	is	opened	up	in	the	violent	movement	of	this	surrogation,	in	the	difference	between	mneme	and	hypomnesis.	The	outside	is	already	within	the	work	of	memory.	The	evil	slips	in	within	the	relation	of	memory	to	itself,	in	the	general	organization	of	the	mnesic	activity.	Memory	is	finite	by	nature.	Plato	recognizes	this	in	attributing	life	to	it.	As	in	the	case	of	all	living	organisms,	he	assigns	it,	as	we	have	seen,	certain	limits.	A	limitless	
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opposed	to	the	inside,	a	body	can	no	longer	strictly	be	conceived	–	following	a	powerful	Western	tradition	–	as	self-contained	container,	but	instead	finds	itself	stretched	and	trembling	in	an	insecure	spatio-temporal	scene	of	augmented	dis-containment.					
The	Puppet	Body:	Demonstrating	a	Way	of	Being	Moved	
	 In	light	of	these	reflections	it	is	unsurprising	that	Goulish,	when	teasing	out	the	effect	of	the	performing	non-performer,	construes	the	performance	of	the	body	as	secondary	with	regards	to	the	primary	performance	of	the	more	or	less	“embodied”	material	trace	and,	what	is	more,	links	it	to	the	reactive	modality	of	a	certain	puppetry.		 Their	performance	appears	secondary,	as	it	allows	for	a	primary	performance	by	these	traces	of	the	past,	in	the	form	of	objects,	documentary	sound	recordings,	and	carefully	calibrated,	enacted	gestures.	[…]		Their	dance,	like	an	essay	on	the	page,	traces	the	journey	of	discovery	that	the	mind	makes	through	a	subject.	Their	non-performer	performances	in	fact	seem,	as	a	style,	necessary	to	bring	about	this	relation	with	the	material	of	the	subject.	In	a	sense	they	perform	a	sort	of	puppetry,	in	which	it	is	essential	that	they,	the	performers,	do	not	overtake	the	subject.445		Goulish’s	recourse	to	‘a	sort	of	puppetry’	when	seeking	to	describe	the	modality	of	non-performance	in	Sweet	Movie	and	Bolero	Variations	here																																																																																																																																																memory	would	in	any	event	not	be	memory	but	infinite	self-presence.	Memory	always	therefore	already	needs	signs	in	order	to	recall	the	non-present,	with	which	it	is	necessarily	in	relation.	(See	Derrida,	
Dissemination,	109).	445	Goulish	‘First,	Second,	Third’,	35.	
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recalls	a	similar	comparison	made	by	Stephen	Bottoms	and	Adrian	Heathfield	when	describing	the	modality	of	performance	in	the	work	of	Goat	Island.	These	observations	furthermore	link	the	ontological	quality	of	the	puppet	–	here	marked	by	the	appearance	of	dispossession	and	a	general	lack	of	volition	–	to	Goat	Island’s	use	of	facial	blankness	as	an	indicator	of	its	filial	link	to	Judson	Dance.	A	facial	blankness	that	furthermore	seems	not	at	all	unrelated	to	the	quality	of	a	certain	‘pedestrianism’	of	non-virtuosity	at	work	in	the	retracing	of	found	source	materials	as	it	has	been	one	of	our	guiding	threads.	‘Like	so	much	else	in	the	company’s	aesthetic,’	Bottoms	begins	his	reflections,			 a	link	can	perhaps	be	traced	back	to	the	Judson	Dance	Theatre	(based	at	Greenwich	Village’s	Judson	Memorial	Church	from	1962-1964):	Steve	Paxton’s	choreography	was	emphasizing	facial	blankness	as	early	as	1963.	Goat	Island’s	work,	however,	retrieves	and	redevelops	the	often-neglected	Judson	experiments	in	rigorously	awkward	new	directions.	If	the	performers	often	seem	devoid	of	individual	agency	and	even	personality	–	somewhat	“besides	themselves”	–	it	is	in	part	because	of	the	impossible	tasks	they	are	charged	with,	but	also	in	part	because	of	the	way	their	movements	are	so	often	plagiarized	from	other	sources,	models	that	they	cannot	quite	live	up	to.	Thus,	they	are	not	quite	“in	possession”	of	themselves	or	their	activities.	As	Adrian	Heathfield	notes	of	the	extensive	copying	of	Pina	Bausch’s	choreography	in	
It’s	an	Earthquake	in	My	Heart:		 It’s	no	accident	that	the	performers	occasionally	seem	to	be	moving	like	puppets,	or	rehearsing	a	set	of	moves	that	they	do	not	yet	know.	The	movement	is	exposed	as	a	repetition.	We	are	watching	them	learn	how	to	move.	That	the	performers	only	“half-inhabit”	the	movement	is	crucial	to	the	work	since	it	creates	a	question	over	the	source	of	the	movement	and	the	performer’s	volition.	Their	
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physicality	seems	to	originate	simultaneously	from	outside	
and	inside	the	performer:	from	some	notional	instruction,	pattern	or	plan,	but	also	from	a	psychic	force,	which	grips	the	performer	within	a	repetition	of	a	gestural	form.	446		The	lack	of	volition	Heathfield	ascribes	to	the	performers	of	Goat	Island	clearly	sets	them	apart	from	what	Samuel	Weber	describes	as	the	modern	conception	of	the	autonomous	subject,	whose	privileged	site	since	the	Reformation,	as	he	puts	it,	has	been	‘the	body	understood	as	
embodied	individual’.447	It	is	with	regards	to	the	latter’s	principle	of	containment	that	the	performing	bodies	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	come	undone.	An	undoing	that	exposes	the	body,	in	Weber’s	words,	as			 no	longer	demarcated	from	its	surroundings	[and]	inevitably	raises	the	question	of	its	relation	to	place	which	is	no	longer	simply	its	exterior.	Rather,	this	body	can	itself	be	a	place,	a	stage	or	staging	area	for	effects	whose	scope	is	not	clearly	predictable.448			No	longer	self-determining	and	autonomous,	these	exposed	bodies	are	‘rather	determined	by	their	“ties”	to	what	they	are	not,’	performing	motion	that	‘does	not	appear	as	the	act	of	an	individual	but	rather	bears	[them]	along	in	a	movement	that	has	its	origin	elsewhere.449	‘Neither	passive	nor	active	[…],	they	demonstrate,	quite	literally,	a	way	of	being	
moved	that	confounds	such	oppositions’.450	Weber	links	the	reactive	modality	of	such	acting	to	‘the	skill	of	the	performer’	–	and	therefore,	curiously,	back	to	a	certain	virtuosity,	only	this	time,	perhaps,	a	virtuosity	of	trembling	–	that	‘allows	a	movement	to	be	deployed	that	can	never	be	
																																																								446Bottoms	&	Goulish	ed.,	74	(my	emphasis).		447	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	317.	448	ibid,	51	449	ibid,	27	&	318.	450	ibid,	27.	
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reduced	to	the	property	or	product	of	an	individual	qua	individual’.451	These	reflections	on	the	dispossessed	modality	of	acting	bodies	take	place	in	a	variety	of	contexts	that	include	a	performance	of	Peking	Opera,	Brecht’s	Epic	Theatre,	as	well	as	a	spout	of	popular	films	from	The	Body	
Snatchers	through	Alien	to	the	Terminator(s)	and	beyond,	which	‘bear	witness	to	the	becoming-uncanny	of	what	seems	most	familiar,	the	(not	always	human)	body	[…]’.452	It	is	in	this	latter	context	that	Weber	turns	to	a	more	recent	example	of	this	general	theme	as	it	resurfaces	in	the	film	
Being	John	Malkevitch.	Here,	the	paradigmatic	example	of	a	body	that	is	determined	by	its	“ties”	to	what	it	is	not	turns	out	to	be,	precisely,	a	puppet.	It	is	the	other-directed	movements	of	the	puppet	that	for	Weber	‘reveal	a	constitutive	heterogeneity	that	[the	Western	tradition	of	a	modern	conception	of	the	autonomous	subject]	is	obliged	to	deny	or	combat’.453	Thus,	if	the	modality	of	non-performing	performers	resembles	the	appearance	of	puppets,	it	is	because	they	similarly	appear	to	be	‘suspended	on	threads;	their	movements	com[ing]	from	elsewhere.	They	respond[,]’	Weber	says	with	a	formulation	that	deeply	resonates	with	the	method	if	not	ethics	of	the	performance	practices	under	consideration	here,	‘they	do	not	initiate’.454	What	Weber	says	of	the																																																									451	ibid.		452	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	51.	453	ibid,	319.	454	ibid.	Weber’s	account	of	puppet-bodies	that	respond	but	do	not	initiate,	here	not	only	recalls	the	style	of	non-performance	as	Goulish	describes	it,	but	furthermore	resonates	strongly	with	the	overall	ethos	and	method	that	informs	both	companies’	working	processes,	its	outcomes	deriving	from	a	long	series	of	response	and	counter-response.	Such	an	ethos	or	attitude	of	reaction	over	initiative	further	informs	the	strong	educational	agenda	that	accompanies	their	work	through	extensive	workshops,	talks	and	publications	often	aimed	at	other,	younger	practitioners.	Perhaps	theirs,	like	Benjamin’s	‘author	as	producer,’	is	also	an	endeavor	to	provide	others	with	an	improved	apparatus	by	emphasizing	a	call	to	response-ability	inscribed	in	the	‘model’	character	of	their	Haltung.	In	any	case,	one	indicator	for	the	centrality	of	an	attitude	of	responsiveness	amongst	many	others	comes	in	the	form	of	Hixon’s	and	Goulish’s	writings	on	their	performance	processes,	which	more	often	than	not	begin	with	the	small	threads	of	an	anecdote,	the	coordinates	of	a	specific	time	and	place	of	a	chance	encounter	with	a	source	material	that	had	not	been	actively	sought	out.	
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puppet,	therefore,	can	here	be	more	or	less	equally	applied	to	the	non-performers	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door:		 Although	they	can	hardly	be	said	to	“act,”	[they]	nevertheless	“embody”	the	essence	of	the	acting	in	which	the	body	itself	becomes	a	stage	upon	which	forces	that	come	from	elsewhere	play	themselves	out;	such	remote	bodies	are	always	defined	by	their	relation	to	the	place	they	occupy	without	ever	possessing.	Puppets	never	take	place,	and	in	this	they	are	at	odds	with	
humans	in	the	specific	sense	accorded	that	term	by	a	powerful	Western	tradition:	namely,	that	of	an	independent,	autonomous,	self-conscious	subject.	Puppets,	by	contrast,	repeat,	respond,	react,	re-move	without	ever	reaching	or	aspiring	to	self-consciousness.	They	are	both	before	and	beyond	it.	Correlatively,	their	“bodies”	never	embody:	not	a	soul,	nor	a	mind,	nor	an	identity.	Their	bodies	are	nonhuman	in	the	extreme,	and	yet	no	less	“bodily”	for	it.	Their	articulations,	joints,	and	members	take	
																																																																																																																																															Whether	the	discovery	of	rare	footage	of	a	Pina	Bausch	performance	in	Martin	Figura’s	flat	at	Fidicinstrasse	32a	in	Berlin,	the	encounter	with	the	1970s	British	repair	manual	Around	the	Home	in	a	physicist’s	apartment	at	Aberystwyth’s	seafront	in	November	2001,	or	the	out-of-print	two	volumes	of	Testimony	by	the	Jewish	American	poet	Charles	Reznikoff	–	which,	as	Goulish	relates,	‘a	friend	gave	me	some	years	ago’	–	an	attitude	of	reactiveness	surrounds	these	non-intended	chance	encounters.	[Goulish,	‘Memory	is	this’,	6;	Lin	Hixon,	‘Small	Acts	of	Repair’	frakcija	32,	2004,	no	pagination;	Matthew	Goulish	&	Lin	Hixon,	‘Poetry,	Document	and	Objectivity’,	Transcript	of	Lecture	held	at	LICA,	Lancaster	University,	November	2014.]	Perhaps	the	recurrent	motif	of	dates	and	addresses	that	mark	the	event	of	an	unexpected	arrival	must	not	then	be	reduced	to	the	habit	of	a	stylistic	device,	but	instead	be	read	as	evidence	of	something	of	an	ethico-political	stance,	that	is,	the	affirmation	of	a	dis-contained	subject	as	a	‘stage	upon	which	forces	that	come	from	elsewhere	play	themselves	out’	[Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	319].	Or	else,	of	a	concept	of	identity	as	‘house’	that	is	able	to	contain	only	insofar	as	it	‘gives	up	a	passage	to	the	outside	world	[l’etranger].’	An	insight,	that	is	furthermore	reflected	in	the	citational	practice	of	their	latest	company	name,	which	reinscribes	Derrida’s	assertion	that	‘there	is	no	house	or	interior	without	a	door	or	windows’.	See	Jacques	Derrida,	Of	Hospitality,	61.	
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their	cue	from	elsewhere,	and	their	being,	reiterative	and	inconclusive,	always	hangs	on	a	thread.455			In	the	theatre,	one	way	to	figure	the	cue	that	comes	from	elsewhere	has	of	course	always	been	the	more	or	less	overtly	exposed	crack	[Sprung]	in	the	boards	of	a	stage	in	which	is	located	the	technology	of	the	prompter:	‘mechanical	ruse	(mekhane),’	as	Derrida	puts	it,	‘or	mistaking	a	person,	repetition	upon	the	perverse	intervention	of	a	prompter	[souffleur],	
parole	soufflé,	substitution	of	actors	or	characters’	(Specters	5).	The	prompter	exposes	the	primary	repetition	of	the	theatrical	“event”	in	the	shape	of	an	opening	–	not	unlike	that	of	a	door	or	window	–	that	doubles	that	of	the	mouth	of	the	performer,	stealing	in	advance	the	performance	of	speech.	In	our	context,	however,	it	is	not	exclusively	nor	primarily	the	speech	of	actors	that	finds	itself	stolen	in	advance,	but	the	gestures	of	bodies	borne	along	by	a	movement	that	has	its	origin	elsewhere.	In	Every	house	has	a	door’s	performance	Sweet	Movie,	the	mechanical	ruse	of	the	prompt	is	figured	overtly	by	two	lap-tops	–	their	screens	turned	away	from	the	audience	–	playing	the	feast	scene	from	Dusan	Makavejev’s	1974	film	Sweet	Movie.	The	latter	prompts	the	‘re-enactment	of	some,	any,	or	all	of	the	roles	simultaneously,’	as	Goulish	relates,	which	the	audience	encounters	as	‘an	elaborate	wordless	lip-synch’	facilitated	by	the	performer	as	stand-in.456	The	performers	stand-in	for	an	absent	‘subject’	(theme)	without,	as	Goulish	points	out,	‘hoping	to	ever	inhabit	it’.457	Although	the	absence	of	the	source	is	here	figured	by	the	lap-top	prompt,	the	resulting	effect	of	dispossession	that	informs	the	style	of	non-performance	in	no	way	relies	on	the	use	of	such	a	theatrical	device.	For	repetition,	as	Heathfield’s	account	of	the	performers	of	Goat	Island	has	sought	to	describe	it,	is	always	already	exposed	by	the	uncanny	mode	of	a	half-inhabited	enactment.																																																											455	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	319-20.	456	Goulish,	‘First,	Second,	Third’,	34-5.	457	ibid,	37.	
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Rehearsing	The	Future	To	Come		 In	contrast	to	Goulish’s	outright	rejection	of	a	hope	to	ever	fully	inhabit	the	repetition,	Heathfield’s	description	continues	to	link	the	repetitive	and	repeatable	modality	of	the	rehearsal	to	a	more	or	less	goal-directed,	progressive	movement	of	a	process	of	learning	(‘we	are	watching	them	learn’).	Here,	a	present	state	of	not-knowing	(‘rehearsing	a	set	of	moves	that	they	do	not	yet	know’)	is	rehearsed	in	view	of	the	horizon	of	a	not	yet,	that	is,	a	however	much	deferred	and	projected	(possibility	of)	final	acquaintance.458	Particularly	however	in	view	of	Goulish’s	recourse	to	the	notion	of	performative	restraint	when	describing	the	modality	of	non-performance,	the	aspect	of	rehearsal	that																																																									458	Heathfield’s	commentary,	which	is	concerned	with	a	particular	moment	of	citation	of	a	difficult	found	movement	sequence	in	Goat	Island’s	performance	It’s	an	Earthquake	in	My	Heart	is	of	course	only	implicitly	related	to	the	wider	questions	of	the	body	and	the	archive,	as	well	as	of	the	temporal	dehiscence	of	the	event	of	performance	qua	iterability	as	it	informs	the	much	broader,	structural	remit	of	my	theoretical	analysis.	Therefore,	I	am	not	concerned	with	a	critique	of	the	reading	and	description	that	it	offers	of	this	particular	scene	on	its	own	terms	–	which	indeed	would	be	difficult	to	divorce	from	a	horizon	of	possible	acquisition	on	the	level	of	mere	physical	skill	–	but	rather	to	render	explicit	its	potential	relation	to	the	philosophical	and	political	stakes	of	my	argument	by	a	slight	displacement	–	for	instance,	by	situating	the	repetition	of	‘found	movement’	more	overtly	in	a	scene	of	spectral	inheritance,	that	is,	the	citational	practice	of	retracing	the	sedimented	marks	of	a	‘tradition.’	The	latter	is	never	merely	a	physical	but	also	symbolic	practice.	In	this	context	of	bodily	citation	as	the	labour	of	cultural	inheritance	and	transmission,	the	performance,	experience	and	testimony	of	not-knowing	at	play	in	a	half-inhabited	repetition	must	then	also	concern	the	production	of	socio-cultural	significance.	It	is	precisely	in	this	excess	of	an	in-	and	over-determination,	the	becoming	opaque	of	the	Vorstellung,	that	the	movement	of	repetition	as	rehearsal,	instead	of	being	submitted	to	a	teleologic	project	of	accomplishment,	begins	to	signal	in	secret	to	the	possibility	of	“its”	coming	alterity.	Therefore	it	is	only	in	the	context	of	this	slight	citational	displacement	of	Heathfield’s	remarks,	rather	than	within	their	own	remit,	that	more	precise	attention	must	be	paid	to	the	conception	of	a	half-inhabited	repetition	as	an	instance	of	rehearsal.	In	this	context,	it	becomes	necessary,	as	Derrida	puts	it,	‘to	free	the	value	of	the	future	from	the	value	of	‘horizon’	that	traditionally	has	been	attached	to	it	–	a	horizon	being,	as	the	Greek	word	indicates,	a	limit	from	which	I	pre-comprehend	the	future’.	[See	Derrida	&	Ferraris,	20].		
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pertains	to	the	half-inhabited	(re-)enactment	must	be	severed	from	the	structural	residue	of	such	a	teleological	perspective.	Here,	the	performance	of	non-mastery	and	not-knowing	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	structural	logic	of	the	not	yet.	To	avoid	doing	so,	the	structure	of	rehearsal	that	exposes	the	performance	as	repetition	must	be	differently	construed.	No	longer	constituting	a	rehearsal	for	the	future,	following	a	repetitive	practice	that	seeks	to	be	rid	of	its	very	coming	by	the	skilful	instituting	of	continuity	through	exact	repetitions	of	the	past,	what	is	at	stake	in	the	appropriative	restraint	of	the	enactment	is	a	more	paradoxical	logic	of	a	repetition	of	what	is	indeed	always	yet	to	come.	The	enactments	of	rehearsal	no	longer	merely	stand-in	for	an	absent	‘subject,’	source	or	prompt,	but	for	the	very	possibility	of	“their”	future	alterity.	The	dislocated	nature	of	such	standing-in	is	without	proper	place	and	actual	taking-place	and	therefore	only	ever	radically	half-inhabited	both	with	regards	to	the	past	and	(possible)	future	of	the	“present”	enactment.	Linking	the	unknowable	coming	of	the	future	to	the	repetitive,	that	is,	repeat-able,	modes	of	the	rehearsal,	the	latter	begins	to	describe	never	merely	a	mode	of	re-institution,	but	a	movement	of	repetition	that	maintains	a	simultaneous	reference	to	the	past	and	to	the	future.	No	matter	how	much	it	might	desire	mastery	and	identity	qua	repetition,	its	structural	repeatability	exposes	the	rehearsal	to	the	future’s	uncontrollable	coming.	Repetition	or	repetition	–	the	French	word	for	the	rehearsal	–	must	either	account	for	and	begin	to	swell	under	a	future	alterity	that	always	at	least	potentially	awaits	it,	or	else	seek	to	disavow	its	coming,	whether	through	the	more	or	less	violent	appeal	to	omnitemporality	or	by	re-inscribing	the	modality	of	a	present	dispossession	or	temporal	(as	well	as	ethical)	disadjustment	into	a	teleologic	narrative	of	its	eventual	overcoming.	Attitudes	with	regards	to	the	structure	of	rehearsal	as	différance	–	that	is,	as	a	repetition	both	altered	and	alterable	–	may	thus	be	twofold:	on	the	one	hand,	in	a	gesture	of	disavowal,	one	may	seek	to	put	the	rehearsal	in	the	service	of	a	teleological	trajectory	of	mastery	over	the	future	–	rehearsing	for	it	by	more	or	less	seeking	to	control	its	coming	through	the	skilful	repetitions	
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of	the	past,	laying	down,	as	it	were,	the	law,	for	other	times	and	places	to	come	–	or,	on	the	other,	one	may	seek	to	rehearse	the	future	to	come,	in	a	gesture	that	repeats	an	inheritance	otherwise	whilst	remaining	open	to	the	unpredictable	and	uncontrollable	coming	of	“its”	future	transformation.	‘[..B]ecause	there	is	a	future,’	Derrida	says,	‘a	context	is	always	open’.459	In	the	context	of	the	style	or	modality	of	performance	employed	by	the	performers	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door,	what	Goulish	describes	with	recourse	to	the	performative	restraint	of	the	stand-in	must	thus	be	read	as	an	“active”	engaging	of	this	opening,	in	other	words,	a	“passive”	modality	or	attitude	[Haltung]	of	placeholding	as	
model	of	response-ability:	‘signifying	hospitality	for	what	is	to	come,’	‘enact[ing]	a	kind	of	opening	[…]	of	the	place	left	vacant	for	who	is	to	come,	for	the	arrivant,’	as	Derrida	puts	it.460	This	‘zone	of	disacquaintance,	of	not	understanding,’	as	Derrida	further	relates,	
prevents	the	present	from	being	consumed	immediately.	In	doing	so	it	‘is	also	a	reserve	and	an	excessive	chance	–	a	chance	for	excess	to	have	a	future,	and	consequently	to	engender	new	contexts’.461	For	Derrida,	here	speaking	in	the	context	of	his	own	writings	and	a	paradoxical	demand	‘for	this	excess	even	with	respect	to	what	I	myself	can	understand	of	what	I	say,’	such	a	marking	of	an	empty	place	for	someone	absolutely	indeterminate	is	similarly	related	to	a	form	of	restraint,	namely,	what	he	calls	with	recourse	to	a	Christian	tradition	from	which	he	radically	parts	in	repeating	it	otherwise,	the	kenosis	of	the	messianic	‘that	does	not	necessarily	have	to	be	the	object	of	a	mystical	exercise	or	ascetic	despoilment’.462																																																													459	Derrida	&	Ferraris,	20.	460	ibid,	30.	461	ibid.	462	ibid,	21.	In	Christian	theology,	kenosis	describes	the	‘self-emptying’	of	one’s	own	will	and	becoming	entirely	receptive	to	God’s	divine	will.	
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An	Economy	of	Narcissism			 […]	and,	like	all	inheritors,	we	are	in	mourning.	[…]	To	be	[…]	means	[…]	to	inherit.	All	the	questions	on	the	subject	of	being	or	of	what	is	to	be	(or	not	to	be)	are	questions	of	inheritance.	[…]	That	we	are	heirs	does	not	mean	that	we	have	or	we	receive	this	or	that,	some	inheritance	that	enriches	us	one	day	with	this	or	that,	but	that	the	being	of	what	we	are	is	first	of	all	inheritance,	whether	we	like	it	or	not.463			 We	are	undeniably	the	heirs	or	legatees	[…]	of	this	word	[here:	democracy,	but	later	also:	archive]	that	has	been	sent	to	us,	addressed	to	us	for	centuries,	and	that	we	are	always	sending	or	putting	off	until	later.	This	sending	or	putting	off	[renvoi]	gestures	toward	the	past	of	an	inheritance	only	by	remaining	to	come.	464	
	In	the	above	description	and	analysis	of	the	entanglement	of	the	body	and	the	archive	in	the	performance	practice	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door,	the	latter	has	emerged	out	of	a	series	of	“enacted”,	but	at	most	half-inhabited	appropriations	of	carefully	selected	archival	remains.	As	such,	it	participates	and	intervenes,	in	however	small	a	way,	in	an	archival	scene	of	historiographical	transmission	and	the	formation	and	transformation	of	collective	schemata	of	inheritance	and	com-memoration.	The	bodies	of	the	performers	enact	or	repeat	an	embodied	journey	through	an	array	of	outside	traces	that	at	the	same	time	they	explicitly	avoid	to	incorporate	through	the	non-performance	of	an	appropriative	restraint.	This	more	or	less	explicit	“refusal,”	that	is,	the	demonstration	of	a	constitutive	failure	to	interiorize,	might	be	described	by	what	Derrida	designates	as	the	structure	of	exappropriation,	whereby	‘each	and	every	movement	of	appropriation	is,	in	effect,	an	“ex-appropriation”	or	a	“finite	appropriation”’	and	thus	a	double	movement																																																									463	Jacques	Derrida,	Specters	of	Marx,	54.	
464	Derrida,	Rogues,	9.	
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involving	‘both	an	inescapable	gesture	of	(re-)appropriation	and	the	necessary	failure	to	interiorize	that	which	remains	outside,	over	there,	always	out	of	reach’.465	The	com-memorative	aspects	of	these	performances,	which	seek	to	contribute	to	the	precarious	survival	and	transmission	of	more	or	less	neglected	or	forgotten	archival	remains,	could	be	said	to	make	of	it	a	work	of	mourning	as	the	constitutively	failing	project	of	introjection,	a	mimetic	interiorization	caught	up	precisely	in	a	double	movement	as	well	as	a	double	bind	of	exappropriation	–	both	the	desired	recovery	and	safekeeping	of	a	neglected	archival	trace,	as	well	as	a	simultaneous	“refusal”	to	make	the	dead	other	a	living	part	of	one.	Such	a	“refusal,”	however,	can	never	simply	be	of	the	order	of	a	choice,	but	merely	of	the	order	of	a	demonstration	of	a	necessary,	structural	impossibility	at	the	heart	of	every	desire	for	appropriation.		It	is	therefore	of	the	order	of	a	modality	or	style	in	the	form	of	a	gesture	of	‘putting	off’	the	very	desire	for	appropriation.466																																																										465	Pleshette	DeArmitt,	The	Right	to	Narcissism,	131.	466	In	anticipation	of	what,	beyond	a	naïve	rejection	of	narcissism	will	soon	be	called	an	economy	of	narcissism,	we	might	thus	here	similarly	speak	of	an	economy	of	desire	and	never	of	an	outright	rejection	to	appropriate.	Appropriation,	interiorization,	‘eating	well,’	as	Derrida	insists,	is	never	an	option.	‘”One	eats	[the	other]	regardless	and	lets	oneself	be	eaten	by	him”	[Derrida	in	DeArmitt,	129]’.	‘Of	course,’	DeArmitt	relates,	‘we	should	hear	this	Derridian	declaration	as	extending	far	beyond	any	empirical	consumption	of	food	or	drink	to	“the	very	concept	of	experience”	itself,	because	the	law	of	need	or	desire	–	the	“‘it	is	necessary	[il	faut]’	that	I	want	the	thing	to	be	mine”	–	is	equally	at	work	in	all	experience,	from	eating	and	perceiving	to	loving	and	mourning’	[DeArmitt,	129].	What	is	more,	Derrida’s	conception	of	desire	(to	appropriate)	is	conditioned	on	its	constitutive	failure.	As	De	Armitt	puts	it:		 [A]lthough	the	absolute	alterity	of	the	other,	time	and	again,	thwarts	or	bars	our	attempts	at	appropriation	and	hence	limits	our	insatiable	desires,	this	is	what	we	desire.	Whether	we	are	conscious	of	it	or	not,	[Derrida]	contends,	we	“desire”	that	the	other	“remain	foreign,	transcendent,	other.”	Indeed,	for	there	to	be	desire	at	all,	[…]	it	is	essential	that	the	other	remain	sufficiently	other	so	that	one	still	has	an	interest	in	making	it	one’s	own	[DeArmitt,	131].		
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																																																																																																																																																A	similar	reading	of	the	Derridian	conception	of	desire	informs	the	discernment	of	what	Martin	Hägglund	calls	the	‘radical	atheism’	of	deconstruction.	Here,	in	the	context	of	a	contestation	of	the	religious	ideal	of	immortality,	the	unscathed	and	salvation,	the	failure	of	desire’s	fulfillment	no	longer	describes	a	negative	limitation	but	the	necessary	opening	for	a	continued	process	of	re-appropriation	intrinsic	to	the	movement	of	life	itself.	[See	Martin	Hägglund,	Radical	Atheism.	Derrida	
and	the	Time	of	Life.	(Stanford	California:	Stanford	University	Press,	2008),	8-11].	Derrida,	Hägglund	argues,	‘relies	on	the	desire	for	mortal	life	in	order	to	read	the	most	religious	ideas	against	themselves’	(ibid,	11).	For	instance,	bringing	to	bear	the	resources	of	the	French	idiom	on	the	deconstruction	of	the	religious	idea	of	salvation,	Derrida	shows	that	every	desire	for	salvation	(salut	de)	must	be	compromised	by	the	greeting	address	to	the	other	(salut	a).	As	Hägglund	puts	it:		Derrida’s	strong	claim	is	that	the	greeting	of	the	other	is	incompatible	with	the	very	hope	for	salvation:	“the	salut	a	presupposes	a	renunciation	of	the	salut	de.	To	address	a	greeting	
to	the	other,	a	greeting	from	one’s	own	self	to	the	other	as	other,	for	this	greeting	to	be	what	it	must	be	it	must	break	off	all	hope	of	salvation	or	redemption,	all	return	and	restitution	of	the	‘safe.’”	The	radicality	of	Derrida’s	argument	emerges	if	one	bears	in	mind	that	greeting	the	other	is	not	a	matter	of	choice.	Whatever	one	does,	one	is	greeting	the	other,	since	nothing	can	happen	without	the	coming	of	the	other.	Thus,	in	spite	of	Derrida’s	recourse	to	voluntary	metaphors,	the	“renunciation”	of	the	hope	for	salvation	is	concomitant	with	the	advent	of	life	as	such	[ibid,	128].		I	will	return	to	this	context	in	more	detail	later	on,	particularly	with	regards	to	the	question	of	the	desire	for	and	promise	of	justice	as	it	surfaces	in	Every	house	has	a	door’s	performance	Testimonium	and	resonates	with	the	work	of	both	Benjamin	and	Derrida.	My	interest	with	regards	to	the	general	structure	of	desire	thus	construed	here	lies	in	probing	for	a	(didactic)	value	of	the	demonstration	of	the	structural	limit	
and	constitutive	failure	of	appropriation	in	the	context	of	a	theatrical	Vor-
stellung	[representing-before].	For	to	demonstrate,	that	is,	to	actively	avow	the	quasi-transcendental	structure	in	a	particular	bearing	of	a	style	or	modality	of	a	Haltung	remains	of	the	order	of	a	choice.	In	this	scenario	of	an	exposed	movement	of	appropriation,	the	demonstration	of	its	interruption	and	failure,	I	want	to	suggest,	not	only	keeps	alive	the	desire	to	re-appropriate	for	those	representing,	but	also	induces	it	for	those	witnessing.	The	latter	are	thereby	activated	in	their	(limited)	ability	to	appropriate,	respond,	participate,	contribute	and	make	their	own.	The	double	movement	of	an	exposed	exappropriation	as	a	simultaneous	gesture	towards	the	past	and	the	future,	or	more	precisely,	towards	the	
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In	the	context	of	the	com-memorative	scene	of	performance	practices	actively	engaged	in	the	task	of	inheritance,	the	half-inhabiting	modality	of	an	appropriative	restraint	can	thus	no	longer	be	inscribed	in	a	teleologic	trajectory	of	a	projected	successful	introjection.	Instead,	the	concomitant	gesture	of	‘putting	off’	the	movement	of	appropriation	is	at	the	same	time	a	gesture	of	‘sending’	a	“saved”	inheritance	towards	the	unpredictable	possibility	of	its	othered	return.	A	saving	that	is	always	only	provisional	and	more	or	less	precariously	exposed.	Here,	the	double	movement	of	the	exappropriated	enactment	–	‘inseparable	from	the	implicit	“ex-”	of	an	iterability	that	can	never	be	self-contained’	–	must	reject	and	demonstratively	ward	off	the	seeming	acquisition	of	“skill,”	“professionalism,”	or	“know-how”	in	favour	of	what	I	have	called	a	virtuosity	of	trembling.467	The	Haltung	[attitude]	of	non-performance	is	thus	also	one	of	an	Anhaltung	[stoppage]	of	its	own	movement	of	re-
appropriation,	self-interrupting	and	immediately	parting	with	itself	by	a	passive	sending	or	putting	off	[renvoi]	that,	as	Derrida	puts	it,	‘gestures	toward	the	past	of	an	inheritance	only	by	remaining	to	come’.468																																																																																																																																																		past	as	to	come,	in	turn	appeals	to	an	audience	to	follow	Echo’s	ruse,	that	is,	a	mimetic	interiorization	that	counter-signs	in	its	own	name.	467	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	341.	468	Derrida,	Rogues,	9.	The	movement	of	this	simultaneous	‘gesture’	to	the	past	and	the	future	–	a	repetition	of	the	past	as	to	come	–	is	precisely	that	of	the	‘citability	of	gesture’	as	Benjamin	describes	it,	and	as	it	has	been	our	privileged	mark	of	return	throughout.	Even	if	it	does	not	always	explicitly	appear	here	by	name,	it	nonetheless	informs	the	present	context.	The	citable	gesture	describes	a	process	of	‘saving’	by	a	movement	of	time	becoming	space,	retention,	the	leaving	of	(external)	traces	and	the	possibility	of	return	and	re-appropriation,	as	well	as	the	structural	exposure	to	the	future	qua	iterability	as	both	threat	and	chance.	For	Derrida,	whether	on	the	level	of	a	subject	or	a	collective,	the	breached	interiority	of	self-identity,	the	intrusion	of	alterity	that	springs	from	the	spacing	of	time	as	the	condition	of	every	relation,	including	the	relation	to	self	–	the	structurally	necessary	opening	to	the	future	in	general	–	is	of	course	never	limited	to	a	specific	style	(i.e.	of	non-performance)	or	at	any	point	subject	to	choice,	decision	and	the	possibility	of	a	successful	avoidance.	Instead,	it	is,	as	Martin	Hägglund	has	so	convincingly	argued,	a	quasi-	or	ultra-transcendental	condition	from	which	no	ethical	norm	can	be	derived.	Nevertheless,	in	contrast	to	its	however	futile	disavowal,	as	well	as	to	its	mere	description,	I	am	here	probing	for	a	didactic	and	political	value	of	its	‘demonstration’	[see	Hägglund,	75].	For	it	is	the	
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The	half-inhabiting,	restrained	appropriation	of	non-performance	resembles	this	double	gesture	towards	a	past	that	is	still	to	come.	Goulish,	as	we	saw,	links	the	restraint	of	non-performance	to	a	critique	of	what	he	calls	a	theatrical	narcissism,	that	is,	‘a	tendency	of	performance,	or	performing,	to	be	about	itself,	while	pretending	to	be	about	something	else’.469	Yet	as	the	mediated	encounter	with	the	absent	material	of	the	performance	through	the	body	of	the	performer	as	stand-in	demonstrates,	the	withdrawal	of	the	performer	before	the	material	must	necessarily	be	incomplete.	Instead,	the	performer	half-inhabits	the	embodied	trace	–	retracing	thereby	an	interval	and	a	gap	between	the	function	of	representing	and	that	which	is	being	represented	–	in	a	movement	of	an	always	limited,	finite	appropriation.	As	such,	following	the	modality	that	Derrida	referred	to	with	the	term	exappropriation,	non-performance	must	not	here	be	read	in	terms	that	oppose	narcissism	and	non-narcissism,	but	instead	can	be	said	to	pursue	what	Derrida	calls	‘the	economy	of	a	much	more	welcoming,	hospitable	narcissism,	one	that	is	much	more	open	to	the	experience	of	the	other	as	other’.470	Hixon,	speaking	in	the	context	of	the	sober	style	of	appropriation	of	American	poet	Charles	Reznikoff’s	Testimony:	The	United	States	(1885-1915)	
Recitative	–	the	primary	material	of	Every	house	has	a	door’s	performance	Testimonium	(2006)	–	hints	at	her	own	methodological	efforts	at	exercising	what	resembles	such	an	economy	of	narcissism	in	her	style	of	directing:	‘I	have	always	found	the	way	forward	by	restraint	and	by	the	particular,’	she	says,	‘–	the	particulars	of	a	walk,	a	fall,	a	specific	name,	a	death	or	saying	goodbye’.471																																																																																																																																																
Haltung	of	such	a	demonstration	that	would	be	able	to	provide	other	producers	and,	what	is	more,	receivers	as	producers,	with	what	we	might	here	call	with	Benjamin	on	Brecht	an	‘improved	apparatus,’	namely,	one	that	foregrounds	the	possibilities	of	its	perpetual	transformation	through	participation	qua	response-ability.	469	Goulish	‘First,	Second,	Third’,	36.	470	DeArmitt,	96.	
471 Goulish	&	Hixon.	I	will	return	in	more	detail	to	the	context	of	Every	house	has	a	door’s	performance	Testimonium	below.	In	this	context,	it	will	be	a	matter	precisely	of	linking	a	sobriety	of	style,	that	is,	an	appropriative	‘restraint’	before	the	particular,	to	the	promise	of	an	
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In	the	context	of	an	economy	of	narcissism	beyond	a	naïve	denunciation	of	narcissistic	appropriation,	it	becomes	possible	to	reinscribe	the	other-directed,	passive-active	or	re-active	modality	of	enactment	of	the	non-performer	in	proximity	to	what	Pleshette	DeArmitt	calls	Derrida’s	strategic	employment	of	the	figure	of	Echo	‘in	order	to	elucidate	a	deconstructive	notion	of	the	“self”	and	its	relation	to	the	other’.472	Particularly,	that	is,	if	one	does	not	limit	the	structure	of	individuation	through	call	and	(limited)	response-ability	to	that	of	an	inter-subjective	scene.	For,	in	Derrida,	the	figure	of	the	other,	on	which	the	limited	movement	of	(Echo’s)	individuation	both	depends	and	by	which	it	comes	undone,	is	never	limited	to	that	of	another	subject,	but	instead	must	be	read	as	the	auto-immune	self-relation	of	the	living	body	with	‘whatever	is	not	the	body	but	belongs	to	it,	comes	back	to	it:	prosthesis	and	delegation,	repetition,	difference’.473	The	possibility	of	return	qua	re-appropriation	is	thus	at	the	same	time	the	impossibility	of	the	purity	of	this	return,	in	other	words,	an	exposition	to	the	necessary	possibility	of	non-return	and	a	movement	of	simultaneous	gathering	and	dividing,	individuation	and	disindividuation.	To	avow	the	necessary	possibility	of	non-return	in	the	limited	movement	of	re-appropriation	by	a	gesture	of	putting-off,	sending,	leaving	or	allowing	[Lassen],																																																																																																																																																impossible	justice	beyond	the	subsuming	generality	of	any	given	law.		For	the	(impossible)	act	of	justice,	Derrida	states	in	his	article	‘Force	of	Law’,	‘must	always	concern	singularity,	individuals,	irreplaceable	groups	and	lives,	the	other	or	myself	as	other,	in	a	unique	situation’.	[Derrida,	‘Force	of	Law’,	947]. 472	DeArmitt,	98.	473	Derrida,	Spectres	of	Marx,	177.	‘To	protect	its	life,’	Derrida	continues,	‘to	constitute	itself	as	unique	living	ego,	to	relate,	as	the	same,	to	itself,	it	is	necessarily	led	to	welcome	the	other	within	(so	many	figures	of	death:	differance	of	the	technical	apparatus,	iterability,	non-uniqueness,	prosthesis,	synthetic	image,	simulacrum,	all	of	which	begins	with	language,	before	language),	it	must	therefore	take	the	immune	defenses	apparently	meant	for	the	non-ego,	the	enemy,	the	opposite,	the	adversary	and	direct	them	at	once	for	itself	and	against	itself’	[ibid,	177].	See	also	Hägglund:	‘In	Derrida	“the	other”	does	not	primarily	designate	another	human	being.	On	the	contrary,	alterity	is	indissociable	from	the	spacing	of	time.	Such	spacing	is	irreducibly	violent	because	it	breaches	any	interiority	and	exposes	everyone	–	myself	as	well	as	any	other	–	to	the	perils	of	finitude’	[Hägglund,	75].	
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demonstrates	the	expansion	or	augmentation	of	the	self	by	a	process	of	infinite	exappropriation	in	the	entanglement	of	the	ego	with	the	archive	of	hypomnemata.	Here,	it	is	my	contention	that	the	other-directed	bodies	of	the	non-performing	performers	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door,	which	physically	forge	an	essay-like	path	through	a	subject	by	the	more	or	less	mimetic	interiorization	of	archival	traces,	demonstrate	their	hypomnesic	augmentation,	visibly	stretched	across	the	assembled	–	whether	successively	laid	out	or	stacked	on	top	one	another	–	array	of	half-inhabited	external	marks.	Albeit	therefore	eschewing	a	theatrical	narcissism	by	demonstratively	leaving	the	interiorized	other	as	other,	one	might	nevertheless	identify	the	non-performer	(on	the	level	of	his	or	her	unique	performance),	or	indeed	the	performance	itself	(on	the	level	of	the	work	as	unique	signature),	following	DeArmitt’s	reading	of	Derrida’s	recourse	to	the	figure	of	Echo,	as			 a	“little	narcisissist”	who	is	responsible	to	the	other	by	answering	and	returning	his	call.	Yet,	while	echoing	the	words	of	her	other,	[…]	is	resourceful	enough	to	speak	of	and	for	herself,	signing	in	her	own	name.474			The	figure	of	Echo,	who	by	divine	prohibition	has	been	deprived	of	her	ability	to	initiate	speech,	is	bound	by	law	to	speak	only	after	and	thus	to	forever	follow	the	other.	Her	speech-act	resembles	that	of	an	actor’s,	stolen	in	advance	by	the	mechanical	ruse	of	a	prompter.	Yet	Echo,	seemingly	deprived	of	all	initiative,	is	nevertheless	capable	of	herself	playing	a	ruse	on	a	mechanical	ruse.	Condemned	to	repetition,	she	feigns	to	repeat	whilst	repeating	otherwise,	signing	in	her	own	name.	Iterability	–	for	instance	of	Narcissus’(self-)address	–	renders	a	process	of	appropriation	possible,	that	is,	to	identify,	recognize,	repeat	and	repeat	otherwise	(respond).	At	the	same	time,	however,	given	the	structure	of	ex-appropriation	that	stems	from	the	(re-)iterability	of	the	appropriated	mark,	Echo’s	ruse	of	a	counter-signature,	as	well	as	that	of	the																																																									474	DeArmitt,	98.	
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performance	practice	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	door,	must	be	exposed	to	the	coming	of	other	respondents.	If	Derrida’s	discernment	of	Echo’s	ruse	as	that	of	an	ability	to	speak	of	and	for	herself	by	following	the	other,	as	DeArmitt	suggests,	constitutes	a	‘powerful	interpretation	of	this	seeming	powerless	figure,’	it	does	not	however	rid	this	reactively	productive	scene	of	individuation	of	a	constitutive	precariousness.	Even	when	powerfully	appropriating	an	external	prosthesis,	this	active	ruse	remains	passively	or	indeed	powerlessly	exposed	to	the	future.	Echo,	as	DeArmitt	suggests,	offers	us	another	narrative	of	narcissism,	‘which	does	not	disavow	mourning	but	instead	opens	itself	to	the	experience	of	the	other	as	other’.475	This	experience	of	a	limit	of	appropriation	must	concern	both	the	past	–	the	other	as	what	precedes	and	produces	a	unique	body	and	voice	through	what	resists	repetition	-	as	well	as	the	future	–	the	other	of	an	already	inscribed	coming	loss	or	ruin	in	the	present	of	(re-)appropriation.	The	present	ruse	of	a	limited	appropriation	is	ambiguously	exposed,	both	in	the	sense	of	an	however	limited	narcissistic	movement	of	re-appropriation	(a	showing	never	far	from	that	of	a	showing	off)	as	well	as	that	of	an	‘open,	vulnerable	position	of	a	person	or	thing,	[…]	thus	bring[ing]	together	the	notions	of	putting	on	show	[as	well	as]	the	presentation	of	ideas	with	the	danger	of	such	exposure’.476	The	work	of	mourning,	as	DeArmitt’s	reading	of	Derrida	shows,	is	therefore	caught	in	a	double	bind,	demanding	‘that	the	mourner	“must	and	must	not	take	the	other	into	[her]self”’.477	If	the	performances	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	seem	largely	driven	by	a	counter-archival	impulse	of	safekeeping	the	neglected	and	forgotten	–	demonstrating	a	concern	with	what	must	be	appropriated	and	kept	safe	–	the	modality	of	restraint	in	non-performance	furthermore	bespeaks	a	concern	with	how	one	ought	to	appropriate	the	other,	that	is,	with	the	ethical	aporia	of	determining	the	most	respectful	way	of	relating	to	the	other	that	is	to	be	mimetically	interiorized.	This	unresolvable	aporia																																																									475	ibid,	99.	476	Ibid,	p.104.	477	DeArmitt,	115.	
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describes	an	impasse	of	undecidability	between	respect	and	disrespect	(violence)	for	the	other.478	The	archival	marks	that	are	taken	up	and	appropriated	in	the	performance	practice	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	–	but	are	only	ever	half-inhabited	–	not	only	precede	but	also	exceed	the	time	of	their	(re-)enactment.	The	demonstration	of	this	precedence	and	excess	of	a	repeatable	mark	on	which	a	singular	yet	finite	appropriation	qua	counter-signature	depends,	calls	for	the	coming	of	“its”	future	appropriations,	or	else,	the	reply	or	response	from	the	one	who	comes	to	sign	in	his	own	manner.	‘It	is	the	ear	of	the	other	that	signs,’	Derrida	says.479	The	demonstrated	possibility	of	the	coming	of	a	counter-signature	by	way	of	a	passive	attitude	[Haltung]	of	place-holding	as	model	of	response-ability	‘signif[ies]	hospitality	for	what	is	to	come.’	‘[E]nacting	a	kind	of	opening	[…]	of	the	place	left	vacant	for	who	is	to	come,	for	the	arrivant,’	is	also	the	Haltung	of	an	appeal	to	a	mode	of	reception	that	cannot	so	easily	be	reduced	to	the	order	of	a	mere	consumption.	For	in	order	‘to	hear	and	understand	[…],’	Derrida	states	further,	‘one	must	also	produce’.480				
	
Every	Archive	Has	a	Door	
	 When	speaking	of	the	primary	material	of	Every	house	has	door’s	2013	production	Testimonium	-	a	selection	of	‘objectivist’	poems	based	on	the	law	reports	of	US	court	cases	between	1885-1915	from	the	two	out-of-print	volumes	of	Testimony	by	the	American	poet	Charles																																																									478	Geoffrey	Bennington	relates	the	impossibility	of	a	non-violent	relation	to	the	other	in	the	context	of	reading	the	texts	of	a	tradition	as	follows:	‘[…]	[T]here	could	be	no	reading	absolutely	respectful	of	a	text,	for	a	total	respect	would	forbid	one	from	even	touching	the	text,	opening	the	book,	so	there	could	be	no	countersignature	absolutely	respectful	of	the	signature	it	countersigns,	for	in	that	case	it	would	become	confused	with	that	first	signature	and	would	no	longer	sign	at	all’.	[Bennington,	
Derridabase,	165].	479	Derrida	quoted	in	DeArmitt,	137.	480	ibid,	138.	
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Reznikoff	–	Goulish	describes	Reznikoff’s	endeavour	as	one	of	imagining	‘an	alternate	history	of	the	United	States,	one	that	would	include	voices	omitted	from	the	history	books’.481	In	doing	so,	he	could	easily	be	speaking	of	the	company’s	own	small	efforts	at	constructing	what	Jane	Blocker	describes	with	regards	to	Goat	Island’s	performance	The	
Lastmaker	as	‘an	archive	forever	being	made	and	remade’.482	For	when	selecting	the	contents	for	these	seemingly	open-ended	archival	or	
hypomnemic	endeavours,	the	company	often	sees	itself	drawn	to	the	historically	or	critically	neglected,	as	if,	in	some	small	way,	as	Hixon	relates,	to	make	amends.483	In	thus	gathering	the	forgotten	and	neglected,	the	archival	aspect	of	the	performances	could	be	said	to	construct	a	counter-archive	to	a	historical	record	that	has	always	been	skewed	towards	the	privileged	and	powerful.	As	critical	interventions	into	a	preceding	archive,	in	however	minute	a	way,	the	performances	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	seemingly	concern	themselves	with	the	question	of	a	politics	of	the	archive.	That	question,	as	Derrida	reminds	us,	is	never	to	be	determined	as	one	political	question	among	others	insofar	as	‘[t]here	is	no	political	power	without	control	of	the	archive	[…].484	‘Effective	democratization,’	Derrida	states,	‘can	always	be	measured	by	this	essential	criterion:	the	participation	in	and	the	access	to	the	archive,	its	constitution,	and	its	interpretation’.485	Thus,	the	companies’	concern	with	aesthetic	participation	through	compositional	as	well	as	discursive	appeals	to	response-ability	here	doubles	up	as	a	concern	with	a	politics	of	archival	co-production.	Yet	besides	contributing	to	the	necessary	redrawing	of	inherited	limits	and	trends	of	exclusion	and	inclusion	–	an	endeavour	that	is	never	itself	without	the	violence	of	new	or	repeated	exclusions	and	can	only	ever	raise	the	stakes	of	responsibility	in	face	of	a	necessary	aporia	of	selection	–	these																																																									481	Goulish	&	Hixon.	482	Blocker,	10.	483	Goulish	&	Hixon.	484	Jacques	Derrida,	Archive	Fever.	A	Freudian	Impression.	trans.	Eric	Prenowitz.	(Chicago	&	London:	University	of	Chicago	Press	1996),	4.	485	ibid,	(my	emphasis).	
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performances	are	not	simply	concerned	with	what	is	being	gathered,	but	furthermore	with	the	how	of	the	gathering,	that	is,	the	manner	of	the	facilitated	transmission.	If	the	manner	of	its	assemblage	differs	with	respect	to	dominant	archival	structures	–	for	instance	by	carefully	avoiding	the	consignation	of	its	parts	to	a	totalizing	system	‘in	which	all	the	elements	articulate	the	unity	of	an	ideal	configuration’	–	the	counter-archival	performance	practice	must	not	however	strictly	be	opposed	to	the	archive	that	precedes	it.	In	contesting	existing	limits	of	inclusion	and	exclusion,	as	well	as	an	archontic	principle	that	wants	to	seal	a	tradition	by	putting	it	under	‘house	arrest,’	as	Derrida	puts	it,	by	consigning	the	gathered	to	a	permanent	dwelling	under	the	guardianship	of	a	privileged	hermeneutic	right	and	competence,	the	performance	as	counter-archive	
demonstrates	an	essential	dividedness	and	open-endedness	to	which	‘that	re-producible,	iterable,	and	conservative	production	of	memory,	[…]	called	the	archive’	was	always	already	structurally	destined.486	The	counter-archive,	however,	not	simply	redraws	the	boarders	of	exclusion	and	inclusion	and	contests	what	Derrida	calls,	with	reference	to	Benjamin,	the	archive’s	‘force	of	law’	–	the	violence	of	a	power	[Gewalt]	which	at	once	posits	and	conserves	–	by	reinstituting	a	reconfigured	archontic	authority	(however	marginal),	but	instead	seeks	to	interrupt,	in	so	far	as	possible,	the	movement	of	oscillation	between	institutive	and	conservative	violence	by	the	open-ended	gesture	of	a	gathering	that	stands-in	as	placeholder	for	“its”	coming	alterity.	Exposing	the	structural	opacity	and	dividedness	of	language	as	the	scene	rather	than	instrument	for	the	exploration	of	the	past,	the	performance	as	counter-archive	indeed	demands	to	be	read,	as	we	have	heard	Blocker	suggest,	as	‘an	archive	forever	being	made	and	remade’.487	What	is	more,	any	such	reading	inevitably	begins	to	participate	in	the	labour	of	archival	deconstruction,	ex-appropriating	the	performance	as	hupomnēmata	by	further	augmenting	its	archival	materials.	The	demonstrated	impossibility	of	consigning	the	gathered,	essentially	divided,																																																									486	ibid,	2	&	26.	487	Blocker,	10.	
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heterogeneous	marks	of	a	secret,	spectral	inheritance	to	the	unity	of	an	ideal	configuration	makes	for	an	unmasterable	structural	complexity	and	compositional	fragility	that	at	once	overwhelms	the	flow	of	immediate	reception	and	evokes	a	participatory,	appropriative	desire	in	the	long	duration	of	its	aftermath.	‘The	whole	thing	is	excessive.	It	is	too	much.	There	are	too	many[,]’	Jane	Blocker	exclaims	before	embarking	on	her	reading	of	The	Lastmaker.	For	Blocker,	the	cluttered,	extremely	dense	and	layered	web	of	assembled	references	of	the	performance	leads	her	to	declare	the	failure	of	the	performance	as	archive.488	Yet	the	performance	as	archive	could	be	said	to	“fail”	only	if	the	concept	of	the	archive	would	essentially	depend	on	the	power	of	its	arresting	authority.	Given	however	that	the	concept	of	the	archive	was	always	already	menaced	by	essential	contradictions	–	i.e.	that	the	possibility	of	keeping	the	past	that	the	archive	seeks	to	facilitate	at	the	same	time	exposes	the	impossibility	of	keeping	the	past	unscathed	–	as	Derrida’s	analysis	seeks	to	formalize	it,	the	failure	of	the	authority	of	the	archive,	here	as	elsewhere,	never	befalls	as	an	avoidable	accident	from	the	outside	what	would	otherwise	have	been	saved	undamaged,	‘in	a	hard	and	lasting	way	[…]	so	as	to	ensure	in	this	way	salvation	and	indemnity’.489	‘To	have	a	concept	at	one’s	disposal,’	Derrida	notes	with	regards	to	the	concept	of	the	archive	as	well	as	any	other	concept	that	presents	itself	as	archivable	in	a	lasting	way,	‘to	have	assurances	with	regards	to	it,	is	to	presuppose	a	closed	heritage	[…].’	And	although	‘[…]	the	notion	of	the	archive	seem[s]	at	first	[…]	to	point	toward	the	past,	to	refer	to	the	signs	of	consigned	memory,	to	recall	faithfulness	to	tradition,’	as	iterable	hypomnemic	retention	it	must	remain	in	excess	of	any	given	finite	schemata,	thereby	becoming	a	question	of	the	future	and	a	question	of	a	response.490	‘The	archive,’	Derrida	says,	‘if	we	want	to	know	what	that	will	have	meant,	we	will	only	know	in	times	to	come.	Perhaps.	Not	tomorrow	but	in	times	to	come,	
																																																								488	ibid,	9.	489	Derrida,	Archive	Fever,	26.	490	ibid,	36.	
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later	on	or	perhaps	never’.491	To	expose	the	structural	unknowing	of	the	gathered	is	to	demonstrate	the	essential	failure	of	archival	authority.	An	avowal	and	demonstration	that	exposes	and	aggravates	the	archive’s	essential	opening	to	the	future,	its	augmentation	and	living-on,	for	better	and/or	for	worse.492	Structurally	taken	into	account,	the	coming	of	the																																																									491	ibid.	492	That	an	archive’s	essential	opening	to	the	future	is	necessarily	for	better	and/or	for	worse	springs	from	what	Derrida	designates	as	the	law	of	contamination.	Speaking	in	the	context,	amongst	other	things,	the	necessary	possibility	of	contamination	of	Nietzsche’s	texts	by	Nazi	ideology,	Derrida	gives	the	following	account	of	a	logic	of	contamination	as	both	threat	and	chance:			 There	is	a	time	and	a	spacing	of	the	“yes”	as	“yes-yes”:	it	takes	time	to	say	“yes.”	A	single	“yes”	is,	therefore,	immediately	double,	it	immediately	announces	a	“yes”	to	come	and	already	recalls	that	the	“yes”	implies	another	“yes.”	So,	the	“yes”	is	immediately	double,	immediately	“yes-yes.”	This	immediate	duplication	is	the	source	of	all	possible	contamination	[…]	The	second	“yes”	can	eventually	be	one	of	laughter	or	derision	at	the	first	“yes.”	It	can	be	the	forgetting	of	the	first	“yes.”	[…]	With	this	duplicity	we	are	at	the	heart	of	the	“logic”	of	contamination.	One	should	not	simply	consider	contamination	as	a	threat,	however.	To	do	so	continues	to	ignore	this	very	logic.	Possible	contamination	must	be	assumed,	because	it	is	also	opening	or	chance,	our	chance.	Without	contamination	we	would	have	no	opening	or	chance.	Contamination	is	not	only	to	be	assumed	or	affirmed:	it	is	the	very	possibility	of	affirmation	in	the	first	place.	For	affirmation	to	be	possible,	there	must	always	be	at	least	two	”yes’s.”	If	the	contamination	of	the	first	“yes”	by	the	second	is	refused	–	for	whatever	reasons	–	one	is	denying	the	very	possibility	of	the	first	“yes.”	Hence	all	the	contradictions	and	confusions	that	this	denial	can	fall	into.	Threat	is	chance,	chance	is	threat	–	this	law	is	absolutely	undeniable	and	irreducible.	If	one	does	not	accept	it,	there	is	no	risk,	there	is	only	death.	If	one	refuses	to	take	a	risk,	one	is	left	with	nothing	but	death	[Derrida	quoted	in	Hägglund,	34].			More	closely	related	to	the	question	of	memory	and	archival	reworking,	Derrida	asserts	in	another	interview,	that	there	is	no	historical	progress	in	general	without	the	threat	of	a	return	of	the	worst.	‘Yes,	a	ghost	can	return	as	the	worst,	but	without	this	revenance,	and	if	one	challenges	its	irreducible	originality,	one	is	also	depriving	oneself	of	memory,	legacy	and	justice	[…]’.	[Jacques	Derrida,	Negotiations.	Interventions	and	
Interviews	1971-2001.	trans.	&	ed.	Elisabeth	Rottenberg.	(Stanford	California:	Standford	University	Press	2002),	106].	Here,	counter-
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future	suspends	in	the	conditional	the	very	possibility	of	present	knowledge,	causing	the	a	priori	‘failure’	of	every	attempt	at	‘reading’	the	archive	–	or	the	performance	as	archive	–	as	Blocker	suggests	with	regards	to	the	archival	clutter	of	references	in	Goat	Island’s	The	
Lastmaker.493	To	designate	the	frustration	of	reception	as	a	‘failure’	of	‘reading,’	however,	would	be	appropriate	only	if	it	would	be	possible	to	know	in	advance	what	its	success	might	constitute.	Reading	would	thereby	begin	to	designate	a	process	of	following	a	readymade	programme,	the	ability	to	hermeneutically	decode	without	difference	and	remainder.494	Such	an	ideal	conception	of	communication	as	a																																																																																																																																																archival	remembrance	as	the	unsealing	of	dangerous	capitalizations	of	silence	within	various	economies	of	memory	–	(‘My	immediate	feeling	is	that	what	took	place	in	France	well	before	and	during	World	War	II	–		and	still	more,	I	would	say,	during	the	Algerian	War	–	has	reinforced,	and	therefore	overdetermined,	the	layers	of	forgetting’)	–	is	designated	by	Derrida	as	‘contradictory,	in	both	its	effects	and	its	motivations	[…].	The	moment	one	remembers	the	worst	(out	of	respect	for	memory,	the	truth,	the	victims,	etc.),	the	worst	threatens	to	return.	One	ghost	recalls	another.	[…]	The	two	memories	relaunch	each	other	[se	renflouent];	they	exacerbate	and	avert	each	other;	they	wage	war	on	each	other,	necessarily,	over	and	over	again.	Always	on	the	brink	of	all	possible	
contaminations.	[…]’	[Derrida,	Negotiations,	107,	my	emphasis].		493	Blocker,	9-10.	494	Speaking	in	the	context	of	reading	as	an	act	of	translation	that	facilitates	the	“living	on”	[sur-vie]	of	texts	because	they	are	at	once	translatable	and	untranslatable,	Derrida	gives	a	brief	account	of	his	engagement	with	the	“failure”	of	translation	as	the	defeat	of	‘the	program	of	the	passage	into	philosophy’	as	an	absolute	transparency	of	mediation.	[Jacques	Derrida,	The	Ear	Of	The	Other.	ed.	Christie	V.	McDonald,	trans.	Peggy	Kamuf.	(New	York:	Schochen	Books,	1985),	119-20].			 The	program	of	the	passage	into	philosophy	signifies	in	this	context	[…]	that	the	philosophical	operation	[…]	defines	itself	[…]	as	the	fixation	of	a	certain	concept	and	project	of	translation.	Let’s	imagine	that	it’s	possible	to	ask	such	a	question:	What	does	philosophy	say?	What	does	the	philosopher	say	when	he	is	being	a	philosopher?	He	says:	What	matters	is	truth	or	meaning,	and	since	meaning	is	before	or	beyond	language,	it	follows	that	it	is	translatable.	Meaning	has	the	commanding	role,	and	consequently	one	must	be	able	to	fix	its	univocality	or,	in	any	case,	to	master	its	plurivocality.	If	this	plurivocality	can	be	mastered,	then	translation,	understood	as	the	transport	of	a	semantic	content	into	another	signifying	form,	is	possible.	There	is	no	philosophy	
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coincidence	of	coding	and	decoding	able	to	traverse	unscathed	a	spatio-temporal	interval	here	brings	to	mind	the	Aristotelian	conception	of	the	medium	as	a	means	to	an	end	and	the	transparency	of	its	scenic	variant	that	renders	possible	the	act	of	taking	in	the	spectacle	with	a	single	view	in	the	final	recognition	of	the	unity	of	action	and	life.495	Or	else,	the	immediacy	of	consumption	by	the	mere	coincidence	of	the	flow	of	consciousness	with	the	flow	of	temporal	objects	of	which	Bernard																																																																																																																																																unless	translation	in	this	latter	sense	is	possible.	Therefore	the	thesis	of	philosophy	is	translatability	in	this	common	sense,	that	is,	as	the	transfer	of	a	meaning	or	truth	from	one	language	to	another	without	any	essential	harm	being	done.	Obviously,	this	project	[…]	has	taken	a	certain	number	of	forms	which	one	could	locate	throughout	the	history	of	philosophy	[…].	The	origin	of	philosophy	is	translation	or	the	thesis	of	translatability,	so	that	wherever	translation	in	this	sense	has	failed,	it	is	nothing	less	than	philosophy	that	finds	itself	defeated	(Derrida,	The	Ear	Of	The	
Other,	120).			Hinting	at	a	possible	transfer	between	his	use	of	a	conception	of	sur-vie	and	Benjamin’s	rhetoric	of	Überleben	and	Fortleben,	Derrida	gives	an	account	of	Benjamin’s	conception	of	the	structure	of	original	texts	as	survival	and	the	task	of	the	translator	that	here	resonates	with	the	open-ended	nature	of	all	archival	gathering	and	living-on	of	archival	remains	through	their	reworking:			 A	text	is	original	insofar	as	it	is	a	thing,	not	to	be	confused	with	an	organic	or	a	physical	body,	but	a	thing,	let	us	say,	of	the	mind,	meant	to	survive	the	death	of	the	author	or	the	signatory,	and	to	be	above	or	beyond	the	physical	corpus	of	the	text,	and	so	on.	The	structure	of	the	original	text	is	survival.	[…]	To	understand	a	text	as	an	original	is	to	understand	it	independently	of	its	living	conditions	–	the	conditions,	obviously,	of	its’	author’s	life	–	and	to	understand	it	instead	in	its	surviving	structure.	[…]	Given	the	surviving	structure	of	an	original	text	[…]	the	task	of	the	translator	is	precisely	to	respond	to	this	demand	for	survival	which	is	the	very	structure	of	the	original	text.	[…]	To	do	this,	says	Benjamin,	the	translator	must	neither	reproduce,	represent,	nor	copy	the	original,	nor	even,	essentially,	care	about	communicating	the	meaning	of	the	original.	Translation	has	nothing	to	do	with	reception	or	communication	or	information.	[…]	[T]he	translator	must	assure	the	survival,	which	is	to	say	the	growth,	of	the	original.	Translation	augments	and	modifies	the	original,	which,	in	so	far	as	it	is	living	on,	never	ceases	to	be	transformed	and	grow	[ibid,	122.	my	emphasis].	495		Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	100.	
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Stiegler	speaks	in	the	context	of	an	increasing	proleterianisation	of	producers	and	consumers	by	the	culture	industries.496	Yet	if	reading,	to	the	contrary,	precisely	implies	the	hetero-affective	encounter	with	an	only	partially	appropriable	other	as	well	as	an	attitude	of	resistance	to	the	concatenated	continuity	of	the	flow	of	diverse	forms	of	mediation	in	order	to	participate	in	the	intermittent	production	of	meaning	qua	counter-signature,	the	facilitated	encounter	with	language	as	excess	–	far	from	foreclosing	the	possibility	of	reading	–	appeals	to	its	very	task.	What	then	fails	in	the	facilitated	encounter	with	language	as	excess	is	not	reading,	but	the	immediacy	of	consumption.	Whereas	in	the	present	context	the	facilitated	encounter	with	language	as	excess	springs	from	an	absence	of	the	unity	of	an	ideal	configuration	and	the	subsequent	fragility,	complexity	and	bewilderment	of	the	orders	of	(compositional)	gathering,	in	what	follows	we	will	further	see	the	demonstrated	failure	of	consumption	closely	linked	to	a	compositional	strategy	of	interruption.	Such	strategies	of	interruption,	as	explicitly	put	to	work	in	Every	house	has	a	door’s	performance	Testimonium,	relaunch,	whether	knowingly	or	not,	the	role	gesture	plays	in	the	exposition	of	a	non-consumable,	divided	and	exposed	present	of	Epic	Theatre	in	Walter	Benjamin’s	account.497	It																																																									496	See,	Stiegler,	‘Anamnesis	and	Hypomnesis’.		497	Interruption,	 in	the	context	of	Testimonium,	 is	precisely	employed	to	bring	to	a	halt	the	flow	of	the	performance	along	a	‘horizontal	axis	of	time	without	 pause’	 in	 order	 to	 provoke	 a	 ‘recognition’	 of	 the	 present	 of	performance	as	 the	zone	or	Schwelle	of	a	structural	disaquaintance	and	unknowing.	Speaking	in	the	context	of	the	compositional	employment	of	transitional	gaps	in	Testimonium,	Hixon	relates:			Erasure	 is	 one	 approach	 to	 transitions.	 Using	 this	 device,	 the	performance	 tumbles	 across	 the	 horizontal	 axis	 of	 time	without	pause.	One	event	flows	into	the	other.	There	are	no	transitions.	If	this	 dynamic	 forward	 motion	 is	 interrupted	 with	 a	 temporary	stop	in	action,	where	the	performers	stop	performing,	a	gap	opens	up.	 Those	 watching	 become	 aware	 of	 themselves	 watching	 and	the	 others	 in	 the	 room	 watching.	 Perhaps	 this	 is	 one	 of	 the	remaining	 powers	 of	 the	 live	 event,	 a	 recognition	 of	 each	 other,	however	uncomfortable	that	may	be.	The	experience	of	the	event	follows	the	logic	of	its	composition.	The	logic	of	the	composition	is	facilitated	 by	 the	 guidance	 of	 the	 poet.	 A	 performance	 emerges	that	 provides	 a	 place	 of	 recognition	 –	 a	 place	 of	 recognition	 as	
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is	thus	a	failure	of	consumption	that	forces	the	spectator	to	negotiate	the	structural	division,	secrecy	and	opacity	of	language	as	medium	by	the	labour	of	a	process	of	reading	that	Samuel	Weber	fittingly	describes	as	a	movement	of	groping,	stumbling	and	interrupting	oneself	that	may	only	consider	the	aftermath	of	divided	marks.498	The	task	of	reading	thus	construed,	which	here	or	indeed	always	doubles	up	as	the	task	of	inheriting,	must	reject	the	possibility	of	a	simple	consummation	and	consumption	of	a	given,	knowable	content.	In	other	words,	the	failure	of	consumption	opens	the	chance	for	reading.	Henceforth,	the	suspense	of	knowability,	the	secrecy	of	an	unknowable	weight,	which,	as	Derrida	reminds	us,	the	concept	of	the	archive	must	inevitably	carry	in	itself,	‘does	not	weigh	only	as	a	negative	charge,’	but	makes	of	archivization	‘a	movement	of	the	promise	and	of	the	future	no	less	than	of	recording	the	past’.499	The	demonstration	of	its	essential	indetermination	exposes	the	counter-archival	performance	practice	as	‘dependen[t]	with	respect	to	
what	will	come,	[…to]	all	that	[which]	ties	knowledge	and	memory	to	the	promise’.500	To	avow	of	an	archival	dependency	with	respect	to	the	future	by	rejecting	an	idea	of	the	archive	‘determined	as	already	given,	in	the	past	or	[…]	determinable	and	thus	terminable	in	a	future	itself	determinable	as	future	present,’	Derrida	says,	is	to	suspend	the	very	order	of	classical	knowledge.501	The	demonstration	of	such	structural	secrecy,	Derrida	seems	to	suggest,	must	seek	to	‘let’	spectral	archival	marks	speak	by	the	performance	of	a	certain	restraint	or	retreat,	a	‘stepping	aside’	that	is	‘the	sign	of	a	respect	before	the	future	to	come	of	the	future	to	come’.502																																																																																																																																																	acknowledgement	of	 the	unknowing	of	 events,	 people,	 time,	 and	its	passing.	[Goulish	&	Hixon].		498	Samuel	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	299.	499	Derrida,	Archive	Fever,	29.	500	ibid,	29-30	(my	emphasis).	501	ibid,	51-2.	502	ibid,	70.	Speaking	in	the	context	of	a	commentary	on	certain	aspects	of	the	writings	of	the	Yewish	History	scholar	Yosef	Hayim	Yerushalmi,	Derrida	notes:	‘[...]	what	is	at	issue	for	him	is	letting	the	images	speak	in	a	book	of	photographs,	that	is,	another	species	of	archive.	But	each	time	a	
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Here,	in	the	context	of	his	development	of	a	messianic	structure	of	archivization,	Derrida,	with	recourse	to	Walter	Benjamin’s	evocation	of	‘the	“narrow	door”	for	the	passage	of	the	Messiah,	“at	each	second,”’	in	his	Theses	on	the	Philosophy	of	History,	is	tempted	to	designate	the	‘affirmation	of	the	future	to	come	as	opening’	by	the	name	of	door.503	Consequently,	if	‘the	meaning	of	“archive,”’	as	Derrida	notes,	‘[…]	comes	to	it	from	the	Greek	arkheion:	initially	a	house,	a	domicile,	an	address,	the	residence	of	the	superior	magistrates,	the	archons,	those	who	commanded[,]’	another	way	of	designating	its	necessary	structural	exposure	to	an	uncontrollable	future	would	be	to	say	that	every	archive,	like	every	house,	has	a	door.	Derrida’s	cautious	references	to	and	citations	of	Benjamin’s	discourse	–	a	performative	repetition	and	enactment	of,	if	not	secret	encounter	in	the	figure	of	the	door	as	metonymy	for	the	structure	of	the	messianic	–	augments,	as	we	might	put	it	with	Derrida	on	Derrida,	a	Benjaminian	archive	that	finds	itself	thereby	engrossed	whilst	simultaneously	loosing	‘the	absolute	and	meta-textual	authority	it	might	claim	to	have’.504	In	what	follows,	I	would	like	to	further	augment	both	Benjamin’s	and	Derrida’s	“archive”	by	facilitating	their	secret	encounter	within	the	figure	of	the	door	and	the	structure	of	the	messianic.	I	will	begin	to	do	so	by	attending	to	the	resonances																																																																																																																																																historian	as	such	decides	to	“step	aside	and	let…	speak,”	for	example	to	let	a	photographic	specter	or	Freud’s	phantom	in	the	monologue	speak,	it	is	the	sign	of	a	respect	before	the	future	to	come	of	the	future	to	come.	Thus	he	is	no	longer	a	historian.	Good	sense	tells	us	there	is	no	history	or	archive	of	the	future	to	come.	A	historian	as	such	never	looks	to	the	future,	which	in	the	end	does	not	concern	him.	But	meaning	something	else	altogether,	is	there	a	historian	of	the	promise,	a	historian	of	the	[…]	door?’	[Derrida,	Archive	Fever,	70].	503	Derrida	makes	a	similarly	sparse	reference	to	the	work	of	Benjamin	in	the	context	of	a	previous	development	of	the	structure	of	the	messianic	–	a	spectral	logic	of	inheritance	turned	towards	the	future	no	less	than	the	past	–	in	a	footnote	of	Specters	of	Marx.	There,	the	reference	to	the	“door”	appears,	albeit	in	a	different	translation,	in	Derrida’s	appeal	for	the	necessity	to	quote	and	reread,	as	he	emphatically	puts	it,	Benjamin’s	‘dense,	enigmatic	and	burning’	theses	‘On	the	concept	of	History’	‘[…]	up	to	the	“strait	gate”	[door]	for	the	passage	of	the	Messiah,	namely,	every	“second”’	[Derrida,	Specters	of	Marx,	228].		504	Derrida	uses	these	terms	when	discussing	Yerushalmi’s	relaunching	of	the	archive	of	Sigmund	Freud.	[See	Derrida,	Archive	Fever,	68].	
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between	the	Benjaminian	concept	of	Rettung	and	the	Derridian	notion	of	
renvoyer	as	we	have	already	encountered	it,	before	addressing	the	messianic	structure	figured	by	the	opening	of	a	door	in	Benjamin’s	conception	of	the	citability	of	gesture	in	Epic	Theatre.505	For	just	as	the	concept	of	Rettung	describes	a	particular	relation	to	the	past	as	future	to	come,	the	gestures	of	Epic	Theatre	are	inextricably	linked	to	the	structure	of	the	messianic	by	the	disadjusted	time	of	their	citability.	Furthermore,	the	conceptual	field	of	Rettung	and	renvoyer,	as	particular	modalities	of	inheriting	that	facilitate	the	living	on	of	an	inheritance	by	augmenting	and	transforming	it,	as	well	as	by	exposing	its	essential	dehiscence	through	the	virtualisation	of	“its”	future	possibilities,	here	find	themselves	closely	linked	to	the	returning	figure	of	‘repair’	in	the																																																									505	An	insightful	summary	of	the	conceptual	field	of	relaunching	–	both	
relancer	and	renvoyer	–	in	the	context	of	the	task	of	inheritance	can	be	found	in	Samir	Haddad’s	Derrida	and	the	Inheritance	of	Democracy:			First,	relancer	carries	the	sense	of	keeping	the	inheritance	in	play,	of	launching	it	in	one’s	turn.	When	an	inheritance	is	received,	it	is	the	heir’s	turn	to	do	something	with	it.	And	since	the	command	here	is	to	do	this	“otherwise,”	what	is	to	be	done	is	not	just	a	simple	repetition	of	the	past.	This	attests	to	the	active	dimension	of	inheritance,	in	which	the	heir	has	a	role	to	play	in	making	a	difference	to	what	is	transmitted.	At	the	same	time,	the	“other”	in	“otherwise”	also	marks	the	fact	that	this	first	meaning	of	relancer	does	not	imply	that	inheritance	is	left	solely	up	to	the	heir.	That	one	inherits	in	one’s	turn	signals	the	place	of	this	action	in	a	historical	chain	of	actions.	Others	have	inherited	before,	and	others	will	come	to	inherit	after.	This	takes	place	beyond	the	heir’s	control	and	is	an	irreducible	part	of	the	inheritance	relation.	In	this	way	there	is	an	important	place	occupied	by	alterity	in	inheritance,	and	the	activity	of	relaunching	is	balanced	against	the	passivity	this	entails.	The	relation	to	alterity	is	both	amplified	and	given	a	more	specific	articulation	in	the	second	meaning	of	relancer,	as	renvoyer.	This	term,	which	appears	across	Derrida’s	oeuvre,	means	a	sending	away,	sending	back	(to	the	source),	and/or	sending	on.	It	thus	reinforces	the	first	meaning’s	image	of	inheritance	as	constituted	in	a	chain	of	actions,	where	a	legacy	is	both	acknowledged	as	given	from	a	past	other,	and	passed	on	to	another	to	come	to	live	on.	[Samir	Haddad,	Derrida	And	The	Inheritance	of	Democracy.	(Bloomington	&	Indianapolis:	Indiana	University	Press	2013),	33-4].		
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work	of	Goat	Island.	Finally,	by	returning	to	a	more	detailed	consideration	of	certain	aspects	of	Every	house	has	a	door’s	performance	
Testimonium,	I	seek	to	show	how	similar	politico-compositional	strategies	of	interruption,	suspense	(of	knowledge,	of	judgement,	of	action)	and	virtualisation	are	employed	in	view	of	an	appeal	to	the	coming	of	an	(archival)	participation	qua	response-ability	as	justice-	as	well	as	democracy-to-come.					
Relaunching	the	Archive:	Repair,	Rettung,	(Salut).		1. Repair			 Perhaps	the	two	most	potent	if	not	frequent	words	used	with	regards	to	the	work	of	Goat	Island	are	response	and	repair.	We	have	already	had	ample	recourse	to	the	former,	whether	in	the	context	of	the	company’s	performance	processes	or	their	accompanying	educational	programme.	The	latter	term	appears,	for	instance,	in	the	title	of	the	only	book-length	study	on	the	work	of	Goat	Island	–	Small	Acts	of	Repair:	
Performance,	Ecology	and	Goat	Island	–	and	plays	a	major	role	as	an	underlying	thematic	in	the	performance	When	will	the	September	roses	
bloom/Last	night	was	only	a	comedy,	which	began	its	development	with	the	question:	how	do	you	repair?	Drawing	on	a	variety	of	source	materials	that	range	from	household	repair	manuals	to	the	poetry	of	Paul	Celan	‘the	piece	questions,’	the	company	states,	‘our	place	in	a	damaged	world	and	our	aptitude	at	repairing	it’.506	Although	the	semantic	field	of	the																																																									506	Goat	Island	When	will	the	September	roses	bloom?	Last	night	was	only	
a	comedy.	a	double	performance	[online].	Accessed	January	2013,	www.goatislandperformance.org/perf-septemberRoses.htm.	‘We	began	this	latest	work	with	the	question	of	repair.	We	looked	at	repair	manuals	from	the	1950s	for	we	could	not	find	any	current	repair	manuals	in	Chicago	bookstores.	The	United	States	no	longer	repairs.	It	“disposes	of”	instead’	[See	Bottoms	&	Goulish	ed.	31].	‘Celan	had	been	brought	into	rehearsal	by	Matthew	around	the	idea	of	repair	–	Celan	took	
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word	repair	may	find	itself	quickly	inscribed	in	a	theological	narrative	of	the	Fall	and	its	prospective	overcoming	as	salvation	or	redemption	–	that	is,	as	the	task	of	healing,	curing	or	remedying	what	has	been	damaged,	of	restoring,	rehabilitating,	rebuilding	or	retrieving	an	originary	plenitude	and	absolute	indemnity	–	it	cannot	and	must	not	here	be	reduced	to	it.	Similarly,	notwithstanding	the	redemptive	logic	of	repair	inscribed	in	the	injunction	of	justice	construed	as	the	task	of	putting	right,	correcting,	redressing	and	adjusting	some	form	of	past	or	present	dis-adjustment,	that	is,	the	bringing	into	alignment	or	straightening	out	of	a	time	that	is	crooked	or	‘out	of	joint,’	the	call	for	justice	qua	repair	can	and	must	here	be	differently	construed.	To	be	sure,	not	everything	in	the	work	and	discourse	of	Goat	Island	can	perhaps	be	fully	distinguished	from	a	struggle	for	justice	in	the	name	of	absolute	justice.	Despite	its	clearest	efforts	to	raise	the	stakes	of	complexity,	absolute	justice	might	at	times	indeed	remain	the	distant	horizon,	as	Bottoms’	seems	to	suggest,	of	what	he	subsequently	confusingly	calls	with	recourse	to	Derrida	the	company’s	systematic	engagement	with	‘the	possibility	of	the	impossible’.507	If	so,	my	reading	is	concerned	with	all	aspects	of	the	work	that	might	allow	us	to	think	otherwise.	Bottom’s	recourse	to	the	Derridian	logic	of	impossibility	is	confused	in	the	context	of	his	own	argument	as	far	as	for	Derrida	impossibility	precisely	describes	the	structural	impossibility	of	an	absolute	–	whether	of	presence,	self-containment,	identity,	closure,	or	indeed	the	ethical	ideal	and	regulative	idea	of	justice	as	total	repair	–	from	which	he	is	seemingly	unable	to	fully	disentangle	his	account	of	the	ethico-political	stance	of	Goat	Island’s	practice.	Derrida’s	account	of	a	structural	impossibility	of	anything	ever	being	in	itself	seems	irreconcilable	with	what	Bottoms	continues	to	call	‘the	responsibility	of	artists	to	at	least	attempt	to	seed	a	more	redemptive	environ/mental	system’.508	Unless,	that	is,	seeding	would	here	amount	to	a	gesture	of	dissemination	(rather	than	the	embryonic																																																																																																																																																on	the	project,	through	his	poetry,	of	“repairing”	the	German	language	after	the	holocaust’	[ibid,	139].	507	ibid,	25.	508	ibid.	
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origin	of	a	process	of	ripening)	that	can	only	ever	facilitate	a	more	or	less	redemptive	future,	without	any	guarantees.	Although	Bottoms	clearly	situates	Goat	Island’s	engagement	with	impossibility	in	the	‘contradictions’	and	‘blind	spots’	of	responsibility	that	warrant	his	recourse	to	Derrida’s	conception	of	the	latter	as	‘“a	certain	experience	
and	experiment	of	the	possibility	of	the	impossible,”’	he	nevertheless	and	almost	within	the	same	breath	remains	within	a	logic	of	the	horizon	of	a	postponed	possibility	when	he	conceives	of	the	smallness	of	the	act	of	repair	as	a	minimal	starting	point	in	face	of	the	scale	of	the	problems	confronted:	‘Perhaps	we	need	to	start	small,’	he	says,	‘given	the	scale	of	the	problems	confronting	us’.509	Impossibility,	however,	as	‘“the	
condition	of	possibility	of	this	thing	called	responsibility,’”	as	Bottoms’	quotation	from	The	Other	Heading	itself	seems	to	suggest,	is	never	reducible	to	a	problem	of	scale,	but	instead	constitutes	an	essential,	paradoxical	condition	of	possibility:	of	responsibility	as	much	as	of	justice	and	thus	of	repair.510	Martin	Hägglund	sums	up	this	structural	condition	of	impossibility	with	regards	to	justice	as	follows:	‘the	possibility	of	justice	is	[…]	the	impossibility	of	absolute	justice.	Justice	is	and	must	be	more	or	less	unjust,	since	it	must	demarcate	itself	against	a	future	that	exceeds	it	and	may	call	it	into	question’.511	It	is	not	here	a	matter	of	discrediting	the	call	to	justice	–	whether	Bottoms’	or	indeed	Goat	Island’s	–	for	its	relation	to	an	however	much	postponed	absolute	horizon,	but	rather	to	reveal	its	logical	incoherence,	particularly	in	light	of	what	throughout	we	have	identified	as	the	distinct	political	“power”	of	theatre	and	theatricality	more	generally,	as	well	as	certain	aspects	of	the	work	of	Goat	Island	(and	Every	house	has	a	door)	in	particular.	In	short,	it	is	precisely	what	I	have	discerned	–	with	Benjamin,	Weber	and	Derrida	–	as	the	demonstrative	power	at	exposing	the	structural	impossibility	of	closure	and	self-containment	qua	(critical)	response-ability,	which	links	these	acts	of	repair	to	what	Derrida	describes,	as	Hägglund	puts	it,	‘the																																																									509	ibid.	510	ibid,	(my	emphasis).	511	Hägglund	42-3,	(my	emphasis).	
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negative	infinity	of	justice	as	an	infinite	perfectibility,	which	is	the	same	as	an	infinite	corruptibility	and	undercuts	the	regulative	Idea	of	final	perfection’.512	The	gesture	of	the	rehearsal,	or	else,	the	rehearsal	of	a	gesture,	repeats	otherwise	whilst	at	the	same	time	more	or	less	demonstratively	appealing	to	the	coming	possibility	of	“its”	transformed	repetition,	whether	by	others	or	the	self	as	other.	Put	in	another	code,	it	is	a	demonstratively	democratic	posturing	[Haltung]	that	exposes	its	non-identical	dehiscence,	reckons	with	its	own	principle	of	ruin	and	calls	for	being	further	called	into	question:	revised	and	transformed	in	the	aftermath	[Nachwirkung]	of	a	participatory	[Mitwirkung]	afterthought	[Nachdenken]	that	facilitates	the	afterlife	[Nachleben]	of	“original,”	that	is,	originally	split	marks	of	an	inheritance.	The	act	of	repair	thus	construed	facilitates	survival	through	transformative	repetitions	that	are	themselves	exposed	as	transformatively	repeatable.	Its	“power”	is	that	of	a	weak	force,	which	is	not	the	same	as	a	small	force,	and	cannot	be	described	as	a	compromised	small	first	step	on	route	to	a	however	distant	consummation.513	Instead,	it	is	the	demonstrated	mark	of	an																																																									512	ibid,	169.	513	Calling	for	a	necessary	if	fragile	distinction	between	“sovereignty”	and	“unconditionality”	in	Rogues,	Derrida	links	the	renunciation	of	sovereignty	as	the	opening	to	the	singular	coming	of	the	other	to	the	notion	of	a	‘weak	force.’	What	is	more,	he	hints	at	the	relation	of	what	we	might	call	a	gesture	of	letting	or	restraint,	that	is,	a	certain	passivity	in	the	active	taking	up	of	an	inheritance	–	the	figure	that	comes	closest	to	describe	such	a	gesture	in	Rogues	is	that	of	the	renvoi,	‘this	sending	or	putting	off,’	which	‘gestures	toward	the	past	of	an	inheritance	only	by	remaining	to	come’	(Derrida,	Rogues,	9)	–	to	the	participatory	call	for	distribution	or	sharing.			But	through	certain	experiences	that	will	be	central	to	this	book,	and,	more	generally,	through	the	experience	that	lets	itself	be	affected	by	what	or	who	comes	[(ce)	qui	vient],	by	what	happens	or	by	who	happens,	by	the	other	to	come,	a	certain	unconditional	renunciation	of	sovereignty	is	required	a	priori.	Even	before	the	act	of	a	decision.	Such	a	distribution	or	sharing	also	presupposes	that	we	think	at	once	the	unforseeability	of	an	event	that	is	necessarily	without	horizon,	the	singular	coming	of	the	other,	and,	as	a	result,	a	weak	force.	This	vulnerable	force,	this	force	without	power,	opens	up	unconditionally	to	what	or	who	comes	and	comes	to	affect	it.	The	coming	of	this	event	exceeds	the	condition	of	
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essential	vulnerability,	an	unconditional	opening	to	the	coming	of	time	on	which	the	possibility	of	a	structurally	impossible	–possible	impossible	–	justice	depends.	Although	absolutely	severed	from	any	form	of	guarantee	(i.e.	of	justice),	its	structural	impossibility	of	plenitude,	as	Hägglund	continues,	is	nevertheless	‘not	a	privation	but	the	possibility	of	change	at	any	juncture,	for	better	or	worse’.514	The	impossibility	of	absolute	repair	marks	the	act	of	repair	with	an	essential	disadjustment	as	the	condition	for	a	justice,	as	well	as	a	democracy	(qua	participation),	which,	as	Derrida	repeatedly	stresses,	albeit	unable	to	wait	must	paradoxically	always	remain	to	come.	If	the	act	of	repair	transforms	as	much	as	it	restores,	we	might	say	that	it	is	always	already	of	the	order	of	a	response	by	its	selective	and	inventive	reworking	of	an	inheritance.	What	is	more,	the	participatory	(critical,	“creative”)	response	to	or	reworking	of	a	given	inheritance	(i.e.	a	given	social	organisation,	an	available	apparatus,	a	more	or	less	accessible	archive)	is	in	turn	breached	in	its	integrity,	carrying	within	it	a	principle	of	ruin	that	opens	it	to	the	coming	of	its	ongoing	participatory	transformations.	It	is	thus																																																																																																																																																mastery	and	the	conventionally	accepted	authority	of	what	is	called	the	“performative.”	(ibid,	14).			In	our	context	it	seems	necessary	to	at	least	point	towards	the	resonance	between	Derrida’s	conception	of	a	‘weak	force’	of	messianicity	and	Benjamin’s	notion	of	‘a	weak	messianic	power.’	I	will	return	to	this	theme	in	a	little	more	detail	later	on.	In	any	case,	the	degree	of	consonance	or	dissonance	between	Derrida’s	and	Benjamin’s	respective	conceptions	of	the	messianic	are	widely	contested	and	any	detailed	analysis	hampered	by	Derrida’s	sparse	references	to	the	Benjaminian	inheritance	and	the	latter’s	dense	and	enigmatic	style.	A	detailed	consideration	of	their	difference	perhaps	exceeds	the	scope	and	also	the	tenor	of	my	project.	Certainly	at	times	this	amounts	to	a	violently	selective	reading	that	more	or	less	unjustly	homes	in	on	their	compatibility	rather	than	differences,	particularly	with	regards	to	a	reading	of	Benjamin	that	focuses	on	those	elements	of	his	texts	that	allow	for	a	deconstructive	assimilation.	Of	course,	a	similar	thing	can	indeed	always	be	said	for	those	arguments	that	seek	to	discern	if	not	protect	a	simple	and	neat	division	between	the	two.	For	a	detailed,	patient	and	nuanced	comparative	reading	between	Benjamin’s	and	Derrida’s	conceptions	of	the	messianic	see	Matthias	Fritsch,	The	Promise	of	Memory.	History	and	Politics	in	Marx,	Benjamin	
and	Derrida.	(New	York:	State	University	of	New	York	Press	2005).	514	Hägglund,	169.	
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active	and	passive	at	the	same	time,	interventive	if	not	inventive	and	simultaneously	vulnerably	exposed.	Acts	of	repair	may	therefore	be	proffered	only	provisionally	from	time	to	time,	severed	from	all	recourse	to	a	horizon	of	consummation,	in	order	to	constitute	what	Derrida	calls	‘a	certain	experience	and	experiment	of	the	possibility	of	the	impossible’.515	To	repair	is	to	facilitate	a	precarious	survival	through	a	gesture	of	relaunching	(or	the	relaunching	of	a	gesture)	of	(archival)	marks,	objects	and	rituals	that	seeks	to	ward	off	the	forgetting	or	mere	consumption	of	an	inheritance,	recasting	its	dominant	interpretations,	interrupting	the	flow	of	its	sedimented	transmission	and	dispensing	with	a	horizon	of	consummation	of	what	we	might	here	designate	its	(re-)work	of	mourning.			 If	a	culture	of	repair	is	able	to	resist	–	and	it	is	precisely	a	matter	here	of	a	with-standing	the	force	of	a	flow	of	continuity,	a	stoppage,	halt	and	stance	more	or	less	firm	–	a	passive	consumerist	cycle	of	consumption,	waste	and	replacement,	this	is	because	its	constitutive	impossibility	at	restoring	an	original	plenitude	calls	for	a	continued	participatory	reworking.	Here,	a	look	at	the	practical	realm	of	things,	in	which	repair	constitutes	a	process	of	mending	as	reworking,	might	fittingly	illustrate	such	a	non-redemptive	movement	of	repair.516	The	act	of	repair	that	reworks,	and	thereby	facilitates	the	living-on	of	things,	neither	hides	a	preceding	damage	nor	its	own	intervention,	giving	second	(third,	fourth,	fifth…)	life	whilst	giving	to	view	an	object’s	historicity.517																																																									515	Derrida	quoted	in	Bottoms	&	Goulish	ed.	25.	516	In	our	context	it	is	perhaps	of	interest	to	call	attention	to	John	Mowitt’s	suggestion	to	translate	the	Brechtian	concept	of	
Umfunktionierung	as	“re:	working”.	‘“Refunctionalization”	has	emerged	as	the	standard	translation	of	Umfunktionierung.	While	not	dissatisfied	with	this,	I	propose	the	perhaps	rebarbative	alternative	“re:	working”	because	it	has	the	advantage	of	keeping	work,	working,	and	workers	in	focus,	while,	through	the	prefix	set	off	by	a	colon,	underscoring	both	work,	working,	and	workers	are	under	reconstruction	and	that	the	term	is	about	itself,	its	own	reworking.	[…].’	[John	Mowitt,	Radio.	Essays	in	Bad	
Reception.	(Berkeley	and	Los	Angeles,	California:	University	of	California	Press	2011),	207].		517	Goulish	hints	at	this	multiplication	of	lives	when	considering	the	repair	of	an	object.	‘A	repair,’	he	says,	‘gives	an	object	a	triple	life,	and	
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What	is	reworked	may	only	ever	be	‘as	good	as	new’	or	indeed	simply	‘patched	up’	by	a	more	or	less	transformative	reconstruction.518	What	here	counts	for	the	practical	realm	is	also	at	work	in	the	symbolic,	where	the	effort	to	“repair”–	for	instance	Celan’s	–	of	a	certain	cultural	inheritance,	may	leave	in	place	and	thereby	expose	the	historicity	of	the	“found”	or	inherited	gestural,	image	or	textual	material	retrieved	from	the	historical	world.	Phil	Stanier,	when	reflecting	on	Goat	Island’s	When	
will	the	September	roses	bloom/Last	night	was	only	a	comedy,	situates	the	latter	squarely	within	such	a	non-redemptive	tradition	of	repair.	In	Stanier’s	reading,	the	performance	proffers	small	acts	of	repair	as	an	alternative	both	to	‘the	accelerated	cycle	of	replacement	common	within	capitalist	culture,’	as	well	as	a	desire	for	‘recovery	wherein	the	original	state	of	being	is	restored	and	the	fault	or	loss	is	forgotten’.	In	doing	so,	Stanier	suggests,	the	work	employs	acts	of	repair	that	leave	an	awareness	of	the	fault	in	place.519	Once	again,	a	look	at	the	construction	of	the	material	world	of	these	performances	might	here	give	us	an	insight	into	the	handling	or	gestural	bearing	of	its	symbolic	material.	In	response	to	the	question	’how	do	you	repair?’	Goat	Island	member	Mark	Jeffrey	relates,	the	company	considered	working	with	principles	of	lightness,	fragility,	collapse,	falling	and	uncertainty:	constructing	tables	out	of	cardboard,	chairs	missing	legs	and	forever	unbalanced,	crutches	of	wood	and	cardboard	to	hold	people	up.	‘In	states	of	repair,’	Jeffrey	states,	‘tables	teeter,	topple,	collapse.	Repairs	are	made	with	parcel	tape	and	cardboard.	Lightness	creates	its	own	weight.	As	more	weight	and	pressure	is	applied,	rigid	temporary	states	become	states	of	fragility.	Objects	are	
																																																																																																																																															makes	that	tripleness	visible.	[…]	We	see	three	[objects]	at	once	–	whole,	damaged,	repaired’	[Bottoms	&	Goulish	ed.	175].	518	Joe	Kelleher’s	account	of	Goat	Island’s	‘The	Lastmaker’	relates	the	impression	that	the	material	submitted	to	rehearsal	in	gestural	recall	has	the	feel	of	something	hoarded,	treasured,	picked	up	and	patched	up,	that	is,	found	and	often	repaired	objects	retrieved	from	the	historical	world	[see	Kelleher,	100].	519	Bottoms	&	Goulish	ed.	95.	
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always	in	a	state	of	imbalance,	instability’.520																																																										520	ibid,	42	(my	emphasis).	The	fragile	material	‘world’	that	these	performances	construct	out	of	acts	of	repair	might	here	be	designated	as	a	minimal	resistance	to	the	destructive	flow	of	a	culture	of	consumption.	‘Today	we	are	continually	consuming	things,’	Stiegler	says,	‘which,	because	they	are	always	new,	become	increasingly	difficult	to	establish	as	things,	so	much	so	that	they	are	increasingly	without	place,	and	less	and	less	do	they	give	rise	to	that	for	which	things	exist,	which	is	to	say,	a	world’	[Stiegler,	Symbolic	Misery,	86].		Although	Stiegler’s	recourse	to	the	affirmative	rhetoric	of	a	relative	stability	of	place	might	at	first	here	appear	to	be	in	contradiction	with	everything	we	have	thus	far	put	forward	under	the	rubric	of	a	general	uncertainty	of	place	and	taking-place	in	the	structure	of	iterability,	it	is	nevertheless	not	irreconcilable	with	it.	For	the	structure	of	iterability	as	we	have	discerned	it,	is	made	of	a	double	movement,	both	dependent	on	a	minimal	security	and	stability	of	place,	of	identity	and	abode	–	in	short,	of	the	construction	of	a	more	or	less	sharable	‘world’	–	that	springs	from	the	interruptive	movement	of	time	becoming	space,	the	possibility	of	return,	repetition	and	transmission,	as	well	as	an	immediate	impartibility	that	undermines	the	very	ground	that	makes	it	possible	by	the	concomitant	movement	of	space	becoming	time.	An	always	necessary	but	limited	security	of	place	here	finds	itself	immediately	and	paradoxically	without	place,	marked	by	an	essential	precariousness:	a	place	without	place,	held	in	place	merely	by	what	we	might	here	designate	a	fragile	weight	of	lightness.	Stiegler’s	comments	on	the	necessity	to	resist	a	culture	of	consumption	through	the	establishment	of	things,	places	and	worlds	are	here	perhaps	particularly	apt	if	read	in	the	wider	context	of	his	own	reflections	on	the	reduction	of	symbolic	reception	to	a	proletarianised	consumerism	that	is	unable	to	participate	in	the	re-production	of	culture.	In	this	context	of	a	resistance	to	symbolic	consumerism,	as	we	saw	in	brief,	it	is	also	a	matter	of	interrupting	the	flow	of	temporal	objects	that	coincide	with	the	flow	of	consciousness.	Here,	interruption	and	spacing	is	able	to	facilitate	participation	qua	after-thoughts	that	are	able	to	consign	their	movements	to	repeatable,	transmissible	spatial	marks	that	give	rise	to	an	(however	secret)	sharing	of	a	‘world.’		The	relationship	between	spatial	resistance	and	the	movement	of	thought	also	plays	an	important	part	in	Joe	Kelleher’s	reflections	on	the	work	of	Goat	Island.	Kelleher	underscores	the	importance	of	the	underlying	image	material	of	its	rehearsed	gestures	of	repetitive	recall	by	figuring	them	with	reference	to	Mary	Carruther’s	study	of	the	techniques	of	medieval	monastic	meditation	as	‘machines	(i.e.	devices	for	lifting	things	up	and	constructing	things)	that	enable	the	lifting	and	construction	of	complex	thought’	[Kelleher,	100].	For	Kelleher,	thinking	takes	place	in	these	performances	as	‘some	sort	of	physicalized	meditation,	based	upon	the	remembering	of	hoarded,	treasured,	or	picked	up	and	patched	up	material’	[ibid].	Kelleher’s	description	of	a	hoarded	treasure	serving	as	the	memory	support	for	a	physicalized	
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																																																																																																																																															meditation	here	recalls	our	comparison	of	the	performance	works	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	to	Foucault’s	description	of	the	use	of	the	hypomnemata	for	a	practice	of	self-writing.	A	comparison	that	is	perhaps	further	warranted	by	Kelleher’s	account	of	the	necessarily	unfaithful	relation	to	the	imitated	material,	which	is	never	merely	recuperated,	he	says,	so	much	as	put	to	use	‘as	a	way	of	thinking	“through”	and	“into,”	so	that	what	the	performance	exhibits	[…]	is	something	like	a	“craft	knowledge,”	what	the	historian	of	medieval	monastic	intellectual	practices	Mary	Carruthers	has	called	a	“craft	of	thought”	[…]’	[ibid].	‘All	of	which	is	to	say,’	Kelleher	concludes,	‘that	there	is	no	thinking	in	this	work	that	is	not	a	matter	of	moving	through	and	into	the	architectures	that	support	the	thought’	[ibid,	101].	This,	of	course,	can	be	said	of	all	thinking,	which	always	requires,	as	Carruthers	puts	it,	some	mental	tool	or	machine.	The	particular	value	of	these	performances	is	to	be	found	in	the	exposition	of	such	dependencies,	that	is,	the	model	character	of	the	labour	and	technique	of	thinking	it	performs.	If	their	demonstratively	mnemonic	thinking,	as	Kelleher	relates,	seeks	‘to	marry	a	respect	for	the	primacy	of	the	object	of	thought	[…]’	–	a	respect	that	here	must	recall	everything	we	have	said	about	a	performative	and	appropriative	restraint	with	regards	to	the	mimetically	appropriated	material	–	‘with	the	integrity	of	a	subjective	response,	a	creative	remaking	or	reuse[,]’	the	demonstrative	distance	between	the	two	is	partly	employed	in	view	of	what	we	might	designate	as	the	desired	‘open	source’	nature	of	their	craft	of	thought.	For	‘this	craft	of	thought	is	also,’	Kelleher	states,	‘essentially,	social	and	public.	By	that	I	mean	that	it	is	rhetorical,	having	to	do	with	the	production,	dissemination,	and	exchange	of	structures	for	thinking:	persuasive	structures,	inventive	structures,	structures	that	we	too	may	recall	and	re-inhabit,	the	morning	after	the	performance	or	ten	years	after	the	performance,	using	these	as	our	own	thinking	devices,	our	own	tools	for	invention’	[ibid].	Finally,	when	Kelleher	seeks	to	reconcile	his	reading	of	the	performance	as	such	a	shared	craft	of	thought	with	the	curious	difficulty	of	remembering	it	in	any	detail,	he	precisely	foregrounds	the	general	model	character	of	the	kind	of	work	it	performs	rather	than	the	specifics	of	its	instantiation.	Much	could	perhaps	be	said	here	about	the	complex	relationship	between	the	performance	as	an	event	that	is	always	already,	to	put	it	in	a	Derridian	code,	(demonstratively)	dislocated,	disjointed	in	a	time	outside	itself,	beside	itself,	unhinged,	not	gathered	together	in	its	place,	in	its	present	etc.	–	that	is,	split	between	a	respected	object	recalled,	a	responsive,	inventive	act	of	recall,	as	well	as	a	future	called	–	and	its	memory	that	will	always	already	be	augmented	across	different	times	and	places,	like	the	specifics	of	a	witnessed	labour	of	enactment	and	its	archival	elsewhere:	i.e.	the	constellations	of	proper	names	and	fragments	of	textual,	image	and	gestural	material	before	which	the	unique	gestures	of	citational	recall	at	all	times	also	retreat.	Here,	the	clear	separation	of	the	retraced	material	and	the	physical	retracing,	between	the	remembered	and	the	act	of	remembering,	or	else	between	the	object	of	thought	and	its	reworking,	problematizes	easy	consumption	and	calls	for	
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Put	more	generally,	Karen	Christopher	sums	up	what	we	might	here	designate	as	a	non-redemptive	act	of	repair:	‘As	part	of	our	effort	to	approach	the	idea	of	repair,	September	Roses	attempts	to	perform	incompleteness,	to	force	a	kind	of	fracture	that	does	not	automatically	heal	itself’.521	In	the	context	of	a	gesture	of	remembrance	of	historical	damage	or	dis-adjustment,	the	effort	of	repair	that	does	not	seek	to	install	health	once	and	for	all,	begins	to	constitute	a	work	of	mourning	
against	consolation.522	It	is	the	effort	to	‘save’	and	keep	“alive,”	or	better,	to	facilitate	a	survival	and	living-on	of	the	memory	of	an	injustice	without	the	prospect	of	its	final	redemption.	Resisting	a	loss	of	world	brought	on	by	the	cycle	of	consumption	and	waste,	it	exposes	the	historicity	of	its	own	intervention	by	appealing	to	a	coming	response-ability.	Yet	even	a	culture	of	repair	thus	construed,	albeit	no	longer	concerned	with	an	absolute	recovery	and	restoration,	seems	nevertheless	difficult	to	fully	disentangle	from	the	status	of	an	original	accident	that	the	act	of	repair	somewhat	seems	to	nevertheless	imply.	Thus,	in	order	to	divorce	it	more																																																																																																																																																the	interruptive,	participatory,	transformative	reuse	of	its	hypomnemic	assemblage.	In	any	case,	Kelleher,	who	perhaps	too	hastily	divorces	the	performance’s	participatory	call	from	the	specifics	of	its	hupomnemic	treasure-chest,	nevertheless	makes	a	convincing	case	for	its	call	for	a	labour	of	the	after-thought	(‘the	next	morning,’	‘ten	years	later’)	that	is	no	longer	tied	to	anything	remembered	in	detail,	but	a	more	general	exemplarity	of	what	we	might	here	suitably	call	the	model	character	of	a	
Haltung:	‘Except…	[…]	I	don’t	remember	anything	in	detail.	[…]	Rather,	the	bits	seem	to	get	pulled	back	as	they	appear	into	the	“what	goes	on,”	back	into	the	communal	human	operation	that	performs	its	way	of	thinking	in	front	of	you,	so	that	what	you	might	take	away	is	the	memory	of	a	sort	of	imageless	theatre	that	offers	itself,	above	all,	as	a	re-iterated	
example	of	its	own	practice,	an	example	that	I	reiterate	in	my	remembering	of	the	work,	a	practice	we	can	borrow	from	and	imitate	certainly	(and	in	our	classrooms	many	of	us	have	been	doing	that	for	some	time)	but	only	by	way	of	a	rehearsal	that	–	in	the	context	of	an	attempt	to	remember	what	it	was	like	and	to	follow	the	way	–	risks	engaging	in	a	form	of	betrayal’	[ibid].	521	Bottoms	&	Goulish	ed.	106.	522	I	am	taking	the	latter	phrasing	from	the	title	of	Martin	Jay’s	essay	‘Against	Consolation:	Walter	Benjamin	and	the	Refusal	to	Mourn’	in	War	
and	Remembrance	in	the	Twentieth	Century.	ed.	Jay	Winter	and	Emmanuel	Sivan,	221-239.	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	1999).	
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fully,	not	only	from	the	horizon	of	a	telos	of	recovery	but	the	belief	in	the	purity	of	an	origin,	I	would	like	to	recast	the	‘act	of	repair’	in	light	of	Benjamin’s	notion	of	Rettung.	Like	repair,	the	word	Rettung	also	finds	itself	inscribed	in	a	semantic	field	of	a	saving	redemption,	as	one	possible	translation	of	the	term	would	have	it.	Yet	in	Walter	Benjamin’s	hands	
Rettung	undergoes	a	decisive	transformation.	Employed	to	describe	an	interruptive	intervention	into	the	violently	subsumptive	transmission	of	a	course	of	history	and	the	seeming	transparency	of	the	flow	of	its	mediation,	Rettung	precisely	saves	from	the	closure	of	a	phantasmatic	self-identity	by	exposing	the	originary	crack	[Sprung]	of	finite	phenomena.	Following	this	logic,	the	origin	was	always	already	breached	and	exposed,	swelling	under	the	future	of	“its”	transformative	survival.	The	act	of	Rettung,	seeking	to	expose	an	original	dehiscence	by	interrupting	its	abstracted,	sedimented	transmission,	returns	to	the	crack	[Sprung]	in	the	origin	[Ursprung]	in	order	to	re-launch	it,	that	is,	in	order	to	return	to	the	originary	leap	[Sprung]	at	play	in	the	crack	of	the	(word)	origin	“itself.”												2.	Rettung		Walter	Benjamin’s	writings	famously	reveal	an	acute	awareness	of	the	entanglements	of	power	with	the	closure	of	a	cultural	heritage	that	he	famously	likened	to	‘the	spoils	carried	along	in	the	triumphal	processions	in	which	today’s	rulers	tread	over	those	who	are	sprawled	underfoot.’	In	resistance	to	a	closure	of	inheritance	qua	tradition,	much	of	Benjamin’s	scholarly	efforts	draw	their	palpable	pathos	from	the	necessity,	as	he	puts	it,	to	brush	history	against	the	grain	of	its	transmission.523	Benjamin’s	concept	of	Rettung	perhaps	constitutes	an	attempt	to	describe	a	technique,	modality	and	style	of	such	a	brush.	In	a	scene	of	inheritance	and	self-inheritance,	he	employs	and	reemploys	the	term	
Rettung	–	a	word	that	can	be	widely	translated	as	rescue,	salvation,	salvage,	redemption,	retrieval	or	saving	–	at	several	instances	throughout																																																									523	Benjamin,	‘Über	den	Begriff	der	Geschichte’,	Illuminationen,	254.	
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his	work.	Benjamin	thereby	relaunches	a	concept	of	Rettung	as	another	name	for	the	very	gesture	of	relaunching	and	inflects	it	with	the	play	of	difference	that	it	itself	seeks	to	expose.	In	Benjamin’s	writings,	Rettung	finds	itself	linked	not	only	to	the	different	strands	of	its	etymology	and	historical	use	–	but	furthermore	to	the	shifting	contexts	throughout	the	development	of	his	own	thought.	For	instance,	he	appropriates	the	concept	of	Rettung	from	German	romanticism,	where	it	seeks	to	describe	a	critical	reconsideration	of	a	works	reception	history	by	an	effort	to	recover	an	original	work	from	its	distorted	transmission,	yet	notably	complicates	the	relation	of	a	history	of	reception	to	the	“original”	work.524	A	complication,	as	the	inverted	commas	in	the	previous	sentence	suggest,	that	will	largely	centre	on	a	quite	different	conception	of	the	origin	as	well	as	that	of	an	original	(work).525	In	its	widest	sense,	as																																																									524	Opitz	&	Wizisla,	627.	525	If	the	Benjaminian	gesture	of	Rettung	entails,	like	that	of	the	Romantics,	a	movement	of	return	to	the	“origin,”	the	latter	must	however	no	longer	be	conceived	as	a	final	point	of	(de-)termination.	The	“origin”	[Ursprung],	for	Benjamin,	is	never	simple	but	finds	itself	divided	by	a	‘crack’	[Sprung]	that	splits	its	present	into	a	pre-	and	a	post-history.	‘[I]t	is	less	a	self-contained	phenomenon,’	as	Samuel	Weber	relates,	‘than	a	complex	relationship	that	is	described	as	a	“rhythm”	(see	Weber,	
Benjamin’s	–abilities,	89).	In	this	dynamic	scenario,	an	‘original	movement	of	restoration	or	reinstatement	remains	forever	incomplete	and	never	reaches	its	goal,’	making	of	every	work	that	is	no	longer	self-contained	or	lasting,	as	Weber	puts	it	‘“only”	the	stopping-place	of	an	ongoing	movement’	(ibid,	91).	‘In	origin,’	Weber	says,	‘the	goal	ends	up	as	interruption’	(ibid,	136).	Calling	a	word	back	to	its	origin	by	summoning	it	by	its	name,	as	Benjamin	will	say	with	regards	to	the	citational	writing	practice	of	Karl	Kraus,	far	from	recovering	a	secure	place	and	time	of	an	absolute	beginning,	exposes	the	dynamic	aspect	of	a	structural	failure	of	institution,	and	thus	the	possibility	of	ongoing	historical	transformation	qua	necessary	reinstatement	of	a	divided	origin.	The	latter	is	‘from	the	start,	as	it	were,	caught	up	in	a	process	of	repetition	that	involves	alteration	and	transformation,	dislocation	and	displacement’	[ibid,	90].	In	other	words,	citation	exposes	an	originary	virtual	historicity	qua	(historical)	citability.	The	same	principle	of	a	structural	virtuality	is	at	work	in	all	of	Benjamin’s	–abilities.	He	develops	his	reflections	of	the	relation	between	an	“original”	(work)	and	its	afterlife	or	survival	most	elaborately	in	the	context	of	his	reflections	on	translation.	There	it	is	also	a	matter	of	identifying	an	originary	translatability	of	works	as	a	potential	that	can	be	realized	but	that	always	already	splits	(teilt)	a	non-identical	original	in	the	process	of	departing	from	itself	before	or	beyond	any	such	
		
251	
Heinrich	Kaulen	relates,	for	Benjamin	the	term	Rettung	takes	on	the	role	of	a	counter-concept	[Gegenbegriff]	to	the	concept	of	myth	as	the	inextricable	course	of	a	fated	life	and	as	resistance	to	abstract	right	‘to	which	it	opposes	the	attention	to	the	non-conceptual	substrate	of	experience,	the	unique	[das	Besondere]	and	non-identical’.526																																																																																																																																																	realizations).	Returning	a	contextually	congealed	mark	to	its	“original”	potentiality	thereby	describes	a	movement	that	is	simultaneously	directed	towards	the	future	and	the	past.	It	exposes	the	origin’s	structural	historicality,	which,	as	Weber	relates,	‘resides	not	in	its	ability	to	give	rise	to	a	progressive,	teleological	movement,	but	rather	in	its	power	to	return	incessantly	to	the	past	and	through	the	rhythm	of	its	ever-changing	repetitions	set	the	pace	for	the	future’	[ibid,	89].	To	return	to	the	origin	of	an	inheritance	is	thus	more	akin	to	a	movement	of	relaunching	it	that	entails	difference	as	much	as	repetition.	Furthermore,	it	exposes	or	aggravates	its	historical	potentiality	by	wresting	it	from	the	congealment	of	its	transmission	history.	The	irreparable	fissure	or	crack	in	the	origin,	Weber	suggests,	both	‘impairs	the	possibility	of	history	ever	being	written	or	thought	of	in	a	full	and	authentic	manner,’	and	‘constitutes	the	chance	of	history	to	be	something	more	than	the	mere	registration	and	reproduction	of	what	has	been’	[ibid,	138-9].	Such	a	chance	we	might	here	also	designate	as	an	originally	inscribed	potentiality	of	participation	qua	response-ability.	526	See	Opitz	&	Wizisla,	625,	(my	emphasis).	The	latter	part	of	Kaulen’s	description	of	an	‘attention	to	the	unique	and	non-identical’	here	recalls	Hixon’s	exclaimed	interest	in	‘the	particulars’	as	we	have	seen	it	linked	to	the	non-performance	of	an	appropriative	restraint	in	the	performance	work	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door.	Elsewhere,	Hixon	furthermore	links	attention	–	which	is	always	an	attention	to	the	particular,	that	is,	to	what	exceeds	the	congealed	schemata	of	perceptive	processing	–	to	a	necessary	restraint	of	intentionality.	She	does	so	by	relating	‘a	thought	on	bewilderment	as	a	way	of	entering	the	day,	a	movement	forward	that	is	actually	a	catching	up	of	what	is	coming	toward	you	and	the	reversal	of	intention	into	attention’	(Companion,	When	will	the	September).	Bewilderment	here	describes	perhaps	nothing	other	than	a	non-conceptual	experience	of	an	excess	of	the	particular,	which	will	always	be	linked	to	affect	(i.e.	bewilderment,	shock,	astonishment)	as	a	form	of	recognition	that	does	not	simply	reproduce	a	prior	cognition.	In	the	context	of	these	remarks,	namely	Goat	Island’s	performance	When	will	the	September	roses	bloom/Last	night	was	only	a	
comedy,	it	seems	fitting	to	further	relate	Hixon’s	statement	to	the	thought	of	the	philosopher,	mystic	and	factory	worker	Simone	Weil,	of	whom	Hixon	says	that	she	does	not	fit	easily	into	the	usual	histories	of	modern	philosophy	and	perhaps	appears	precisely	for	that	reason	as	a	figure	in	the	performance.	‘”We	do	not	obtain	the	most	precious	gifts	by	going	in	search	of	them[,]’	Hixon	quotes	Weil	elsewhere,	‘but	by	waiting	for	them.	This	way	of	looking	is,	in	the	first	place,	attentive.	The	soul	empties	itself	
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In	Benjamin’s	early	work	on	a	philosophy	of	language,	as	Kaulen	notes,	rescue	[Rettung]	from	abstraction	is	put	into	play	by	an	act	of																																																																																																																																																of	all	its	own	contents	in	order	to	receive	the	human	being	it	is	looking	at,	just	as	he	is,	in	all	his	truth.	Only	one	who	is	capable	of	attention	can	do	this.”’	[Hixon	in	Live	Art	and	Performance.	ed.	Adrian	Heathfield	(London:	Tate	Publishing	2004),	131,	my	emphasis].	Bringing	into	relation	Hixon’s	evocation	of	Weil’s	description	of	attention	as	an	emptying	of	the	soul’s	contents	with	her	own	thought	on	bewilderment	as	a	way	of	entering	the	day,	that	is,	with	a	particular	attitude	[Haltung]	towards	the	coming	of	time,	might	return	us	to	Derrida’s	recourse	to	the	concept	of	kenosis	as	the	passive	act	of	leaving	an	empty	place	for	the	coming	of	someone	absolute	indeterminate	in	a	disadjusted	present.	However,	the	aspect	of	Weil’s	discourse	that	speaks	of	an	encounter	with	the	‘truth’	of	being	(‘just	as	he	is’)	of	the	human	being,	for	which	attention	is	said	to	prepare	in	waiting,	somewhat	jars	with	Derrida’s	conception	of	the	coming	of	an	event.	One	aspect	of	what	underlies	this	difference	may	concern	two	diverging	conceptions	of	the	‘unique’	as	either	singular	or	individual.	‘If	the	latter	generally	involves	the	claim	of	being	indivisible,’	as	Samuel	Weber	relates,	‘singularity	by	contrast	is	accessible	only	through	its	constitutive	divisibility’	[Samuel	Weber,	‘Feel	of	Today’	presentation	at	The	London	Graduate	School	Summer	Academy	in	the	Critical	Humanities,	26th	of	June,	2014].	As	such,	the	experience	of	singularity	is	irreconcilable	with	that	of	plenitude	–	for	instance	the	encounter	with	a	proper	and	properly	unique	subject,	just	as	he	or	she	is.	Instead,	‘constituted	by	an	intrinsic	split,	by	a	constitutive	division	that	prevents	it	from	ever	being	strictly	contemporaneous	with	itself’	[….]	singularity,	Weber	says,	‘can	only	be	experienced	through	a	certain	absence,	difference	or	perhaps	better,	as	a	certain	resistance’	[ibid].	Whereas	individuality	describes	a	uniqueness	that	would	be	able	to	more	or	less	remain	the	same	over	time,	singularity	emerges	precisely	as	what	resists	a	repetition	on	which	it	nevertheless	depends.	For	Weber,	in	an	account	that	here	begins	to	resonate	with	Hixon’s	thought	on	the	link	between	the	passivity	of	attention	and	the	affect	of	bewilderment,	it	is	precisely	what	resists	the	plenitude	of	a	repetition	that	no	longer	comes	full	circle	that	exceeds	a	conceptual	grip	on	phenomena	and	ties	it	to	the	experience	of	feeling.	‘Since	it	emerges	only	in	and	through	withdrawal,’	Weber	says,	‘it	[the	singular]	can	never	constitute	a	stable	and	identifiable	object	of	cognition.	The	singular,	then,	belongs	to	the	experience	not	of	knowledge	but	of	acknowledgement	through	affect,	as	a	form	of	recognition	that	does	not	simply	reproduce	a	prior	cognition’	[ibid,	5].	Finally,	Weber’s	reflections	are	nevertheless	able	to	return	us	back	to	another	aspect	of	Weil’s	terminology	by	relaunching	the	figure	of	a	‘truth’	of	the	unique.	For	given	that	its	characteristic	mode	of	emergence	is	that	of	withdrawal	from	determinate	repetition,	Weber	is	able	to	describe	singularity	as	the	reappearance	of	the	Heideggerian	motif	of	truth	as	aletheia,	albeit,	as	he	adds,	in	a	more	temporal	or	“temporized”	mode	[ibid].	
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naming	that	frees	‘the	unique	signature	of	objects’	from	the	assimilating	grip	of	a	concept	[Begriff].	A	similar	constellation	of	Rettung	and	naming	informs	Benjamin’s	discussion	of	the	citational	writing	practice	of	Karl	Krauss.527																																																								In	this	context,	the	activity	of	naming	qua	saving	[rettende]	citation	finds	itself	inextricably	related	to	an	endeavour	to	interrupt	and	prise	open	the	concatenated	flow	of	sentences	and	words	in	order	to	free	fragments	from	their	linear	contextual	subsumption.	Krauss’s	citational	polemics,	Benjamin	emphatically	relates,	apply	a	crowbar	to	the	most	delicate	joints	of	the	concatenated	text,	breaking	and	slashing	into	the	syllables.528																																																										527	In	our	context,	it	is	non-fortuitous	that	Benjamin’s	portrait	of	Kraus’s	citational	writing	style	is	notably	held	in	theatrical	terms.	‘“I	am”,’	says	Kraus,	says	Benjamin,	‘“perhaps	the	first	case	of	a	writer	who	experiences	his	writing	like	an	actor	[schauspielerisch]’	[Benjamin,	‘Karl	Kraus’,	364].	Kraus’s	‘mimic	genius,’	says	Benjamin,	‘copies	and	makes	faces’	in	commentary	and	polemic.	It	‘unleashes	ceremonially	in	the	public	readings	[Vorlesungen]	of	dramas	who’s	authors	non-fortuitously	take	up	a	curious	middle	position	[Mittelstellung]:	Shakespeare	and	Nestroy,	poet	and	actor;	Offenbach,	composer	and	conductor’	[ibid].	Here,	the	reference	is	to	Kraus’s	one-man	public	readings	of	plays	and	operettas.	Yet	beyond	the	latter,	his	‘mimical’	style	of	writing	that	‘creeps	into	[its]	material’	–	staging	it	qua	transforming	citation	–	seems	never	far	from	the	modality	of	a	theatrical	performativity	itself.	What	is	therefore	non-fortuitous	about	Kraus’s	choice	of	literature	for	his	public	readings	and	their	author’s	so-called	middle	position	[Mittelstellung]	is	that	it	echoes	Kraus’s	own	taste	for	the	middle,	lodged	somewhere	in	the	interstices	between	text	and	performance,	archive	and	staging,	signature	and	counter-signature,	writing	and	reading.	We	are	thus	never	far	from	what	we	might	designate	as	an	aspect	of	demonstrated	‘performativity’	that	exposes	the	illusory	stability	of	congealed	identities	by	exposing	their	divided	origin	[Ur-sprung]	upon	an	arche-stage.		528	The	polemic	aspects	of	Kraus’s	citational	writing	style	perhaps	somewhat	jars	with	the	relationship	of	the	modality	of	citation	to	the	cited	material	in	the	works	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	I	am	here	avoiding	the	overtly	violent	rhetoric	by	which	Benjamin	at	times	describes	it.	For	instance,	Kraus,	according	to	Benjamin,	not	only	takes	recourse	to	a	crowbar	but	a	‘crowbar	of	hatred’	–	its	breaking	and	slashing	of	syllables	in	so	many	ways	out	to	do	harm	or	in	any	case	‘punish’	the	context	of	its	intervention.	Upping	the	ante	on	a	theatrical	register,	Benjamin	furthermore	repeatedly	evokes	the	image	of	a	citational	cannibalism,	which	interiorizes	its	adversaries	–	like	an	actor	would	a	part	–	in	order	to	destroy	them	[Benjamin,	‘Karl	Kraus’	in	
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Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	II.	334-367.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag),	365,	372	&	375].	Thus,	not	unlike	a	certain	aspect	of	Brechtian	distanciation,	here,	a	citational	repetition	may	appropriate	a	detested	source	in	order	to	reveal	a	critical	distance	of	the	performance	to	the	performed.		Such	a	violently	critical	relation	to	the	cited	source	is	absent	from	the	work	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door,	which	is	notably	unpolemic,	displaying	instead	an	overtly	loving	relationship	to	its	source	materials.	As	such,	it	resembles	the	gesture	of	the	amateur,	if	the	latter,	as	Stiegler	notes,	‘is	the	name	given	to	one	who	loves	works	or	who	realizes	him-	or	herself	in	traversing	such	works’	[Stiegler,	‘Anamnesis	and	Hypomnesis’].	The	amateur’s	participatory	or	contributory	relation	to	the	work	that	is	loved,	however,	implies	and	opens	the	possibility	of	the	latter’s	critique.	In	our	context,	it	is	furthermore	of	note,	that	Stiegler,	in	contrast	to	the	consumer,	links	the	critical,	participatory	relation	of	the	amateur	to	the	work	loved	to	the	capacity	of	a	careful	attention.	‘To	love	anything	at	all,’	Stiegler	says,	‘is	like	loving	nothing	at	all,	and	to	love	nothing	at	all	is	to	be	no	longer	capable	of	careful	attention:	the	amateur	can	no	longer	love	wherever	consumption	has	killed	attentiveness	to	what	is	consumed’	[ibid].	In	any	case,	the	relevance	of	Kraus’s	citational	polemics	for	our	present	consideration	imposes	itself	in	this	context	not	through	its	ability	to	‘punish’	but	to	‘save’	[retten].	Benjamin	himself	exclaims	a	preference	for	the	‘saving’	[rettende]	aspect	of	the	Krausian	citation.	Albeit	impossible	to	strictly	separate	it	from	violence	altogether,	as	well	as	always	also	at	work	in	every	punishment,	Rettung	here	nevertheless	distinguishes	itself	from	‘punishment’	by	its	primary	concern	with	the	future	of	an	uncontrollable	afterlife	rather	than	the	mere	critique	of	a	previous	context.	Relaunching	an	inheritance	by	upping	the	ante	on	its	withdrawal	from	knowledge	into	the	secret	of	irony	and	overdetermination,	a	‘saving	citation’	exposes	the	structural	breach	[Sprung]	and	disadjustment	at	the	origin	[Ursprung]	of	the	mark	in	order	to	aggravate	and	multiply	its	potential	afterlife.	Echoing	a	theme	that	Derrida	developed	at	length	in	
Specters	of	Marx	and	‘Force	of	Law’	–	and	that	will	become	increasingly	relevant	in	my	reading	of	Every	house	has	a	door’s	performance	
Testimonium	–	Benjamin	hails	the	exposed	structural	disadjustment	of	a	language	‘saved’	from	contextual	closure	as	‘the	matrix	of	justice.’	See	for	instance	the	following	extract	from	Benjamin’s	essay	on	Kraus,	which	touches	on	the	relationship	between	citation,	naming,	interruption,	destruction,	punishment,	Rettung	and	justice	as	I	have	evoked	them	here:		From	within	the	linguistic	compass	of	the	name,	and	only	from	within	it,	can	we	discern	Kraus’s	basic	polemical	procedure:	citation.	To	quote	a	word	is	to	call	it	by	its	name.	So	Kraus’s	achievement	exhausts	itself	at	its	highest	level	by	making	even	the	newspaper	citable.	He	transports	it	to	his	own	sphere,	and	the	empty	phrase	is	suddenly	forced	to	recognize	that	even	in	the	deepest	dregs	of	the	journals	it	is	not	safe	from	the	voice	that	swoops	on	the	wings	of	the	word	to	drag	it	from	its	darkness.	How	
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	They	do	so	in	an	effort	to	wrest	language	from	its	reduction	to	pure	instrumentality.	In	Benjamin’s	account,	Kraus’s	saving	gesture	is	thus	performed	in	view	of	an	encounter	with	language	as	excess.	Language,	for	Benjamin	as	well	as	Kraus,	is	fundamentally	non-instrumental.	Even	where	it	is	treated	in	the	most	instrumental	way	possible	–	Kraus’s	privileged	and	abhorred	example	is	the	newspaper	–	it	will	have	been	citable.	As	citable	it	will	carry	the	deferred	trace	of	a	difference	that	a	saving,	transforming	citation	is	able	to	expose.	Therefore	it	is	never	merely	a	question	of	opposing	one	possible	use	of	language	with	another,	but	rather	of	exposing,	despite	all	appearances	to	the	contrary,	the	structural	failure	of	the	purity	of	language’s	instrumentality.	The	more	or	less	destructive,	if	not	deconstructive	force	of	Rettung’s	interruptive	intervention	is	thus	necessarily	of	the	order	of	a	demonstration	of	what	is	already	structurally	at	work	by	itself	before	and	beyond	it.	To	actively	intervene	qua	punishing	and	saving	citation	is	to	expose	the	false	appearance	of	a	transparent	instrumentality	of	language.	As	the	power	of	this	illusory	appearance	always	turns	out	to	be	related	to	a	certain	‘flow,’	rescue	[Rettung]	from	the	reduction	to	instrumentality	qua	citation	implies	the	movement	of	an	interruption	and	subsequent	suspense.	In	Benjamin’s	essay	on	Kraus,	two	interrelated	types	or	orders	of	an	illusory	flow	can	be	identified.	On	the	one	hand,	as	the	wielding	of	a	citational	crowbar	indicates	it,	it	is	from	the	semantic	linearity	of	the	‘idyllic	con-
																																																																																																																																															wonderful	if	this	voice	approaches	not	to	punish	but	to	save	[retten],	as	it	does	on	the	Shakespearean	wings	of	the	lines	in	which,	before	the	town	of	Arras,	someone	sends	word	home	of	how	in	the	early	morning,	on	the	last	blasted	tree	beside	the	fortifications,	a	lark	began	to	sing.	A	single	line,	and	not	even	one	of	his,	is	enough	to	enable	Kraus	to	descend,	as	saviour,	into	this	inferno,	and	insert	a	single	italicization:	“It	was	a	nightingale	and	not	a	lark	which	sat	there	on	the	pomegranate	tree	and	sang.”	In	the	quotation	that	both	saves	and	punishes,	language	proves	the	matrix	of	justice.	It	summons	the	word	by	its	name,	wrenches	it	destructively	from	its	context,	but	precisely	thereby	calls	it	back	to	its	origin	[Ursprung].	[Benjamin,	The	work	of	Art,	384;	Benjamin,	Illuminationen,	379].	
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text	of	sense’	that	the	word	as	name	must	be	roused.529	Here,	to	cite	is	to	prise	open	the	successive,	concatenated	‘pseudo-logic	of	the	discourse’	–	to	recall	an	expression	of	Roland	Barthes	speaking	in	the	context	of	Brecht’s	interruptive	techniques	of	distancing	marks	from	an	elaborate	layer	of	contextual	codification	–	‘links,	transitions,	the	patina	of	elocution,	in	short	the	continuity	of	speech’	that	produces	the	effect	‘of	a	kind	of	force,	[…]	an	illusion	of	assurance’.530	Or	put	in	the	rhetoric	of	Benjamin’s	study	of	Baroque	language-dismemberment	[Sprachzerstückelung],	to	interrupt	and	suspend	the	joint,	connection,	conjunction	of	sense	[Sinnverbindung]	is	to	orphan	fragments	–	words,	syllables,	phonemes	–	from	every	conventional	connection	of	sense,	inducing	a	fracturing	of	language	into	pieces	[Stücke]	or	‘things’	[Ding]	that	allow	for	their	‘allegorical	exploitation’.531	‘Language	is	broken	up,’	Benjamin	says	about	certain	Baroque	texts,	‘in	order	to	lend	itself	to	a	transformed	and	enhanced	expression	through	its	pieces’.532		On	the	other	hand,	Kraus’s	citational	practice	seeks	to	interrupt	a	different	order	of	flow	–	encompassing	the	first	but	also	somewhat	raising	its	stake	–	namely,	of	‘information’	gathered	and	distributed	by	newspapers	as	the	dominant	apparatus	of	news	production	and	distribution	of	his	time.	In																																																									529	Benjamin,	‘Karl	Kraus’,	Illuminationen,	380.	530	Roland	Barthes.	‘Brecht	and	Discourse:	A	Contribution	to	the	Study	of	Discursivity’	in	Brecht,	The	Rustle	of	Language.	212-222.	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press	1992),	216	(my	emphasis).	531	Walter	Benjamin,	Ursprung	des	deutshcen	Trauerspiel.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1978),	183-4.	532	ibid.	Roused	from	idyllic	sense,	the	isolated	fragment	or	name	does	not	thereby	strictly	become	non-sense.	Instead,	the	failure	of	determinate	sense	is	indeterminate	only	in	as	far	as	over-determinate.	It	is	precisely	for	the	increased	potential	of	sense	that	the	fragment	lends	itself	to	allegorical	exploitation.	In	one	of	Benjamin’s	examples	of	a	Baroque	text,	it	is	what	Benjamin	calls	the	remainder	of	sense	[Bedeutungsrest]	that	imbues	the	fragment	with	a	menacing,	that	is,	affective	quality.	Languages	‘enhanced	expression’	may	thus	refer	to	the	affective	quality	of	what	resists	but	also	multiplies	the	possibility	of	determination.	The	reception	of	dis-contextualised	language-fragments	thus	finds	itself	linked	to	both	the	experience	of	affect	as	well	as	desire.	For	its	multiplied	(allegorical)	potential	of	meaning	–	or	what	we	might	also	call	the	exposure	of	its	increased	response-ability	–	calls	for	the	(historical)	participation	in	the	production	of	sense.	
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Benjamin’s	account,	newspapers	structurally	enhance	the	reduction	of	language	to	the	status	of	an	instrument	in	their	accelerated	endeavour	to	take	hold	and	disseminate	‘any	area	of	life,	politics,	economy	and	art.’	As	accelerated	production	and	distribution	times	call	for	an	increase	in	the	gathering	of	information	to	be	made	readily	available	for	consumption,	every	kind	of	material	taken	from	any	area	of	life,	Benjamin	says,	has	to	be	quickly	reached	and	‘journalistically	processed.’	Such	processing	amounts,	as	he	puts	it,	to	the	‘making	tradable	of	thought’	[den	Gedanken	
verkehrsfähig	macht].533	Rendered	more	literally,	what	is	evoked	by	the	latter	expression	is	a	preparation	for	the	road	or	the	flow	of	traffic	[Verkehr].	In	short,	what	is	at	stake	is	a	reduction	of	language	to	an	instrumental	economy	that	is	able	to	withstand	the	demands	of	a	changing	public	sphere.534	A	demand	for	a	certain	lightness,	compactness	and	unequivocality	of	language	as	a	transparent	means	to	inform	and	communicate	best	met	in	what	Benjamin	with	Kraus	calls	the	‘empty	phrase.’535	Benjamin’s	Krausian	appeal	to	interrupt	the	accelerated	flow	of	‘information’	induced	by	the	modern	press	apparatus	in	order	to	free	language	from	its	reduction	to	the	instrumentality	of	an	‘empty	phrase’	perhaps	finds	an	echo	in	Derrida’s	demand	for	vigilance	and	resistance	in	face	of	the	determining	speed	of	contemporary	media	in	the	construction	of	actuality,	‘in	the	sense	of	“what	is	timely”	[“ce	qui	est	actuel”]	or	rather,	in	the	sense	of	“what	is	broadcast	under	the	heading	of	the	news	[sous	le	
titre	d’actualités].	Derrida	fittingly	designates	this	general	and	necessarily	artificial	construction	of	time	and	actuality	by	the	term																																																									533	Benjamin,	‘Karl	Kraus’,	Illuminationen,	337.	534	Benjamin’s	rhetorical	use	of	traffic	metaphors	when	discussing	the	accelerated	movement	of	‘information’	by	the	modern	press	apparatus	of	course	takes	on	another	resonance	in	light	of	what	for	some	time	at	least	would	have	been	often	referred	to	as	the	information	superhighway.	535	Benjamin,	as	we	have	seen,	uses	the	same	formulation	when	discussing	different	methodological	attitudes	towards	the	transmission	of	educational	contents	in	his	reflections	on	a	proletarian	children’s	theatre.	There,	in	line	with	his	critique	of	an	instrumental	use	of	language,	he	alerts	to	the	danger	that	an	idea	that	is	merely	transmitted	but	not	rehearsed	(i.e.	class	consciousness),	runs	the	risk	of	merely	reaching	the	child	as	an	empty	phrase	[Phrase].	
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artifactuality.	In	an	interview	with	the	French	journal	Passages,	which	like	so	many	others	begins	with	a	critique	of	the	‘rhythm’	of	its	temporal	conditions,	that	is,	its	complicity	in	the	artificial	production	of	the	time	of	a	public	speech	that,	given	the	temporal	constraint	of	the	interview	form,	must	not	go	to	waste	and	surrender	to	what	we	might	here	call	the	‘making	tradable	of	thought,’	if	not	a	reduction	to	the	empty	phrase	–Derrida	gives	the	following	description	of	the	production	of	actuality:				 It	is	not	given,	but	actively	produced,	sifted,	contained,	and	performatively	interpreted	by	many	hierarchizing	and	selective	procedures	–	false	or	artificial	procedures	that	are	always	in	the	service	of	forces	and	interests	of	which	their	“subjects”	and	agents	[…]	are	never	sufficiently	aware.	The	“reality”	(to	which	“actuality”	refers)	–	however	singular,	irreducible,	stubborn,	painful,	or	tragic	it	may	be	–	reaches	us	through	fictional	constructions	[facture].	The	only	way	to	analyse	it	is	through	a	work	of	resistance,	of	vigilant	counterinterpretation,	etc.	Hegel	was	right	to	remind	the	philosopher	to	read	the	newspapers	everyday.	Today,	the	same	responsibility	also	requires	us	to	find	out	how	the	newspapers	are	made,	and	who	makes	them,	the	dailies,	the	weeklies,	and	the	television	news.536			Derrida’s	call	for	vigilance,	resistance	and	counterinterpretation	in	face	of	the	flow	of	artifactuality	–	the	latter	finding	its	apotheosis	in	the	production	of	the	illusion	of	presence	through	the	device	of	a	teleprompter,	or	else,	more	generally,	in	the	‘live	effect’	of	a	seemingly	immediate	transmission	of	images	and	its	concomitant	production	of	belief	–	here	resonates	with	the	interruptive	intervention	of	a	punishing	and	saving	citation	in	Benjamin’s	account	of	Kraus’s	critique	of	the	newspaper	and	its	instrumental	reduction	of	language	to	the	status	of	
																																																								536	Jacques	Derrida,	‘The	Deconstruction	of	Actuality’,	Negotiations,	86.	
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mere	information.537	Although	Derrida’s	account	of	the	structural	changes	of	the	public	sphere	are	largely	concerned	with	what	he	calls	the	new	‘resources	of	“live”	communication	and	“real	time”	transmission,’	the	latter	seem	to	remain	in	a	relation	of	continuity	to	the	accelerated	production	times	of	newspapers	of	which	Benjamin	speaks	in	the	context	of	Kraus.	Furthermore,	in	what	Derrida	is	soon	to	more	or	less	designate	himself	as	a	Benjaminian	injunction,	he	calls	for	the	task	to	make	use	of	‘new	[technological]	resources	while	continuing	to	critique	their	mystifications’.538	To	do	so,	he	asserts,	must	never	remain	a	matter	of	merely	‘pointing	out,’	that	is,	of	describing	the	impurity	of	a	more	or	less	illusory	transparency,	immediacy	and	neutrality	of	mediation,	but	must	involve	its	necessary	demonstration.	It	is	necessary	to	‘continu[e]	to	point	out,	and	demonstrate,’	Derrida	says,	‘that	“live”	communication	and	“real	time”	are	never	pure:	they	permit	neither	intuition	nor	transparency,	nor	any	perception	unmarked	by	interpretation	or	technical	intervention.	[…]’.539	The	Benjaminian	gesture	of	citational	Rettung,	as	we	have	seen	thus	far,	similarly	seeks	to	expose	an	illusory	assurance	of	the	informational	flow	by	its	interruption	and	suspense	–	that	is,	by	the	
Anhaltung	[stoppage]	that	doubles	up	as	a	particular	Haltung	[pose,	attitude]	towards	the	coming	of	the	other.	It	is	thus	always	of	the	order	of																																																									537	With	regards	to	the	media	apparatus	in	general	and	the	technology	of	the	teleprompter	in	particular	Derrida	says:	‘We	would	need	to	look	at	them	[newspapers,	television]	from	the	other	side:	from	the	side	of	the	news	agencies	as	well	as	from	that	of	the	teleprompter.	And	let	us	never	forget	what	such	a	statement	implies:	whenever	a	journalist	or	a	politician	appears	to	be	addressing	us	directly,	in	our	homes	and	looking	us	straight	in	the	eye,	he	(or	she)	is	actually	reading	on	the	screen	at	the	dictation	of	a	“prompter”	and	reading	a	text	that	was	produced	elsewhere	at	another	moment,	possibly	by	other	people	or	even	by	a	whole	network	of	anonymous	writers’	[Derrida,	Negotiations,	86].	For	another	discussion	of	artifactuality	in	general	and	the	‘live	effect’	of	so-called	“live”	images	and	its	profound	transformation	of	the	field	of	perception	and	of	experience	in	general	see Jacques	Derrida	&	Bernard	Stiegler.	Echographies	of	Television:	Filmed	Interviews.	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press	2002)	39-43.	538	Derrida,	Negotiations,	88.	539	ibid,	(the	emphasis	on	demonstrate	is	Derrida’s	but	would	have	also	been	mine).	
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what	Benjamin	elsewhere	calls	with	Brecht	the	‘refunctioning’	or	‘reworking’	of	an	available	media	apparatus,	that	is,	the	demonstrated	exposure	of	its	opacity	and	possible	transformation	(for	instance,	in	view	of	its	democratization	qua	response-ability).540		Although	it	could	seem	as	if	this	reading	of	Benjamin’s	account	of	Kraus’s	interruptive	citational	practice	in	the	context	of	Derrida’s	discussion	of	artifactuality	has	drifted	afar	from	the	modality	of	archival	exappropriation	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	as	outlined	above,	there	nevertheless	remain	clear	resonances	between	the	respective	movements	of	resistance	to	consumption	and	a	participatory	call	to	rework	qua	‘repair’	and	Rettung.	To	be	sure,	these	performance	practices,	albeit	citational,	do	not	take	their	mimetic	material	from	the	realm	of	the	artifactuality	of	current	news	production,	nor	seek	to	reveal	or	‘punish’	its	hidden	ideological	substrate.541	However,	to	begin	with,	they	can	nevertheless	be	read	as	a	self-consciously	indirect	response	to																																																									540	As	part	of	the	same	interview,	in	a	brief	discussion	on	the	changing	stakes	of	political	commitments	of	intellectuals,	Derrida	distinguishes	between	the	attitudes	displayed	by	Hugo	or	Sartre	to	that	of	Benjamin.	The	brief	reference	recalls	our	previous	discussion	of	Benjamin’s	reflections	on	the	Brechtian	concept	of	‘refunctioning’	in	‘The	Author	as	Producer’	and	puts	forward	an	extended	concept	of	the	apparatus	that	resonates	with	what	is	there	called	‘the	transformation	of	the	forms	and	
instruments	of	production’	by	taking	into	account	both	the	institutional	structures	of	a	public	space	–	with	all	the	macro-political	questions	of	access	to	power	–	as	well	as	the	intimate	‘experience	of	language.’	‘I	am	not	saying	that	Hugo	or	Sartre	never	questioned	or	transformed	the	form	of	the	engagement	that	was	available	to	them.	I	am	only	saying	that	it	was	not	a	constant	theme	or	a	major	concern	of	theirs.	They	did	not	think,	as	Benjamin	suggested,	they	needed	to	begin	by	analyzing	and	transforming	the	apparatus;	they	simply	began	by	supplying	it	with	a	content,	however	revolutionary	this	content	might	be.	The	apparatus	in	question	involves	not	only	technical	or	political	powers,	procedures	of	editorial	or	media	appropriations,	the	structure	of	a	public	space	(and	thus	of	the	supposed	addressees	one	is	addressing	or	whom	one	should	be	addressing);	it	also	involves	a	logic,	a	rhetoric,	an	experience	of	language,	and	all	the	sedimentation	this	presupposes.	[…]’.	[Derrida,	
Negotiations,	113].	541	A	prominent	example	of	a	contemporary	literary	practice	for	the	theatre	that	much	more	overtly	follows	and	relaunches	Kraus’s	gesture	of	a	citational	‘punishment’	of	contemporary	mass	media	can	perhaps	be	found	in	the	work	of	fellow	Austrian	writer	Elfriede	Jelinek.	
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current	events	and	political	urgencies	–	for	instance,	the	question	of	how	to	repair	arises	in	the	aftermath	of	9/11	as	an	alternative	to	the	ill-judged	immediate	military	and	political	responses	of	the	time	–	that	demonstratively	resist	the	rhythm	of	the	latter’s	appropriation	by	a	media	saturated	public	sphere,	‘in	order	that	the	debate,’	as	we	might	put	it	with	Bottoms,	‘reorganise	itself	on	a	higher	level	of	complexity”’.542	Yet	what	is	more,	their	hypomnemic	intervention	into	an	archival	scene	of	inheritance	is	never	far	from	the	problematic	of	a	selective	construction	of	artifactuality	by	what	Bernard	Stiegler,	in	conversation	with	Derrida,	suggestively	calls	the	“memory	industries”.543	By	designating	the	apparatus	of	production	of	artifactuality	a	memory	industry,	Stiegler	seemingly	alerts	us	to	a	field	of	continuity	between	the	production	of	actuality	(artifactuality)	and	history.	Indeed,	Derrida’s	account	of	artifactuality	more	or	less	resembles	his	own	description	of	an	archontic	principle	that	similarly	depends	on	the	many	hierarchizing	and	selective	procedures	of	sifting,	containing,	and	performatively	interpreting	in	the	service	of	certain	forces	and	interests.544	In	short,	a	field	of	continuity																																																									542	Bottoms	&	Goulish	ed.,	25.	543	Derrida	&	Stiegler,	41.	544	In	Echographies	of	Television,	a	‘filmed	interview’	with	Stiegler,	Derrida	further	generalizes	the	necessary	structure	of	an	‘interpretative	sifting,’	which,	as	he	puts	it,	‘is	not	confined	to	the	news	or	the	media,’	but	‘is	indispensable	at	the	threshold	of	every	perception	or	of	every	finite	experience	in	general’	[ibid,	42].	Stiegler,	in	a	later	text,	similarly	retraces	the	structural	logic	of	artifactuality	in	its	relation	to	the	general	‘plight	of	memory’	–	strikingly	figured	in	Borge’s	famous	story	of	Funes	the	Memorius	–	whilst	alerting	to	the	field	of	continuity	between	history	and	artifactuality:	‘The	daily	and	industrial	fabrication	of	time	by	a	press	agency	is	not	a	mere	account	of	the	news:	the	industries	of	current	events	are	not	satisfied	with	recording	“what	happens,”	for	then	everything	happening	would	have	to	be	recorded.	But	this	“what	happens,”	happens	only	in	not	being	everything,	by	distinguishing	itself	from	all	the	rest,	and	information	has	value	only	as	result	of	a	hierarchisation	in	“what	happens”:	by	selecting	what	deserves	the	name	of	event,	these	industries	co-produce,	at	least,	the	access	of	“what	happens”	to	the	status	of	event.	This	is	the	plight	of	memory	in	general,	that	it	(must	be)	a	selection	in	the	present,	and	that	its	passing,	its	becoming	past,	is	its	diminution.	This	is	the	theme	of	Funes	or	memory	by	Jorge-Luis	Borges.	But	here,	the	criteria	of	selection	become	industrial	–	and	the	selection	takes	place	in	real	time,	and	not	through	this	work	of	time	that	is	history	qua	Historie	
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opens	up	between	the	mnemic	construction	of	history	and	the	mnemic	construction	of	artifactuality	as	that	of	a	selective,	interpretative	and	abstracted	survival	and	transmission	of	finite	events.	In	turn,	the	flow	of	artifactuality,	which	Rettung	seeks	to	interrupt,	must	be	read	in	a	field	of	continuity	to	another	order	of	flow,	namely,	precisely	the	congealed,	interested	and	abstracted	transmission	of	tradition	Benjamin	has	in	mind	when	calling	for	the	necessity	to	brush	history	against	the	grain.	What	concerns	Benjamin	about	the	construction	of	a	historical	continuum,	which,	as	he	puts	it,	covers	its	revolutionary	moments	–	revolutionary	“moments”	that	Benjamin	always	associates	with	the	interruption	and	suspense	of	the	historical	continuum	–	is	not	only	the	outright	denigration,	exclusion	or	marginality	of	what	falls	out	of	the	archives	of	a	more	or	less	monumental	historiography	(it	does	that	also),	but	the	abstracted,	partial	transmission	of	an	unequivocal	appraisal	of	works	entered	into	tradition.545	‘Appraisal	or	apologia,’	Benjamin	says,																																																																																																																																																	and	Geschichte.	The	conservation	of	memory,	of	the	memorable	(the	selection	from	within	the	memorisable	which	is	the	retention	of	this	memorable	constitutes	it	as	such)	is	always	already	its	elaboration	as	well:	it	is	never	the	sheer	reporting	of	“what	takes	place”,	and	what	takes	place	only	takes	place	in	not	quite	taking	place:	one	memorizes	only	in	forgetting,	in	effacing,	in	selecting	what	deserves	to	be	retained	in	what	could	have	been	–	[…]’	[Stiegler,	‘Anamnesis	and	Hypomnesis’].	545		Benjamin	was	of	course	also	concerned	more	simply	with	what	Martin	Jay	calls	‘the	imperative	to	rescue	what	had	been	forgotten	by	the	victors	of	history’	[Jay,	‘Against	Consolation’,	229,	my	emphasis].	The	privileged	and	biographically	informed	example	of	Jay’s	account	is	the	social	remembrance	of	WWI	casualties	by	a	reparative	narrative	that	necessarily	prescribes	the	forgetting	of	Benjamin’s	close	friends’	Fritz	Heinle	and	Rika	Seligson	anti-war	suicides.	‘For	the	suicides	of	the	two	teenagers	vainly	protesting	the	outbreak	of	hostilities[,]’	Jay	notes,	‘cannot	have	had	the	same	meaning	as	the	deaths	of	the	soldiers	who	were	assumed	to	have	gallantly	fought	for	their	country’	[ibid,	228].	Devoted	to	their	memory,	Benjamin	brushes	against	the	grain	of	history	in	pursuit	of	a	melancholic	work	of	mourning	that	cannot	so	easily	be	assimilated	to	the	movement	of	a	healthy	working	through	that	seeks	to	make	sense	of	or	‘repair’	the	deaths	of	his	friends.	If	forgetting	is	here	linked	to	the	mnemic	preference	and	selection	of	some	traces	of	history	over	others	–	what	is	being	remembered	–	it	might	however	also	concern	a	selective	kind	of	remembrance.	It	is	this	second	order	of	‘forgetting’	in	remembrance	that	primarily	informs	our	discussion	of	a	gesture	of	rescue	that	seeks	to	repeat	otherwise	an	inheritance	in	resistance	to	the	flow	of	
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	 strives	to	cover	the	revolutionary	moments	in	the	course	of	history.	It	has	the	production	of	continuity	at	heart.	It	attaches	importance	only	to	those	elements	of	a	work	that	have	already	entered	its	aftermath	[Nachwirkung].	It	evades	the	cliffs	and	prongs	that	provide	a	foothold	[Halt,	also:	halt,	stop,	support,	purchase,	hold]	to	the	one	who	wants	to	progress	beyond	it.546		Cliffs	or	prongs,	as	what	resists	the	movement	of	an	institutionalised	transmission,	providing	a	foothold	[Halt]	that	doubles	up	as	the	stoppage	[Halt]	–	interruption,	suspense	and	Schwellung	–	of	a	flow	of	continuity	that	merely	appeals	to	its	non-participatory	consumption.547	Yet	this																																																																																																																																																“its”	congealed	transmission	history.	Both	these	aspects	of	resisting	a	selective	remembrance	(i.e.	between	different	marks,	between	different	transmissions	of	the	“same”	mark)	are	seemingly	at	work	in	Benjamin’s	description	of	the	task	of	remembrance	as	what	‘must	not	proceed	in	the	manner	of	a	narrative	or	still	less	that	of	a	report,	but	must,	in	the	strictest	epic	and	rhapsodic	manner,	assay	its	spade	in	ever-new	places,	and	in	the	old	ones	delve	to	ever-deeper	depths’	[Benjamin	quoted	in	Jay,	229].		546	Walter	Benjamin	‘Zentralpark’,	Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	I,	655-690.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1977),	658.	547	Reflecting	on	Benjamin’s	critical	inheritance	of	Marxist	concepts,	Matthias	Fritsch	relates	how	in	his	critique	of	a	historicism	that	suppresses	‘the	‘drudgery	of	the	nameless’	in	order	to	reduce	a	heritage	‘to	a	dead	possession	or	inventory	whose	origin	in	labor	and	a	history	of	expropriation	is	forgotten,’	Benjamin	seeks	to	reveal	how	a	heritage	takes	on	a	fetishistic	aspect.	Fritsch’s	admittedly	very	general	comment	that,	‘moreover,	commodity	fetishism	in	general	is	said	to	hamper	active	intervention	into	political	processes	in	that	it	contributes	to	the	melancholic	boredom	characteristic	of	modernity’	here	nevertheless	resonates	with	what	I	have	identified	as	the	non-participatory	tendencies	of	the	flows	of	historical	transmission	and	artifactuality.		Benjamin	emphasizes	the	danger	of	the	seemingly	apolitical	nature	of	such	a	flow	when	seeking	to	put	forward	his	concept	of	historical	materialism	as	an	alternative	model	of	historiography.	The	latter,	Benjamin	insists,	must	question	the	flow	of	historical	transmission.	The	historical	materialist,	as	Fritsch	relates,			must	ask	above	all	about	the	origin	of	the	developmental	process	unified	in	a	“stream	of	transmission	[Strom	der	Überlieferung]”:	“Whose	mills	are	driven	by	this	stream?	Who	utilizes	its	rapids?	
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foot-hold	[Halt],	albeit	the	minimal	ground	for	a	sharing	of	world	qua	participation	in	its	infinite	reworking,	is	essentially	anything	but	secure.	Precisely	eschewing	a	conceptual	[begrifflich],	instrumental	grip	[Griff]	on	the	essence	of	phenomena,	it	describes	the	minimal	and	limited	identity	of	a	Halt,	Haltung,	gesture	that	begins	to	swell	and	tremble	under	the	virtual	intrusion	of	the	possibilities	if	“its”	living-on.	Rettung,	which	performs	a	gesture	of	interruption	qua	citation,	relaunches	an	inheritance	otherwise	to	reveal	its	structural	dehiscence	and	historicity,	upping	the	ante	on	a	constitutive	disadjustment:				 From	what	are	phenomena	to	be	saved?	Not	only,	and	not	so	much	from	the	disrepute	and	contempt	into	which	they	have	fallen	as	from	the	catastrophe	that	a	certain	kind	of	tradition,	their	“valorization	as	heritage,”	very	often	entails.	They	are	saved	through	the	disclosure	[Aufweisung]	of	the	breach	[Spung:	leap,	crack]	in	them.	548		In	other	words,	what	is	disclosed	or	exposed	by	Rettung	is	the	impossibility	of	self-containment	and	self-identity	of	the	cited	material.	In	doing	so,	the	interruptive	intervention	prises	open	the	relative	closure	of	a	transmission	that	tends	towards	non-participation.549																																																																																																																																																	Who	contained	it?	–	thus	asks	the	historical	materialist.”	[Fritsch,	166].		For	Benjamin,	the	dead	inventory	of	a	fetishized	heritage	–	a	stream	of	transmission	that	hampers	active	intervention	–	‘does	not	allow	any	“genuine,	that	is,	political	experience.”	[…]	Overcoming	the	fetishistic,	historicist	notion	of	cultural	history,	in	the	crafting	of	a	new	historiographical	method,’	Fritsch	sums	up	Benjamin’s	efforts	to	reactivate	political	experience,	‘contributes	to	a	memory	of	suffering	that,	in	turn,	motivates	political	resistance	against	those	who	profit	from	the	fetishism’	[ibid].	548	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	139.	549	I	say	tends,	following	Derrida’s	account	of	the	“logic”	of	sovereignty	that	can	reign	only	for	a	limited	time	by	not	sharing.	‘As	soon	as	there	is	sovereignty,	there	is	abuse	of	power	and	a	rogue	state.	Abuse	is	the	law	of	use;	it	is	the	law	itself,	the	“logic”	of	a	sovereignty	that	can	reign	only	by	not	sharing.	More	precisely,	since	it	never	succeeds	in	doing	this	
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Every	Theatre	Has	a	Door:		
Exposing	the	Unknowing	of	Events,	People,	Time,	and	its	Passing		 Samuel	Weber,	as	we	have	seen,	reads	the	theatre	(whether	as	such	or	more	broadly	construed)	as	a	privileged	space	or	zone	for	the	scene	of	such	an	exposure	of	the	limit	of	self-containment.	For	the	space	of	the	theatre	finds	itself	‘internally	split,	divided	into	spectacle	and	spectators,	stage	and	audience,	inseparable	and	yet	distinct’.550	A	space,	as	we	might	put	it,	that	embodies	the	very	division,	breach	or	crack	of	every	mark	that	is	structurally	bound	to	part	with	itself	qua	opening	towards	future	iterations	that	will	transform	it.551	Nowhere	does	it	do	so	more	overtly	than	in	the	interruptions	of	its	own	continuum,	for	instance	those	of	a	plot.	In	Benjamin’s	reflections	on	Brecht’s	Epic	Theatre	and	the	citability	of	gesture,	the	future	intrudes	as	the	virtual	swell	of	a	coming	alterity	in	a	proliferation	of	gaps	that	open	in	the	compositional	joints	of	the	performance.	These	gaps	demonstratively	inscribe	into	the	experimental,	trembling	conditions	[Zustände]	of	Epic	Theatre’s	test-performances	the	appeal	to	an	audience’s	response.	Yet	in	as	far	as	the	citability	of	the	suspended	gesture	or	scenario	[Zustand]	also	marks	the	opening	to	other	times	and	places,	the	appeal	of	response-ability	is	never	simply	addressed	to	the	immediacy	of	the	present	or	merely	to	those	in	attendance	[die	Anwesenden].	Instead	it	addresses	itself	to	the	future	of	after-thoughts,	the	coming	response	of	others	or	the	self	as	other,	for	which	an	exposed	present	[des	Anwesenden]	may	merely	stand-in.	Confronted	with	the	limit	of	contextual	saturation,	a	situated	audience																																																																																																																																																except	in	a	critical,	precarious,	and	unstable	fashion,	sovereignty	can	only	
tend,	for	a	limited	time,	to	reign	without	sharing.	It	can	only	tend	toward	imperial	hegemony’	[Derrida,	Rogues,	102].			550	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	235-6.	551	‘Theatrical	representations	cannot	be	framed	by	a	complete,	self-contained,	meaningful	narrative	[…]	since	the	actualization	of	theatre	involves	a	temporal	repetition	that	is	suspended	in	a	divided	space.	It	is	the	simultaneity	of	this	division,	of	actors	acting	before	and	to	an	audience,	which	both	distinguishes	theatrical	representation	from	other	kinds	and	makes	it	difficult	for	it	to	be	enclosed	within	the	stable	structure	of	a	work’	[Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	259].	
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experiences	a	tension	between	an	intrinsically	overdetermined	and	open-ended	relational	network	of	signification	and	the	finitude	of	experience.552	Reduced	to	seeing	without	knowing	just	what	one	is	seeing,	the	audience	“recognizes”		‘that	the	irreducible	secret	of	whatever	one	sees	is	that	it	could	mean	something	entirely	different	from	what	one	expects’.553	In	this	context,	Hixon’s	assertion	that,	within	the	gaps	of	the	composition,	‘those	watching	become	aware	of	themselves	watching	and	the	others	in	the	room	watching,’	becomes	suggestive	of	a	“recognition”	of	what	Weber	calls	‘the	complexly	relational	structure	of	cognition’	by	which	‘the	significance	of	events,	persons,	and	things	depends	not	just	on	their	intrinsic	qualities	but	on	their	situation,	which	is	to	say,	on	their	relation	to	what	is	external	to	them’.554	‘[..S]uch	situatedness,’	Weber	continues,	‘can	never	be	internally	defined,	never	finished	in	the	sense	of	being	completed,	but	only	interrupted’.555	An	interruption	that	doubles	up	as	a	suspense	of	significance	qua	understanding,	exposing	the	theatre,																																																									552	Perhaps	a	not	dissimilar	tension	is	at	work	in	Benjamin’s	experience	of	the	limit	of	contextual	saturation	in	the	interrupted	encounter	of	the	images	of	the	Kaiserpanorama.	Benjamin’s	promise	of	repetition	(the	desire	‘to	come	again	the	next	day’)	furthermore	constitutes	a	commitment	to	the	response	of	the	appeal	to	the	after-thought.	553	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	264.	554	ibid,	263.	Kelleher,	in	his	account	of	attending	a	Goat	Island	performance,	describes	an	experience	that	here	comes	very	close	to	a	recognition	of	the	relational	structure	of	cognition	that	is	closely	linked	to	what	Hixon	designates	as	the	becoming	aware	of	the	others	in	the	room	watching.	Although	with	regards	to	the	work	of	Goat	Island	such	a	recognition	is	quite	literally	facilitated	through	the	traverse	seating	arrangement,	as	Hixon’s	comments	in	the	context	of	Testimonium	show,	they	do	not	depend	on	it.	Speaking	of	‘the	associative	leaps	that	we	spectators	are	able	to	make	across	the	spirals	and	through	the	strata	of	the	composition	as	our	thought	seeks	its	way,	its	ductus,	among	the	possibilities	on	offer[,]’	Kelleher	notes:	‘These	possibilities,	though,	are	strung	out	across	a	range	of	very	different,	even	contradictory,	approaches	to	the	same	thing;	so	that	it	is	never	quite	possible	to	only	“go”	in	one	direction	at	a	time.	There	is	always	another	view	opening	up	–	like	anamorphosis	–	another	perspective	from	which	the	object	before	you	might	be	seen	and	understood	differently	[…],	if	only	you	were	coming	at	it	not	from	here	but	from	over	there,	where	the	other	people	are,	and	have	been	all	this	time,	the	other	people	who	appear	to	be	watching	the	same	show	as	you’	[Kelleher,	106].	555	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	263.	
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as	Hixon	and	Goulish	evocatively	describe	it,	as	‘a	place	of	recognition	as	acknowledgement	of	the	unknowing	of	events,	people,	time,	and	its	passing’.556		Nowhere	in	Benjamin’s	writings	on	Epic	Theatre	is	the	opening	to	other	times,	places	and	respondents	more	overtly	figured	than	in	the	self-titled	primitive	example	of	a	literal	opening	of	a	(stage)	door	onto	a	familiar	scene	from	bourgeois	life:	the	wife	was	just	about	to	grab	a	bronze	bust	in	order	to	launch	it	towards	the	daughter;	the	father	about	to	open	the	window	to	call	for	an	officer.	In	this	very	moment,	Benjamin																																																									556	Goulish	&	Hixon.	The	rhetoric	of	“recognition”	at	work	in	Hixon’s	and	Goulish’s	exclamation	here	re-inscribes,	whether	consciously	or	not,	a	tradition	that	goes	back	to	the	founding	text	of	western	theatre.	In	any	case,	it	is	this	inheritance	of	the	Aristotelian	concept	of	recognition,	which	in	the	Poetics	follows	on	the	heels	of	the	interruption	of	a	sudden	turn	of	events	in	Aristotle’s	account	of	the	complex	tragic	plot,	that	Weber	has	in	mind	in	the	above	reflections.	Yet	whereas	for	Aristotle	“recognition”	signifies	the	repetition	or	return	of	cognition	after	the	shock	of	the	unexpected	turn,	as	well	as	the	passage	from	a	state	of	wonder	and	even	ignorance	to	a	state	of	insight,	Weber’s	reading	of	Sophocles’	Oedipus	(as	well	as,	as	we	saw	elsewhere,	of	Benjamin’s	reading	of	Brecht’s	Epic	Theatre)	seeks	to	displace	the	spatio-temporal	dynamic	of	interruption	and	recognition	by	which	the	latter	becomes	an	overt	problematization	of	the	assurances	of	understanding.	In	doing	so,	recognition	begins	to	resemble	the	interruption	from	which	it	sought	to	set	itself	apart	qua	resolution	in	a	way	that	recalls	Hixon’s	potent	formulation	of	a	recognition	of	unknowing.	Not	being	able	to	reproduce	Weber’s	analysis	in	more	detail	we	must	here	content	ourselves	with	one	of	its	conclusion:			What	one	“learns”	in	beholding	a	tragedy	such	as	Oedipus	could	therefore	be	that	as	a	mortal	being,	one	always	sees	without	
knowing	just	what	one	is	seeing.	And	therefore	that	the	irreducible	secret	of	whatever	one	sees	is	that	it	could	mean	something	entirely	different	from	what	one	expects.	This	secret	but	ubiquitous	possibility	is	not	only	responsible	for	the	theatrical	
peripeteia	–	it	makes	it	indistinguishable	from	the	anagnorisis	that	Aristotle	sought	to	separate	from	it.	The	peripeteia	is	the	
anagnorisis.	But	that	means	that	what	is	thereby	recognized	is	the	possibility	of	a	“turn”	whose	singularity	can	never	be	stabilized	or	exhausted	in	a	predication,	in	a	“this	one	is	that,”	which	in	turn	suggests	that	anagnorisis	always	contains	the	possibility	of	turning	out	itself	to	be	peripeteia.	[Weber,	Theatricality	as	
Medium,	264].		
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suggests,	the	stranger	appears	at	the	door.	Suddenly,	the	image-scene	comes	to	an	abrupt	halt	and	exposes	itself	before	the	eyes	and	ears	of	a	stranger.557	A	gap	opens	up	qua	door	through	which	a	passage	is	carved	to	the	outside	world	–	l’etranger	–	as	Derrida	fittingly	names	the	latter	when	designating	its	constitutive	role	within	the	architecture	of	every	house,	structured	by	the	door	in	such	a	way	that	what	constitutes	a	space	of	controlled	and	circumscribed	property	is	just	what	opens	it	to	intrusion.558	Perhaps	here,	in	Benjamin’s	primitive	example	of	an	interrupted	theatrical	scenario,	a	door	then	not	merely	opens	onto	and	exposes	the	represented	interior	of	a	house,	but	furthermore,	the	time	and	place	of	the	performance	with	all	those	gathered	in	a	theatre.		Benjamin,	as	we	saw,	calls	the	interrupted	action	of	Epic	Theatre	a	gesture,	the	interrupted	scenario	a	Zustand.	A	Zustand	describes	a	condition	or	state,	but	also	a	stance	and	position	[Stand]	advanced	by	the	relational	syllable	of	‘towards’	[zu-],	a	state	of	things	that	is	never	simply	given	in	advance	and	by	itself,	readily	representable,	but	which,	as	Benjamin	says,	must	be	discovered	by	those	that	attend	to	it.559	A	discovery	that	doubles	up	as	a	becoming	strange	(Verfremdung)	and	thus	as	a	resistance	to	knowledge,	the	flow	of	comprehension	and	the	consumption	of	the	ostensibly	self-identical	and	familiar.560	Never	merely	representing	a	given	repeatable	scene,	the	Zustand,	as	the	result	of	an	interruption,	finds	itself	exposed	before	an	audience	as	stand-in.	The	arrival	of	the	stranger	in	the	door	literally	figures	this	structural	possibility	of	the	coming	and	going	of	other	respondents,	or	else,	the	pre-	and	afterlife	of	the	image-scene	in	other	contexts,	past	or	to-come.			Far	from	the	Aristotelian	project	of	rendering	the	scenic	medium	of	theatre	transparent	in	the	service	of	synoptical	vision	–	subsuming	the	shock	of	the	unexpected	turn	by	the	recognition	that	is	able	to	facilitate																																																									557	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater	(1)’,	522.	558	Derrida,	Of	Hospitality,	59.	559	Benjamin,	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater	(2)’,	26.	560	‘This	discovery	(alienation)	[(Verfremdung)]	of	conditions	[Zustände],’	Benjamin	says,	‘unfolds	by	means	of	the	interruption	of	the	flow	[von	Abläufen]’	[ibid].	
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‘the	passage	from	a	state	of	wonder	and	even	ignorance	to	a	state	of	insight’	–	a	theatre	of	interruption	exposes	the	scenic	medium	of	theatre	as	opaque	medium	and	Vorstellung,	a	representing-before	or	staging	rather	than	the	mere	alternation	of	concrete	representations.561	Severed	from	the	linear	pull	of	a	telos,	the	interrupted	scenario	appeals	to	be	read	‘against	the	grain	of	meaning,’	as	we	might	paraphrase	it	with	Weber,	so	that	the	scenario	does	not	disappear	into	it	but	remains	as	figure,	scenic	medium,	gesture	or	writing-image.	In	the	absence	of	a	coincidence	between	endings	and	meanings,	each	audience	member	is	more	and	more	forced	to	position	her	or	himself	with	regards	to	the	halted	and	exposed	scenario.	Benjamin,	as	we	saw,	calls	such	positioning	a	
Stellungnahme	[also:	response].	Between	Vor-stellung	and	Stellung-
nahme,	a	structure	resembling	that	of	appeal	and	response,	everything	“is”	only	on	the	basis	of	its	relation.	The	task	of	spectatorial	positioning,	the	taking	up	of	a	particular	relation	with	regards	to	the	Vorstellung,	exposes	the	heterogeneity	of	an	audience’s	point	of	view,	in	space	as	much	as	in	time.	The	stranger’s	gaze	of	Benjamin’s	primitive	example	of	interruption	figures	this	heterogeneity	and	its	effect	of	othering	[verfremden]	the	image-scene	in	such	a	way	that	it	can	only	be	experienced	as	overdetermined.	What	his	arrival	on	the	doorstep	brings	home,	so	to	speak,	is	the	recognition	of	equality	before	language	and	the	other’s	right	of	response.	Such	a	right	and	indeed	responsibility	to	respond,	Samuel	Weber	relates,	‘opens	the	way	to	a	different	conception	and	indeed,	practice	of	theatre	[than	Aristotle’s],	in	which	the	medium	reemerges	as	of	decisive	significance.’	A	re-emergence,	as	Weber	further	insists,	that	is	‘marked	by	the	importance	of	the	response:	[…]’.562	The	eyes	and	ears	of	Benjamin’s	‘stranger’	embody	the	possibility	of	such	an	uncalculable	response	exceeding	any	contextually	determined	convention	of	a	context	that	can	never	be	fully	saturated	or	closed	upon	itself.	The	context	of	a	particular	time	and	place	of	performance	finds	itself	thereby	exposed	as	historically	determined	and	open.	The	space	of																																																									561	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	261.	562	ibid,	107.	
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a	controlled	and	circumscribed	property	must	give	up	a	passage	to	the	outside.	Every	theatre,	like	every	house,	has	a	door.	Its	‘present	is	ex-posed	in	being	placed	before	“us,”	before	our	eyes,’	Weber	says,			 but	in	a	way	that	can	never	simply	be	seen,	because	it	is	never	fully	there.	Rather,	such	presence	is	overdetermined	by	being	situated	in	a	space	that	is	limited	and	yet	never	fully	closed	or	defined.	It	must	be	seen,	heard,	commented	upon,	and	responded	to,	yet	without	being	entirely	comprehended	in	any	of	those	responses.563		If	the	crack	and	opening	in	the	stage	floor	in	which	sits	the	prompter	figures	the	exposure	of	the	theatrical	scene	as	repetition	–	the	haunting	of	history	in	the	live	event	of	performance	–	the	figure	of	the	door	here	opens	it	to	a	future	repeat-ability,	that	is,	“its”	coming	reworking	qua	participation	(Mitwirkung).	Following	this	spatio-temporal	schema,	the	‘act	of	repair,’	the	relaunching	of	the	archive	as	a	re-work	of	mourning	that	simultaneously	puts	off	its	movement	of	appropriation	is	always	already	an	act	of	‘teleiopoesis,	a	telephone	call	or	message	transmitted	to	distant	others	–	ghosts	from	the	future’.564	Repeatability	implies	the	possibility	of	a	coming	response	[Stellungnahme]	(response-ability)	by	the	after-thought	of	others	–	as	well	as	the	self	as	other,	whether	tomorrow	or	ten	years	from	now.	The	eyes	and	ears	of	the	stranger	at	the	door	hold	in	suspense	the	possibility	of	the	alterity	of	her,	his	or	its	response.	This	actual	appearance	of	a	stranger	at	the	door	in	Benjamin’s	self-designated	‘primitive	example’	of	the	interruption	of	a	plot	is	of	course	here	only	a	figure	for	the	structural	necessity	of	an	opening	to	the	future,	or	else,	for	the	necessity	of	a	door	within	the	technology	of	the	house	and	home	that	must	keep	open	the	possibility	of	such	intrusions	in	order	to	provide	a	limited	security	of	the	accustomed	place	of	the	ethos.	What	Benjamin																																																									563	ibid,	109-10.	564	Derrida	in	Lavery	&	Hassall,	112.		
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says	of	the	basic	attitude	of	the	writer	of	epic	theatre	towards	the	plot	–	namely	that	‘it	could	happen	this	way,	but	it	could	also	happen	any	other	way’	–	is	here	figured	by	the	gaze	of	the	stranger	as	stand-in,	this	one	or	indeed	any	other	who	would	be	wholly	other.	Like	the	audience,	who’s	conventional	grip	on	the	perceived	scene	finds	itself	thereby	interrupted,	the	stranger’s	embodied	presence	stands-in	for	a	space	of	alterity	that	by	far	exceeds	those	gathered	in	a	particular	space	and	time.	‘In	the	theatre,’	as	we	have	heard	Weber	state	in	a	potent	formulation	that	has	become	a	sort	of	refrain	for	our	concern,	‘such	a	space	of	alterity	is	always	
provisionally	embodied	in	and,	even	more,	exposed	as	an	“audience”	–	singular	noun	for	an	irreducibly	heteroclite	stand-in.	The	“audience”	stands	in,	Weber	says,	for	the	others,	those	who	were	and	those	who	will	be	–	and	perhaps	even	more	for	those	who	will	never	come	to	be’.565			 In	the	context	of	Derrida’s	reflections	on	the	structure	of	the	messianic,	we	might	then	say	that	the	door	as	opening	to	the	coming	of	time	exposes	a	disjointed	present	to	the	possibility	of	the	question	and	response	as	the	condition	for	an	injunction	of	democracy-	as	justice-to-come	beyond	any	given	right	or	law.	Before	finally	turning	to	a	reading	of	Every	house	has	a	door’s	performance	Testimonium,	in	which	a	concern	with	the	relations	of	testimony,	law,	justice	and	theatre	will	come	to	the	fore,	I	want	to	briefly	outline,	in	view	of	its	increasing	relevance	for	our	analysis,	Derrida’s	conception	of	the	messianic	structure	of	an	impossible	justice	as	justice-to-come.					
Temporal	Disjointment	as	the	Condition	of	an	Impossible	Justice	
	 The	citability	of	gesture,	as	a	result	of	the	interruption	of	the	continuum	of	a	plot	here	figured	by	the	opening	of	a	door	and	the	literal	intrusion	of	the	outside	on	the	ostensibly	self-contained,	renders	the	time	of	its	suspended	occurrence	out	of	joint.	Swelling	under	the	intrusion	of	a																																																									565	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	341.	
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possible	living-on	qua	iterability	–‘the	irreducible	possibility	of	indefinite	repetition	as	alteration,’	‘the	other	time	in	the	first’	–	any	given	context	of	judgement	and	determination	must	necessarily	remain	dis-adjusted,	out-of-joint	and	over-determined,	that	is,	open	toward	the	future	coming	of	the	question	and	the	response.566.	A	structurally	necessary	dis-adjustment	and	hospitality	for	what	is	to	come	–	temporal	alterity	as	the	nonethical	opening	of	ethics	–	that	constitutes	the	condition	and	limit	of	justice,	not	as	calculable	and	distributive,	but	‘as	incalculability	of	the	gift	and	singularity	of	the	an-economic	ex-position	to	others’.567	Derrida	thereby	links	iterability	to	a	thought	of	justice	as	the	structure	of	a	messianism	without	messiah,	that	is,	to	‘the	coming	of	the	other,	the	absolute	and	unpredictable	singularity	of	the	arrivant	as	justice’.568	Justice,	for	Derrida,	can	never	be	fully	guaranteed	in	any	given	law	or	decision,	nor	hoped	to	ever	be	achieved	in	however	remote	a	future,	but	instead	–	following	what	Hägglund	describes	as	‘the	deconstructive	idea	of	justice	[as]	the	idea	of	the	negative	infinity	of	time,	which	will	always	disjoin	the	present	from	itself	and	expose	it	to	the	unpredictable	coming	of	other	circumstances’	–	must	remain	always	to	come,	promised	beyond	what	it	actually	is.569	The	ideal	of	a	(falsely	desired)	totalizing	justice,	as																																																									566	Derrida,	Limited	Inc,	60	&	120.	567	Derrida,	Spectres	of	Marx,	26.	Hägglund	relates	the	impossibility	of	absolute	justice	as	the	condition	for	the	promise	of	justice	as	follows:	‘[…]	Derrida	maintains	that	there	can	be	no	justice	without	the	coming	of	time.	The	coming	of	time	makes	justice	possible,	since	there	would	be	no	question	of	justice	without	unpredictable	events	that	challenge	the	generality	of	the	law.	But	by	the	same	token,	the	coming	of	time	makes	absolute	justice	impossible,	since	it	opens	the	risk	that	one	has	made	or	will	have	made	unjust	decisions.	When	Derrida	argues	that	the	coming	of	time	is	the	undeconstructable	condition	of	justice,	he	thus	emphasizes	that	it	is	a	“de-totalizing	condition,”	which	inscribes	the	possibility	of	corruption,	evil,	and	mischief	at	the	heart	of	justice	itself.	If	this	impossibility	of	absolute	justice	were	to	be	overcome,	all	justice	would	be	eliminated.	[…]	Absolute	justice	is	thus	incompatible	with	the	coming	of	time,	since	the	coming	of	time	exceeds	any	totalization.	But	by	the	same	token,	absolute	justice	entails	that	nothing	can	happen	to	cause	the	concern	for	justice	in	the	first	place’	[Hägglund,	122].	568	Derrida,	Spectres	of	Marx,	33.	569	‘Derrida	describes	the	negative	infinity	of	justice	as	infinite	
perfectibility,’	Hägglund	recalls	further,	‘which	is	the	same	as	an	infinite	
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Hägglund’s	reading	of	Derrida	insists,	would	annul	the	irreversible	past	and	the	unpredictable	future.	It	cannot	even	therefore	be	the	case	‘that	there	ought	to	be	an	ideal	justice	that	can	encompass	and	do	justice	to	all	[…]	others’.570	Instead,	Derrida’s	argument,	as	Hägglund	relates,			 is	[…]	that	any	given	decision	or	definition	of	justice	can	be	called	into	question,	since	it	is	preceded	and	exceeded	by	innumerable	finite	others	that	it	excludes.	Accordingly,	Derrida	connects	his	use	of	the	term	justice	to	a	principally	endless	questioning	by	defining	“the	possibility	of	the	question”	as	what	“we	are	calling	here	justice.”	If	justice	is	inseparable	from	the	coming,	it	is	not	because	anything	or	anyone	will	come	and	ordain	a	final	justice.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	the	possibility	of	the	question	that	always	comes,	the	possibility	of	yet	another	question	that	always	opens	anew	and	“questions	with	regard	to	what	will	come	in	the	future-to-come.	Turned	toward	the	future,	going	toward	it,	it	also	comes	from	the	future,	it	proceeds	from	the	future.	It	must	therefore	exceed	any	presence	as	presence	to	itself	”.571		Responsibility	in	the	face	of	an	injunction	of	justice	beyond	right	or	law,	Derrida	says	with	a	formulation	that	here	begins	to	echo	Weber’s	account	of	a	spectral	audience	of	ghosts	from	the	past	and	the	future,	rises	up	in	the	very	respect	owed	to	whoever	is	not,	no	longer	or	not	yet,	living,	presently	living,’	in	other	words,	as	we	might	here	put	it,	whoever	might	come	to	appear	or	return	in	the	door	to	interrupt	and	suspend	the	securities	of	a	house,	home,	archive	and	theatre.572																																																																																																																																																	
corruptibility	and	undercuts	the	regulative	Idea	of	final	perfection.	The	impossibility	of	such	an	absolute	state	is	not	a	privation	but	the	possibility	of	change	at	any	juncture,	for	better	and	for	worse’	[Hägglund,	169].	The	conception	of	an	infinite	perfectability	has	also	played	a	part	in	my	reading	of	Benjamin’s	reflections	on	the	reproducible	work	of	art’s	‘capacity	for	improvement.’	570	Hägglund,	169.	571	ibid.	572	Derrida,	Spectres	of	Marx,	121.	
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Testimonium:	Relaunching	the	Archive	as	Justice-to-Come		 Throughout	the	analysis	of	the	theatre	practice	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	I	have	discerned	a	concern	with	the	demonstrated	exposure	of	the	structural	impossibility	of	closure	and	self-containment	through	response-ability’s	appeal	to	a	coming	participation	that	strongly	link	it	to	the	messianic	structures	of	a	democracy-	and	or	as	justice-to-come.	Here,	the	Haltung	[attitude,	pose]	of	a	limited	appropriative	restraint	was	employed	both	with	regards	to	the	demonstrated	structural	opening	to	the	future,	as	well	as	a	concern	with	a	limited	respect	paid	before	the	“singularity”	of	an	inheritance	that	necessarily	must	be	corrupted	in	order	to	be	‘saved’	or	repaired	in	the	first	place.	By	employing	a	gesture	of	repair	as	re-work	of	mourning,	such	a	Haltung	was	furthermore	seen	to	implicitly	lay	bare	a	previous	and	coming	historicity	of	survival	of	the	‘patched	up’	and	exappropriated	material.	Read	in	this	way,	its	necessarily	violent	re-workings	of	an	inheritance	might	be	said	to	follow	the	aporetic	task	of	working	out	‘strategies	for	a	“lessor	violence”	that	are	essentially	precarious’.573	A	precariousness	that,	as	we	saw,	is	ubiquitously	palpable	in	the	constructed	fragility	of	the	performance	as	hupomnēmata,	counter-archive	and	world:	the	more	or	less	accustomed	place	of	a	demonstratively	deconstructable	ethos.	Furthermore,	as	we	have	seen,	via	an	account	of	Benjamin’s	concept	of	Rettung,	the	gesture	of	‘relaunching’	the	archival	marks	of	an	inheritance	qua	strategies	of	
repair/response	could	at	least	tentatively	be	read	as	put	in	the	service	of	returning	a	sedimented	transmission	of	archival	remains	and	historical	contents	to	a	state	of	greater	in-	as	over-determinacy;	making	amends,	in	so	far	as	possible,	for	the	violence	of	forgetting	qua	(critical)	neglect	and	distorted	recognition	by	a	dominant	tradition	(i.e.	Benjamin’s	history	of	the	victors),	as	well	as	demonstratively	opening	the	door	for	an	(ex-)appropriative	participation	to	come.	In	the	context	of	the	work	of	Bernard	Stiegler,	the	latter	aspect	of	an	aggravated	response-ability	as																																																									573	Hägglund,	101.	
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the	call	for	a	participation	to	come	through	the	interruption	of	the	flows	of	(sedimented)	historical	transmissions	and	artifactuality	can	be	further	said	to	resist	or	stand	in	the	way	–	exposing,	to	put	it	within	the	rhetoric	of	our	analysis	and	not	the	terminology	of	Stiegler,	the	necessarily	relational	stance	of	Vorstellung	[representing-before]	and	Stellungnahme	[response]	–	of	the	tendency	to	oppose	producers	and	consumers	by	the	flow	of	the	memory	industries.	With	the	industrial	production	and	passive	consumption	of	memory,	as	Stiegler	warns,	comes	the	risk	of	a	hyper-synchronisation	of	the	time	of	consciousness	that	leads	to	a	symbolic	misery	as	the	ruining	of	a	pre-pathological	narcissism	of	appropriative	desire.	Whereas	‘tertiary	retentions	such	as	the	alphabet,’	as	Stiegler	asserts,	‘are	those	things	that	undergird	every	collective	and	psychic	individuation’s	access	to	pre-individual	funds’	and	‘condition	individuation	as	symbolic	sharing	[…]	made	possible	by	the	externalisation	of	the	individuated	experience	in	traces,’	‘[h]ypersynchronisation	leads	to	the	loss	of	individuation	through	the	homogenisation	of	individual	pasts	by	ruining	primordial	narcissism	and	the	process	of	collective	and	psychic	individuation’.574	All	this	is	to	say,	that	with	the	cursory	recourse	to	the	latter	context,	an	emphasis	on	a	general	(re-)activation	of	an	(ex-)appropriative	attitude	towards	the	archive	of	pre-individual	funds	has	at	times	imposed	itself.	In	other	words,	an	imposition	of	the	privileging	of	the	cunning	and	exuberant	modalities	of	taking	up	the	task	of	inheritance	by	the	‘amateur,’	to	which	the	performance	practice	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door	both	appeals	and	stands-in	for	as	model.	Given	the	emphasis	on	defending	or	reigniting	an	appropriative	desire	in	view	of	a	danger	of	its	drying	up,	questions	concerning	the	impossibility	of	“just”	modalities	of	appropriation	(the	aporia	of	mourning	as	an	impossible	respect	before	the	singularity	of	an	inheritance)	as	well	as	the	political	stakes	of	counter-archival	subversions	of	an	‘archontic	principle’	or	‘victor	history’																																																									574	Bernard	Stiegler,	‘Suffocated	Desire,	Or	How	The	Cultural	Industry	Destroys	The	Individual:	Contribution	To	A	Theory	Of	Mass	Consumption’	trans.	Johann	Rossouw,	Parrhesia	(2013)	13,	57	&	58.		
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has	at	times	perhaps	moved	into	the	background.	Both	these	latter	aspects	however	return	to	the	foreground	in	Every	house	has	a	door’s	performance	Testimonium.	Whereas	in	Kelleher’s	account	of	the	work	of	Goat	Island,	as	we	saw,	it	was	the	performance	as	hypomnemic	model,	as	a	‘machine	for	thinking’	or	‘craft	of	thought’	divorced	from	the	specifics	of	
what	it	gathers	in	the	operation	of	its	appropriative	reworking	of	an	inheritance	that	was	privileged,	Testimonium	seemingly	invites	us	to	consider	in	more	detail	the	specificity	of	the	relation	between	the	modalities	of	the	performance’s	process,	composition	and	appropriated	material.	As	the	latter	revolves	around	a	concern	with	relaunching	documents	of	courtroom	testimonies	–	provoking,	as	we	will	see,	a	consideration	of	what	Goulish	calls	the	difference	between	a	courtroom	and	a	theatre	as	analogous	to	the	difference	between	law	and	justice	–	it	becomes	clear	that	the	question	of	justice	and	the	structures	of	the	messianic	must	return	to	the	fore	of	our	analysis.	Both,	that	is,	in	the	sense	of	an	impossible	respect	paid	before	the	singularity	of	an	absolute	past	and	the	messianic	coming	of	an	absolute	future	in	general,	as	well	as	a	more	specific	concern	with	the	precarious	re-construction	of	alternative	versions	of	history	that	are	responsive	to	the	tradition	of	the	oppressed.	Thus,	in	a	closer	reading	of	certain	aspects	of	Every	house	has	a	door’s	2013	production	Testimonium,	alongside	an	accompanying	lecture	presented	by	the	company’s	dramaturg	Matthew	Goulish	and	director	Lin	Hixon,	I	here	aim	to	reinscribe	several	of	the	major	concerns	raised	in	the	above	analysis	under	the	explicit	heading	of	an	impossible	justice	as	justice-to-come.			 In	the	context	of	Testimonium,	the	relevance	of	a	conception	of	the	structural	necessity	of	justice’s	impossibility	arises	both	with	regards	to	the	performance’s	relation	to	the	(appropriated)	archived	past	as	well	the	latter’s	relation	to	the	future.	Whereas	the	first	concerns	a	precarious	ethical	demand	for	an	impossible	respect	before	the	singularity	of	an	inheritance	–	here,	largely	of	the	testimonies	of	an	injustice	–	that	can	only	be	remembered,	‘saved,’	repaired	and	re-launched	by	being	more	or	less	violently	subsumed	to	a	generality	in	order	to	remain	legible,	the	
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second	springs	from	the	relation	of	any	call	to	justice	to	the	coming	of	time	and	the	absence	of	a	determinate	ethics	as	law	in	light	of	an	essential	limit	of	absolute	justice	as	the	necessary	opening	for	a	justice	to	come.575	In	other	words,	a	necessary	degree	of	disadjustment	of	any	given	context	forms	the	condition	for	the	coming	of	justice	in	a	future	that	exceeds	it	and	may	call	it	into	question,	following	a	reiterative	chain	of	infinite	finitude.	A	contextual	disadjustment	in	a	time	out	of	joint	that	must	undermine	any	conceptions	and	phantasies	of	identity	as	self-presence,	whether	of	the	marks	of	an	inheritance	(i.e.	works),	the	indebted,	other-directed	subjects	of	“its”	reception	or	the	ethos	formed	around	the	collective	sharing	of	pre-individual	funds.	It	is	precisely	to	ward	off	the	disavowal	of	an	essential	breach	of	identity	that	Benjamin,	as	we	saw,	employs	the	grafting	gesture	of	a	saving	citation	–	Rettung	as	the	matrix	of	justice	–	in	the	service	of	an	active	dehiscence	of	identity,	prising	open	the	sedimented	phantasms	and	rogue	abuses	of	time	by	the	tendentially	sovereign	self-same.	Similarly,	the	messianic	structure	of	a	precarious	gesture	of	‘repair’	as	the	restrained	appropriation	of	an	inheritance	that	demonstratively	leaves	open	a	place	for	future	transformative	participation	qua	response-ability,	as	I	have	identified	it	at	work	in	the	overtly	exappropriative	performance	practice	of	Goat	Island	and	Every	house	has	a	door,	perhaps	seeks	to	follow	as	close	as	possible	the	aporetic	program	of	an	impossible	justice	by	its	tendency	towards	a	maximum	limit	of	respect	before	the	singularity	of	the	re-inscribed	and	a	concomitant	retreat	before	the	coming	of	“its”	future	transformation.	Whereas	the	rhetoric	of	participation,	as	I	have	privileged	it	throughout,	is	more	likely	to	evoke	the	Derridian	theme	of	a	democracy-to-come,	it	is	nevertheless	Derrida’s	closely	related	analysis																																																									575	Additionally,	as	the	specification	of	the	re-worked	inheritance	as	that	of	an	‘inheritance	of	injustice’	here	indicates,	the	latter	perhaps	expresses	a	more	explicit	and	concrete	concern	with	the	question	of	justice	in	the	context	of	an	effort	at	retrieving,	as	Fritsch	puts	it	with	reference	to	a	possible	way	of	reading	Benjamin’s	conception	of	the	messianic,	‘the	voice	of	the	nameless’	that	requires	‘a	resistance	to	the	rulers	in	the	present’	[Fritsch,	168].		I	will	briefly	return	to	this	aspect	of	the	work	in	a	little	more	detail	in	the	Postscript	to	these	reflections.	
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of	the	distinction	between	law	and	justice	as	justice-to-come	that	must	here	be	foregrounded.	Both	are	in	any	case,	as	Derrida	reminds	us,	inextricably	linked,	as	in	the	verbless	phrase	of	Specters	of	Marx:	‘“[f]or	the	democracy	to	come	and	thus	for	justice,”’.576	The	shift	towards	a																																																									576	Derrida	glosses	the	inextracability	of	democracy-	and	justice-to	come	in	the	following	paragraph	from	Rogues.	The	passage	also	briefly	relates	the	irreconcilability	of	justice	as	justice-to-come	with	a	desire	for	all	communitarian	adjoinments,	to	which	it	must	necessarily	pose	a	threat:	‘In	Specters	of	Marx	the	expression	“democracy	to	come”	is	inextricably	linked	to	justice.	It	is	the	ergo	or	the	igitur,	the	thus	between	“democracy	to	come	and	justice”:	“For	the	democracy	to	come	and	thus	for	justice,”	as	a	verbless	phrase	puts	it	in	Specters	of	Marx.	This	gesture	inscribes	the	necessity	of	the	democracy	to	come	not	only	into	the	axiomatic	of	the	messianicity	without	messianism,	the	spectrality	or	hauntology,	that	this	book	develops,	but	into	the	singular	distinction	between	law	and	justice	(heterogeneous	but	inseparable).	This	distinction	was	first	developed	in	
Force	of	Law	and	was	further	elaborated	in	Specters	of	Marx	in	the	course	of	a	discussion	of	the	Heideggerian	interpretation	of	dike	as	gathering	[Sammlung/Konzentration,	Zerstreuung],	adjoining,	and	harmony.	Contesting	that	interpretation,	I	proposed	aligning	justice	with	disjointure,	with	being	out	of	joint,	with	the	interruption	of	relation,	with	unbinding,	with	the	infinite	secret	of	the	other.	All	this	can	indeed	seem	to	threaten	a	community-oriented	or	communitarian	concept	of	democratic	justice’	[Derrida,	Rogues,	88].	For	Derrida	there	is	no	‘now	us’	in	the	‘as	one’	of	community.	Instead,	in	the	irreducible	now	of	the	event,	there	is,	a	coming	together	in	secret.	The	condition	for	any	sharing	is	that	there	is	something	non-sharable,	an	absolute	secret,	cut	off	from	any	bond	yet	conditioning	its	possibility.	It	is	a	consensus,	Derrida	suggests,	if	it	still	is	possible	to	say	so,	of	the	fact	that	the	singular	is	singular	and	the	other	other,	an	affirmation	of	the	fact	that	everything	that	exists	shares	the	unsharable.	[Derrida	&	Ferraris,	58].	The	necessary	threat	posed	to	the	communitarian	‘as	one’	by	an	essential	decomposition	of	the	indivisibility	of	the	‘at	once’	in	Derrida’s	aligning	of	justice	with	the	disjointed	gathering	within	contexts	that	are	always	open	and	overdetermined	resonates	with	Hixon’s	account	of	the	theatre	as	a	privileged	space	for	the	facilitated	recognition	of	unknowing.	In	the	exposed	present	of	a	theatre	of	interruption,	Hixon	asserts,	‘those	watching	become	aware	of	themselves	watching	and	the	others	in	the	room	watching’	[Goulish	&	Hixon].	‘Perhaps	this	is	one	of	the	remaining	powers	of	the	live	event,’	she	continues,	‘a	recognition	of	each	other,	however	uncomfortable	that	may	be.	[…]	A	performance	emerges	that	provides	a	place	of	recognition	–	a	place	of	recognition	as	
acknowledgement	of	the	unknowing	of	events,	people,	time,	and	its	passing’	[Goulish	&	Hixon,	my	emphasis].	In	Derrida’s	discourse,	but	also	perhaps	in	Benjamin’s	(for	instance,	in	the	‘secret	rendez-vous	between	generations’	and	of	course	in	the	already	encountered	formulation	of	the	
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focus	on	the	messianic	structure	of	an	impossible	justice	as	justice-to-come	here	imposes	itself	through	the	specificity	of	the	appropriated	archival	material.	For	what	is	saved	and	relaunched	and	thus	put	before	the	outstanding	‘judgement’	of	an	audience	in	Testimonium	are	a	selection	of	documented	victim	testimonies	in	criminal	cases	and	those	of	workplace	negligence	based	on	the	law	reports	of	US	court	cases	between	1885-1915.	Or	better	and	what	is	more,	what	is	here	saved	or	relaunched	are	not	the	law	reports	themselves	but	a	previous	gesture	of	their	relaunching,	namely,	the	two	out-of-print	volumes	of	poetry	
Testimony:	The	United	States	(1885-1915)	Recitative	by	Charles	Reznikoff	that	constitute	the	primary	source	material	of	the	performance.	To	be	sure,	neither	the	law	reports	nor	Reznikoff’s	poetry	are	here	‘saved,’	as	in	the	privileged	scenario	of	Benjamin’s	conception	of	Rettung,	from	a	sedimented	valorization	as	heritage,	but	from	the	threat	of	historical	oblivion.577	Yet	Testimonium’s	counter-archival	force	might	be	said	to																																																																																																																																																‘secret	signal	of	the	to-come	that	speaks	from	the	gesture	of	the	child’),	the	unknowingness	of	an	out-of-joint	time	becomes	‘the	infinite	secret	of	the	other’	that	rejects	belonging	and	the	putting	in	common	of	family,	nation	and	tongue,	as	well	as,	as	we	might	here	put	it,	that	of	an	audience,	however	conventionally	situated	in	a	particular	time	and	place.	Thus	put	in	the	idiom	of	Derrida,	what	Hixon’s	formulation	seems	to	evoke	is	a	spectral	‘bond	between	singularities	–	the	bond	that	links	what	will	not	be	linked’	[Derrida,	Negotiations,	4].	Or	else,	‘a	community	that	does	not	constitute	itself	on	the	basis	of	a	contemporaneity	of	presences	but	rather	through	the	opening	produced	by		[…]	allegoresis	–	that	is,	the	interpretation	of	a	text	not	given,	not	closed	in	on	itself,	an	interpretation	that	itself	transforms	the	text.	We	would	have,	then,	a	community	of	writing	and	reading	–	a	community	that	would	be	bound	by	a	testament	to	the	law	that	is	neither	given	in	advance	nor	understood	in	advance’	[Derrida	&	Ferraris,	24-5].	‘I	have	no	misgivings	about	this	community,’	Derrida	adds	with	a	formulation	that	here	reiterates	the	messianic	disruption	of	(theatrical)	presence,	‘it’s	just	that	there	is	something	that	would	always	make	me	hesitate	to	call	it	‘community’	–	namely,	that	the	force	of	the	future	that	has	to	be	at	work	in	it	has	to	be	a	force	of	disruption	no	less	than	a	force	of	integration,	a	force	of	dissension	no	less	than	a	force	of	consensus’	[ibid].	577	Although	what	at	first	here	seems	obvious	in	as	far	as	what	is	saved	from	historical	neglect	cannot	at	the	same	time	be	saved	from	a	sedimented	valorization	by	tradition,	must	perhaps	immediately	be	complicated	in	this	particular	instance.	For	having	been	refused	the	theatrical	rights	to	any	extract	from	Reznikoff’s	Testimony	from	the	
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remain	demonstratively	weak.	Its	delicate	and	precarious	efforts	at	counter-archival	saving	clearly	seek	to	expose	an	essential	non-sovereignty	that	keeps	to	a	minimum	any	tendential	abuse	of	time	through	the	explicit	appeal	to	a	coming	participation	as	the	condition	of	justice-to-come.	In	doing	so,	as	we	will	see,	it	models	itself	on	the	very	gesture	it	repeats.	For	in	“citing”	and	responding	to	Reznikoff’s	critically	neglected	collection	of	poetry	and	interweaving	it	with	the	outlines	of	a	portrait	of	the	author,	Testimonium	seemingly	adds	the	name	of	Charles	Reznikoff	to	those	that	he	himself	sought	to	rescue	from	oblivion.	Yet	beyond	following	his	endeavor	to	‘save	voices	omitted	from	the	history	books,’	Hixon	and	Goulish	are	furthermore	concerned	with	demonstratively	repeating	Reznikoff’s	model	Haltung	of	relaunching,	namely,	that	of	a	sobriety	of	style	as	a	precarious	modality	of	saving.				
The	sober	style	of	Testimony		 Hixon	and	Goulish	identify	Reznikoff’s	model	as	a	‘generative	constraint,’	that	is,	a	certain	withholding	of	ego,	intention	and	expression	in	(re-)production,	as	well	as	the	absence	of	all	embellishment	of	an																																																																																																																																																publisher,	Goulish	sees	himself	forced,	by	a	gesture	that	we	might	here	designate	as	a	kind	of	reversal	of	Echo’s	predicament,	to	save	and	facilitate	the	survival	of	the	voice	of	the	other	by	the	cunning	of	an	appropriative	transformation	that	undermines	the	prohibition	to	cite	by	the	publisher’s	copyright.	These	efforts	are	thus	clearly	imbued	with	a	task	of	returning	the	transmitted	closure	of	a	work,	albeit	not	one	that	forms	part	of	a	dominant	tradition,	to	a	greater	state	of	indeterminacy.	Here	is	Goulish’s	account	of	this	process:	‘In	the	wake	of	this	legal	refusal,	we	resolved	to	attempt	a	transformation	and	unfolding	of	those	6	pages.	It	became	my	responsibility	as	writer	and	dramaturg	to	revise	the	text.	I	approached	the	task	in	one	respect	according	to	a	purely	formal	measure:	no	five	consecutive	words	could	remain	intact	from	the	original	version.	I	began	by	considering	differences	between	words	on	the	page	and	words	heard	aloud.	In	fact,	when	reading	publicly,	Reznikoff	selected	and	re-sequenced	his	poems,	fashioning	reading	scripts	that	differ	drastically	from	the	sequences	of	the	published	work	[…]	’	[Goulish	&	Hixon].	
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appropriated	material	that	other-directs	the	non-performer	as	guide.	An	expressive	restraint	as	generative	constraint	that	Reznikoff	himself	identified	with	the	sober	style	of	testimony.	Here,	sobriety	as	a	modality	of	(re-)presentation	surely	becomes	another	way	to	describe	the	appropriative	restraint	of	what	Goulish	elsewhere	designates	as	the	non-virtuosity	of	non-performance:	the	artist	as	facilitator,	guide,	puppet.	In	other	words,	sobriety	describes	a	limit	tendency	of	an	impossible	retreat	before	an	inappropriable	singularity	that	must,	in	order	to	be	saved	and	relaunched,	paradoxically	be	appropriated.	A	brief	look	at	Reznikoff’s	original	text	palpably	reveals	the	generative	force	of	such	a	self-set	constraint	of	expressive	restraint.	By	comparing	Reznikoff’s	poems	to	the	historiographic	documents	they	are	based	upon,	Richard	Hayland	is	able	to	reveal	the	minute,	most	calculated	of	changes	and	additions	to	the	historical	records.578	Actively	withholding	any	additional	emotion,	commentary	or	judgment,	Reznikoff’s	poetry	therewith	seeks	to	remain	within	the	register	of	testimony	itself,	namely,	as	Hixon	puts	it,	that	of	a	sober,	‘ruthlessly	straightforward’	style	recounting	the	many	‘brutal,	irresolvable	moments	of	ethical	crisis’	without	accompanying	judgment,	and	emotional	effect.	For	instance,	merely	the	unrecorded	colour	of	hair	of	fourteen	year	old	factory	worker	Amelia	is	added	for	the	smallest	of	effects	–	as	she		‘[…]	stood	at	the	table,	her	blonde	hair	hanging	about	her	shoulders’	–	before	feeling	it	getting	caught	gently,	as	Reznikoff	continues	to	describe	the	scene,	zooming	in	on	and	slowing	it	down	with	a	word	and	impression	that	once	more	is	not	to	be	found	in	the	official	records,	by	the	shaft	of	a	wire	stitching	machine,			 wound	and	winding	around	it,	until	the	scalp	was	jerked	from	her	head,	
																																																								578	Charles	Bernstein	‘Charles	Reznikoff’s	“Amelia”:	A	case	study	by	Richard	Hyland’.	Accessed	online	April	2015.	http://jacket2.org/commentary/charles-reznikoffs-amelia-case-study-richard-hyland	
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and	the	blood	was	coming	down	all	over	her	face	and	waist.579			It	is	with	regards	to	the	sobriety	of	his	style	that	Reznikoff	was	willing	to	accept	for	his	poetry	the	label	of	Objectivism,	which	he	idiosyncratically	defined	as	‘a	poetic	inflection	of	the	objective	register	required	of	courtroom	testimony’.580	One	must	follow	the	rules	with	respect	to	testimony	in	a	court	of	law,	he	says,	as	Hixon	relates,	that	is,	evidence	to	be	admissible	in	a	trial	cannot	state	conclusions	of	fact	but	must	state	the	facts	themselves’.581	In	other	words,	one	must	wrest	the	externals	of	an	event,	however	horrific,	from	any	emotion,	commentary	or	judgment,	which	are	left	for	a	reader	to	provide	him-	or	her-self.	Hixon,	who	emphatically	relates	her	admiration	for	Reznikoff’s	model	restraint,	his	ability	to	withdraw	before	the	other	in	order	to	construct	rather	than	express	emotion,	as	we	saw,	expresses	a	similarly	ambition	for	a	sober	approach	towards	the	treatment	of	material	within	the	composition	of	the	performance.	‘I	have	always	found	the	way	forward	by	restraint	and	by	the	particular,’	she	says,	‘	–	the	particulars	of	a	walk,	a	fall,	a	specific	name,	a	death	or	saying	goodbye’.582	Here	as	elsewhere	then,	the	company’s	treatment	of	historiographic	materials	in	its	persistent	engagement	with	the	archive	echoes	the	movement	of	Benjamin’s	conception	of	a	citational	practice	of	Rettung	as	the	matrix	of	justice.	In	a	gesture	of	resending	what	has	barely	been	received,	a	neglected	inheritance	is	saved	and	sent	on,	ex-appropriated,	exposed	before	the	coming	of	other	respondents.		In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 relaunched	 testimonies,	 the	 generative	constraint	of	a	sobriety	of	style	further	doubles	up	as	the	suspension	of	a	rush	to	judgment.	As	such	it	here	recalls	the	afterlife	of	the	Hölderlinian	conception	 of	 caesura	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 Weber	 locate	 it	 in	 Benjamin’s	writings	on	Epic	Theatre’s	practice	of	 interruption	precisely	around	the																																																									579	Charles	Reznikoff,	By	the	Water	of	Manhatten.	(New	York:	Charles	Boni	Press	1930),	76.	580	Goulish	&	Hixon.	581	ibid.	582	ibid.	
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terminology	 of	 a	 certain	 sobriety.	 Unsurprisingly,	 in	 Testimonium,	 the	employment	 of	 a	 sobriety	 of	 style	 will	 be	 similarly	 associated	 with	 a	compositional	structure	 that	employs	 interruption,	 separation	and	gaps	as	 its	 overriding	 principle.	 Finding	 itself	 breached	 at	 the	 joints,	repeatedly	and	temporarily	halting	the	forward	thrust	of	the	action,	the	performance	 unfolds	 in	 fits	 and	 starts,	 leaping	 across	 the	 openings	 of	gaps	within	a	continuously	interrupted	spatio-temporal	composition.583		Far	from	a	transparency	of	transitions	between	mere	alternations	of	 representations	 that	move	seamlessly	 towards	 their	 final	 conclusion,																																																									583	‘Matthew:		Stephen	delivers	a	file	to	Bryan	at	the	table.	The	delivery	interrupts	Stephen’s	movement	sequence.	Bryan	opens	the	file	and	immediately	begins	to	read	the	first	testimony,	involving	the	day	laborers	crowded	into	a	boat	in	a	pre-dawn	icy	harbor.	Theo	enters,	sets	up	his	drums,	and	sits	behind	them.	Bryan	resumes	reading.	The	boat	strikes	a	large	ice	floe	and	begins	taking	water.		 Men	begin	to	shout,	ankle-deep	in	water.	
The	man	at	the	wheel	turns	now	with	his	flashlight:	–everybody	turning	and	everybody	pushing;	–those	near	the	windows	try	to	break	the	windows,	in	spite	of	wire	mesh	in	the	glass;	–those	near	the	door	are	now	in	the	river.	They	are	in	the	river.	They	reach	for	the	ice	floe,	–their	hands			Lin:	Theo	 begins	 drumming	 an	 off-balance	 beat.	 Did	 he	 interrupt	 Bryan?	 Is	the	story	finished?	What	will	happen	to	the	men	in	the	icy	river?	Tim	and	Bobby	 enter	 with	 their	 guitars.	 The	 first	 song	 has	 already	 begun,	exploding	 out	 of	 the	 first	 testimony	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 protest	 against	 the	irreversible	nature	of	the	facts.			 I	used		 the	scythe	like	a	corkscrew.		 I	used	 the	corkscrew	like	a	wedge.				 I	used		 the	wedge	like	a	hammer		 	 Because	any	tool	is	also	a	hammer		 	 As	any	rule	is	subject	to	its	matter’.	[Goulish	&	Hixon]	
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interruptions	of	continuity	expose	isolated	fragments	before	an	audience	piecemeal,	 severed	 from	the	 flow	of	empty	and	homogenous	clock	 time	or	 the	 linear	 pull	 of	 teleological	 conclusions.	 Confronted	with	 the	 thus	exposed	 fragments,	 Hixon	 relates,	 ‘those	watching	 become	 increasingly	aware	of	 themselves	watching	and	 the	others	 in	 the	 room	watching’.584	Moreover,	 in	 Testimonium,	 the	 clearly	 framed	 and	 separated	 parts	 are	not	merely	 severed	 from	 linear	 continuity,	 but	 further	 belong	 to	 three	clearly	separated	strands	of	media	the	performance	puts	to	work:	recital,	movement	and	music.	Discussing	the	effect	 the	clearly	separated	blocks	have	on	 the	viewer,	Goulish	observes	 that	 ‘the	blocks	never	blend	–	 all	juxtaposition,	 no	 accompaniment.	 Our	 audience/jury	 then	 has	 another	
responsibility,’	 he	 says,	 namely,	 ‘to	 assemble	 the	parts.	As	 one	observer	noted	in	a	post-show	conversation,	meaning	can	be	construed	in	how	the	parts	meet,	 in	 the	gaps	and	leaps	between	 them.	Lin	might	say	 that	one	can	 also	 construct	 emotion	 this	way’	 (my	 emphasis).585	The	 formal	dis-jointure	 of	 Testimonium’s	 composition,	 its	 structural	 open-endedness	and	appeal	to	the	response	of	an	audience	is,	as	Goulish’s	above	likening	of	the	audience	to	a	jury	hints	at,	here	closely	linked	to	the	context	of	its	material,	 re-rehearsing	 a	 concern	 with	 the	 relations	 of	 testimony,	 law	and	 justice	 as	 they	 were	 already	 put	 to	 work	 in	 the	 two	 volume’s	 of	Reznikoff’s	Testimony.	 What	 distinguishes	 a	 theatre	 from	 a	 courtroom,	Goulish	reflects	 in	this	context,	 is	 that	the	 jury	of	an	audience	 is	merely	introspective,	with	‘no	power	to	convict	but	only	to	consider’.586	In	other	words,	 the	 place	 of	 the	 theatre	 remains	 demonstratively	 open	 qua	disjointure	 to	 the	 future	 as	 a	 promise	 of	 justice	 to	 come.	 For	 ‘[o]ne	difference	between	a	courtroom	and	a	theatre,’	as	Goulish	continues	with	a	 formulation	 that	here	must	 evoke	 the	discourse	of	Derrida,	 ‘might	be	analogous	to	the	difference	between	 law	and	 justice’.	Reznikoff,	Goulish	suggests,	attempted	to	place	his	poetry	into	the	breach	between	law	and	
																																																								584	ibid.	585	Goulish	&	Hixon,	my	emphasis.	586	Goulish	&	Hixon.	
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justice,	 ‘“with	 absurd	 hope	 of	 restoration	 and	 furious	 repair”’.587	‘Our	performance,’	 he	 continues,	 ‘like	 his	 poetry,	 requires	 the	 space	 of	 the	reader,	 or	 audience,	 the	 introspective	 jury,	 whose	 necessary	 attention	charges	 and	 completes	 the	 event’.588	Yet	 this	 charge	 of	 attention,	 this	retrospective	and	introspective	consideration	of	what	has	been	exposed	before	the	eyes	and	ears	of	readers,	must	here	best	not	be	described	as	an	 act	 of	 completion.	 For,	 by	 following	 the	 demonstrated	 model	 of	Reznikoff’s	Haltung,	placed	 in	 the	 breach	 between	 law	 and	 justice	 that	exposes	 the	 essential	 crack	 [Sprung]	 of	 any	 given	 judgement,	 the	performance	as	model	of	 inheritance	 turned	 towards	 the	 future	no	 less	than	 the	 past	 must	 appeal	 in	 turn	 to	 a	 modality	 of	 participation	 that	follows	the	aporetic	program	of	a	certain	experience	and	experiment	of	the	 possibility	 of	 the	 impossible	 as	 the	 condition	 of	 responsibility.	Following	this	model,	any	given	audience	does	not	complete	the	received.	Instead,	they	become	temporary	caretakers	of	a	precariously	transmitted	inheritance,	 taking	up	 the	 task	of	 a	 responsive	and	 responsible	 reading	and	 Stellungnahme	 by	 becoming	 its	 heirs	 or	 legatees	 in	 turn.	 The	audience,	 ‘singular	noun	for	an	irreducibly	heteroclite	stand-in,’	 ‘stands-in	 for	 the	 others	 […],’	 re-sending	 what	 has	 been	 addressed	 to	 them,	putting	off	appropriation	as	final	judgment,	or	else,	rehearsing	the	future	as	 the	 promise	 of	 justice	 to	 come. 589 		 Put	 differently,	 instead	 of	completing	the	received,	the	audience	is	in	turn	set	the	task	of	a	spectral	inheritance	 that	must	 greet	 [salut]	 the	 other	 in	 the	 sense	 given	 to	 this	French	 term	 by	 Derrida.	 Derrida	 employs	 the	 notion	 of	 salut,	 which	 is	able	 to	 add	 the	 sense	 of	 greeting	 or	 salutation	 to	 that	 of	 saving	 and	salvation,	 in	 order	 to	 draw	 out	 the	 irreconcilability	 of	 the	 necessary	(unconditional)	exposure	to	the	coming	of	time	and	the	hope	for	a	 final	salvation.		
																																																									587	ibid.	I	will	return	to	a	brief	discussion	of	hope	in	the	Conclusion	of	my	Thesis.	It	should	be	clear	that	I	would	have	reservations	designating	it	as	‘absurd’	and	in	the	pursuit	of	‘restoration’.	588	Goulish	&	Hixon.	589	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	341.	
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If	to	the	notion	of	salut	as	Retten	and	Heilen	we	were	to	add	the	sense	of	salut	as	Gruss	or	gruessen	[…],	and	if,	[…],	one	were	to	separate	as	irreconcilable	the	notion	of	salut	as	greeting	or	salutation	to	the	other	from	every	salut	as	salvation	(in	the	sense	of	the	safe,	the	immune,	health,	and	security),	if	one	were	to	consider	the	greeting	or	salutation	of	the	other,	of	what	comes,	as	irreducible	and	heterogeneous	to	any	seeking	of	salut	as	salvation,	you	can	guess	into	what	abysses	we	would	be	drawn.590		And	 yet	 salvation,	Rettung,	 repair	 is	 not	 altogether	 out	 of	 the	question.	Instead,	 it	 must	 be	 differently	 construed.	 Namely,	 precisely	 as	 what	 is	never	 assured	 and	 completed	 but	 only	 able	 to	 facilitate	 a	 precarious	survival.	 Although	 ‘[t]he	 religious	 notion	 of	 salvation,’	 as	 Hägglund	asserts,	‘is	[…]	emphatically	negated.’		 […]	Derrida	writes	[…]	that	salvation	is	not	“out	of	the	question”	but	should	rather	be	understood	as	something	that	is	never	assured.	These	apparently	contradictory	claims	become	consistent	if	we	apply	[a]	distinction	between	immortality	and	survival.	Insofar	as	salvation	is	understood	as	the	absolute	immunity	of	immortality,	it	is	out	of	the	question.	There	can	be	no	such	salvation,	since	nothing	can	happen	without	the	greeting	of	an	other	that	can	come	to	compromise	any	immunity.	However,	insofar	as	salvation	is	understood	as	a	survival	that	saves	one	from	death	by	giving	one	more	time	to	live,	it	is	not	out	of	the	question.	It	is	rather	a	precarious	possibility	that	always	can	“be	refused,	threatened,	forbidden,	lost,	gone”	because	of	the	infinite	finitude	of	time	(“the	endlessness	of	the	end	that	is	never-ending”).	[…]591																																																												590	Derrida,	Rogues,	114.	591	Hägglund,	131	
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Postscript:		
Labor	Trouble,	Machine	Age,	Property:	Remembering	The	Voice	of	
the	Nameless	in	History		 He	will	call	this	part	Machine	Age.		 He	has	read	through	court	transcripts:	testimonies.		 He	has	distilled	the	words	and	forged	these	poems.		 These	poems	that	are	not	poems.		 Who	was	Bernadette?		 He	will	not	let	her	disappear.		 He	will	not	let	her	words	burn	away	into	ash.		 Machine	age.592					As	already	indicated,	another	way	of	emphasizing	Testimonium’s	relation	to	 the	 question	 of	 inheritance	 and	 justice	 seems	 possible.	 One	 that	bespeaks	no	longer	a	sole	or	privileged	concern	with	a	general	attitude	of	exappropriative	 restraint	 in	 view	 of	 a	 maximum	 (if	 limited)	 respect	before	the	singularity	of	an	absolute	past	and	future,	but	a	more	specific	endeavor	of	brushing	history	against	 the	grain.	An	effort	 that,	 never	 so	much	 as	 explicitly,	 yet	 nevertheless	 implicitly	 goes	 far	 beyond	 a	 self-proclaimed	 interest	 in	making	amends	 for	 the	critical	neglect	of	certain	source	materials	but	more	radically	might	be	said	to	‘free	the	present	for	a	memory	 of	 the	 downtrodden	 in	 history’	 and	 somewhat	 quietly	 ‘seize	the	political	 chances	of	 the	day	and	 ‘rescue’	 the	 images	of	 the	past	 that	most	concern	the	present’.593	‘Reznikoff’s	Testimony,’	Hixon	relates,			 makes	irregular	use	of	intertitles	in	the	form	of	categories:			SOCIAL	LIFE	DOMESTIC	DIFFICULTIES	LABOR	TROUBLES																																																									592	Goulish	&	Hixon.	593	Fritsch,	161-2.	
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CHILDREN	PROPERTY	MACHINE	AGE	STREETCARS	AND	RAILROADS			 	 	 	 						SHIPPING	Of	these,	we	decided	to	concentrate	on	LABOR	TROUBLES,	MACHINE	AGE,	and	PROPERTY’.594			The	categories	in	general,	but	even	more	so	the	particular	selection,	inscribe	in	elliptical	form	the	testimonies	of	human	suffering	into	a	historical	trajectory	of	industrial	progress	as	evidence	of	Benjamin’s	famous	claim	that	‘[t]here	is	no	document	of	civilization	which	is	not	at	the	same	time	a	document	of	barbarism.’	For	‘[a]	heritage,	Benjamin	insists,	owes	its	existence	“not	only	to	the	efforts	of	the	great	minds	and	talents	who	created	them,	but	also	the	anonymous	toil	of	their	contemporaries.	[…]”’.595	To	avoid	a	second	victimization	of	the	“anonymous”	dead	at	the	hands	of	the	survivors,	Testimonium	might	thus	be	said	to	stand	within	a	critical	historiographic	tradition	that	calls	for	‘a	“memory	of	the	nameless”	rather	than	a	memory	of	the	dead	in	general,	so	as	to	resist	‘a	process	of	cultural-historical	transmission	[…]	that	dissimulates	both	past	oppressions	and	contemporary	domination’.596		
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									594	Goulish	&	Hixon.	595	Fritsch,	161.	596	ibid.	
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Conclusion	
	
	
An	Amateur’s	Courage	–	Cunning	and	High	Spirits	for	the	
Task	of	Inheritance	that	Remains			 In	retrospect,	perhaps	the	figure	of	the	amateur	can	be	seen	to	proliferate	throughout	this	writing,	whether	in	the	form	of	the	artist,	the	child,	the	allegorist,	the	plotter,	the	assistant	[Gehilfe],	the	creature,	Echo	or	indeed	Walter	Benjamin.	The	decisive	trait	that	allows	these	different	incarnations	of	the	figure	of	the	amateur	to	participate	in	what	they	love	and	desire,	of	proffering	a	critical	response	[Stellungnahme]	in	spite	of	a	lack	of	a	secure	Stellung	[position,	status,	employment]	would	be	that	of	courage	[Mut],	which,	as	Benjamin	relates	with	regards	to	the	Fairy	Tale,	dialectically	splits	into	cunning	and	high	spirits	[Unter-	und	Übermut].597	It	is	the	courage	to	contribute	to	the	socio-political	construction	of	the	ethos	in	spite	of	an	absence	or	lack	of	the	securities	of	the	proper	that	here	mark	out	the	figure	of	the	amateur.	Barred	from	the	participatory	task	of	inheritance	by	its	monopolised,	instrumentalized	and	increasingly	sealed	transmission,	the	amateur	revolts	against	his	or	her	alienation,	expropriation	and	reduction	to	the	consumerist	experience	of	life	as	the	ephemeral	flux	of	an	industrially	produced	flow	of	artifactuality.598	The																																																									597	‘The	wisest	thing	–	so	the	fairy	tale	taught	mankind	in	olden	times	and	teaches	children	to	this	day	–	is	to	meet	the	forces	of	the	mythical	world	with	cunning	and	with	high	spiritis.	(This	is	how	the	fairy	tale	polarizes	
Mut,	courage,	dividing	it	into	Untermut,	that	is,	cunning,	and	Übermut,	high	spirits.)	[Walter	Benjamin,	‘Der	Erzähler.	Betrachtungen	zum	Werk	Nikolai	Lesskows’,	Illuminationen,	385-410.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	2002),	404].	598	‘The	amateur	is	not	a	consumer.	Contact	between	the	amateur’s	body	and	his	art	is	very	close,	imbued	with	presence.	That’s	what	is	beautiful	about	it,	and	that’s	where	the	future	lies.	But	here	things	open	onto	a	problem	of	civilization.	Technical	development	and	the	evolution	of	mass	culture	reinforce	the	division	between	producers	and	consumers	to	a	
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lack	of	Stellung	that	bars	him	from	contributing	to	the	social	production	of	value	becomes	the	precarious	resource	and	hope	for	a	new	conception	of	the	task	of	inheritance	as	the	socio-individual	re-work	of	mourning.599	The	counterstroke	against	the	lack	of	Stellung	and	the	relegation	to	the	passivity	of	consumption	comes	in	the	form	of	a	Haltung	that	resists	the	monopolized	flow	of	cultural	transmission	in	order	to	un-seal	it,	that	is,	open	it	to	the	possibility	of	transformation	qua	participation.	The	temporal	lag	of	a	resistance	exposes	the	interrupted	transmission	as	essentially	breached,	swelling	under	the	virtual	intrusion	of	other	
possibilities.	In	other	words,	the	amateur’s	Haltung	is	an	effort	to	render	cultural	inheritance	appropriable.	‘For	what	is	the	value	of	all	our	culture	
																																																																																																																																															frightening	extent.	We	are	a	consumer	society,	and	not	at	all	a	society	of	amateurs’	[Roland	Barthes,	The	Grain	of	the	Voice.	Interviews	1962-1980,	217].	599	If	the	amateur	is	a	figure	that	here	predominantly	arises	in	a	context	of	resistance	to	monopolist	capitalism’s	tendencies	towards	the	expropriation	of	experience	[Erfahrung]	–	and	thus	from	the	dissolution	of	pre-industrial,	non-similar	traditions	–	a	notable	exception	to	this	dynamic	imposes	itself	within	the	context	of	the	German	baroque	as	it	has	been	one	of	our	themes.	For	Benjamin,	as	we	saw,	portrays	the	latter	precisely	as	a	crisis	of	tradition	as	the	crisis	of	tradition’s	monopoly	over	the	social	organisation	of	life.	In	this	context,	it	is	the	dissolution	of	the	prevalent	eschatological	narratives	of	theology	and	their	institutional	organisation	by	the	Church	that	leads	‘to	the	problematic	situation	of	an	isolated	self	and	its	difficult	relation	to	the	community’	that	calls	for	the	cunning	and	high	spirits	of	the	amateur	[Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	168].	The	vacuum	left	behind	by	the	departure	of	a	monopolist	organisation	of	the	social	paves	the	way	for	the	emergence	of	the	latter	(allegorist,	plotter)	to	become	the	model	of	a	new	economy	of	contribution.	By	adopting	an	attitude	of	allegorical	theatricalization	in	the	production	of	social	significance,	the	baroque	“amateur”	begins	to	experiment	with	new	forms	of	socio-individual	appropriation	in	which,	as	we	might	put	it,	‘the	relation	to	self	and	the	relation	to	world	are	articulated	together	[…]	[Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	246].	The	baroque	amateur	thereby	seeks	to	build,	to	paraphrase	Stiegler,	‘a	sustainable	libidinal	economy	and	does	not	expect	[the	Curie]	to	put	it	in	place’	[Bernard	Stiegler,	‘Amateur’,	Ars	Industrialis.	http://arsindustrialis.org/amateur-english-version/.	Accessed	February	2016.	Stiegler’s	sentence	actually	reads:	‘…and	does	not	expect	industrial	society	to	put	it	in	place’].		
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[Bildungsgut,	more	literally:	the	goods	of	education],’	Benjamin	asks,	‘if	it	is	divorced	from	experience?’600		As	a	response,	as	we	might	put	it,	to	a	difficult	situation	of	isolated	individuals	and	their	relation	to	the	community,	the	amateur’s	hopeful	experiments	arise	–	without	ever	becoming	fully	erect	–	as	a	consequence	of	a	mourned	loss	of	a	more	active	culture	of	contribution.	Benjamin	unfolds	this	mournful	narrative	as	a	socio-economic	development	that	dissociates	the	‘goods’	of	tradition(s)	from	the	possibilities	of	their	socio-individual	appropriation.	What	Benjamin	mourns	is	the	loss	of	experience	[Erfahrung]	as	‘a	form	of	appropriation	in	which	the	relation	to	self	and	the	relation	to	world	are	articulated	together	and	which	simultaneously	transforms	the	appropriated	and	the	appropriator’.601	The	acquisition	of	experience	[Erfahrung]	through	the	becoming	present	of	the	past	by	a	dynamic	process	that	defies	their	metaphysical	opposition	–	alongside	that	of	living	and	dead	memory	(anamnesis	and	
hypomnesis)	–	could	thus	be	said	to	describe	a	relay	movement	through	which,	as	Stiegler	says,	the	‘living	and	dead	compose	without	end’.602	Within	this	dynamic	process,	Erfahrung	would	be	the	product	of	the	labour	of	such	compositions.	What	has	been	lost,	therefore,	is	not	merely	the	specific,	situated,	specialised	know-how	(to	live)	passed	on	through	the	generations	that	is	as	yet	unstamped	by	technological	and	industrial	drives	to	similitude,	but	more	importantly,	the	participatory	possibilities	of	its	on-going	transformation	by	a	labour	of	appropriation	that	must	double	up	as	that	of	a	response.	What	has	been	lost,	in	other	words,	is	responsibility	before	an	inheritance	brought	on	by	a	loss	of	the	response-ability	of	its	transmission.	Benjamin	describes	this	process	as	that	of	a	loss	of	experience	within	capitalist	modes	of	production	(from	artisanal	production	to	machine	labour)	and	consumption	(from	use-value	to	commodity	fetish),	as	well	as	an	increasingly	instrumentalised																																																									600	Benjamin,	‘Erfahrung	und	Armut’,	292.	601	Thomas	Weber,	‘Erfahrung’	in	Benjamin’s	Begriffe,	ed.	Michael	Opitz	and	Erdmut	Wizisla,	230-259.	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	2000),	246.	602	Stiegler,	‘Anamnesis	and	Hypomnesis’,	no	pagination.	
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transmission	of	memory	and	know-how	(the	decline	of	the	story	and	the	rise	of	industrial	flows	of	information).		With	recourse	to	Benjamin,	Thomas	Weber	fittingly	sums	up	this	parallel	dissolution	of	experience	as	follows:			 As	the	social	and	technical	conditions	of	production	increasingly	fall	out	of	people’s	memory	and	experience	[Merk-	und	[…]	
Erfahrungswelt]	with	the	commodity-form,	historical	phenomena	become	“inaccessible”	[“unnahbar”]	within	cultural	history	[Kulturgeschichte].	The	latter	goes	hand	in	hand	with	a	loss	of	an	awareness	that	cultural	goods	[Kulturgüter]	“not	only	owe	their	emergence	[Entstehung]	but	also	their	transmission	to	a	continuous	social	labour	by	which,	moreover,	those	goods	themselves	are	processed	[verarbeitet],	that	is,	transformed”.603		Seeking	to	bring	the	ostensibly	transparent,	“inaccessible”	flows	of	transmission	of	cultural	history	to	a	halt,	the	Haltung	of	the	amateur	renders	them	memorable	qua	strange	[merk-würdig].	In	doing	so,	he	or	she	facilitates	the	becoming	opaque	of	the	medium	of	transmission,	prising	open	its	contextual	closure	and	exposing	it	as	essentially	breached:	demonstratively	leaving	room	for	his	or	her	own	as	well	as	the	coming	of	other’s	participation.604	To	ward	off	the	stultifying	transmission	of	a	sealed	inheritance,	the	amateur	must	put	to	the	test,	again	and	again,	by	a	labour	of	appropriation	that	takes	the	form	of	rehearsal.	Benjamin,	to	be	sure,	does	not	strictly	employ	the	term	rehearsal	to	describe	the	necessarily	transformative	labour	of	appropriation	but	one	that	comes	very	close	to	it,	namely,	Übung,	the	task	of	practicing,	training,	exercising	or	taking	lessons.	If	in	the	realm	of	labour	processes	Übung	describes	a	more	artisanal,	participatory,																																																									603	Thomas	Weber,	‘Erfahrung’,	255.	604	The	difference	between	a	closed,	transparent	and	an	open,	opaque	means	of	transmission	is	for	instance	elaborated	in	Benjamin’s	distinction	between	the	passive	consumption	of	information	and	the	story’s	call	to	participation.	See	Benjamin’s	essay	‘The	Story	Teller’.	
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transformative	mode	of	skill	acquisition	before	or	against	that	of	the	conditioning	drill	[Dressur]	of	capitalist	modes	of	production,	in	the	context	of	cultural	history	it	might	describe	a	modality	of	inheritance	and	reception	as	socio-individual	co-production	before	or	against	the	sealed	transmissions	of	memory	industries	in	the	service	of	what	Bernard	Stiegler	calls	the	control	society.	The	loss	of	Erfahrung	springs	from	the	loss	of	Übung	as	the	technique	of	its	acquisition.		With	the	rise	of	industrial,	monopolist	capitalism,	Übung	or	rehearsal	must	make	way	for	the	stultifying	expropriations	of	drill	and	control.	Although	Benjamin’s	concept	of	experience	thus	construed	would	be	closely	linked	to	the	transformative	aspects	of	its	acquisition	through	rehearsal,	in	the	context	of	the	narrative	of	its	loss	he	nevertheless	seems	tempted	to	stress	the	aspect	of	its	relative	permanence.	As	a	result,	those	passages	in	which	he	laments	the	loss	of	lasting	experiences	against	the	background	of	an	immense	and	monstrous	expansion	of	technology	over	mankind,	perhaps	form	the	apotheosis	of	one	side	of	what	Samuel	Weber	calls	the	‘double	(or	“cracked”)	tone’	of	Benjamin’s	thinking	and	writing,	split	between	melancholy	and	mourning	on	the	one	hand,	engagement	and	hope	on	the	other.605	‘Where	has	it	all	gone?’	Benjamin	asks	in	his	lament	of	a	time	during	which	one	exactly	knew	what	experience	constituted.	‘Who	still	meets	people	who	really	know	how	to	tell	a	story?	Where	do	you	still	hear	words	that	last,	and	that	pass	from	one	generation	
to	the	next	like	a	precious	ring?’606	Yet	as	the	essay	‘Experience	and	Poverty’	seems	to	closely	follow	the	programme	of	a	double	tone,	split	between	a	mournful	lament	of	tradition	and	a	call	for	high	spirited	improvisations	in	its	wake,	one	might	suspect	that	Benjamin’s	stress	on	the	lasting	aspects	of	experience	over	those	of	its	transformative	survival	through	participatory	transmission	is	in	parts	employed	for	the	rhetorical	effect	of	their	contrast.	Indeed,	a	similar	observation	can	at	times	be	made	at	the	other	side	of	the	spectrum	of	a	cracked	tone,	namely,	in	those	passages	where	Benjamin	wants	to	be	done	with																																																									605	Samuel	Weber,	Benjamin’s	–abilities,	119.		See	footnote	228,	p.86.		606	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Erfahrung	und	Armut,	291	&	731,	my	emphasis.	
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experience	and	inheritance	altogether.	Yet	a	more	nuanced	reading	of	the	relation	between	what	is	sadly	mourned	and	paradoxically	affirmed	with	high	spirits	seems	possible.	By	calling	for	the	radical	affirmation	of	the	loss	of	tradition,	habit,	security	and	the	possibility	‘to	hold	tight’	[Festhalten]	that	‘has	become	the	monopoly	of	a	few	powerful	people,’	Benjamin	rejects	the	lasting	aspect	of	more	or	less	reified	products	of	experience	whilst	nevertheless	seeking	to	restore	and	radicalize	–	perhaps	relaunch	–	the	dynamic,	participatory,	transformative	processes	that	previously	brought	about	their	acquisition.	Put	differently,	the	counterstroke	against	the	security	and	steadfastness	of	a	Stellung	that	has	become	the	monopoly	of	the	few	and	powerful,	is	not	the	latter’s	restoration,	but	the	search	for	renewed	possibilities	for	transformative	participation	from	an	affirmed	position	of	limited	security.	Thus,	Benjamin’s	call	for	an	avowal	and	affirmation	of	the	‘poverty	of	experience’	describes	a	modality	of	inheritance	as	the	dynamic	process	of	a	reworking	of	its	transmission	that	avoids	reification	into	lasting	‘products’	of	experience.	It	is	this	desire	to	participate	without	Stellung,	the	hopeful	affirmation	of	a	poverty	of	experience	that	must	‘make	do	with	little,’	‘construct	out	of	little,’	that	I	am	here	associating	with	the	cunning	and	high	spirits	of	the	amateur	and	a	politics	of	rehearsal.	The	hope	that	it	conjures	is	never	that	of	the	restoration	of	a	mourned	security	of	tradition,	of	more	or	less	possessable	and	communicable	experiences,	but	of	a	radical	commitment	to	the	task	of	inheritance	through	its	perpetual	reworking	in	the	absence	of	the	securities	of	the	proper.	‘To	make	do	with	little,’	which	was	perhaps	also	an	aspect	of	the	method	of	self-writing	Michel	Foucault	identified	in	the	Greco-Roman	practices	of	keeping	a	treasure-like	assemblage	of	rehearsable	marks	in	the	notebook	as	hupomnēmata	–	a	modality	of	appropriation,	as	we	might	here	put	it,	in	which	the	relation	to	self	and	the	relation	to	world	are	articulated	together	by	the	simultaneous	transformation	of	what	is	appropriated	and	who	appropriates	–	without	ever	becoming	too	fixated	
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on	what	one	knows.	Not	to	erase	one’s	traces,	as	Benjamin	also	likes	to	quote	Brecht,	but	to	avoid	their	reified	accumulation.607		In	the	comfort	of	the	bourgeois	interior,	Benjamin	says,	a	maximum	of	habits	accumulate	and	suffocate	the	occupants	of	such	plush	apartments.	Thus,	at	the	end	of	‘Experience	and	Poverty,’	he	calls	for	a	very	different	way	‘to	make	oneself	at	home’	[sich	einrichten],	that	is,	to	construct	an	ethos	in	the	affirmed	absence	of	familiarity,	security	and	identity.	It	is	the	effort	of	‘making	[oneself]	a	home	away	from	home’	[Einrichtung],	to	‘set	oneself	up’	[sich	einrichten]	anew	and	with	little,	whilst	avowing	an	essential	process	of	self-deconstruction.608	Benjamin	non-fortuitously	employs	the	very	same	term	–	Einrichtung	–	in	the	context	of	his	analysis	of	Epic	Theatre,	where	the	place	upon	which	one	must	‘take	one’s	place’	[sich	einrichten]	becomes	that	of	the	theatrical	stage,	or	more	precisely,	the	podium	of	Epic	Theatre.	What	the	latter	context	brings	home,	so	to	speak,	is	that	the	call	to	Einrichtung	in	the	absence	of	the	securities	of	the	proper	and	property	entails	a	becoming	theatrical	of	the	house	and	home	and	a	subject’s	being-at-home-with-itself.	The	latter	must	give	up	a	passage	to	the	outside,	which	prohibits	a	simple	opposition	of	inside	and	outside,	private	and	public.	For	‘the	space	of	the	theatrical	scene,’	upon	which	one	must	install	oneself	[es	gilt,	sich	
einzurichten],	as	Weber	puts	it,	‘is	no	longer	simply	an	interior	space,	since	it	is	always	directed	outward,	away,	toward	others.609	‘The	self	is	never	therefore	simply	“at	home”	on	a	podium,	or	on	a	stage[,]’	Weber	continues.	‘Perhaps,’	he	finally	goes	on	to	suggest,	‘the	stage	can	come	to	stand	for	a	place	in	which	one	is	always	already	placed,	without	being	fully	at	home	or	definitely	positioned’.610	To	be	thus	positioned	in	the	absence	of	a	security	of	Stellung	is	also	the	Haltung	of	the	amateur,	who	takes	up	a	pose	and	attitude	that	makes	do	with	little	and	never	fully	comes	to	rest	(for	instance,	on	what	he	or	she	comes	to	know)	as	it	perpetually	and	demonstratively	appeals	to	the	coming	of	the	other’s																																																									607	Walter	Benjamin,	Erfahrung	und	Armut,	294.	608		ibid,	296.	609	Samuel	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	246-7.	610	ibid,	68.	
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response	qua	theatrical	iterability	as	response-ability.	In	Derrida’s	account,	as	we	saw,	to	be	thus	exposed	to	the	coming	of	time	is	never	simply	a	matter	of	choice	but	an	ultratranscendental	condition	of	life	qua	survival.	Yet	by	affirming	and	aggravating	certain	auto-deconstructive	processes	of	the	laws,	goods	or	products	of	an	inheritance,	the	ethico-political	bearing	of	the	amateur	is	nevertheless	able	to	counter	all	limited	but	nonetheless	threatening	tendencies	towards	their	closure.	For	the	amateur,	the	crisis	of	tradition,	which	he	or	she	meets	with	a	cracked	sentiment	of	mourning	and	high	spirits,	becomes	the	only	chance	to	keep	alive	the	task	of	its	perpetual	reworking.	In	designating	the	place	for	a	more	or	less	precarious	Einrichtung	no	longer	simply	as	a	stage	but	as	a	podium,	Benjamin	seeks	to	radicalize	this	scene	of	exposure	through	the	podium’s	more	emphatic	appeal	to	others.611	For	in	Benjamin’s	account,	the	decisive	trait	of	the	podium	is	that	it	is	no	longer	separated	from	the	audience	by	the	chasm	of	the	orchestra	pit.	‘Although	the	stage	is	still	distinct	from	that	of	the	audience,	“still	elevated,”’	Weber	relates,	‘it	functions	more	as	a	“podium”	than	as	a	sacred	space’.612	‘On	this	podium,’	Benjamin	concludes,	‘one	must	find	one’s	place	[gilt	es,	sich	einzurichten]’.613	If	the	orchestra	pit	sought	to	separate	players	and	theatre-goers,	as	Benjamin	puts	it,	like	the	living	from	the	dead,	the	podium	appears	‘as	a	site	where	the	living	confront	the	dead’.614	A	confrontation	that	here	might	also	be	described	as	the	relay	movement	between	past	and	present	by	which	the	living	and	dead	compose	without	end	for	which	the	stage	as	podium	becomes	a	paradigmatic	place	without	Stellung.	‘Whatever	else	Benjamin’s	notion	of	
Einrichtung	may	entail,’	Weber	states,	‘it	refers	to	the	relation	of	the																																																									611	Samuel	Weber	describes	the	difference	of	stage	and	podium	as	follows:	‘In	being	raised	above	the	horizontal,	it	[the	podium]	is	positioned	to	appeal	to	others.	This	is	true	of	stages	in	general,	but	to	the	extent	that	a	stage	is	also	a	podium	its	relation	to	its	addressees	has	become	more	emphatic.	It	becomes	a	site	from	which	others	are	not	just	addressed,	but	enjoined.	In	the	presence	of	a	podium,	spectators	are	expected	to	do	more	than	just	observe’	[ibid].	612	ibid.	613	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater	(1)’,	7.	614	Samuel	Weber,	Theatricality	as	Medium,	69.	
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living	to	the	dead,	of	the	present	to	the	past	–	and	hence	also	of	both	to	the	future’.615	Thus,	to	make	oneself	at	home	away	from	home	on	the	stage	as	podium	is	to	“inhabit”	the	paradoxical	temporality	of	rehearsal	by	a	gesture	of	repetition	that	maintains	a	simultaneous	reference	to	the	past	and	to	the	future.	In	‘Experience	and	Poverty,’	Benjamin	further	develops,	albeit	in	elliptical	fashion,	the	strange	temporality	of	such	an	Einrichtung	and	links	it	to	the	figure	of	hope.	There,	the	proponents	if	not	examples	of	what	I	am	here	calling	the	amateur	–	Bert	Brecht,	Adolf	Loos,	Paul	Klee,	Paul	Scheerbart	–	‘reject	the	traditional,	solemn,	noble	image	of	man,	festooned	with	all	the	sacrificial	offerings	of	the	past[,]	to	‘[…]	turn	instead	to	the	naked	man	of	the	contemporary	world	who	lies	screaming	like	a	newborn	babe	in	the	dirty	diapers	of	the	present’.616	Benjamin	therewith	links	the	rejection	of	the	securities	of	tradition	in	the	present	with	an	image	of	hope	for	the	future.	A	similar	sentiment	returns	at	the	very	end	of	the	essay.	Here,	in	contrast	to	the	possibility	‘to	hold	tight’	[Festhalten]	that	‘has	become	the	monopoly	of	a	few	powerful	people,’	Benjamin	evokes	the	necessity	of	most	but	also	the	particular	capacity	of	some,	‘to	install	oneself	[sich	einzurichten]	–	beginning	anew	and	with	few	resources’.617	The	latter	are	able	to	do	so,	Benjamin	says,	with	laughter,	that	is,	as	we	might	here	put	it,	with	the	courage	of	cunning	and	high	spirits.			 In	their	buildings,	images	and	stories,	mankind	is	preparing	to	outlive	culture,	if	need	be.	And	the	main	thing	is	that	it	does	so	with	a	laugh.	This	laughter	may	occasionally	sound	barbaric.618																																																									615	ibid.	616	Walter	Benjamin,	‘Experience	and	Poverty’,	Selected	Writings	Vol	2.2,	ed.	Michel	W.	Jennings,	Howard	Eiland,	and	Gary	Smith,	trans.	Rodney	Livingstone	et	al,	732-738.	(Cambridge	and	London:	Harvard	University	Press	2005),	733.	617	Walter	Benjamin,	Erfahrung	und	Armut,	296.	618	Earlier	in	the	essay	Benjamin	declares	his	intention	to	introduce	a	new,	positive	concept	of	barbarianism	to	designate	an	affirmative	attitude	towards	the	poverty	of	experience.	
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Well	and	good.	May	the	individual	from	time	to	time	give	up	a	little	humanity	to	the	masses,	who	one	day	will	repay	him	with	compound	interest.619			Although	the	crisis	of	tradition	is	unmistakably	the	condition	for	the	hope	that	opens	with	the	increased	possibilities	for	its	future	reworking,	Benjamin	is	here	perhaps	too	quick	in	wanting	to	offer	guarantees	through	the	trade-off	of	a	present	“barbarism”	for	a	future	interest.	For	the	newborn	babe	in	the	dirty	diapers	of	the	present	might	always	turn	out	to	have	been	a	monster.	A	monstrosity,	however,	which	even	if	it	remains	a	danger,	is	precisely	what	carries	hope	in	the	absence	of	all	future	guarantees.	The	monstrous	child,	like	‘the	call	for	a	thinking	of	the	event	to	come,	of	the	democracy	to	come,	of	the	reason	to	come,’	would	thus	carry	the	good	and	the	bad,	the	chance	and	the	danger,	‘[…]	bear	every	hope,	to	be	sure,	although	[remaining],	in	itself,	without	hope.		 Not	hopeless,	in	despair,	but	foreign	to	the	teleology,	the	hopefulness,	and	the	salut	of	salvation.	Not	foreign	to	the	salut	as	the	greeting	or	salutation	of	the	other,	not	foreign	to	the	adieu	(“come”	or	“go”	in	peace),	not	foreign	to	justice,	but	nonetheless	heterogeneous	and	rebellious,	irreducible,	to	law,	to	power,	and	to	the	economy	of	redemption.620																																																																			619	ibid,	296.	620	Jacques	Derrida,	Rogues,	xiii.		
		
299	
Bibliography	
	
	Agamben,	Giorgio.	‘Aby	Warburg	and	the	Nameless	Science’	in		
Potentialities.	Collected	Essays	in	Philosophy.	89-103.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1999.		Agamben,	Giorgio.	‘In	Playland	–	Reflections	on	History	and	Play’	in		
Infancy	and	History.	Essays	on	the	Destruction	of	Experience,	65-89.	London:	Verso,	1993.		Agamben,	Giorgio.	‘Kommerell,	or	On	Gesture’,	in	Potentialities.	Collected		
Essays	in	Philosophy.	77-88.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1999.		Agamben,	Giorgio.	‘Notes	On	Gesture’,	in	Infancy	and	History.	Essays	on		
the	Destruction	of	Experience,	147-156.	London:	Verso,	1993		Agamben,	Giorgio.	What	is	an	Apparatus?	And	Other	Essays.	Stanford:		Stanford	University	Press,	2009.		Austin,	John.	How	to	do	Things	with	Words.	Cambridge	Massachusetts:		Harvard	University	Press,	1975.		Banes,	Sally.	Democracy’s	Body.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	1993.		Barthes,	Roland.	‘Brecht	and	Discourse:	A	Contribution	to	the	Study	of	Discursivity’	in	Brecht,	The	Rustle	of	Language.	212-222.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1992.		Barthes,	Roland.	‘From	Work	to	Text’	in	Image	Music	Text,	155-164.		London:	Fontana	Press,	1977.		Barthes,	Roland.	The	Grain	of	the	Voice.	Interviews	1962-1980.	New	York:		Hill	and	Wang,	1992.		Baudelaire,	Charles.	‘Of	the	Essence	of	Laughter,	and	generally	of	the		Comic	in	the	Plastic	Arts’,	in	Baudelaire:	Selected	Writings	On	Art	
And	Artists,	translated	by	P.E.	Charvet,	140-161.	(Harmondsworth:	Penguin	Books,	1972).		Benjamin,	Walter.	‘Aus	dem	Brecht-Kommentar’	in	Versuche	Über	Brecht,		34-38.	Edited	by	Rolf	Tiedermann.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1966.		Benjamin,	Walter.	Briefe.	Edited	by	Gershom	Scholem	and	Theodor	W.		Adorno.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1977.		
		
300	
Benjamin,	Walter.	‘Das	Passagen	Werk.	Aufzeichnungen	und	Materialien’		in	Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	V,	79-654.	Edited	by	Rolf	Tiedermann	und	Hermann	Schweppenhäuser,	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag	1977.		Benjamin,	Walter.	Das	Passagenwerk.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp		Verlag,	1982.		Benjamin,	Walter.	‘Der	Erzähler’	in	Illuminationen,	385-410.	Edited	by		Siegfried	Unseld.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	2002.		Benjamin,	Walter.	Einbahnstraße.	Berliner	Kindheit	um	Neunzehnhundert.		Frankfurt	am	Main:	Fischer,	2011.		Benjamin,	Walter.	‘Franz	Kafka	–	Zur	zehnten	Wiederkehr	seines		Todestages’	in	Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	II,	409-438.	Edited	by	Rolf	Tiedermann	and	Hermann	Schweppenhäuser.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1977.	
	Benjamin,	Walter.	‘Goethes	Wahverwandtschaften’	in	Gesammelte		
Schriften	Band	I,	125-201.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1977.		Benjamin,	Walter.		‘Karl	Kraus’	in	Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	II,	334-367.		Edited	by	Rolf	Tiedermann	und	Hermann	Schweppenhäuser.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1977.		Benjamin,	Walter.	‘Kurze	Schatten’	in	Illuminationen,	297-306.	Edited	by		Siegfried	Unseld.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	2002.		Benjamin,	Walter.	‘Programm	eines	proletarischen	Kindertheaters’	in								
Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	II,	763-772.	Edited	by	Rolf	Tiedermann	und	Hermann	Schweppenhäuser	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1977.		Benjamin,	Walter.	The	Origin	of	German	Tragic	Drama.	Translated	by		John	Osborne.	London:	Verso,	2009.		Benjamin,	Walter,	‘Über	den	Begriff	der	Geschichte’	in	Illuminationen.		251-261.	Edited	by	Siegfried	Unseld.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	2002.		Benjamin,	Walter,	‘Über	die	Sprache	überhaupt	und	über	die	Sprache	des		Menschen’	in	Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	II,	140-157.	Edited	by	Rolf	Tiedermann	und	Hermann	Schweppenhäuser	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1977.			
		
301	
Benjamin,	Walter.	Ursprung	des	deutschen	Trauerspiel.	Frankfurt	am		Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1978.		Benjamin,	Walter.	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater	(1)’	in	Gesammelte		
Schriften	Band	II,	519-531.	Edited	by	Rolf	Tiedermann	und	Hermann	Schweppenhäuser.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1977.		Benjamin,	Walter.	‘Was	ist	das	epische	Theater?	(2)’	in	Versuche	
über	Brecht,	22-30.	Edited	by	Rolf	Tiedermann.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1966.			Benjamin,	Walter.	Versuche	über	Brecht.	Edited	by	Rolf	Tiedermann.		Frankfurt	am	Maim:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1966.		Benjamin,	Walter.	‘Zentralpark’	in	Gesammelte	Schriften	Band	I,	655-690.		Edited	by	Rolf	Tiedermann	und	Hermann	Schweppenhäuser.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1977.		Bennington,	Geoffrey.	Derridabase.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,		1993.		Bernstein,	Charles.	‘Charles	Reznikoff’s	“Amelia”:	A	case	study	by	Richard	Hyland’,	Jacket	2.	Accessed	online	April	2015	http://jacket2.org/commentary/charles-reznikoffs-amelia-case-study-richard-hyland		Blocker,	Jane.	(2013)	‘Queer	Failures	of	History:	Stupidity	and	Temporal		Dissidence	in	The	Lastmaker’	in	Parallax,	19:3,	5-23.		Bottoms,	Stephen	&	Goulish,	Matthew	edited.	Small	Acts	Of	Repair.		
Performance,	Ecology	and	Goat	Island.	London	&	New	York:	Routledge,	2007.		Butler,	Judith.	‘Performative	Acts	and	Gender	Constitution:	An	Essay	in		Phenomenology	and	Feminist	Theory’	in	Theatre	Journal,	Vol.	40,	No.	4.	(Dec.,	1988),	519-531.		Campany,	David.	‘Posing,	Acting,	Photographing’	in	Stillness	and	Time.		
Photography	and	the	Moving	Image	edited	by	David	Green	&	Joanna	Lowry,	97-113.	London:	Photoworks,	2005.		Caygill,	Howard	‘Walter	Benjamin’s	Concept	of	Cultural	History’	in	The		
Cambridge	Companion	to	Walter	Benjamin	edited	by	David	Ferris	73-96.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006.		Cooper,	Rosie	&	Yedgar,	Ariella.	In	the	Belly	of	the	Whale	(Act	III)		[exhibition	information	leaflet],	Vitoria:	Montehermoso	2012.	
		
302	
	Cixous,	Helen.	‘Grace	and	Innocence:	Heinrich	von	Kleist’	in	Readings.	The		
Poetics	of	Blanchot,	Joyce,	Kafka,	Kleist,	Lispector	and	Tsvetayeva.	Minneapolis:	University	of	Minessota	Press,	1991.	
	Connor,	Steven.	‘Shifting	Ground’	in	Samuel	Beckett,	Bruce	Nauman.		Edited	by	Michael	Glasmeier,	80-7	(Vienna:	Kunsthalle	Wien,		2000).	Accessed	November	2011	http://www.bbk.ac.uk/english/skc/beckettnauman/		DeMan,	Paul.	‘The	Concept	of	Irony’	in	Aesthetic	Ideology,	163-184.	Edited		by	Andrzej	Warminski.	Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1996.		DeMan,	Paul.	‘The	Rhetoric	of	Temporality’	in	Blindness	and	Insight.		
Essays	in	the	Rhetoric	of	Contemporary	Criticism,	187-228.	Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1983.		DeArmitt,	Plashette.	The	Right	to	Narcissism.	A	Case	for	an	Impossible	Self		
Love.	New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2014.			Derrida,	Jacques.	Archive	Fever.	A	Freudian	Impression,	translated	by	Eric		Prenowitz.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1996.		Derrida,	Jacques.	Dissemination.	Translated	by	Barbara	Johnson.	London:		The	Athlone	Press,	1981.		Derrida,	Jacques	&	Stiegler,	Bernard.	Echographies	of	Television:	Filmed		
Interviews.	Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2002.		Derrida,	Jacques.	Fischus.	Frankfurter	Rede.	Translated	by	Stefan		Lorenzer.	Wien:	Passagen	Verlag,	2003.		Derrida,	Jacques.	‘Force	of	Law:	The	Mystical	Foundation	of	Authority’	in		
Cardozo	Law	Review	11	(1989-1990),	translated	by	Mary	Quaintance,	920-104.		Derrida,	Jacques.	‘La	parole	souffleé’	in	Writing	and	Difference,	212-245.		London:	Routledge	2001.		Derrida,	Jacques	Learning	to	Live	Finally:	The	Last	Interview.	Edited	and		translated	by	Pascale-Anne	Brault	&	Michael	Naas.	Hoboken,	NJ:	Melville	House	Publishing,	2010.		Derrida,	Jacques.	Limited	Inc.	Illinois:	Northwestern	University	Press,		1990.				
		
303	
Derrida,	Jacques.	Negotiations.	Interventions	and	Interviews	1971-2001.		Edited	&	translated	by	Elisabeth	Rottenberg.	Stanford	California:	Standford	University	Press,	2002.		Derrida,	Jacques.	Of	Hospitality.	Anne	Dufourmantelle	invites	Jacques		
Derrida	to	Respond.	Translated	by	Rachel	Bowlby.	Stanford	California:	Stanford	University	Press,	2000.		Derrida,	Jacques.	Of	Grammatology.	Translated	by	Gayatri	Chakravorty		Spivak.	Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1998.		Derrida,	Jacques.	Rogues:	Two	Essays	on	Reason.	Stanford	California:		Stanford	University	Press,	2005.		Derrida,	Jacques.	‘Shibboleth	for	Paul	Celan’	in	Derrida,	Sovereignties	in		
Question.	The	Poetics	of	Paul	Celan.	Edited	by	Thomas	Dutoit	and	Outi	Pasanen,	1-64.	Fordham:	Fordham	University	Press	2005.		Derrida,	Jacques.	‘Signature,	Event,	Context’	in	Limited	Inc,	1-23.	Illinois:		Northwestern	University	Press,	1990.		Derrida,	Jacques.		Specters	of	Marx.	Translated	by	Peggy	Kamuf.	London:		Routledge,	2006.		Derrida,	Jacques.	The	Beast	and	the	Sovereign	Volume	1.	Edited	by	Michel		Lise,	Marie-Louise	Mallet	and	Ginette	Michand,	translated	by	Geoffrey	Bennington.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press	2009.		Derrida,	Jacques.	The	Ear	Of	The	Other.	Edited	by	Christie	V.	McDonald,		translated	by	Peggy	Kamuf	&	Avital	Ronell.	New	York:	Schocken	Books,	1985.		Derrida,	Jacques.	The	Other	Heading.	Reflections	on	Today’s	Europe.		Translated	by	Pascale-Anne	Brault	and	Michael	Naas.	Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	1992.		Derrida,	Jacques.	‘The	University	Without	Condition’	in	Without	Alibi.		Edited	and	translated	by	Peggy	Kamuf,	202-237.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2002.		Derrida,	Jacques	&	Maurizio,	Ferraris.	A	Taste	for	the	Secret.	Translated		by	Giacomo	Donis.	Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2001.		Foucault,	Michel.	‘Self-Writing’	in	Ethics.	The	Essential	Works	of	Foucault		
1954-1984,	207-222.	Edited	by	Paul	Rabinow,	translated	by	Robert	Hurley.	London:	Penguin	Books,	2000.			
		
304	
Foucault,	Michel.	‘What	is	Enlightenment’	in	Ethics.	The	Essential	Works		
of	Foucault	1954-1984,	303-320.	Edited	by	Paul	Rabinow,	translated	by	Robert	Hurley,		Fritsch,	Matthias.	The	Promise	of	Memory.	History	and	Politics	in	Marx,		
Benjamin	and	Derrida.	New	York:	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	2005.		Gershom,	Scholem.	Walter	Benjamin	–	die	Geschichte	einer	Freundschaft.		Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1975.		Goulish,	Matthew	(2010).	‘First,	Second,	Third’	in	Performance	Research:		
A	Journal	of	the	Performing	Arts,	15:2,	pp.34-38.			Goulish,	Matthew	(2000).		‘Memory	is	this’	in	Performance	Research:	A		
Journal	of	the	Performing	Arts,	5:3,	6-17.		Goulish,	Matthew	&	Hixon,	Lin.	‘Poetry,	Document	and	Objectivity’,		transcript	of	lecture	held	at	LICA,	Lancaster	University,	November		 2014.		Haddad,	Samir.	Derrida	And	The	Inheritance	of	Democracy.	Bloomington		&	Indianapolis:	Indiana	University	Press,	2013.		Haddad,	Samir.	(2006)	‘Derrida	Reading	Derrida:	Deconstruction	as	Self-	Inheritance’	in	International	Journal	of	Philosophical	Studies,	14:4,	505-520.		Hägglund,	Martin.	Radical	Atheism.	Derrida	and	the	Time	of	Life.	Stanford		California:	Stanford	University	Press,	2008.		Hamacher,	Werner.	‘Afformative	Strike:	Benjamin’s	‘Critique	of	Violence’		in	Destruction	&	Experience.	Edited	by	Andrew	Benjamin	and	Peter	Osborne,	108-136.	Manchester:	Clinamen	Press,	2000.		Hamacher,	Werner.	‘Die	Geste	im	Namen’	in	Entferntes		
Verstehen,	280-324.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	1998.		Hamacher,	Werner.	‘The	Gesture	in	the	Name:	On	Benjamin	and	Kafka’	in	
Premises,	294-336.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1999.		Hansen,	Miriam.	Cinema	and	Experience:	Siegfried	Kracauer,	Walter		
Benjamin,	and	Theodor	W.	Adorno.	Berkley:	University	of	California	Press,	2012.		Heathfield,	Adrian.	edited.	Live	Art	and	Performance.	London:	Tate		Publishing,	2004.		
		
305	
Heathfield,	Adrian	and	Jones,	Amelia.	edited.	Perform.	Repeat.	Record.		
Live	Art	in	History.	Bristol:	Intellect,	2012.		Hixon,	Lin.	‘When	will	the	September	roses	bloom?	Last	night	was	only	a		
comedy:	Reflections	on	the	Process’	in	Frakcija	Performing	Arts	Magazine,	No.	32	(Summer),	no	pagination.		Köhn,	Eckhardt.	‘Sammler’	in	Benjamins	Begriffe.	Edited	by	Michael	Opitz		&	Erdmut	Wizisla,	695-724.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	2000.		Jay,	Martin.	‘Against	Consolation:	Walter	Benjamin	and	the	Refusal	to		Mourn’	in	War	and	Remembrance	in	the	Twentieth	Century.	Edited	by	Jay	Winter	&	Emmanuel	Sivan,	221-239.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999.		Jennings,	Michael	W,	Doherty,	Brigid	and	Levin	Y.	Thomas	edited.	Walter		
Benjamin,	The	Work	of	Art	in	the	Age	of	Its	Technological	
Reproducibility	and	Other	Writings	on	Media.	Translated	by	Edmund	Jephcott,	Rodney	Livingstone	&	Howard	Eiland.	Cambridge	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press,	2008.		Jones,	Amelia.	‘“Presence	in	Absentia:	Experiencing	Performance	as		Documentation’	in	Art	Journal,	Vol.	56,	No	4,	Performance	Art:	(Some)	Theory	and	(Selected)	Practice	at	the	End	of	This	Century	(Winter,	1997),	11-18.			Jones,	Amelia.	‘“The	Artist	is	Present”:	Artistic	Re-enactments	and	the		Impossibility	of	Presence’	in	TDR:	The	Drama	Review,	Volume	55,	Number	1,	Spring	2011,	15-45.			Kafka,	Franz.	Das	Schloß.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Fischer,	1998.		Kartsaki	Eirini	edited.	On	Repetition:	Writing,	Performance,	Art.	London:		Intellect	2016.			Kelleher,	Joe.	‘Their	Hands	Full	of	Ghosts:	Goat	Island	at	the	Last’	PAJ:	A		
Journal	of	Performance	and	Art	(2009),	31:3,	98-107.		Köhn,	Eckhardt.	‘Sammler’	in.	Benjamins	Begriffe.	Edited	by	Michael	Opitz		&	Erdmut	Wizisla,	695-725.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	2000.		Lambert-Beatty,	Carrie.	Being	Watched	-	Yvonne	Rainer	and	the	1960s.		Cambridge	Massachusetts:	The	MIT	Press,	2008.		Lavery,	Carl	&	Hassall,	Lee.	‘A	Future	for	Hashima’	in	Performance		
Research:	A	Journal	of	the	Performing	Arts	(2015),	20:3,	112-125.	
		
306	
	Mowitt,	John.	Radio.	Essays	in	Bad	Reception.	Berkeley	&	Los	Angeles:		University	of	California	Press,	2011.		Mowitt,	John.	TEXT.	The	Genealogy	of	an	Antidisciplinary	Object.	Durham		and	London:	Duke	University	Press,	1992.		Naas,	Michael.	Derrida	From	Now	On.	Fordham:	Fordham	University		Press,	2008.		Naas,	Michael,	Miracle	and	Machine:	Jacques	Derrida	and	the	Two	Sources		
of	Religion,	Science,	and	the	Media.	Fordham:	Fordham	University	Press,	2011.	
	Nietzsche,	Friedrich,	Die	Fröhliche	Wissenschaft.	Köln:	Anaconda	Verlag,		2009.	
	Noland,	Kerry,	Agency	and	Embodiment.	Performing	Gestures/Producing		
Cultures.	Harvard:	Harvard	University	Press,	2009.		Rainer,	Yvonne.	‘Some	Retrospective	Notes	on	a	Dance	for	10	People	and		12	Mattresses	Called	“Parts	of	Some	Sextets.”’	The	Tulane	Drama	
Review	(1965),	10/2,	168-178.		Ranciere,	Jacques.	The	Emancipated	Spectator.	Translated	by	Gregory		Elliot.	London	and	New	York:	Verso,	2009.		Ranciere,	Jacques.	The	Ignorant	Schoolmaster.	Five	Lessons	in	Intellectual		
Emancipation.	Translated	by	Kristin	Ross.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1991.		Ranciere,	Jacques.	The	Politics	of	Aesthetics.	Translated	by	Gabriel		Rockhill.	London:	Continuum,	2005.		Reznikoff,	Charles.	By	the	Water	of	Manhatten.	New	York:	Charles	Boni		Press,	1930.		Ridout,	Nicholas.	Theatre	&	Ethics.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,		2009.		Ronell,	Avital.	The	Test	Drive.	Urbana	and	Chicago:	University	of	Illinois		Press,	2005.		Rothe,	Katja.	‘Nicht-Machen.	Lassen!	Zu	Walter	Benjamin’s		pädagogischem	Theater’	in	Ökonomien	der	Zurückhaltung:	
Kulturelles	Handeln	zwischen	Askese	und	Restriktion,	331-349.	Edited	by	Barbara	Gronau	and	Alice	Lagaay.	Bielefeld:	Transcript	verlag,	2010.		
		
307	
Schneider,	Rebecca.	Performing	Remains.	Art	and	War	in	Times	of		
Theatrical	Reenactment.	London	&	New	York:	Routledge,	2011.		Schneider,	Rebecca.	‘Solo	Solo	Solo’	in	After	Criticism.	New	Responses	to		
Art	and	Performance.	Edited	by	Gavin	Butt.	Malden	and	Oxford:	Blackwell	Publishing,	2005.		Stiegler,	Bernard.	‘Anamnesis	and	Hypomnesis.	Plato	as	the	first	thinker		of	proletarianisation’,	Ars	Industrialis.	Accessed	online	May	2014		http://arsindustrialis.org/anamnesis-and-hypomnesis		Stiegler,	Bernard.	‘Suffocated	Desire,	Or	How	The	Cultural	Industry		Destroys	The	Individual:	Contribution	To	A	Theory	Of	Mass	Consumption’	in	Parrhesia	13,	2013,	52-61.	Translated	by	Johann	Rossouw.		Stiegler,	Bernard.	Symbolic	Mysery.	Volume	2:	The	katastrophe	of	the		
sensible.	Translated	by	Barnaby	Norman.	Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2015.		Taussig,	Michael.	Walter	Benjamin’s	Grave.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago		Press,	2006.		Voigts,	Manfred.	‘Zitat’	in	Benjamin’s	Begriffe,	826-850.	Edited	by	Michael		Opitz	and	Erdmut	Wizisla.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag		2000.		Weber,	Samuel.	Benjamin’s	–abilities.	Cambridge	Massachusetts:	Harvard		University	Press,	2008.		Weber,	Samuel.	Institution	and	Interpretation.	Stanford:	Stanford		University	Press,	2001.		Weber,	Samuel.	Mass	Mediauras:	Form,	Technics,	Media.	Stanford:		Stanford	University	Press,	1996.		Weber,	Samuel.	Theatricality	as	Medium.	New	York:	Fordham	University		Press,	2004.		Weber,	Samuel.	‘The	Feel	of	“Today”’	Transcript	of	presentation	at	The		London	Graduate	School	Summer	Academy	in	the	Critical	Humanities,	26th	of	June,	2014.		Weber,	Samuel.	‘Upping	the	Ante:	Deconstruction	as	Parodic	Practice’	in		
Deconstruction	is/in	America,	60-78.	Edited	by	Anselm	Haverkamp.	New	York:	New	York	University	Press	1995.				
		
308	
Weber,	Thomas.	‘Erfahrung’	in	Benjamins	Begriffe.	Edited	by	Michael		Opitz	&	Erdmut	Wizisla,	230-259.	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp	Verlag,	2000.		Weigel,	Sigrid.	Die	Kreatur,	das	Heilige,	die	Bilder.	Berlin:	Fischer	2008.		Weigel,	Sigrid.	Body	and	Image	Space.	London	and	New	York:	Routledge,		1996.																			
